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ISBN 91-7346-534-8 
The focal point of this dissertation is the question of the value of and right to genetic information 
from presymptomatic genetic testing that may reveal risk of disease. This question is discussed 
regarding first parties, that is, the person on whom the test is performed, second parties, that is, 
blood relatives' of first parties, and third parties, such as insurance companies and employers. 
In the second chapter, it is argued that the value of presymptomatic genetic testing for first 
parties ultimately rests on autonomy and subjective well-being. This shows the basis for some 
types of tests weaker than for others. Moreover, the way in which the test result is disclosed is 
crucial for the realization of the values. This renders some support for genetic counselling, the 
ethos of which is evaluated. 
In the third chapter, autonomy is analysed. A conception of autonomy is developed, which is 
useful to analyse the novel idea in this area that autonomy is a value that should be promoted. In 
relation to this, various theoretical issues are addressed, e.g. about the possibility of measuring 
autonomy. 
In the fourth chapter, the question of first parties right to genetic information is discussed. It is 
argued that the proper basis for such rights is the above mentioned values: autonomy and well-
being. From this basis, it is argued that some limited rights to genetic information should be 
recognized. 
In the fifth chapter, rights to remain ignorant about one's genetic constitution are discussed. 
Such rights are defended, e.g. from charges that considerations of Kantian ethics and autonomy 
speak in favour of a duty to know about one's genetic constitution. 
In the sixth chapter, the question of blood relatives' rights to genetic information is discussed. 
It is argued that practical considerations speak in favour of leaving the decision to inform relatives 
to the tested person, except perhaps in very rare circumstances. 
In the seventh chapter, the question of third parties', and primarily insurance companies', right 
to genetic information is discussed. It is argued that considerations of justice and well-being speak 
in favour of some regulation of insurance companies access to genetic information in conjunction 
with the protection and resurrection of social insurance systems. 
Thus, there are some values of and rights to genetic information, mainly based on 
considerations of autonomy, well-being, and justice. 
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Chapter I 
Introduction 
1. Background 
Contemporary genetics has brought about an immense and rapidly growing 
ethical discussion. The issues actualised by this discussion have attracted so 
much interest as to give rise to a separate niche of bioethics: gen ethics. 
Genethics has its own conferences, journals, and books. In 2002 this field of 
inquiry saw its first encyclopaedic publication: A Companion to Genethics, just as 
there are companions to epistemology, metaphysics, political philosophy, and 
other more classical areas of philosophy. 
The background of this development is the recent progress of genetics. 
There was an eruption of achievements in the 1990s, consisting mainly of the 
mapping of the human genome, HUGO, and the continuous discovery of the 
relationship between particular genetic sequences and various diseases. Parallel 
developments in biotechnology have meant not only that these facts are 
known, but also that the presence of such sequences in a person can be 
detected by so-called genetic testing. Such achievements naturally give rise to 
expectations of even further progress. For one thing, if scientists have gained 
knowledge of the genetic basis of many diseases, there is perhaps an increased 
possibility of developing cures for or preventions of these diseases. As we will 
see soon, this possibility is yet to be realized for most genetic diseases. This 
fact is sometimes called the therapeutic gap, and this gap is one of the reasons 
why some of the initial enthusiasm over genetics has faded. 
Despite doubts about the continuing pace of progress, even more distant 
possibilities of genetics than therapy for genetic disease have been discussed: 
for instance cloning and permanent modifications of the human genome, 
aimed at eliminating diseases altogether or maybe even improving human 
capacities for future generations, in so far as they are genetically determined.1 
This debate prompts us to ponder possible future developments, but they 
1 Harris, 1998, provides an accessible introduction to the ethical debate on subjects such as these. 
An intriguing discussion of these topics can also be found in Glover, 1984. Buchanan et al, 2000, 
addresses questions of justice relating to these possibilities. 
1 
often involve scenarios so uncertain that it cannot be determined today how 
credible their realization may be. Even so, these are the kinds of questions that 
seem to receive most attention in genethics, probably since they very clearly 
challenge many of our most fundamental beliefs about ourselves. 
This book is about genethics. However, it hardly addresses non-realized 
possibilities at all, partly since others have done this so extensively and often 
meritoriously. Even though it is of utmost importance to anticipate ethical 
dilemmas that can arise in the future and questions such as these can be useful 
in order to test our deepest moral convictions, they should not block the view 
of present moral concerns. The technology that is relevant to the debate I will 
engage in already exists: genetic testing. Use is already being made of such tests in 
the health services of many countries to establish or further secure diagnoses 
and to estimate the risk of a w ide range of diseases before onset. 
More specifically, it is the latter kind of predictive testing, sometimes called 
presymptomatic genetic testing, that will be the focus of interest. Should these tests 
be performed? If so, why? Who should have the right to gain access to the 
genetic information that is the result of such tests? These are the kind of 
questions I want to discuss in this book. For those readers unfamiliar with 
ethical discussions, it should thus be noted that the discussion does not 
concern what can be done, or what is allowed by the state, or anything of the 
like. These are all interesting and important questions. But the concern here is 
what should be done . That is, given that this and that can be done, what reasons 
are there to actually engage in these activities? I will soon return to the manner 
in which questions such as these can be addressed in a systematic manner. 
2. Questions and purpose 
The topic I want to discuss is, then, different moral questions that arise in 
relation to presymptomatic genetic testing, questions regarding the value of 
and right to such testing. However, since the ways in which genetic material is 
extracted and analysed do not themselves create any immediate problems from 
an ethical point of view,2 the very procedure of presymptomatic genetic 
testing itself is o f minor interest per se. Rather, it is the information about the 
genetic constitution of people resulting from such testing that is the main area 
2 This is so, at least regarding genetic testing performed on adults, which is the focus of interest in 
this book (see this section below), unlike e.g. prenatal testing, where testing procedures (e.g. 
amniocentesis) gives rise to risk of harm. 
2 
of concern. Thus, my focus will be on the value of and right to genetic 
information from presymptomatic genetic testing. But even this has to be 
specified, since, as hopefully will become evident in the course of the book, 
genetic information as such, taken as an abstract object, cannot be of any value 
to anyone. It is the use of such information for various purposes that can be in 
various ways valuable to various parties. So whatever value genetic information 
has, it is derived from these possible uses. 
There are many parties for which information about a person's genetic 
constitution can be valuable and, thus, of interest. Foremost, the person herself 
can have an interest in acquiring such knowledge. One might want to know if 
one has a genetic predisposition for some disorder in order to either take 
measures for preventing its outbreak, or just for making ones future plans with 
consideration to this. This person, on whom a presymptomatic genetic test for 
some disease can be performed, i.e. the first party, will in this book most often 
be called the index-person, or the individual, and sometimes the proband, 
patient, or client, depending on the vocabulary of the text under discussion. 
These terms should then be considered as synonymous. 
By its very nature, genetic information about ourselves also discloses 
genetic information about others, namely those with whom we share our 
genes: parents, siblings, children, and other blood relatives.3 In consequence, 
just as an individual may have an interest to know about her own genetic 
constitution, relatives of this individual may also have an interest in knowing 
this, since it can say something about the probability that they themselves have 
a genetic predisposition of developing some condition. Knowledge of this 
kind may also be relevant for reproductive decisions, such as whether or not 
to have children at all or whether or not to use procedures such as prenatal 
diagnosis. For this reason, one might feel obligated to reveal such information 
to the partner one is planning to procreate with. These kinds of parties will be 
called relatives or second parties. 
If we widen the scope from the first party perspective even further, genetic 
information about a person could be of interest to business associates, 
employers, insurance companies, health institutions, researchers and society in 
general. Business associates may have an interest in knowing these things, for 
instance in order to decide whether or not it is worthwhile to establish long-
3 Of course, to a large extent, our genes are (qualitatively) identical with those of almost all living 
organisms. 
3 
time contracts. Employers have economic reasons for knowing about it: why 
hire and train someone if you know that she probably is going to be 
permanently disabled in a few years or on sick leave for long periods. 
Insurance companies have an interest in genetic information that reveals 
increased risk of disease in order to protect themselves from economic loss. 
And so on.4 Let us call th ese kinds of parties third parties. 
Against the background of the various interests at stake, it should hardly 
come as a surprise that the issue of which parties it is that have a right to 
genetic information has become a growing subject of controversy among 
geneticists, medical professionals, sociologists, historians, economists, and 
philosophers.5 
The questions I want to discuss in this book are thus: 
(i) W hat is the (derived) value of genetic information from presymptomatic 
genetic testing for first, second, and third parties? 
(ii) Do any of these parties have some kind of right to genetic information 
from presymptomatic genetic testing? 
And, consequently: 
(iii) How should conflicts of interests/rights between various parties be 
handled? 6 
It should be noted, even if perhaps obvious, that the questions of the value of 
and right to genetic information from presymptomatic genetic testing are 
somewhat different regarding the first person and other parties. The value-
question of the first person is the question of what value the person can 
realize for herself by (receiving the information from) genetic testing, while 
4 See VII. 1 for further third party interests. 
5 Contributions from a wide range of experts and scientists on the subject have been published in 
Chadwick et al, 1997. 
6 The conflicts that will b e the focus of concern are the ones between the index-person and 
relatives (chapter VI), and the index-person and third parties (chapter VII). However, various 
types of conflicts arising as a result of presymptomatic genetic testing will be discussed before that 
(see e.g. section II.3.4). 
4 
the value-question of other parties is the question of the value of receiving the 
information from the genetic testing of th e individual who go throug h with testing. Si milarly, 
the right-question of the first person is the question of the right have a genetic 
test performed on herself (and receiving the information from this), while the 
right-question of other parties is the question of the right to receive the information 
from the genetic testing of the individual who go through with testing. 
Furthermore, questions of values and rights can regard the ethics of 
individual conduct or the ethics of institutions. This book will deal with both 
these kinds of questions, but depending on the more specific question at hand, 
emphasis will be put on one or the other. For instance, when discussing 
negative and positive rights of individuals (TV.2 - IV.3), the emphasis will be on 
institutional questions, since institutions often determine the scope of such 
rights or are the parties with the corresponding obligations towards the 
individual right-holder. In contrast, when discussing the duty to know about 
some genetic information about oneself, the question is most naturally 
interpreted as one about the morality of individual conduct. Similarly, the 
question of obligations to reveal genetic information to relatives is more of a 
question of the morality of individual conduct (VI.3),7 while questions of 
insurance companies access to genetic information is obviously related to 
institutional questions of regulation (VTL1 - VII.5). However, I make the 
assumption that questions of institutional setting are moral ones too, in the 
sense that it can rationally be argued what kind of policy or regulation that 
should be implemented. 
While kept apart from other areas of genethics, the scope of my inquiry is thus 
still quite broad. For this reason, some additional limitations are necessary in 
order for the discussions not to be too sketchy. In any intellectual 
investigation, there is always a trade-off to be made between scope and depth, 
and the trick here is to ensure that depth is not bought too much at the 
expense of scope. I believe that the limitations to be explained serve this 
purpose. 
First, as already indicated, I will primarily focus on genetic testing that can 
be performed today. This means that I will ignore presymptomatic, or other, 
7 Even if there are questions of the extent to which institutions should enforce individuals to do 
their moral duties. Therefore questions of the role of institutions will not be ignored in these 
contexts either (see e.g. VI.3.1.2). 
5 
genetic testing that is not testing of what is conventionally seen as diseases. In 
the future, various tests for individual properties that are not diseases might be 
developed. For instance, one might have testing revealing the propensity of 
developing musical or athletic skills, and so on.8 These "science fiction" -
questions, although intriguing and important, will be ignored. This means that, 
without exception, whenever I write "genetic information", this is equivalent 
to "genetic information about future risk of disease". 
Second, as al so already indicated, I will deal exclusively with presymptomatic 
genetic testing, which means roughly testing that reveals increased risk of 
genetic disease before symptoms emerge or before onset (see I.4.1).9 This 
means that genetic testing that is used for the purpose of establishing or 
securing diagnosis, i.e. diagnostic genetic testing, will be ignored. This 
limitation is due to the moral problems of diagnostic genetic testing often 
being less serious than they are for presymptomatic genetic testing. The most 
obvious reasons for this is that diagnosis establishes the existence (or non­
existence) of a disease that the patient actually suffers from, while 
presymptomatic testing only can establish increased risk of some disease, i.e. 
that the person tested may become ill in the future. However, some of the 
moral problems are common for diagnostic and presymptomatic testing. For 
instance, they both reveal the genetic constitution of relatives, and both kinds 
of testing will make it more difficult to get private health insurance. In the 
cases that the problems are the same, the arguments of this book will be 
relevant for both, then. However, the focus will b e on presymptomatic genetic 
testing. 
Third, I will not address ethical questions specific to genetic screening-
programs. At least two things separate pure10 screening-programs from the 
kind of genetic testing discussed in this essay: 1) Health care as a societal 
institution, rather than the individual or the family, takes the initiative for 
having tests performed. 2) There is no prior knowledge of an increased risk 
common to all the individuals approached in this way. Genetic screening gives 
8 See e.g. Harris, 1998, and Buchanan et al, 2000. 
9 The last clause is important, since not all diseases are defined symptomatically. 
10 Screening-programs can be more or less pure, depending on the level of individual initiative 
and prior knowledge of increased risk. For instance, screening of populations for which there are 
some indication of increased risk ( although low), e.g. screening-programs among Ashkenazi Jews 
for Tay-Sachs (see 1.4.1), is less pure than screening of populations for which there are no such 
indications, e.g. g eneral screening for phenylketonuria (see 1.4.1). 
6 
rise to an array of problems of its own.11 The genetic testing I will discuss are 
thus the ones initiated by the individual (including, perhaps, her family), 
commonly motivated by some prior suspicion of or concern for having 
genetic susceptibility for some disease. I will also almost entirely ignore 
genetic testing for purposes of research, although I will have something to say 
about this (see VII.6.2). 
Fourth, I will only discuss presymptomatic genetic testing on adults, who 
can reason and make decisions themselves. I will not discuss moral questions 
that can arise particularly as a result of genetic testing on children, foetuses, or 
fertilized eggs. I will t hus not discuss the ethics of prenatal or preimplanation 
genetic diagnosis (PGD),12 even though many serious genetically determined 
diseases affect the individual early on in life.13 This means that so-called late 
onset-disorders will be the focus of attention. However, adults may perform 
genetic testing in order to make reproductive decisions. These tests include 
testing for diseases that can cause disease or risk of disease to their children. 
But testing for these diseases will, then, only be dealt with to the extent that 
they concern the presymptomatic genetic testing on adults. Once again, some 
of the arguments put forward in the book will b e of relevance for these other 
issues, but they will not be the focus of interest.14 
Fifth, I will not discuss ownership of genetic information in the form of 
DNA patenting, although I am aware that this issue can be cast in terms of 
rights. This is also the kind of question that requires a lengthy inquiry of its 
own.15 
Naturally, the main purpose of this book is to take a stand on the questions 
formulated above. While doing this, I will evaluate some influential 
contributions on the subject. However, the purpose is not to map an entire 
discussion, since such a project would be futile given the exponential growth 
of the literature on the subject. Rather, I will try to take a stand on some of the 
11 For discussions of the ethics of genetic screening, see the anthology of Chadwick et al, 1999, 
and Munthe, 2002. 
12 See Munthe, 1996, and 1999, for a discussion of these issues. 
13 For instance, Tay Sachs disease and Lesch Nyhan syndrome (see 1.4.1). 
14 For instance, some reasoning on the duty to know will be of relevance to the question of when 
PGD is morally justifiable. 
15 The question also has been meritoriously discussed elsewhere from an ethical point of view 
(Wilkinson, 2003, p 182-221). 
7 
suggestions that have been made by influential writers. These suggestions have 
ranged from the more theoretical to the more practical, as will b e the case with 
this book. Of course, some issues will receive more attention than others. 
Sometimes, this will b e given an explicit motivation. Other times, I have let my 
own interest in a certain issue determine the extent to which I discuss it. I am 
therefore partly relying on the beneficence of the reader, and hope she or he 
will not be too disappointed to find that their own favourite problem has 
received less attention than others. 
However, I have further more subordinate, yet important, secondary 
purposes. One such motive is to remedy the present focus on more futuristic 
questions in genethics. In order to take a stand on the issue of improving the 
genome of future generations, we have to take a stand on the moral 
justifiability of genetic testing, since genetic testing is a prerequisite for genetic 
therapies and modifications. Even though the questions of presymptomatic 
genetic testing that will be addressed in this book have been discussed for at 
least the past two decades, they are still cont roversial and far from solved. This 
book is thus entering an already existing debate, a debate that will continue 
long after this book. This is important to emphasise: this is neither the first nor 
the last word on the subject, but a contribution to an ongoing discussion. 
However, since there is no collected account of the questions with a scope 
comparable to this book, it fills a gap in the literature. 
Another motive is to resurrect the interest for some traditional values in 
biomedical ethics that has been argued obsolete or insufficient for practical 
purposes. I am primarily thinking of autonomy. When writing about the right 
to know of one's genetic information, Göran Hermerén makes the following 
statement: "Both those who wants to know and those who do not want to 
know, may appeal to the principle of autonomy and have done so" (Hermerén, 
1999, p 145). This is no doubt true. On the basis of this observation, the 
following line of reasoning may seem attractive: "If the autonomy of different 
parties clash, the conflict cannot be resolved merely on the basis of autonomy; 
other ethical considerations have to be introduced." (Hermerén, 1999, p 142)16 
Another similar example is Laurie, who claims that: 
16 Similarly, Parker, 2001, when discussing genetic testing, writes: "Respect for patient autonomy... 
call f or both testing with and testing without consent... The usefulness of biomedical ethics... as 
a t ool for decision-making... is limited." (p 453) 
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The principle of respect for patient autonomy — which has been 
described as the guiding ethical principle in health care and which has 
received unprecedented recognition by the laws of most Western states 
- is... ill-equipped to provide a comprehensive solution to the problems 
posed by familial genetic information. This is because the focus of an 
autonomy-based argument is largely on the individual and her ability to 
control aspects of her life. The 'group' nature of claims concerning 
family information poses a se rious conceptual threat to this paradigm. 
(Laurie, 2002, p 4) 
These statements are united in their scepticism towards autonomy as an 
appropriate concept, principle or value for addressing the moral issues of 
genetic testing. However, against Hermerén it can be held that conflicts of 
autonomy can be solved if there are two different senses of autonomy at work 
and one is the more reasonable,17 or if autonomy is a question of degrees and 
one of the parties has more autonomy at stake than the other. In the course of 
this book, I will argue in favour of both these points. Against Laurie it can be 
held that there is nothing unique about genetic information, and that the 
present problems can be addressed with classic tools from moral philosophy, 
such as autonomy, including problems of relatives' right to genetic 
information. I will also argue in favour of these points. 
This suggests that we should perhaps take another round with autonomy 
before discarding its viability o r practical usefulness altogether, especially since 
autonomy "has been described as the guiding ethical principle in health care 
and which has received unprecedented recognition by the laws of most 
Western states" (Ibid.). Of course, it may be more thrilling to say that common 
conceptions are wrong, but some principle of charity seems to bid us to try to 
interpret widespread opinions as reasonably as we can before discarding them. 
So again, a subordinate purpose of this book is to try out classical biomedical 
values of autonomy (and well-being) again. In fact, if there is any thesis in this 
book, it is that the only relevant basic ethical concerns regarding almost all 
moral problems of presymptomatic genetic testing are concerns of 
autonomy18 and well-being.19 
17 Hermerén, 1999, seems to be aware of this when writing: "we cannot simply take it for granted 
that "autonomy", used on both sides of the controversy, is used in the same way." (p 145) 
18 Primarily conceived of as a value, which is something of a novelty. See chapter III. 
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Finally, I do hope that this book can provide valuable reading for primarily 
two different groups: moral philosophers interested in health care and health 
care professionals interested in moral issues. Therefore, some passages may 
seem superfluous or shallow on the verge of misleading for some readers, but 
perhaps difficult verging to obscurity to others. For instance, the short account 
of genetics below probably will seem superfluous to some geneticists, while 
maybe coming through as excessively detailed in the eyes of the layperson. 
And similarly, the passage on method below will most likely not shake the 
foundations of any moral philosopher, but may be thought tricky or 
controversial for others. However, the passage on method is primarily directed 
to those readers who are not well acquainted with moral philosophy, so that 
they at least have a general grip on how questions like the ones posed in this 
book can be tackled. And the passage on genetics is prim arily directed to those 
readers who are not well acquainted with genetics, so that they can have a 
fuller appreciation of the more practical problems of the book. Bearing this in 
mind, you might be more patient when some passages seem too lengthy or too 
laconic. 
3. Method 
How is one to settle disputes over the value of and right to genetic 
information? Is it "just a matter of opinion", where no standpoint is superior 
to another, or is t here some systematic way of evaluating different standpoints? 
In the following, I will briefly present how I think moral questions in this area, 
and in morals in general, should be tackled. That is, I will present, in very 
general terms, a method for dealing with questions such as the one's discussed 
in this book in a rational manner. 
This book belongs to the area of applied ethics, which is the area of moral 
philosophy that discusses concrete or particular moral problems. More 
precisely, the investigation belongs to the realm of biomedical ethics, which is 
the area where moral problems that arises in, or as a result of, biomedicine are 
discussed. As mentioned in the outset of the book, it is also a book in 
19 A striking example to the contrary is, I believe, conflicts between first and third parties, where 
moral considerations of justice b ecomes highly relevant. See primarily chapter VII. 
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genethics, that is, the area that discusses moral problems that are brought about 
by genetics and its application.20 
The area of applied ethics is often distinguished from normative ethics, in 
which general theories of what makes an action right, a state of affairs valuable, 
a person worthy, and so on, are discussed. However, there is no sharp line 
between applied and normative ethics. This is so, since both these areas of 
investigation discuss questions regarding the plausibility of moral standpoints, 
but applied ethics discusses more particular ones and normative ethics more 
general ones. So the difference is one of degree rather than kind. Moreover, 
standpoints on a m ore general level can affect standpoints on a more particular 
level, and vice versa (I will return to this s hortly). So, even if one wants to make 
a distinction between the areas, one has to concede that they are interrelated. 
Besides applied and normative ethics, moral philosophy consists of 
metaethics, which is the area of investigation that discusses questions like the 
meaning of moral terms, for instance 'right', 'wrong', 'good', 'bad', and so on, 
and whether moral judgements can be true and false or, at least, rational or 
well-founded. So, loosely speaking, while applied and normative ethics deals 
with questions regarding the content of morality, metaethics deals with 
questions regarding the nature of morality.21 
I will try to remain neutral on metaethical questions as far as possible. 
However, I will make one exception to this. I will presuppose that one can 
rationally argue in questions of morals, that is, I will assume that moral 
judgements are in need of justification and can be subject to criticism. A 
minimal part of this presupposition is that moral judgements can stand in 
logical relations to one another in the way, I guess, that one normally takes it 
for granted that they do. For instance, if some person claims that a particular 
action is right, and someone is denying this very claim, the conjunction of 
these statements is contradictory. Another example of logical re lations between 
moral judgements is that general normative principles in conjunction with 
20 Perhaps, not all genethics is a part of biomedical ethics, since one may be reluctant to call some 
issues in genethics medical, like the question of enhancement of properties that are (partly) 
genetically determined. However, since I will on ly discuss genetic disease, this book more clearly 
falls w ithin the confines of traditional biomedical e thics. 
21 However, there is n o sharp line between normative ethics and metaethics either, for instance 
since one tries to argue in favour of moral standpoints in normative ethics, that is, one tries to 
justify th em, which must presuppose some idea on how moral judgement are to be justified. 
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particular factual statements can yield particular normative judgements. For 
instance, from the general moral principle "murdering innocent is always 
wrong" and the particular statement "performing action A is to murder 
someone innocent" one can conclude that performing A is wrong. 
However, logical consistency seems insufficient for accepting some set of 
moral judgements. In order to accept our moral judgements, we would also 
like some kind of reason for, or justification of, or argument in favour of 
these judgements. In the absence of some self-evident Moral Truth from 
which we can deduce our more particular judgements, the favoured way of 
accomplishing justification in morals is by testing our considered judgements 
about particular cases against moral principles, and vice versa. Thus, we go back 
and forth, sometimes revising particular judgements, and, on other occasions, 
general principles, until we, ideally, reach a s tate of "reflective equilibrium".22 
This is a state where the moral and other judgements of an ethical theory are 
not only coherent in the sense of logically consistent, but also closely knit 
together, explaining each other. In this ideal state of coherence, the more 
particular judgements are explained by the more general moral principles that, 
in turn, are supported by the particular considered judgements. The general 
thought is that moral judgements are justified by being a part of such a 
reflective equilibrium. 
This justificatory ideal opens up for various kinds of rational discussion of 
moral problems. First, it opens up for the possibility of questioning arguments 
for irrelevance. An argument is irrelevant if it does not show what it intends to 
show, that is, even if one accepts the premises of the argument in question, the 
conclusion that they intend to support is not supported. For instance, one may 
accept the following premise: "The European Monetary Union makes war in 
central Europe less likely." However, this does not support the following 
claim: "Sweden should join the European Monetary Union", at least not 
without some additional premises (for instance that one should join a union if 
one contributes to its end of making war less likely and the membership of 
Sweden would contribute to this end). This is one kind of criticism that will 
be adopted in this book. For instance, Kantian premises cannot be used to 
argue in favour of general duty to know about one's genetic constitution, 
despite what has been claimed, or so I will argue (see V.3.1). So even if one 
22 The idea was originally introduced by Rawls, 1972, p 48-53, and is d eveloped and discussed by 
Tersman, 1993. 
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accepts the premise (Kantian ethics), the conclusion (a duty to know) does not 
follow. 
Second, the ideal of coherence _opens up for criticism of the plausibility of 
general moral principles, due to them, or their implications, being at odds with 
our considered, more or less particular, moral judgements. For instance, one 
may reject libertarianism due to the fact that it seems to imply that we should 
not enforce a duty to help those without the necessary means to survive. Also 
this kind of criticism will be adopted by some arguments in this book (for 
instance, see VII.5.2.2). 
Another way of testing the plausibility of moral principles by seeing if it is 
at odds with our moral judgements is to try them out in thought experiments. 
This method is very common in moral philosophy, and the point of them is 
to extract and isolate the features of a situadon that is relevant. For instance, 
one may want to ask if genetic information is necessary for autonomous 
decision-making when this information is relevant for the decision in 
question. To prove this wrong, it requires a possible situation where it is the case 
that some genetic information is relevant and the person making the decision 
does not have it (or willingly refuses it), but nonetheless is making an 
autonomous decision. This kind of situation does not have to be common. In 
fact it may never have happened or will never happen. In order to reject the 
claim that some connection is necessary, it is enough to demonstrate that the 
opposite connection is possible. Thought experiments can thus have an 
important role to play in moral arguments. However, they will be used less 
frequently in this book than is sometimes the case in more principled 
discussions of "pure" normative ethics, since this discussion deals with more 
concrete moral problems. Nevertheless, this kind of criticism will be adopted 
by some arguments in this book too.23 
T.hirrl i-l^e ideal of coherence opens up for the criticism of the plausibility 
of particular moral judgements, since they are at odds with some general 
principle one is reluctant to give up. ForJfl5tancEL_oae may give up the 
narticular moral iudeement that a certain act of torture is wrong, if one 
believes that this instance of torture is the only way to save thousands of 
human lives, due to one accepting the ge^enl p"ri rip 1 in flk.tum.^a.iri_ ..an. 
someone is less bad than failing to save thousands of human lives. Also this 
23 In fact, I will present an argument similar to the one adumbrated here (see V.3.1). However, this 
argument does not refer to any far-fetched possibility, but to very credible scenarios. 
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kind of criticism will be adopted by some arguments in this book. For 
instance, a kind of theory of justice will be criticised, since it can favour 
particular moral judgements that are at odds with the general principle of 
justice t hat bids us to take more consideration to those worse off (see VII.5.3). 
One can also criticise the plausibility of particular moral judgements due to 
them resting on dubious empirical facts. This strategy will also be adopted 
sometimes. For instance, it will be argued that the judgement that insurance 
companies should be prohibited from using genetic information rests on the 
questionable empirical assumption that this prohibition is an efficient means 
for protecting people with increased risk of genetic disease against lack of 
insurance (see VII.2.2). 
Of course, when general principles and particular judgements are at odds, 
there is always a choice of which one of them one should give up. When 
making such a choice, a lot of factors come into play. For one thing, our basic 
moral intuitions do. We sometimes think that if a moral theory has 
implications at odds with a certain particular judgement, this speaks strongly 
against that theory due to the intuitive force of the particular judgement. On 
the other hand, when the intuitive appeal of a general moral principle is strong 
enough, we sometimes think that the particular judgement that first seemed 
attractive should be abandoned after all wh en in conflict with the principle in 
question. 
However, this does not mean that moral intuitions, although important, 
should be treated as data that cannot be revised. We would also like our 
theories not to be arbitrary, or ad hoc, in the sense of making distinctions 
without explaining why the distinctions are made and should be considered 
relevant. For instance, one might originally have the intuition that genetic 
relatedness is of moral relevance in the sense that we have stronger obligations 
to those who we are genetically related to. However, as I will argue, if we find 
that there is reason to question the moral relevance of genetic relatedness and 
if we can defend the particular moral judgements that we, on closer 
inspection, want to retain without resorting to the relevance, but only to more 
general or uncontroversial moral principles, there is no reason to ascribe the 
distinction between genetic relatives and non-relatives any moral relevance in 
itself (see VI.3.2.1). This relates to the fact that general theoretical virtues, such 
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as simplicity and power,24 also play a role in choosing between moral 
judgements in conflict. In the choice between two alternative explanations, we 
prefer the simpler and more powerful one, at least if it does not force us to 
revise our most considered judgement too much. 
The last kind of criticism directed against a moral judgement or a moral 
argument is that it rests on concepts, notions or conceptions that are 
incoherent or too vague for us to be able to evaluate the judgement or 
argument in question. In order to tackle such incoherence or vagueness, 
conceptual analysis will be necessary. This relates to the distinction between, 
on the one hand, ideals, which defends moral standpoints, and, on the other 
hand, concepts or conceptions, that is used to formulate moral standpoints. 
Proponents of ideals should be careful to define the concepts they make use 
of, so it is clear enough what the ideal actually says. And concepts should be 
defined generally enough as to permit the formulation of different ideals. This 
last point is important, so that one avoids making moral disagreements into 
terminological ones. 
I will t hus not only be analysing moral arguments, but the concept used in 
these arguments. Most thoroughly, autonomy will be analysed, and a 
conception of autonomy will be presented (see chapter ID).25 T he reason for 
giving the analysis of autonomy such a conspicuous place in this book is that it 
is one of the concepts most adopted but at the same time less scrutinized in 
the debate of the value of and right to genetic information. 
So, the ideal of justifying moral judgement with reference to their coherence 
provides us with a toolbox, or method, of possible rational arguments in 
morals. The ideal allows us to question the plausibility of moral judgements by 
arguing that they are at odds with other considered judgements, both more 
general and more particular ones. The ideal also allows us to question moral 
judgements resting on irrelevant premises, dubious empirical assumptions or 
an incoherent or unclear conceptual basis. 
24 Roughly, a theory is simpler than another if it generates the same body of particular 
judgements using less general p rinciples, and a theory is m ore powerful than another if it can be 
used to cover more previously unattended cases. See Kagan, 1989, p 11-15, for an elaboration of 
the importance of theoretical virtues in moral theory. 
25 The concepts of well-being (see II.4) and rights (see IV.1) will also receive some extra attention. 
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Perhaps needless to say, I will not defend any full-fledged coherent moral 
theory in this book. In this regard, I will not satisfy the ultimate ideal of the 
reflective equilibrium. Rather, I will use the methodological toolbox offered 
by this ideal in order to scrutinize arguments in the debate of the value of and 
right to genetic information. While doing this, I will often take a s tand on the 
issues discussed. 
4. Genetics 
In this section26 I will present a brief account of the science and technology 
that has made genetic testing possible by presenting some basic genetic 
terminology (see 1.4.1). Future possibilities offered by genetics will be further 
elaborated in section 1.4.2. Even though speculation about the very distant or 
very unsure future lies beyond the scope of this book, some scenarios as to 
what may become possible in the more immediate future will be relevant for 
the discussion to follow, especially on the societal level.27 
However, before this I wish to counter a common but fundamental 
misunderstanding: a gene in itself can never give rise to the properties of an 
individual and can only affect an individual given a particular biochemical 
environment. Contrary to this claim, there seem to be a widespread view, at 
least among lay people, that human nature is identical with, or determined by, 
the genes of humans. This view is refuted by modern genetics, as we will see. 
The view, presented in so loose a fashion, can of course be interpreted in 
several, more or less reasonable, ways. The view that the genes of a person 
constitute her nature is sometimes called genetic essentialism and the view that 
a person is a product solely of his genes is sometimes called genetic 
determinism (Launis, 2000, p 309). I will not uphold this distinction, but use 
the term genetic essentialism for both.28 As will b ecome clear in the following, 
26 This section draws heavily on chapter 2 in Radetzki, Radetzki & Juth, 2002. It has gained 
tremendously from the expertise of Jan Wahlström, professor of clinical genetics at the 
Sahlgrenska University Hospital in Gothenburg. All re sponsibility for the content and its flaws is 
the author's. 
27 This level will primarily be discussed in chapter VII. 
28 Strictly speaking this presentation of genetics only rebuts genetic determinism. Nonetheless, it 
makes substantial interpretations of genetic essentialism highly unlikely to be valid, since genetics 
shows that phenotypic properties (which are the most likely candidates of being essential) are the 
result only of an interaction between genes and the environment. It thus seems unlikely that 
properties of genes (the DNA) are essential properties of a person (if there indeed are such 
essential properties at all). 
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modern genetics shows that genetic essentialism is based on gross 
misunderstandings of the significance of biological inheritance. The 
environment is not something that becomes significant, so to speak, after the 
creation of the biological individual with all his properties. Environment is 
there as a determining factor from the start at all levels: the chemical and 
biological as well as the social, economic and cultural (moreover, the latter 
levels affect the former, for instance by the impact our technology has on 
nature). Environments thus always have a crucial significance for the 
properties of any individual. The biological individual is consequently a 
product of the interaction between genes and environment. 
4.1 Some basic genetic terminology29 
What is a gene? What kind of information is genetic information? How can 
this kind of information reveal anything about a person's susceptibility to 
certain diseases? 
Genes have two main functions. They provide a mechanism for inheritance 
between generations and a mechanism for the development of the biological 
individual. The latter process can now be explained to an increasing extent. 
All living organisms consist of cells. Cells are biochemical systems that 
contain, among other things, a long molecule: the DNA (the genetic 
vocabulary in italics is collected and explained in table 1.1). DNA, or 
deoxyribonucleic acid, is built up of a sugar phosphate backbone with 
nitrogenous bases (A, G, C and T), which, because of their chemical 
constructions, can be combined in varied but limited ways. K gene is a part of 
the DNA that, in the appropriate chemical environment, via RNA (ribonucleic 
acid), creates a protein — i.e., this part of the DNA interacts chemically with its 
environment and the product of this interaction is a protein. This is in fact the 
definition of a gene: a unit of DNA, which codes for one specific protein. The 
proteins "do the work" in the cell. Among other things, they decide the 
function of the cell, whether it is to be a heart cell, liver cell, nerve cell, etc. 
The chemical process is complicated, and scientists are far from fully grasping 
it yet. 
29 This very rudimentary account of genetics is p art of the standard view of the functioning of 
genes and the literature is of course vast. An accessible, while fairly detailed, account can be 
found in Connor, Ferguson-Smith, 1997. 
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The general idea, however, is that the genes are a part of the construction 
of the phenotjpe, i.e. t he individual.30 This takes place through a number of steps: 
gene (DNA), RNA, protein, cell and so on. Each one of these steps is sensitive 
to influence from environmental factors and, sometimes, other genes. This 
means that the impact of a single gene on an individual is difficult to 
determine. Geneticists know more about the chemical construction of the 
DNA than they know about the impact of genes on the cell and even less 
about the impact on the whole organism (Buchanan et al, 2000, p 349). 
Sometimes genes are randomly changed, due to external influence (for 
instance, radioactivity or foreign chemical substances) or because they fail to 
make an exact copy of themselves when the cell divides. Such a change of 
genes is called a mutation. Sometimes mutations damage the genes permanently, 
damage that eventually causes disease. 
Genetic disorders differ with regard to how many of those who carry the 
gene that actually contract the disease in question {penetrance) and how grave the 
symptoms are (expressivity). Some genes always give some specific symptoms 
and some only increase the risk that some of a variety of symptoms will 
emerge. 
A gene consists of two parts or alleles, o ne inherited from the mother and 
one from the father. All genes in the nuclei of our cells are organised in 
longer "packages" called chromosomes. Humans have 46 chromosomes, 23 
from each parent. The likelihood of receiving a given allele, the part of the 
gene one gets from one of the parents, is 50%. With respect to its biological 
function an allele can be dominant or recessive. If it is dominant, one allele alone 
is s ufficient to contract the disease or the risk of the disease, i.e. you need only 
inherit the genetic abnormality from one parent. If the allele is recessive you 
have to inherit it from both parents. If you inherit a recessive genetic 
abnormality from one parent only, you are a healthy carrier of the genetic 
abnormality. This means that you can pass on the gene to your children, who 
may become sick if the other parent is also a carrier (the likelihood in this case 
is 25%).31 Some genetic diseases, such as haemophilia, are inherited through 
30 Sometimes the properties of the phenotype are defined as the properties that are directly 
perceptible. However, in modern biology, it is m ore of a "garbage can category" which is u sed to 
refer to all the non-genetic properties of the biological individual, such as height, blood type, 
taste in music and so on (Buchanan et al, 2000, p. 354). 
31 The matter is really more complicated because of the phenomenon of "crossing over", which 
splits up and combines chromosomes in arbitrary ways. 
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genes located on the sex chromosomes, so the impact of the gene is 
determined by the person's sex (usually the gene is located on the X 
chromosome, so that males get the disease and females are healthy carriers).32 
Table 1.1 Explanations of some basic genetic terms 
Term Explanation 
Allele The part of the gene one gets from one of the 
parents 
DNA The chemical carrier of our inheritance. Short 
for deoxyribonucleic acid, a long molecule 
shaped like a spiral staircase, built up of sugar 
phosphate as the sides of the staircase, with 
nitrogenous bases acting as the steps. 
RNA Mediates the chemical "message" from the DNA 
to the cell. Sh ort for ribonucleic acid. Consists 
of one side of a DNA step. 
Gene A part of DNA that (via RNA), in suitable 
circumstances, p roduces a protein. 
Phenotype The perceptible properties of an individual. 
Mutation A change in the DNA of an organism. 
Penetrance The extent to which a g ene manifests itself in a 
certain population. 
Expressivity The strength with which a gene manifests itself 
in an individual. 
Dominant The property of a hereditary condition caused 
by a gene, the inheritance of which from one of 
the parents is enough for this condition to 
develop. 
Recessive The property of a hereditary condition that will 
develop only if t he gene causing it is inherited 
from both parents. 
Chromosome A part of the DNA (much longer than a gene). 
The human cell contains 46 chromosomes, 
organised in pairs, 23 from each parent. 
Sex chromosomes The pair of chromosomes that decides the sex 
of the organism. In humans a female has two X 
chromosomes, a male has one X and one Y 
chromosome. 
Modifying gene A gene that affects the penetrance and/or 
expressivity of another gene. 
32 Genes that are not located on the sex chromosome are called au tosomal while those that are so 
located are called sex-linked. 
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In the medical and legal literature, a d istinction is often made between three 
kinds of genetic testing. Presymptomatic genetic te sting aims at identifying a single 
gene disorder in order to predict whether the tested person will develop a 
disease or not (the genetic testing vocabulary in italics is collected and 
explained in table L2). Another kind of genetic testing tries to establish 
whether the tested person has an increased risk of developing certain diseases 
that are generally caused by a c ombination of environmental factors and one 
or a number of genes. This kind of genetic testing is called predictive genetic 
testing. Sometimes individuals are healthy carriers of genes, which can be 
inherited by following generations and cause diseases there. Tests for these 
genes are called genetic carrier detection. 
In this context it is important to mention that one can obtain access to 
genetic information using other methods besides genetic testing. To an 
investigator with a proper understanding of genetics, the family's or relatives' 
medical history can reveal if a person has a risk of genetically based disease. 
Family information, rather than genetic testing, can thus sometimes be used in 
order to acquire relevant genetic information. Therefore, one should not 
focus exclusively on genetic testing. Genetic information is, in itself, neutral 
with regard to method used in order to reveal it. However, in this book, focus 
will almost entirely lie upon risks for genetic disease revealed by genetic 
testing, i.e. some sort of biochemical test. 
As indicated above, some genetic diseases or risks of diseases are single gene 
disorders, that is, they are the result of the abnormality of one particular gene. 
Examples of such diseases are some special forms of cancer, cystic fibrosis, 
Huntington's disease and sickle cell anaemia. A short description of two such 
diseases will follow. 
• Huntington's disease is a dominant single gene disorder that causes 
severe and progressive physical and neurological deterioration. The 
symptoms usually become apparent when the affected person is 35-45 
years old. Symptoms are lack of coordination, lack of balance and an 
unsteady walking gait, drastic changes in behaviour such as 
unmotivated outbursts of rage and increasing physical and mental 
dysfunction. The disease is not lethal in itself but the symptoms cause 
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other problems, and the person usually dies from these side effects 
within 15-20 years. The sick individual will be in increasing need of 
care and will in the end be totally dependent on constant help. 
Though the genetic cause of the disease is known, no treatment exists 
for this disease. Medical treatment aimed at slowing down the process 
of deterioration does not exist, a lthough there is research to develop 
ameliorative and preventive medical measures. 
• Experts believe that about 5-10% of all cancer is caused by hereditary 
factors. Some are believed to be dominant single gene disorders, with 
reduced penetrance. One example is the mutation called BRCA1, 
which can cause breast or ovarian cancer. A carrier of BRCA1 has a risk 
of approximately 80 per cent of developing cancer in adulthood.33 
What you really inherit is then not cancer, but a severely increased risk 
that you will develop some forms of cancer. As opposed to 
Huntington's there are, however, methods of treating cancer. There are 
also preventive measures, such as regular controls in order to secure 
early diagnosis and, in effect, improve chances of successful treatment, 
and prophylactic surgery (i.e. removal of tissue or complete body parts 
before symptoms start to appear). 
The reason to single out these genetic disorders, i.e. H untington's disease and 
cancer due to BRCA1, is that they will be much used as examples in the 
discussion to follow. For both these diseases, presymptomatic genetic testing 
exists. Due to this, they are performed in a c linical setting and have received 
much discussion and research. However, as we will see in chapters to come, 
they differ in morally important ways. For instance, there are some medical 
measures to take for breast cancer, unlike Huntington's. Moreover, there are 
other kinds of genetic diseases that, due to their different nature, should be 
treated differently. This will also become evident in the following discussion. 
Other single gene disorders that will b e referred to in the following are: 
• Cystic fibrosis is a recessive disease with grave respiratory problems 
and increased sensitivity to infection, the symptoms of which can be 
treated to an increasing extent. 
33 Even if th is high figure has been contested. See Shattuck-Eidens et al, 1997. 
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• Duchenne muscular dystrophy is an X-linked recessive trait, thus 
affecting only boys (girls can be healthy carriers), with onset in early 
childhood and symptoms of deteriorating muscles, especially in 
shoulders and pelvis. 
• Fragile X syndrome is an X-linked that can lead to a wide variety of 
symptoms, foremost different degrees of intellectual disability, but 
also connective tissue problems, attention deficit disorders, autistic 
behaviour and hand-biting. The penetrance on females is usually much 
milder. Male carriers of a premutation that as a full mutation gives rise 
to fragile X can develop FXTAS, a deteriorating neurological disorder, 
with onset in late middle-age and old age and symptoms similar to 
Huntington's. 
• Krabbe's disease is a recessive disease, which seriously upsets 
metabolism, with onset in infancy, and symptoms of muscular 
tensions and uneasiness when touched. Leads to death within a few 
years a fter birth. 
• Lesch-Nyhan syndrome is an X-linked recessive trait, with onset in 
infancy and symptoms of mental handicap, self-mutilation, and renal 
calculi. Leads to death within a few years after birth. 
• Marfan syndrome is a dominant trait, which leads to damages on the 
connective tissue, and typically is connected to characteristics such as 
heart and eye de fects. 
• Phenylketonuria is a recessive disease has its onset in infancy and leads 
to early dea th unless prevented by giving the patient a special diet. This 
is thus one of the few genetic diseases that can be prevented. 
• Sickle cell a naemia is a r ecessive disease, which leads to lack of blood 
cells and thus damage the body's uptake of oxygen. 
• Tay-Sachs is a recessive trait, which seriously upsets metabolism and 
causes progressive neurological abnormalities, with onset in infancy. 
Leads to death within a few years after birth. 
In fact, there are many single gene disorders (about 8000 have been detected), 
though all of them are rare. Only a minority of these diseases have their onset 
in adult years. For an even smaller minority, there are any preventive measures, 
palliatives or cures. Presymptomatic genetic testing can be used to detect some 
of these diseases today and, in principle, such tests can be developed for all 
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these diseases, once the genetic mutation responsible for the pathology has 
been identified. 
Other diseases are polygenetic, that is, they are the result of muldple genes 
with different loci, each with a small but additive effect. There are probably 
no polygenetic disorders that result solely from the genes involved. Most 
likely, they are all the product of several genes in interaction with 
environmental factors. These diseases are thus also called multifactorial. From 
this point on, therefore, both polygenetic and multifactorial diseases will be 
called multifactorial. The term polygenetic will in stead be used to refer to the 
genetic element that is causally active in a multifactorial genetic disease. The 
inheritance of multifactorial diseases is more complex, and therefore more 
difficult to predict, than single gene disorders. Predictive testing for 
multifactorial diseases can therefore only, at best, reveal the risk of disease. 
Many of the more common diseases are multifactorial: cardiac diseases, 
alcoholism, diabetes, (some forms of) Alzheimer's disease, schizophrenia and 
many other diseases can, but do not have to, be a result of a complicated 
interaction between environmental factors and genes. They might also be the 
result of environmental factors only, in the sense that there is no reference to 
the malfunction of a gene in the explanation of the disease. In other words, 
genes are neither a necessary nor a sufficient cause of these diseases. Genetic 
testing is therefore an imprecise tool for determining the risk of such diseases. 
In this context, it should also be mentioned that specific combinations of 
genes could have a positive effects on health, even if in other combinations 
they cause disease. Some individuals thus have inherited "disease genes" that 
decrease the risk of contracting infectious diseases, such as malaria, 
tuberculosis and dysentery (Diamond, 1999, p 201). 
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Table 1.2 Types of genetic diseases and tests, with explanations 
Types of genetic diseases and tests Explanation 
Presymptomatic genetic testing Genetic testing before onset of disease to 
establish the existence of single gene disorders 
which are very likely to cause disease. Sometimes 
used as a term for both presymptomatic and 
predictive genetic testing. 
Predictive genetic testing Genetic testing before onset of disease to 
establish the risk of developing a polygenetic or 
multifactorial disease. 
Genetic carrier detection Genetic testing to establish whether the 
individual is a healthy carrier of (recessive) genes 
that may cause disease in offspring. 
Single gene disorder Disease due to damage to a single gene. 
Polygenetic disease The genetic basis of diseases due to damage to 
several genes in combination with 
environmental factors. 
Multifactorial disease Disease due to several genes at different loci in 
the DNA molecule that interact with 
environmental factors. Here used for both 
polygenetic and multifactorial diseases. 
The line between single gene and multifactorial inheritance is not very sharp, 
however. This is so, due to the existence of genes that influence the 
penetrance and expressivity of single gene disorders: modifying genes. In these 
cases there is a "main gene" that causes the symptoms, but there is a m odifying 
gene that affects the onset of the symptoms, and their severity. Not all damage 
to a gene that usually causes disease actually results in disease, since modifying 
genes also influence the penetrance of the damaged gene. Thus, the damaged 
gene causes only an increased probability of becoming ill (one example is the 
cancer case mentioned above). 
The fact that single gene disorders may have reduced penetrance makes the 
common distinction between presymptomatic and predictive genetic testing a 
bit hazy. It is easy to get the impression that a positive result from 
presymptomatic genetic testing shows without doubt that the tested individual 
will b ecome ill (at least if he lives l ong enough). This, as we have explained, is 
not necessarily the case. The following remark also speaks against the 
24 
distinction: all predictive genetic testing is presymptomatic (is done before 
symptoms emerge) and (almost) all presymptomatic testing is predictive 
(reveals different degrees of risks). Due to this, I will not uphold the 
distinction between presymptomatic and predictive genetic tests for the rest of 
the book, but I will call all these tests presymptomatic. 
At this point we can see problems with the classic dichotomy between 
inheritance and environment. The gene is active in a chemical environment, 
which influences the gene and can be influenced by external factors. The gene 
itself can therefore be seen as an easily influenced environmental factor 
among others. This is why modern genetics makes the prospect bleak indeed 
for many forms of crude genetic essentialism, according to which we are 
nothing but our genes, and genetic determinism, according to which we are 
products of our genes alone. The environment always plays a crucial role for 
the health and development of the individual. Indeed, the more genetic 
science unfolds the complexity of heredity and the link between genotype and 
phenotype, the less meaning is left to the idea of a distinction between 
environment and heredity. 
4.2 The possibilities of genetics 
Thus far, the account of genetics has dealt with its past and present 
achievements. In this section I will discuss the potential of this science in the 
immediate future with regard to prediction of disease and premature death. 
The rapid development of genetics has encouraged the opinion that the 
genetic basis of a growing number of diseases will be revealed. The received 
wisdom seems to be that increasing genetic insights will also increase the 
possibility of foreseeing disease and length of life. Indeed, this opinion seems 
to have been the very fuel that has kept much of the debate on genetic testing 
going. However, as already indicated, scepticism in this regard has been 
growing recently.34 The mapping of the human genome - the HUGO project 
- has recently been concluded and revealed that human beings have far fewer 
genes than previously thought (about 30,000 rather than 100,000).35 The 
34 See for instance Kristoffersson, 2000, whose article questions the ability of genetics to make 
adequate predictions of risk for multifactorial diseases. 
35 This has been questioned too. Geneticists at the Johns Hopkins University now seem to believe 
(private communication) that the number of genes is s omewhere in between (about 70,000). This 
would probably make the scepticism here adumbrated slighdy less likely. Whatever conclusions 
one is inclined towards, one can be sure that the final word has not yet been said. 
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resulting conclusion does not seem to be that things are simpler than we had 
expected, but rather the opposite; the connection between health and genes is 
more complicated than previously imagined. This is because fewer traits of the 
phenotype than assumed are the result of a single gene. Instead, they are the 
product of a complex interaction between different genetic36 and (other) 
environmental factors, i.e. they are multifactorial (Wahlström, 2002a). If this 
analysis, based on the HUGO project, turns out to be correct, there might not 
be many meaningful predictions we can make about a person's susceptibility 
to diseases on the basis o f genetic testing alone (Goring et al.\ 2001).37 
The difficulty of making adequate predictions of multifactorial disease on 
the basis of genetic testing alone is thus explained by the fact that a n umber of 
genes, together with various environmental factors and an element of chance, 
interact to change the protein and cause disease. Because all of these factors 
interact to cause a dis ease it is difficult to determine the contribution of any 
one factor in isolation. To make predictions on the basis of genetic 
information alone is therefore difficult, to say the least. 
This is well illustrated by a common type of diabetes, which is 
multifactorial.38 Today 12 different genes are considered to affect whether a 
person will develop the disease or not. This implies at least 531,144 possible 
combinations of alleles.39 Since different genes have different penetrance and 
expressivity, and since the environment also influences the risk of diabetes, it 
is easy to understand why genetic testing will have marginal value as a 
predictive instrument in this case. 
36 The complexity here is a result, among other things, of the facts that many genes can be 
involved in the explanation of a certain trait, that a few genes are sufficient for a wide variety of 
possible combinations of inheritance (three are enough to yield 64 possibilities), and that some 
genes affect the penetrance of other genes to various degrees. 
37 Goring et al are genetic statisticians. They emphasise the difficulty of determining the 
contribution of a si ngle gene to a trait by statistical methods. In other words: we cannot account 
for differences in phenotype in terms of differences in genes when a certain trait of the 
phenotype is mu ltifactorial. This is b ecause the penetration of the DNA loci investigated will 
always be overvalued with regard to the trait investigated (they can even be completely 
independent). 
38 I wish to thank Jan Wahlström for bringing this example to my attention. 
39 The reservation "at least" is m ade due to the Mendelian conjecture that there are two alleles in 
each gene (one from the mother and one from the father), which can be similar in two ways (AA 
or aa) or differ in one way (Aa=aA). There are reasons to believe that there may be more alleles i n 
a gene, which makes this a cautious estimation of possible combinations. 
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Geneticists, to be sure, believe that more single gene disorders will be 
identified. Presymptomatic genetic testing will probably be developed for 
those of these diseases that are late onset. However, such diseases ar e rare and 
there is reason to believe that the ones not discovered yet are even more rare 
than those already discovered (otherwise they would probably have been 
discovered before). The most common and most widespread diseases caused 
by genetic factors are multifactorial. Moreover, a majority of these are 
explained more by differences in environment than by differences in genes 
(Kristoffersson, 2000, p 5499). We have already seen why there are strong 
reasons for doubting that genetic testing could ever be used for adequately 
determining well-specified risks of most multifactorial diseases. The future 
potential of genetic risk-analysis must therefore be judged with quite some 
caution. Visions of how genetics can alter our lives and society to its very 
foundations (Silver, 1997) may th us never be realised. 
Having said this, it is nevertheless important to note that the science of 
genetics is still rat her young, and the technology underlying the boost in this 
field during the recent decades even more so. It is a known fact about the 
history of science that many developments generally considered to be 
incredible, or even inconceivable, in the scientific community, have been 
realized. Our ability to foresee scientific progress is weak even in the short 
term, since groundbreaking developments are often considered credible only 
when they are almost a fact. In the mid-1930s, the father of atomic theory, 
Ernest Rutherford, expressed his co nviction that the theory would never have 
practical applications. About a decade later, the first atomic bomb exploded 
(Glover, 1984, p 14). The common opinion among geneticists was that c loning 
of larger mam mals was not possible, at least not in the foreseeable future, until 
someone in fact ac hieved it (remember the famous sheep Dolly). How ever, at 
the same time, it may also be argued that account of genetics underlying an 
ethical discussion of mainly contemporary practices should not rest on 
hypotheses concerning developments that are possible, but highly unlikely. 
Further considerations, however, seem to lend some support to the 
opinion that reliable presymptomatic genetic testing will be developed for 
multifactorial diseases to a larger extent than the sceptics seem to believe. First, 
not even the sceptics deny that there will be a clearer understanding of the 
connection between genes and the common diseases (Kristoffersson, 2000, p. 
5501). This conjecture is strengthened by the suspicion among some 
geneticists that the HUGO project's way of counting genes may have led to an 
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underestimation of the number of genes (see above). Because of this, it is 
more likely that a larger number of multifactorial diseases have a simpler 
pattern of inheritance than the diabetes case mentioned above. As a result, the 
prospect for reliable and adequate presymptomatic testing seems less bleak. 
Second, the construction of the biochip or DNA chip has helped to raise 
expectations of better insights about how genes interact to affect the human 
organism (Helgesson, 2001).40 Third., it has been claimed that the environment in 
developed countries has been improved and homogenised, which leads to 
reduced risks of disease due to the environment. This may mean that genes 
will tak e on increasing significance as a medical risk factor (Rasmusson, 2001). 
However, one should not disregard the remaining variation in the inner 
biological environment of each individual and the basic statistical 
considerations mentioned above (Goring et al, 2001) that, in combination, 
leaves a basic scepticism regarding the practical possibilities of collecting the 
very knowledge necessary as a basis for any prediction about future health on 
the basis of information about the structure and content of a person's DNA. 
Besides tests on DNA (genes), however, there are other tests that are the result 
of progress in genetics and that might be used to predict disease or the risk of 
disease before onset, namely tests on RNA or the protein product. As 
mentioned in the previous section, the basic doctrine of genetics is that the 
gene (located on the DNA molecule) creates the protein via RNA. An analysis 
of the protein product is often used in order to establish a d iagnosis, even for 
single gene disorders.41 Two international research areas, "functional 
genomics" and "proteomics", are studying the relationship between damage to 
RNA or proteins, on the one hand, and diseases, on the other hand. These 
projects may make it possible to do tests on RNA or proteins that can be used 
for presymptomatic and predictive purposes, even if the damage to the RNA 
or the protein has a highly complex multifactorial genetic background. To 
what extent this possibility will b e realised is hard to foresee. Testing may not 
be feasible until the individual already has the symptoms of the disease tested 
for, that is, the change in the RNA or the protein and symptoms may emerge at 
the same time. In that case, the tests will not be useful for predicting disease or 
40 These positive expectations may rest on an underestimation of the complexity of inheritance. 
In support of this there is the claim that the genes for only a few polygenetic diseases have been 
identified, in spite of massive use of biochips. 
41 For instance, phenylketonuria (1.4.1) is tested this way. 
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determining the risk of disease before onset. However, it is also likely that, at 
least for some conditions, tests of this type will be able to reveal (the risk of) 
some diseases before onset. 
Tests on RNA or protein are not genetic in a s trict sense of the word, since 
they do not detect any property of a person's DNA. In cases where they can be 
used for presymptomatic and predictive purposes, however, they will not 
differ in any relevant way from strict genetic testing. They will still be tests for 
diseases for which the malfunction of s ome gene(s) are an integral part of the explanation. A nd 
this is the definition of genetic testing relevant to this book. The one-sided 
focus on examinations of the DNA in ethically oriented literature and various 
legislations on genetic testing is therefore misguided and should be exchanged 
for a more inclusive definition, which includes both biochemical tests on 
genes and the products of genes.42 
In the light of all these uncertainties regarding the future of genetics, it seems 
prudent to experiment with different scenarios. For simplicity, I will consider 
two contrasting scenarios regarding the expected development of genetic 
testing during the coming 10-15 years. One of these scenarios is more cautious 
and in line with the opinions of many geneticists today (Goring et al.\ 2001; 
Kristoffersson, 2000; Wahlström, 2002a). This cautious scenario c onjectures that 
we will identify more single gene disorders (each one rare), for which reliable 
presymptomatic genetic testing will probably be developed, but we will not be 
able to develop reliable predictive testing for most multifactorial diseases. In 
rare cases, tests on RNA and protein will be possible before the onset of the 
disease, but will mainly be used for diagnostic purposes. The reason for this is 
the above mentioned hypothesis that in most cases damage to the RNA or 
protein and the disease will emerge at the same time. 
The bold scenario agrees with the cautious one that more single gene 
disorders will be detectable before onset through presymptomatic genetic 
testing. However, the bold scenario expresses a greater faith in the possibility 
of developing reliable predictive genetic testing for multifactorial diseases. It 
also implies higher hopes concerning the possibility of using RNA or protein 
tests for presymptomatic and predictive purposes. The most plausible version 
42 For regulatory purposes, methods of finding out genetic information about persons that does 
not include testing at all (e.g. by access to blood relatives' medical journals) may have to be 
considered too, which would require an even wider definition of what should be regulated. 
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of the bold scenario emphasises the latter rather than the former possibility. 
However, the end result of both these technical solutions is more or less the 
same: radically expanded opportunities of assessing risks of multifactorial 
diseases. 
For the purpose of the ensuing deliberations, the practical difference 
between the scenarios is that in the cautious one only a small proportion of 
the population can be demonstrated to suffer from genetic defects, while in 
the bold one, genetic testing can reveal differences in genetic risks for a much 
larger group of people. Which scenario that will be realized is thus most 
important to consider when discussing wider societal questions regarding 
proper policies and regulations with regard to genetic testing and information. 
Questions such as these primarily arise in connection to third parties interest 
in genetic information, such as insurance companies and employers (see 
chapter VII). 
Will the cautious or the bold scenario be realised? The answer to this 
question is a matter of speculation. The cautious scenario perhaps has a 
stronger foundation, given the opinions of geneticists today. The bold 
scenario is deliberately cast in vague terms, in order to allow different degrees 
of deviation from the cautious scenario. I t is legitimate to ask why one should 
experiment with scenarios that appear less likely to occur given the well-
founded beliefs of today's geneticists. We have already hinted at the answer to 
that question: scientific development is hard to predict, even in the short term. 
Scientific achievement often surpasses the most fanciful prognoses for the 
future. Even if the bold scenario at present seems less likely, we should 
consider the societal consequences of that scenario too, so we will not be 
taken by surprise if it should be realised after all. T he realization of some 
version of the bold scenario will be a severe test for politicians and shapers of 
public opinion, and bearing in mind the inertia of political institutions there is 
good reason already now to formulate a str ategy that enables us to handle the 
consequences of that scenario, should it come about. 
One or two further possibilities of genetics are worth mentioning in this 
context. First, many genetic diseases cannot be treated today (e.g. H untington's 
disease). However, one of the primary motives behind the HUGO project was 
to develop effective therapies for such diseases, or at least medicines that delay 
or lessen the severity of the symptoms. If this endeavour is successful for 
more diseases, presymptomatic genetic testing — on DNA, RNA or protein — 
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will be useful in order to offer treatment before the onset of these diseases. 
This will strengthen the moral reason to perform these tests (see II. 2.1). 
Second, the developments in genetics and biotechnology underlying the 
development of presymptomatic genetic testing also opens up for a special 
variant of these tests, namely commercial home tests. These are 
presymptomatic genetic tests that are sold on the open market directly to the 
user of the test. These tests thus enable individuals to find out about their 
genetic propensity for various conditions, without ever coming into contact 
with public health care or having the result noted in the medical record. Such 
tests already exist, which demonstrates the pace at which developments are 
progressing. In the USA, genetic home tests that reveal the risk of developing a 
certain form of breast cancer (see 1.4.1) can be ordered by mail, and in London, 
genetic tests that reveal if you are sensitive to certain diets can be bought 
directly in stores.43 The consequences might be that even more people will 
have access to genetic information with great relevance to the estimation of 
health and life expectancy, while at the same time being more able to keep this 
information private.44 
4.3 The moral (ir)relevance of genetic information 
Why have genetics received so much attention in recent moral discussions? 
This question may well be asked in the light of the exponential growth of 
genethics. I think part of the answer is that the development of contemporary 
genetics gives rise to practical problems that need to be tackled; problems like 
the ones addressed this book. These cannot always be directly answered with 
reference to norms of classical b iomedical ethics. For instance, the question of 
why and when one should perform presymptomatic genetic testing can not 
always be c ast in terms of the health of patients, since, sometimes no gains in 
terms of health can be made (see 1.4.1 and H2.1). T hen the question arises: 
when, if ever, should these tests be performed? This is a practical question that 
certainly should be pondered. 
However, the enormous interest in genethics may give rise to the 
impression that one is presuming that there is something unique or special 
with genetic information that makes it especially worthy of our interest. In 
43 In the US, the tests are provided by Myriard Genetics in Salt Lake City (Capron, 2000) and in 
the UK by Sconia (www.genewatch.org). 
44 I will d iscuss the defensibility of these tests later (see section IV.2). 
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order to avoid any future misunderstandings regarding my own view on this, I 
will state why I believe this presumption to be false. This has been 
successfully argued elsewhere (Holm, 1999; Launis, 2000; Sandberg, 1995, p 
1550-1553; Takala, 2000, 95-96), and I will just provide a brief recapitulation of 
these arguments. 
Four main characteristics have been proposed in favour of the claim that 
genetic information is morally relevant in a way that other (medical) 
information is not. Genetic information is: (i) p redictive about disease before 
onset; (ii) transmittable to offspring; (iii) rev ealing about other persons than the 
one tested (namely the persons relatives); and (iv) especially personal and 
intimate or sensitive. 
However, none of these characteristics single out genetic information as 
deserving special treatment compared to other medical information, not even 
taken together. This is so, since there are other kinds of non-genetic 
information that are relevantly similar. The point that other information is 
relevantly similar to genetic information is easily made concerning 
characteristic (i)-(iii). A lot of non-genetic (medical) information is predictive 
about disease before onset, e.g. information about HIV-carrier status, smoking 
and cholesterol. A lot of risk factors besides genes are transmitted to offspring, 
e.g. HIV-virus, the environment in the womb and social position.45 Some non-
genetic diseases reveal information about other persons than the one tested, 
e.g. sexually transmittable diseases. For instance information about HIV-carrier 
status, then, shares all t hese characteristics with genetic information. 
The most debated characteristic concerns the personal and intimate nature 
of genetic information. The argument should not rely on the very 
controversial idea that there is something uniquely personal about genetic 
information as such, since this claim would draw on a form of genetic 
essentialism already refuted (1.4.1). Of course, one can claim that genetic 
information is considered very personal and intimate in our culture, but so are 
information about sexual preference, private relations and so on. So the claim 
that genetic information has any special p roperties that are morally relevant 
seems unfounded. 
45 All people evidently do not have the same social position as their parents, but people have 
increased probability of occupying the same social position (the social heritage). This is true 
about genetic heritage too, however. 
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I will argue further against the claim that genes and genetic information has 
direct moral relevance. For instance, I will argue that the alleged sensitive 
nature of genetic information cannot be used to found rights, even if one 
grants that genetic information is very sensitive (see IV.2.1). I will also argue that 
no one has special obligations towards others only due to being genetically 
related to them (see VI.3.2.1).46 Moreover, I will argue that the fact that genetic 
information is not special in the sense just described calls for founding 
legislation on other concerns than the special nature of genetic information 
(see VII.4.1). 
Of course, none of this means that there are no interesting moral questions 
regarding genetic information. There are indeed, and I would not think it 
worthwhile to write this book if I thought there were no such questions 
myself. As already mentioned, I find the practical problems that contemporary 
genetics gives rise to, some of which are discussed in this book, highly 
interesting. I also think that moral philosophy in general stands to gain from 
scrutinizing important practical questions, like the question of the right to and 
value of genetic information. And genetic information can be directly relevant 
to decision-making. However, the interest in these questions should not rest 
on any notions of genetic information being unique in a morally relevant way. 
This interest should rather be in the practical problems contemporary genetics 
give rise to. 
If one accepts that there is nothing uniquely morally relevant with genetic 
information, it becomes more natural to resist any urge to formulate a new 
morality for questions regarding genetic information. Instead it becomes 
tempting to use the ideas of already existing moral theory to tackle the 
problems contemporary genetics gives rise to. Even if classical bioethics is 
insufficient to tackle all these problems, I thi nk that we can come a long way, 
and perhaps all the way, in the moral discussion of issues that arise from 
contemporary genetics using concepts well known in moral philosophy, such 
as autonomy, well-being, rights, obligations and justice. 
5. The plan of the book 
As already mentioned, I hope that this book can provide valuable reading for 
both moral philosophers interested in health care and health care professionals 
46 Some additional moral premise is n eeded, which does not refer to genetic relatedness. 
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interested in moral issues (1.2). However, the same point that applies to this 
chapter applies to the whole book: some passages will be directed more to one 
of these groups than others. Most clearly, chapter II is directed more to those 
involved in the health care practice (for instance, I there discuss genetic 
counsellor's professional norm of non-directiveness) and chapter III m ore to 
moral philosophers (since I discuss more theoretical issues on the nature and 
value of autonomy in this chapter). Having said this, many arguments in this 
book hinges on arguments more fully explic ated in other parts of the book, so 
a full appreciation of some arguments may require reading both the more 
practical and more theoretical parts. Nonetheless, I will now present an 
overview of the content of the book, so that the reader can concentrate on the 
parts of the book she or he finds most interesting. 
The book is organised in accordance with the question of the value of and 
the right to genetic information from presymptomatic genetic testing for first, 
second and third parties. Most emphasis will be on first parties', i.e. 
individuals', value of and right to genetic information, since the findings here 
will prove useful for discussing the values and rights of other parties as we ll. 
Chapter II discusses the question of the value for the individual of 
presymptomatic genetic testing and the counselling often accompanying such 
testing. I argue that there are basically two values of both presymptomatic 
genetic testing and genetic counselling, namely well-being and autonomy. This 
provides us with a coherent account of more specific values in these practices, 
as well a s a s tandard of evaluation for the practices based on these basic values. 
For instance, the norm of non-directiveness and the requirement of pre-
counselling are thus evaluated. However, the idea of autonomy as a value to 
promote often presupposed in this context is somewhat of a novelty in 
biomedical ethics, in which autonomy is usually considered to be a r ight that 
should be respected. This calls fo r a closer analysis of autonomy, which is the 
subject of chapter HI This analysis consists of developing a conception of 
autonomy, useful for formulating ideas of autonomy conceived of as a value, 
as well as a right, and a discussion of the theoretical problems that arise in 
relation to the conceptions and moral ideals of autonomy. Some of these 
problems, for instance the problem of comparing and measuring autonomy, 
are found to have practical relevance as well. 
Chapter IV and V deals with the individuals' right regarding genetic 
information from presymptomatic genetic testing. While chapter IV presents 
some basics on rights and deals with the question of the right to have such 
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information, or, as it is sometimes put, the right to know, chapter V deals with 
the question of the right not to have such information or, as it is sometimes 
put, the right to ignorance. In chapter IV, I argue that the proper basis of rights 
in the context of presymptomatic genetic testing is the values the recognition 
of such rights can promote. This warrants some more specific conclusions, 
such as somewhat limiting the scope of negative rights to purchase genetic 
testing, while granting positive rights to be tested in some circumstances. In 
chapter V, I address the question of the right to ignorance and argue that such a 
right, at least in one sense, should be recognized. I further defend a right to 
ignorance from charges to the effect that grounds of Kantian ethics or 
autonomy implies a duty to know, allegedly incompatible with a right to 
ignorance. 
Chapter VI deals with second parties', and then primarily blood relatives', 
rights to genetic information. Although the value-question is tackled too, it is 
found to concern the same values as first parties, whereby the focus lies on 
the right-question. I argue that there may be a moral obligation to inform 
relatives that vary in strength with the value for the relatives of being 
informed, but that practical considerations make it plausible to leave the 
decision of whether or not to inform relatives to the tested person, except 
perhaps in very rare cases. I also argue that the consent of relatives should not 
be a requirement for testing. 
Chapter VII deals with third parties' right to genetic information, and then 
almost exclusively insurance companies' rights. I argue that regulation is 
insufficient to protect the interest of those in need of being insured against 
the financial burdens of genetic risk and disease, but that, at least very stern, 
regulation may be counterproductive to this effect. Instead I argue that 
considerations of consequence and justice speak in favour of the protection or 
resurrection of social insurance, a key component in the welfare state. I use the 
findings in this discussion to very briefly address the question of employers' 
right to genetic information, where a more restrictive stance seems plausible. I 
finally add some remarks on researchers right to genetic information, which 
brings the plausibility of different versions of consequentialism to the stand. 
35 
Chapter II 
Values in Presymptomatic Genetic 
Testing and Genetic Counselling 
1. Introduction 
We are all mortal. Although we may only grasp this truth at some abstract level 
or, like Tolstoy's Ivan Ilich, are unwilling to recognize that this is true also 
about ourselves, we all know that we are going to die at some point in the 
future. However, very few of us have any well-founded beliefs about when 
this will in fact occur. And if some omniscient archangel asked: "Do you want 
to know when you are going to die?" I guess many would feel reluctant to 
answer "yes!" Even if one knows that one is going to die, one might be 
hesitant to find out when this will actu ally happen. 
It is also very likely that most people who live long enough will be affected 
by, more or less serious, disease. Very few are completely healthy all the time. 
And most of us do not know when and how they are going to be affected by 
disease, although the rapid development of medicine makes it more and more 
a truth with modification. 
Genetics has provided an instrument to give more precise answers to these 
questions: presymptomatic genetic testing. Now, as should be clear from the 
previous chapter, one must take heed not to overvalue the predictive force of 
such testing. Nevertheless, for at least some of us, presymptomatic genetic 
testing is an instrument that can reveal information about possible future 
disease and death that is more well-founded and precise than the unfounded 
and imprecise beliefs most of us have. 
Of course, genetics has to some extent also given us an instrument to live 
longer and healthier lives and will hopefully do so to a greater extent in the 
future. An obvious reason for performing presymptomatic genetic testing is to 
improve one's health and longevity. However, tests can, and in fact are, made 
for diseases where little or nothing can be done to prevent or ameliorate the 
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possible future disease. This gives rise to the question of the justification of 
presymptomatic genetic testing. 
So, why perform presymptomatic genetic testing at all? If one asks for the 
reason to implement such a procedure, or any procedure for that sake, an 
answer that seems natural is to point to the (alleged) fact that this procedure 
makes at least someone better, or less worse, off. That is, one often justifies the 
implementation of a procedure, or the choice to act in a particular way, with 
reference to the value for someone that the procedure or act will, or may, 
produce. This chapter examines this kind of justification for presymptomatic 
genetic testing. Furthermore, it examines the values of genetic counselling, 
since it is commonplace to think that presymptomatic genetic testing should 
be performed within the framework of this practice.1 
I will argue that the fundamental values in presymptomatic testing and 
genetic counselling are (subjective) well-being and autonomy. How well-being 
and autonomy should be understood is a matter of controversy in moral 
philosophy. These concepts will therefore receive some attention in the 
following. Subjective well-being is a relatively established concept and will 
thus be developed only to a minor extent in the end of this chapter (section 4). 
However, the concept of autonomy has received less attention in this context 
and will thus require some more elaboration (chapter ID). For now, a very 
rough characterisation will do. Well-being is then to feel good and/or having 
it one's own way, while autonomy is to live one's life according to one's own 
plans. 
To claim that well-being and autonomy is the fundamental values in 
presymptomatic genetic testing and genetic counselling is not only consistent 
with the most common claims about the value of these practices, but also 
provides a coherent framework of these practices that explains more particular 
statements and allows for an evaluation of the practices. However, conflicts 
within and between these values may arise. This gives rise to normative issues 
of how the practices should be designed. Some such questions will be 
addressed later in this chapter (II.3.4). They will a lso recur in chapters to follow 
(see e.g. VL3.1.2). 
1 See e.g. WHO, 1998, p 7, that in their "Proposed Ethical Guidelines for Genetic Screening and 
Testing" claims: "Test result should be followed by genetic counselling". 
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2. The value of presymptomatic genetic testing 
Why should, or should not, the individual know of genetic information 
concerning her own genetic constitution? Since I am dealing with genetic 
information that is the result of presymptomatic genetic testing the question 
becomes: from the point of view of the individual receiving information from 
presymptomatic genetic testing, why should such genetic testing be, or not be, 
performed? This is m ost naturally seen as a question of the balance of reasons 
in favour or disfavour of presymptomatic testing of the index-person(s) (or 
patient or client) for this person, i.e., what advantages and disadvantages 
presymptomatic genetic testing has for the person tested. Another way to put 
this is in terms of what good (or avoidance of bad) or value that a 
presymptomatic genetic test would realize for the index-person. The question 
I am interested in thus becomes: what reasons in terms of the effects on the 
individual are there for this individual to perform or not perform such a test? 
Or: what values for the pe rson, or personal,, or prudential values, may be realized by 
such testing? 
Since the days of Hippocrates, it is a traditional assumption in biomedical 
ethics that the point of health care in general is to benefit the patient.2 The 
same, then, goes for genetic testing as a health care practice. If this assumption 
is accepted, the ultimate rationale fo r genetic testing should be sought in the 
personal value that testing could realize for the index-person. The idea that the 
value for the patient provides the justification of medical practices in general 
and genetic testing in particular is widespread (Marteau & Richards, 1996, p 3; 
Munthe, 2002, p 78). If there are any such values then these values provide a 
legitimate goal (or aim or point) of presymptomatic genetic testing. 
What is the goal of presymptomatic genetic testing? If we take the 
traditional doctrines of personal value or well-being for granted,3 two of these 
doctrines are predominant in the justification of presymptomatic genetic 
testing, namely subjective we ll-being (from now on: well-being, see Ü.4.1.4) and 
autonomy. 
[T]he advantages [of genetic testing] are crudely of three types: 1. 
Positive effects on the physical health of the individual (correct 
2 The Hippocratic oath says the physician should "come for the benefit of the sick". See e.g. 
Beauchamp & Childress, 2001, p 173. 
3 They will b e developed in closer detail in II.4. 
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diagnosis of symptoms, preventive measures for e.g. demonstrated 
substantial risk of cancer). 2. Reduced anxiety/uncertainty (given initial 
suspicion of substantial risk, e.g. in families burdened with hereditary 
disease). 3. Better opportunities for the individual to plan her life. To 
simplify, related to basic values commonly referred to within medical 
ethics, one may say that point 1 and 2 focuses on aspects of the goal of 
promoting well-being. The goal of point 3 is rather to strengthen 
autonomy... (Munthe, 2002, p 78. My translation) 
The view that well-being and autonomy are the two most important values of 
presymptomatic genetic testing seems to be widespread among clinicians, as 
well as those people who undergo these tests, i.e., the index-persons: 
Two main classes of reasons were given by subjects asked about their 
decision to take the predictive test for Huntington's disease: reduction 
of anxiety and uncertainty associated with being at risk, and enhanced 
planning and decision-making about one's future (Shiloh, 1996, p 90) 
The first reason is obviously about well-being, and the second about 
autonomy (see II.2.3). That well-being is considered to be a rationale of 
presymptomatic genetic testing should not be a surprise, since it is a classic 
goal of health-care (see II.4). However, autonomy as a g oal of health care can 
come through as more of a novelty. However, not only index-persons but also 
health care professionals seems to have some idea of autonomy in mind when 
providing a rationale for genetic testing: 4 
An international survey of geneticists reported that virtually all 
respondents believed that an absolutely essential goal of genetic 
screening was to 'help patients understand their options so they can 
make decisions'. (Chadwick et al, 1997, p 3) 
Of course, there are other (alleged) values that genetic testing may realize, such 
as knowledge conceived of as an intrinsic value or perfectionist values, but 
4 Empirical support for this can also be found in an ongoing study of the ideology and 
organisation of Swedish presymptomatic testing programmes for cancer (personal information 
from Christian Munthe). 
39 
they are more peripheral in the debate, and I will ignore them partly for this 
reason.5 As we will see, often more specific goals are often mentioned, but as I 
will argue, I think most of these goals are ultimately derivative from or can be 
cast in terms of well-being and/or autonomy. Anyway, it is hard to see why the 
more specific suggested goals should be considered as legit imate goals if they 
do not promote well-being and/or autonomy. 
We can call the type of well-being addressed in point 1 in Munthe's list 
above health-related well-being, since they are about therapeutic and/or preventive 
measures to avoid, ameliorate or delay the onset of symptoms of genetic 
disease.6 Other positive effects on well-being of presymptomatic genetic 
testing are more related to Munthe's second point. In this context, I define 
health-related well-being somewhat narrowly and negatively, as well-being that 
is the direct result of avoidance of or amelioration of symptoms of disease or 
bodily harm. Even if one defines health more broadly, partly in terms of well-
being, which perhaps is r easonable (Briilde & Tengland, 2003, p 237-245), there 
seems to be general consensus on the view that not all well-being is health-
related: a person may change with regard to well-being, for instance for the 
better when her favourite soccer team is winning or for the worse when she 
has lost her new pair of gloves, without changing with regard to health (or 
disease). Given this, it seems obvious that there may be reasons of well-being 
for presymptomatic testing that is not of Munthe's type 1. Let us, somewhat 
coarsely, call this type of well-being psychological well-being. T his is somewhat 
misleading, since ultimately all wel l-being is to some extent psychological.7 But 
the term is designed to pinpoint the kind of well-being that is not directly tied 
to the avoidance or amelioration of symptoms of disease, and which is thus 
not the subject of straightforward genetic explanation.8 Rather, with the term 
psychological well-being I intend to capture the kind of well-being that is the 
result of having certain attitudes to genetic information about oneself, e.g. 
5 I will elaborate on the reasons for this limitation further (see II.4.1.4). 
6 As we have seen, the term "genetic disease" or genetic disorder" is not an unequivocal one, but I 
take it to mean a disease the explanation of which contains as a significant part the 
m a l f u n c t i o n i n g  o f  s o m e  g e n e .  F o r  i n s t a n c e ,  t h i s  m a k e s  c o m m o n  c o l d  n o n - g e n e t i c ,  b u t  
Huntington's disease genetic. 
7 This is s o regarding subjective well-being, which is the kind of well-being thought of in this 
context. See the section on well-being later on in this chapter to see why all s ubjective well-being 
is psychological. 
8 Of course, testing or lack of testing may lead to conditions that could be labelled as 
pathological, e.g. s evere depression, but this is not part of the genetic disease itself. 
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anxiety as a result of receiving some genetic information about one's 
susceptibility for disease. 
To sum up, then, the reasons that have been suggested to speak in favour of 
acquiring information about one's own genetic constitution are that such 
acquisition may promote the health-related well-being, the psychological well-
being, or the autonomy of the person in question. 
Just as the predominant positive values brought to stand regarding 
presymptomatic genetic testing are well-being and autonomy, the disadvantages 
or negative va lues of presymptomatic genetic testing that have been suggested 
are predominantly about the reduction of well-being and/or autonomy that 
such testing may result in. Of course, when there is no preventive life-style or 
medical measures to initiate (as is the case with e.g. Huntington's), there is a 
lack of positive contribution to health-related well-being. However, this is not 
so much a n egative value as absence of a positive value. But it has been claimed 
that presymptomatic genetic testing may produce negative values or harm and 
primarily then psychological "ill-being" or reduction of autonomy. Several 
examples of such possible harms will be presented below. 
Since it seems possible that values can be both promoted and reduced by 
presymptomatic genetic testing, conflicts may arise. For instance, a genetic test 
can lead to the promotion of someone's health, but the reduction of her 
overall psychological well-being. And promoting the well-being of someone 
in the short term may lead to the reduction of her well-being in the long term. 
Furthermore, promoting the well-being of one person may lead to the 
reduction of well-being of another. In addition, conflicts may arise both 
within and between persons regarding autonomy. And we cannot assume that 
there is no conflict between promoting well-being and autonomy. So the goals 
of presymptomatic genetic testing may come into conflict. I will return to this 
below (see e.g. section II.3.4). 
Before that, I will now look at some claims about the possibility for 
presymptomatic genetic testing to promote, but also to damage, the values of 
well-being and autonomy. Since the literature on this subject is vast and 
expanding, a complete overview is not feasible. Rather, I will present some 
examples that I find to be representative. When doing this I will substantiate 
the point that more specific goals that are mentioned are ultimately derivative 
from or can be cast in terms of well-being and/or autonomy. The presentation 
of the values will allow us to make a list over the reasons for and against testing 
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or, to put it another way, the positive and negative values of genetic testing. 
Moreover, the presentation will all ow us to draw some general conclusions on 
the value of different types of testing. For instance, I will argue that in general, 
reasons for the testing of multifactorial diseases are weaker than for 
monogenetic ones. Furthermore, some reasons are irrelevant regarding some 
testing, e.g. healt h-related values for testing of diseases for which there are no 
medical or life-style measures. However, even more importantly for the 
context of philosophical reflection, this analysis will provide the point of 
departure for more in depth inquiries regarding the more exact nature of these 
values, so it becomes clearer what ethical conclusions regarding the practice of 
presymptomatic genetic testing they support. These inquiries will occupy 
section II.4 and chapter III below. 
2.1 Health-related well-being 
As I said, in this context health-related well-being is understood as well-being 
that is about the avoidance, amelioration or delaying of the onset of symptoms 
of genetic disease. This kind of reason to obtain information of one's own 
genetic constitution has been stated by leading participants in the ethical 
debate on genetic testing: 
Let us suppose...that the [genetic] disorder is...curable or preventable at 
an early stage. Assuming that individuals want to live long and healthy 
lives, i t would seem prudential for them to know about such a dormant 
condition. (Takala, 2000, p 59-60) 
For some genetic disorders there may be preventive measures that 
could be taken. For example a woman who has inherited the BRCA1 
gene is likely to develop breast cancer. Some such women choose to 
undergo prophylactic bilateral mastectomy. Alternatively, regular follow-
up could be offered to identify breast cancer at an early stage. 
(Chadwick et al, 1997, p 2) 
When the prevalence of the actual illness depends on these other [non-
genetic] factors, it could be argued that people should know about their 
genetic weakness because the knowledge enables them to adjust their 
life-styles accordingly. (Takala, 2000, p 60) 
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The knowledge [of genetic susceptibility for disease] may enable the 
individual to seek appropriate therapy or to take preventive of 
ameliorative action. (Chadwick, 1997, p 14)9 
The realization of health-related well-being is accomplished through 
therapeutic and/or preventive measures. Strictly speaking, only diseases for 
which there are preventive measures can justify presymptomatic testing from a 
health-related perspective. If treatment or ameliorative measures are effective 
only when symptoms emerge, there is no health-related (in the sense above) 
reason to know about the susceptibility to develop the disease before the 
symptoms, i.e., presymptomatically. Then the argument only shows that there 
is a health-related reason to perform diagnostic test ing. For instance, if there is 
an effective drug therapy to ameliorate the symptoms of Huntington's disease 
once they occur, but that does not work before the symptoms emerge, this in 
itself can only tell in favour of making a correct diagnosis, and not in favour of 
presymptomatic testing. 
However, there is a possible exception to this. In order to recognize certain 
changes in the person as symptoms of disease, it is useful to know beforehand 
that this person has an increased risk of that disease. This may facilitate earlier 
therapeutic measures than if this risk were unknown, which can be a health-
related advantage. However, once again, this is only a reason for 
presymptomatic testing if there are such measures to take. Furthermore, it is 
only a reason if symptoms can be conflated for normal changes and if early 
measures really are an advantage. 
Regarding preventive measures, we can roughly distinguish between medical 
measures, such as the administration of prophylactic drug, surgery, and medical 
investigations to secure early diagnosis, and life-style cha nges, such as changes of 
behaviour or environment. Life-style changes are most interesting when it 
comes to multifactorial genetic diseases, where life-style factors can affect the 
probability and seriousness of the disease. Given the plausible assumption that, 
at least in most cases, the symptoms of a disease will affect the well-being of 
the person negatively and given that testing is necessary in order to determine 
whether preventive measures should be taken, the person has a good reason 
indeed to take the test. Presumably, the reason is stronger the better the test 
9 See also Wood-Harper & Harris, 1996, p 287, for similar statements on the value of using genetic 
testing in order to determining genetic susceptibility of disease. 
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predicts the onset of disease, the more efficient the measure is, the less 
hardship (e.g. side-effects) it imposes on the person,10 and the graver the 
symptoms are. 
However, an obvious prerequisite for this kind of reason is that there really 
are measures to take. For many genetic disorders there are no effective 
therapies or preventive measures at all (at least not yet), e.g. Huntington's 
disease, hereditary Alzheimer's, or FXTAS. For the time being, this kind of 
health-related argument cannot provide the rationale for those tests, then. 
Another prerequisite for the value to be realized is that the test is positive, i.e., 
shows that the index-person is a carrier of the disorder in question. Otherwise 
preventive measures are not needed. 
A similar point applies to therapies that are independent of knowing the 
genetic background of the disease. Then it is not important per se to perform 
genetic testing in order to initiate effective treatment. For instance, the need to 
initiate some of the therapies to ameliorate some of the symptoms of fragile X, 
such as training to compensate for intellectual disability, can be determined 
without knowing about the genetic explanation of the symptoms that the 
therapies are designed to ameliorate. In such cases, the health-related argument 
of well-being for genetic testing is irrelevant, even though there may be other 
good reasons to test, as we will see. 
However, in cases where genetic risk of disease is suspected and the test is 
capable of clarifying the risk, even a negative test result may be of positive value 
in terms of health. This since it may provide reasons for the avoidance of 
burdensome preventive measures and health controls for the disease in 
question that would otherwise have been undertaken. A good example of this 
is provided by the case when there is initial suspicion of breast cancer due to 
family history. Prophylactic mastectomy may be recommended and performed 
on this basis. A genetic test of BRCA1 with a negative result can provide 
grounds for thinking such a drastic measure unnecessary. 
However, this example highlights the possible negative values in terms of 
health of presymptomatic genetic testing. Not only may the measures lead to 
preventive measures that may turn out to be more harmful than the genetic 
10 E.g. the hardships of prophylactic mastectomy, see below. 
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risk of disease,11 moreover, the risk of depression, to be mentioned below, 
may in extreme cases lead to health-related consequences, such as physiological 
deterioration. 
2.2 Psychological well-being 
2.2.1 Positive values 
In this context, psychological well-being refers to the kind of well-being that is 
not directly tied to the avoidance, amelioration, or delaying of symptoms of 
disease and bodily harm. One such mentioned advantage of presymptomatic 
genetic testing in terms of well-being is the removal of suffering due to the 
anxiety of uncertainty: 
An asymptomatic young person with a parent affected by 
Huntington's... may prefer to have uncertainty about their fate removed. 
(Chadwick et al, 1997, p 2) 
Some people may experience the knowledge [of genetic susceptibility 
for disease] as a liberation from the agony of uncertainty. (Chadwick, 
1997, p 18) 
There are testimonies of people feeling bad about not knowing whether or 
not they are carriers and people feeling good about receiving a definite test 
result, even when the test reveals genetic susceptibility to disease for which 
there are no cure or preventive measures and, thus, no health-related gains to 
be made.12 This indicates that there may indeed be well-being to be gained by 
removing uncertainty. In addition, there are testimonies of people strongly 
desiring genetic testing on grounds of removing uncertainty,13 which further 
strengthens the case for this claim.14 
11 See Laurie, 1999, p 122, for further references to literature about the inherent risks of 
prophylactic mastectomy. 
12 See Sue Wright's story about her presymptomatic test for Huntington's disease: "We [she and 
her partner] both felt more at peace now we knew I had the gene" (Marteau & Richards, 1996, p 
7). 
13 See Julia Madigan's story about her presymptomatic test for Huntington's disease: "I wanted 
the answer more than life itself." (Marteau & Richards, 1996, p 7) 
14 
"Feeling good about receiving the information" is primarily about well-being in hedonistic 
terms, and "getting informadon that you strongly want" is primarily about well-being in 
preferentialistic terms. These accounts of well-being will be developed (see 11.4.2). 
45 
However, reduction of anxiety of uncertainty can most plausibly be 
expected only when test results are certain enough themselves. This, in turn, 
depends on the disease tested for and what testing possibilities are available. 
For instance, the less reliable the test is in the sense of likelihood to produce 
false positives and negatives, the less likely it is to remove uncertainty. 
Moreover, due to the nature of some genetic diseases, even the most reliable 
tests will only inform about a risk in form of a p ercentage figure. This is the 
case for all multifactorial diseases (since they are not solely caused by genetic 
factors) and some monogenetic diseases (like breast cancer caused by BRCA1). 
However, for the former, this figure will also be unspecific, that is, provide a 
range of possible risk-figures rather than one such figure. That is, the test will 
be less predictive. For instance, if the result of a ge netic test is that the index-
person has a combination of genes that increases his risk of having a certain 
disease with between 20 to 40% this will probably not be perceived as 
reducing uncertainty of what will happen for most people. Of course, 
"uncertainty" is a matter of degree and some may prefer even a very small 
reduction of uncertainty. However, generally speaking, the less reliable and the 
less predictive the test is, the weaker is the argument of reduction of anxiety of 
uncertainty in favour of testing. 
Furthermore, it has to be emphasised that the anxiety of uncertainty is 
present only if the index-person has some prior suspicion that she has an 
increased risk of genetic disease. Such suspicion is usually evoked by a family 
history of disease or by knowing of relatives' positive test result.15 The 
reduction of anxiety rationale for testing is thus mostly relevant in these kinds 
of cases. However, this is not to say that prior suspicion is always well-
founded. There may be cases when persons have irrationally founded fears of 
genetic disease, for instance when test results of relatives have been 
misunderstood, or when the person is a h ypochondriac. If it is not possible 
for health care professional to convince the person in question that she has no 
reason to be suspicious, and testing thus is the only way to remove the 
uncertainty of anxiety, this kind of rationale for testing also favours those 
persons being tested.16 
15 This gives r ise t o questions about whether family members should be informed about the result 
of genetic testing, a question that will be discussed in chapter VI. 
16 Compare with the argument for providing prenatal diagnosis to women who have 
unsubstantiated worries about the health of their future child in Munthe, 1996, chapter 2. 
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Other possible values for the index-person are the result of the test either 
being positive or negative. A potential benefit of a positive p resymptomatic test 
result is the time it gives for psychological adjustment to cope with the (more 
or less probable) disease (Wood-Harper & Harris, 1996, p 284). The distress of 
having a disease might be ameliorated if one is previously acquainted with its 
effects. However, most presymptomatic genetic tests are for diseases that the 
persons sometimes are familiar with already, due to a family history of disease. 
These persons already have had the time for getting acquainted with and 
coping with the potential onset of the disease, in which case this value is not 
applicable.17 However, when the family history has been repressed, as is 
sometimes the case, testing might force the person in question to deal with the 
consequences, which may be beneficial in the long run. 
Another potential benefit in terms of psychological well-being is improved 
relations with family members and relatives. This effect seems to be most 
noted in cases when the index-person has tested positive in a family with 
formerly identified carriers (Brandberg, 2003, p 93; Sobel & Cowan, 2003, p 53-
54). Presumably, feelings of belonging and having someone to share one's 
experiences and expectations with plays a role for the result of the test being 
welcomed as well as being conducive to feelings of well-being. 
However, to be sure, the most obvious effect on psychological well-being of 
presymptomatic genetic testing is the relief of finding out that the result is 
negative.™ Fo r a negative result, the sources of relief may vary. It may be due to 
the simple fact of not having increased risk of the disease in question, not 
having to endure burdensome preventive measures (if there are any), the 
avoidance of stigmatisation, knowing that one will not pass the genetic 
disorder in question on to one's children, and so on. 
2.2.2 Negative values 
One possible factor that may affect the well-being of the individual for the 
worse is that the result of the test, whether positive or negative, may evoke an 
unwelcome change in (false) self-image (Chadwick, 1997, p 19; Laurie, 1999, p 
17 Of course, if testing is made within a setting designed to help the person to better cope with 
the psychological effects of the disease, e.g. genetic counselling, then the reason for testing within 
this setting will be stronger (see section II.3). 
18 See Julia Madigan's story about her presymptomatic test for Huntington's disease for a strong 
personal statement about this, Marteau & Richards, 1996, p 16-18. 
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124; Widmer, 1994, p 184).19 As we will see below, some people seem to build 
an important part of their self-image on being predisposed to some hereditary 
disease. They may therefore regard a negative result as unwelcome and 
distressing. A similar point may be made of positive test results: "A woman 
who has genetic predisposition to develop breast cancer in later life may have 
a self-image that is incompatible with this as a possible future." (Chadwick, 
1997, p 19) To present this woman with a p ositive result could be distressing 
to her, not only due to the fear of contracting a serious disease, but also partly 
due to her having plans for the future where breast cancer was never a 
considered possibility. 
Of course, this is to claim that information that destroys the possibility for 
the individual to uphold a false self-image may have adverse consequences in 
terms of well-being. However, one could claim that a true self-ima ge must be 
conducive to well-being in the long run. Closer inspection, however, reveals 
this possible response as n ot very plausible. Take Chadwick's example of the 
"woman who has genetic predisposition to develop breast cancer in later life" 
(Ibid.). She may receive information about her increased risk without ever 
developing breast cancer (despite not taking preventive measures). It is not 
unlikely that this information will make her life worse in terms of well-being 
than it would have been had she never received it: not only has she received 
undesired and distressing information, she may also have changed her plans 
against the background of this information without the risk for breast cancer 
ever being realized and thereby unnecessarily sacrificed what she would most 
have liked to have.20 Thus, she may very well have been better off in terms of 
well-being if she had not received the information. 
Moreover, the same may hold even if she in fact developed breast cancer. 
To be sure, she would then have to revise her self-image anyway, at the point 
when the cancer developed. But the gain in well-being effected by being able 
to keep a false self-image up till that point may still override the value of 
knowing beforehand. That this may be so seems plausible to hold against the 
fact that exaggerating the positive outlook of one's future seems to help us to 
19 Widmer and Laurie speak of a right not to receive information that can evoke an unwanted 
change in self-image, and Chadwick connects this with "notions of integrity and privacy." (Ibid.) I 
will ignore these ramifications, since, in this context, I am interested only in the (negative) value of 
such a change for the individual. 
20 Besides being distressing it is als o negative in terms of autonomy, in a sense. So surprisingly, a 
false self-image may be conducive to autonomy. I will re turn to this (see II.2.3.2 and V.3.1.1). 
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cope with the minor problems of every day life. D eep down, we all know that 
the rosy picture of our future many of us have may be false, but it helps us to 
lead a good life until the day some misfortune actually occurs. 
Of course, the examples are hypothetical. But they are not inconceivable or 
even unbelievable. Of course, many persons will perhaps benefit in terms of 
well-being from being forced to revise their self-image due to genetic testing. 
The point is that they do not have to. These are possible negative values of 
genetic testing in terms of well-being. As we will see, some such possibilities 
are not just theoretical examples, but have empirical support. 
The possible realization of negative psychological well-being that typically 
could be the effect of the result of the test being positive are often mentioned 
and are in many way a r eflection of the beneficial effects of negative testing: 
anxiety for having increased risk of the disease in question, the inconvenience 
of having to endure burdensome preventive measures (if there are any), the 
hardships of stigmatisation, and worries about passing the genetic disorder in 
question on to one's children.21 
Even though many empirical investigations stress the long-term 
psychological benefits of knowing, data are conflicting (Sobel & Cowan, 2003, 
p 50). There are reports of people becoming distressed when learning that 
they are carriers of genetic disease (Marteau & Anionwu, 1996, p 127). There 
are also reports of severe depression and suicidal tendencies (even suicide) 
seemingly resulting from learning that one is a carrier of genes for serious 
disease for which the testing is highly predictive, like testing for BRCA1, 
Huntington's and Alzheimer's (Harper, 2001, p 16; Lannfelt et al, 1995, p 333-
334). Probably, such information will be especially damaging if it is disclosed 
without the patient asking for it (Adelswärd & Sachs, 2002, p 74-75), if the 
patient has no known family history (Marteau & Anionwu, 1996, p 127-128), if 
the family has been denying the disease, if the patient is emotionally stressed 
(Shiloh, 1996, p 92-93), or if the information is disclosed without ensuring the 
patient's proper understanding of it or without proper professional support. 
This indicates that the way in which the information is disclosed is of great 
importance for what positive and negative values will be realized, a point to 
which I will return. 
21 See e.g. Brandberg, 2003, p 93; Chadwick et al, 1997, p 3; Takala, 2000, p 60; Wood-Harper & 
Harris, 1996, p 288-289. 
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A positive test result may also result in "feelings of isolation and self-
stigmatism" (Wood-Harper & Harris, 1996, p 288). Presumably, feelings of 
isolation and self-stigmatism will affect any person's self-respect, that is the 
feeling a person has of her own worth and the confidence she has in her 
ability to realize her intentions. Not only is low self-respect unpleasant and 
something one wants to avoid, it will probably adversely affect the person's 
ability to live the life she wants and thus her autonomy, a point to which I will 
return.22 
Not only may the index-person's knowledge of a positive test result lead to 
feelings of isolation and self-stigmatisation. It may also result in actual isolation 
and stigmatisation23 from both family and society at large, which in turn affects 
the well-being of the person negatively. For instance, there may be permanent 
disconnections with other family members. There are examples of cancelled 
marriage plans and divorces as a result of positive presymptomatic test results 
of Huntington's disease (Sobel & Cowan, 2003, p 52). One woman, who's 
husband left her after her positive test result, said: "My ex-husband said he 
wanted healthy children. He said, 1 don't want to waste love and energy on a 
dead-end project.'" (Ibid.) There are also examples of disconnections and 
strained relationships with one's family of origin as a result of positive test 
result, since the family of origin does not want to acknowledge that there is a 
hereditary disease running in the family.24 
One should be very careful when evaluating the effects on well-being of 
strained family relations. Often they are strained to start with (Sobel & Cowan, 
2003, p 56), and one could argue that for instance the woman just quoted may 
lead a better life on the whole without a husband having such attitudes. 
However, when these things happen, they are likely to be distressing and 
perhaps even traumatising. 
22 Rawls claimed that self-respect in this sense is one of the primary social goods, since it is a 
prerequisite in order to live an autonomous life (1972, p 440). 
23 Stigmatisation has a psychological aspect: the shame and self-contempt one may feel due to 
having a (risk of) disease, as well as an aspect relating to the reactions of others: the stigmatised 
person may be misunderstood, ignored, isolated, or despised by others, as well as excluded from 
societal opportunities (Briilde & Tengland, 2003, p 26-27). 
24 See e.g. Sobel & Cowan, p 53, and Marteau & Richards, p 7-13 about this happening in families 
with Huntington's. 
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Another stigmatising effect of a positive presymptomatic genetic test may 
be that one conceives oneself or is conceived of by others as sick before any 
symptoms appear, which, of course, can be experienced as frustrating.25 One 
may also be treated as if one is sicker than one actually is, or be expected to die 
at any time. Merry France-Dawson, affected by sickle cell anaemia, writes about 
the attitudes of her surroundings in her twenties: "listening to 'learned' people 
talking about my dying, having family and friends treat me like I was no longer 
valid (though still loved) affected me more than I realised. This was manifested 
by my loss of interest in academic work. After all, why bother if you are going 
to die?" (Marteau & Richards, 1996, p 48) When she wrote this she was in her 
forties. So obviously, the stigmatisation that may result from being labelled 
"sick" (even though presymptomatic testing only shows risk of becoming sick) 
may have detrimental consequences on an individual's well-being. 
Moreover, third parties, like insurance companies and employers, may 
discriminate (in the non-evaluative sense) against individuals for having a 
positive presymptomatic genetic test result. Employers will be reluctant to 
employ someone who runs high risk of falling sick, especially if monetary 
compensation for sick leave and/or health-care costs is included in the terms 
of employment. This may of course affect a persons well-being, since it may 
stop her from taking the job she prefers and this will probably create 
frustration. Of course, insurance companies will want to charge higher 
premiums for life- and health insurance or deny insurance altogether to such 
individuals in order to safeguard against the higher risk of paying 
compensation. The extent to which this will be done is dependant on factors 
such as legislation. The extent to which this will have negative consequences 
on well-being for the individual depends on the extent to which private 
insurances are required in order to get goods necessary for well-being, e.g. 
health care and income compensation in case of working disability due to 
disease. I will discuss this issue later (chapter VU), so I will ignore it for now, 
except by pointing out that the well-being of positively tested persons could 
be negatively affected by society's reaction towards them. 
Perhaps more surprisingly, also negative results of genetic testing may have 
adverse effects in terms of well-being for the individual. There are well-
25 One can also experience oneself as sick, even though there are no pathological changes or 
symptoms. See Adelswärd & Sachs, 2002, p 76. 
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documented feelings of "survivor's guilt", i.e., feelings of guilt towards one's 
relatives with genetic susceptibility for disease for being "the one who got 
away": "The joy that should have been there disappeared in guilt towards the 
others who were affected." (Öberg's testimony in Öberg, 2002, p 59. My 
translation.)26 This is sometimes due to a misconception of the nature of 
biological heredity, believing that you could have been the one of a group of 
siblings taking on the disease (Sobel & Cowan, 2003, p 56). There may also be 
feelings of distress for not being a carrier if one has expected that one might 
be before testing. For instance, a negative testing result may take away one's 
identity as "sick", which might mean for instance being robbed of having 
something to blame when failing and thus creating a feeling of a demanding 
obligation "to do something with one's life".27 
Moreover, isolation from family is not an uncommon result of receiving a 
negative test result (Brandberg, 2003, p 93; Sobel & Cowan, 2000, p 53). This 
may be the case when there is previous knowledge of the history of disease in 
the family, which can create a family identity. A negative test result for those 
who receive it may then give rise to the feeling that they have "lost their 
commonality with the family", leading to disconnection with the other family 
members (Sobel & Cowan, 2000, p S3).28 
2.3 Autonomy 
"What is the point of predictive testing if there is no cure for the disease?"29 
This pithy question, asked by a person considering whether or not to test for 
Huntington's disease, for which there are no cures or other preventive 
measures, asks for the value of testing in the absence of traditional health-
26 See also Brandberg, 2003, p 93; Chadwick et al, 1997, p 3; Julia Madigan's testimony in Marteau 
& Richard, 1996, p 18. 
27 Once again, I want to refer to the personal story of Julia Madigan (Marteau & Richards, 1996), 
who writes: "In a funny, ironic way the second option [a positive test result] seems more 
appealing. Enjoy yourself and go out with a bang!" (p 15) "It has been a crutch half my life... It's 
easy to blame HC." (p 18) 
28 Sobel & Cowan has specifically investigated the impact of genetic testing for Huntington's 
disease on the family system, but as they point out, there is n o reason not to assume that their 
findings will not be "likely t o be applicable to people at risk fo r other autosomal dominant, mid­
life o nset genetic diseases" (p 49). This is s upported by the ongoing study of the ideology and 
organisation of Swedish presymptomatic testing programmes for cancer (personal information 
from Christian Munthe). 
29 From Julia Madigan's story in Marteau & Richards, 1996, p 7. 
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related reasons for medical testing. One answer, which was addressed in the 
previous section, is to refer to other possible gains in well-being, such as the 
reduction of anxiety. Another is to refer to possible gains of autonomy. 
My vivid impression is that autonomy is becoming increasingly widespread 
as an answer to the question of what values presymptomatic genetic testing can 
promote.30 Besides the examples of referral to this value we have already seen 
(II.2), consider the following statements: 
[Kjnowledge [of genetic predisposition for cancer]31 would be 
beneficial, as it would enable individuals to draw up their life plans 
realistically. (Takala, 2000, p 59) 
According to Chadwick, the reason to grant the individual access to her genetic 
information is the same as granting access individuals to any medical 
information, namely "principles of autonomy and self-determination", since 
"access to information will always be important in making plans and life 
choices" and genetic information is especially relevant for "reproductive 
choices." (Chadwick, 1997, p 14) And again: 
An international survey of geneticists reported that virtually all 
respondents believed that an absolutely essential goal of genetic 
screening was to 'help patients understand their options so they can 
make decisions'. (Chadwick et al, 1997, p 3) 
The line of reasoning seems roughly to be the following: if individuals 
possess the knowledge that they (probably) will fall si ck (or the knowledge that 
they will not if they have suspected that they might be), they are in a better 
position to plan their lives in accordance with their own conception of a good 
life, to live in accordance with their own values or basic wishes or to realize 
their own important projects (or something like that), against the background 
of this knowledge. To live such a life is roughly what is means to live an 
autonomous life or being an autonomous person, according to traditional 
general accounts of autonomy (HL2.1). The idea is, then, that leading an 
30 The same point seem to apply as well to other areas of health care and health policy, such as 
prenatal diagnosis, assisted reproduction, and public health. 
31 The example of genetic disorder used in this context is Li-Fraumeni Syndrome, a mutation that 
increases risk of "a spectrum of cancers" (Takala, 2000, p 60). 
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autonomous life, or at least increasing the possibility to do so, is something 
that presymptomatic genetic testing can promote. Indeed, since this is a r eason 
to do the test, it is seen as a value that presymptomatic genetic testing should 
promote, according to this line of thought. 
However, traditionally autonomy has not been considered primarily as a 
value to promote, but rather as so mething that gives rise to moral restrictions 
on how we are allowed to treat each other when trying to promote other 
things found valuable. If an individual is adult and competent to make 
decisions, other individuals should not prevent that individual from making 
decisions and act upon them, at least if she does not violate the rights of others 
(Locke, 1689; Nozick, 1974) or inflict harm in a w ider sense on someone else 
(Mill, 1859; Glover, 1977). According to this line of reasoning, we thus have a 
duty (at least of a prima facie-kind) not to restrict the autonomy of others. This, 
however, does not imply any obligation to help others to be more 
autonomous or live more autonomous lives. In other words, we have a m oral 
obligation to respect autonomy but not necessarily to promote it. 
This way of thinking about autonomy is the predominant one in biomedical 
ethics (11.4, m.3). In biomedical ethics, the right to have one's decisions 
respected is often claimed (HI.3). This has been taken as the ground for not 
being manipulated or coerced into medical treatments. Instead, the patient has 
a right to know what the treatment is about and a right to accept it or reject it, 
i.e. i nformed consent should be obtained from the patient. This is well in line 
with the idea of autonomy as s omething that is the foundation of rights or as 
something that ought to be respected. 
However, as indicated, the quotations above express another idea of 
autonomy: it is conceived of as a value that ought to be promoted. The point is 
thus not only to respect the patient's wants when trying to promote her health 
and well-being, but also to enable her to become more autonomous. That is, 
autonomy is not only the foundation of restrictions of how health care are 
allowed to treat people, expressed in duties and rights, but a value the 
promotion of which may provide the very rationale of health care procedures, 
e.g. presymptomatic genetic testing. However, at the same time, the idea of 
autonomy founding duties and rights is not entirely cast away. O n the contrary, 
notions of rights "to know" or "not to know" is a recurring theme in the 
ethical discussion of genetic testing. Such notions will be discussed in 
chapters to come (TV and V). S o, apparently, the idea is that autonomy can both 
be seen as a value to promote and as a basis of restriction of this as well as 
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other values. This means that promoting and respecting autonomy can conflict 
in certain situations (see e.g. III.3.3). However, as we will see (e.g. in IV.3.2) some 
of the rights to genetic knowledge and/or ignorance might be based on 
autonomy conceived of as value, just as the value of well-being has sometimes 
been thought to be the basis of respecting autonomy (Mill, 1859; Tännsjö, 
1999). 
It is far from clear, however, how the notion of autonomy as a value to be 
promoted should be understood, if it can be made sense of and to what extent 
it may be combined with traditional ideas of respect for autonomy. We thus 
need an account of autonomy that allows us to formulate the idea that 
autonomy is a value that should be promoted, so as to make it intelligible and 
plausible. For this we need a conception of autonomy and a demonstration of 
moral ideals with regard autonomy cast in terms of the conception, which 
develops autonomy as a v alue to promote. To develop such a c onception and 
try to demonstrate how autonomy conceived of as a value to promote, but also 
as a right that should be respected, can be formulated by this conception will 
be the task of the next chapter. I will now proceed with a very brief sketch of 
this conception and how it may be employed to make sense of the idea of 
promoting autonomy. Thereafter, I will investigate whether presymptomatic 
genetic testing does promote autonomy in this sense. 
Autonomy, generally characterised, says that to be autonomous is to govern 
oneself or to decide one's own way. To live autonomously is then to live in 
accordance with one's own basic desires or values. There are three ways to be 
less than fully autonomous according to this general characterisation: if one 
does not or cannot live the life one has chosen to live or if one does not or 
cannot chose the life one wants to live, or if one's wants are not really one's 
own. 
As will be developed in the next chapter, this means that autonomy is a 
matter of degrees: a person can more or less lead the life he has chosen and 
more or less choose how to live according to her own wants. This can be seen 
on the basis of the following minimal definition of autonomy: a person is 
autonomous (in a s ituation) to the extent that she does what she has decided to 
do, because she has decided to it and decides to do what she wants, because 
she wants it. Thus, the degree of a person's autonomy is dependent on the 
want causing the decision and the decision causing the action. Here three 
components are discernable: will (desire, value), decision, and action. All these 
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three components determine how autonomous a person is and they can all 
vary in degree. 
First, the desire from which one acts can be more or less one's own, or 
more or less authentic. Generally speaking, an authentic desire is a self-
determined desire. How this should be taken more precisely is far from self-
evident, but will in the next chapter be identified with the ability to identify 
with a desire in light of knowledge about oneself and the desire. More 
specifically, there is nothing about the knowledge of why the person has the 
desire that would make her inclined to disapprove of having it. The agent can 
identify herself with the desire, willingly acknowledge that she has it and will 
not be inclined to abandon it just because she learns new things about herself. 
Inauthentic desires are desires that one would be inclined to disapprove of 
having if one were to find out why one has them. The following empirical 
hypothesis seems to be plausible. Desires that are a result of indoctrination, 
brainwashing, hypnosis, self-deception, fear, phobias and other psychological 
pathologies are typically such that we would be inclined to disapprove of, if 
we were convinced that some of these events were the explanation to why we 
have the desire. Thus, such desires are less to be counted as "one's own". 
Another factor that influences the autonomy of an individual is the capacity 
to make decisions from one's desires, or decision com petence. In order to reach a 
decision, it is not enough to want something. One also has to have beliefs on 
how to act in order to achieve what one wants. This component of autonomy 
is thus essentially about beliefs and the ability to choose on the basis of these 
beliefs and one's wants. That is, what is required is the ability to judge the 
alternatives one considers in a way conducive to the satisfaction of one's 
desires, i.e. the capacity of rational deliberation. Decision competence is also a 
matter of degrees, since one may possess a more or less clear picture of what 
one wants, how this may be achieved, which options are open in a situation, 
how these rate in terms of desire-fulfilment, and, on top of this, one may be 
more or less able to process this information into a decision. 
This takes us to the last component in the conception of autonomy: 
efficiency. Efficiency is about acting so that one carries out what one has 
decided. A number of factors affect the efficiency of a person. One of these is 
how well founded the beliefs underlying one's choice are. If one has 
incomplete or erroneous information, one is more likely to take a course of 
action that is inefficient for the realization of one's decision. Another factor is 
inner obstacles, for instance in the form of obsessions, that stand in the way of 
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effectuating one's decisions. Also external obstacles, for instance coercive 
measures from others, can affect the efficiency component. Other people can 
also help a person to become more efficient by helping to develop the 
capacities required to effectuate the person's decisions. 
As will be elaborated to a greater extent in chapter HL, this conception can be 
used to formulate different, and sometimes competing, ideals of autonomy. 
Regarding ideals of autonomy that conceives of autonomy as a value that 
should be promoted, I will present two basic ideals: the ideal of self-realization 
and the ideal of capacity. 
The ideal of self-realization claims that the value of autonomy consists in 
actually living one's life in accordance with one's basic authentic desires, 
through one's own decisions and actions. Crudely put, the more a person in 
fact succeeds in achieving or realizing her basic authentic desires, the more 
autonomous she is. And the more autonomous the person is (in this regard) 
the better it is for that person, ceteris paribus. A person's degree of autonomy 
is then a function of the realized basic desire's authenticity, (the more authentic 
they are, the more autonomous the person becomes given their realization), 
number and strength in comparison with the non-realized basic desire's 
authenticity, number and strength. In other words, the more "important" 
(strong) and "self-governed" (authentic) desires that the person succeed in 
achieving of the desires she has, the more autonomous she is and, in virtue of 
this, the better off she is. This ideal captures the idea that the good thing about 
autonomy is to actually succeed in living the life one wants to live. The 
decision competence and efficiency of the person will causally influence the 
extent to which the person is autonomous in this sense. However, decision 
competence and efficiency does not have to be ascribed a value of their own, 
according to this ideal. 
The ideal of capacity says that the value of autonomy consists in being an 
autonomous person. This is a person with authentic desires, and enough decision 
competence and efficiency to implement these desires. The autonomous 
person, then, has the capacity required to independently consider her own 
basic projects and values, make decisions on the basis of them and realize 
them through her own action. This ideal is thus to a great extent an ideal of 
character. An autonomous person is one who is not weak of will, self-
deceiving, confused, phobic, irrational, and so on, since all these things tend to 
destroy autonomy in the capacity sense. This ideal also emphasises not being 
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manipulated, coerced or in other ways prevented by others to realize one's 
plans of life. Also this ideal makes autonomy a matter of degree. The more 
authentic, decision competent and efficient I am, the better for me. The value, 
then, is to be such a person that can b e self-realized, i.e. a person possessing 
such capacities required for self-realization (but not necessarily one who 
makes use of them). 
On the basis of this, we may now pose the question about the extent to which 
autonomy may be promoted by presymptomatic genetic testing in a more 
precise way. The issue to address is to what extent such testing would promote 
self-realization or those capacities of a person that make her capable of self-
realization. 
2.3.1 Positive values 
We have already seen claims to the effect that promotion of autonomy in fact 
is a possible advantage of presymptomatic genetic testing (11.2.3). The 
conception and the ideals of autonomy as a value presented here put us in a 
position to formulate and evaluate these claims more precisely. As will be 
seen, in terms of self-realization and the capacity for this, these claims actually 
do seem warranted. 
First, presymptomatic genetic testing may result in the index-person realizing 
her basic desires to a greater extent. Perhaps most obviously, this can be the 
result of improving the person's efficiency, i.e. the person's ability to 
implement, through her own action, what she has decided. This is so since 
presymptomatic genetic testing results in information, the knowledge of 
which may be relevant to decision-making. And knowledge relevant to a 
decision can increase the ability to live in accordance with one's basic desires 
and thus promote self-realization. 
In order to further corroborate this, consider the following example. Jill is 
in her thirties and is facing an important crossroad in her life. She is 
considering embarking on a n ew carrier as a doctor and possibly a r esearcher 
in medicine. This would require her to complete a very long and arduous 
education. Up till this time, she has been working as a clerk in a store, an 
occupation she has been satisfied with and that has left her with considerable 
spare time to engage in her time consuming hobby, leading an amateur theatre 
group. She, let us assume, realistically thinks that this hobby would be 
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incompatible with the career plans and has therefore decided to give one of 
her cherished projects up. Now, a few years back, her mother was diagnosed 
with Huntington's disease and the mother's condition is rapidly deteriorating. 
Jill therefore knows that she may be a carrier, possibly facing the same destiny 
in a perhaps not too distant future. She is considering going through with 
presymptomatic genetic testing, since she thinks that the information provided 
by the test is relevant to her decision of whether or not to embark on the new 
career. If the test is positive, she suspects that she will not have enough time to 
complete her education, and certainly not enough time to reap the benefits of 
it, before symptoms become grave enough. 
Let us assume that Jill's assessment of her own capabilities and time is 
correct: she will not have the time to complete her education if she is a carrier 
of the gene for Huntington's disease. Let us furthermore assume that both of 
her projects, the career and the hobby, are basic and authentic, so their 
achievement would boost her self-realization. Let us furthermore assume that 
if she does not go through with testing, she will take a chance and start her 
education. We also assume that, alas, she is a c arrier of the gene and that a test 
thus would be positive. It now seems obvious that the test will help her to 
realize her basic plans, projects and desires to a gre ater extent. This is so, since 
the test will he lp her to avoid a p roject she cannot succeed in accomplishing. 
Faced with the test result, she will gain good reasons for continuing to engage 
herself in her hobby and stick with her "bread job", something she would 
have given up for no good without testing. 
The general point of the example is the one made by Takala and Chadwick 
above: the knowledge that can be provided by presymptomatic genetic testing 
can increase one's ability to plan and live one's life in accordance with one's 
own basic desires. Now we can see why this is so more precisely in terms of 
autonomy: knowledge can increase one's possibility to choose a line of 
conduct that more efficiently realizes one's basic desires. One is more likely to 
fail in the realization of one's plans if one has false beliefs about one's future. 
So information can contribute to the efficiency of a person and thus, 
indirectly, to her self-realization. This is not only true of career planning in 
particular, but holds generally for all areas in which genetic information may 
be relevant, e.g. family planning. 
In the example of Jill, genetic information from presymptomatic genetic 
testing helped a person fulfil the ideal of self-realization to a greater extent, i.e., 
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helped her live a life that was more in accordance with her authentic and basic 
desires, than she would have, had she not had access to the information 
provided by the test. But presymptomatic genetic testing can also help the 
person to become a more autonomous per son, in terms of the ideal of capacity. As 
Jill's example shows, a person may become more efficient, i.e. m ore capable of 
realizing her decisions, as a result of presymptomatic genetic testing, since the 
information made her more able to take an efficient route towards her ends. 
She may also become more decision competent due to the information 
provided by the test, i.e. increase her capacity to make choices on the basis of 
her desires and beliefs. As we have seen, a person's capacity to choose an 
alternative from her desires and beliefs is displayed in the psychological 
process of deliberation. This process may be facilitated by more information. 
For instance, sometimes one knows what one values, but is unsure about how 
to realize this. More information on how to accomplish such a realization may 
then make it easier to make a decision on what to do in order to accomplish 
this realization. One example, similar to the one of Jill, is when one has two 
central life projects, but only wants to invest the time and effort needed to 
realize these projects if there is a reasonable chance of success. And, just like 
the case of Jill, the substantial risk of future (genetic) disease may be crucial to 
future chances of success for one of these projects. The information of this 
can then help one, not only making a choice that is more likely to succeed, but 
to make a choice at all. T his is so, since it is sometimes psychologically easier 
to make a decision if one has enough information to form a more definite 
picture of what will happen given different decisions. That is, uncertainty may 
be paralysing and thus damaging to the capacity to make decisions. 
Furthermore, genetic information from presymptomatic genetic testing can 
make a person more authentic, since knowledge in general may be helpful in 
"making up one's mind", i.e. in seeing and formulating what one really wants. 
An example that may be interpreted as an indication of this psychological 
mechanism is the often-cited reports of people asked if they would like to 
know about their genetic risks (Chadwick et al, 1997, p 2; Takala, 2000, p 58). 
Many say that they would, but when testing is offered, much fewer actually 
uses this possibility. One possible interpretation of this behaviour is that at 
least some of the people who chooses to reject testing once that they can 
really h ave it, have more carefully considered what they really wants in light of 
the knowledge of the possibility of testing. As will be seen in the next chapter, 
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some plausible views of authenticity would not require that one actually has 
such knowledge, but only that one would uphold the desire in question if one 
had it (I3I.2.2.2).32 However, in that case, the information can be seen as 
contributing to decision competence. 
Nevertheless, the informadon resulting from presymptomatic genetic 
testing can be helpful in exposing some desires as less authentic. Let us change 
the example of Jill slightly, assuming that once she receives the positive result, 
she feels a great relief because she now realises that the medical career was not 
something she really wanted after all. R ather, she begins to understand that this 
"desire" to have a c areer was a result of her family's pressure that she "should 
do something with her life". However, she resisted seeing this when the 
option of a career was still open. Furthermore, knowledge of genetic 
susceptibility to disease may also encourage an evaluation of one's basic aims 
and desires, which may be argued to promote authenticity (HI.2.2.2), or at least, 
the ability of a person to discard inauthentic desires (which may promote 
efficiency). 
So, genetic information from presymptomatic genetic testing can make a 
person realize her authentic and basic desires to a greater extent and can make 
her more efficient, decision competent and authentic and, thus, a more 
autonomous person. 
2.3.2 Negative values 
The claim that presymptomatic genetic tests can reduce or damage autonomy 
is less common than the claim they can promote it. However: 
If we understand autonomy... as empowerment ... it might be argued 
that that genetic knowledge is not empowering, at least not always... 
(Chadwick, 1997, p 19) 
Other have similarly remarked that increased (genetic) knowledge does not 
necessarily increase autonomy:33 
32 Even if I myself am inclined to accept the view that actual knowledge would increase 
autonomy even more (III.2.2.2). 
33 See also Munthe, 2002, p 85. 
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The fact that a person receives new and relevant information does not 
in itself justify a c laim of enhancement of autonomy."(Husted, 1997, p 
63) 
Claims such as these also seem warranted. Perhaps most obviously, the 
autonomy of a person may be reduced, if she does not understand the 
information received properly. This is an important point. If the patient 
receives information without understanding, the information cannot be used 
to make better predictions about the future and cannot thus be helpful in 
order to realize her basic aims. In general, misinterpretation decreases the 
possibility of achieving aims, for the same reason as knowledge increases the 
possibility: knowledge of what will happen increases and ignorance of this 
decreases the possibility of taking an efficient route in the realization of one's 
aims.34 For instance, interpreting a positive test BRCA1 as indicative of being 
sick already,35 or as a c ertain result that one will be sick in the future, may make 
one give up plans that one could have realized. Misinterpretation of test results 
can also result in omission of much needed treatment, if the significance36 of 
the test is underestimated, or in unnecessary anxiety and depression, if the 
significance of the test is overestimated. So, in general, it seems that the 
positive values of genetic testing are dependent on the proper understanding 
of them. Otherwise it seems as though they are likely to produce negative 
values of well-being (anxiety or depression) and autonomy, since, as will be 
argued shortly, such emotional states may be detrimental to autonomy as well. 
Attaining proper understanding is often especially problematic regarding 
genetic information. This is partly due to the information often being 
emotionally charged, being as it is about future disease of a, sometimes, 
terminal nature. Information that is likely to produce powerful emotions of 
fear and anxiety or of strong relief and joy (shoul d the test be negative) are less 
likely t o be understood properly. Moreover, genetic information is often risk 
information. The literature on the difficulty of understanding and interpreting 
genetic risk information is vast.37 This is not only due to patient's problems 
understanding risk-information. There is also reason to be cautious of the risk-
34 This point is even more obvious regarding false test results. 
35 Which sometimes happens. See Adelswärd & Sachs, 2002, p 76. 
36 With significance in this context I mean the severity of the disease and the probability for it 
that the test reveals. 
37 See Adelswärd & Sachs, 2002, for an overview. 
62 
estimations in genetics, since there is reason to believe that they often are 
overestimated (1.4.3).38 
But even if they are not, and the risk-estimations given are adequate, there 
are many problems of understanding risk and relating it to one's own decision­
making. First, it can be difficult to see the relevance of a numerical risk-figure 
that is based on genetics and statistical population-studies to one's own 
situation. But being able to make the connection between a g eneral risk-figure 
and one's own situation is crucial in order to determine what one should do 
oneself on the basis of the information. Second, several studies show that 
people often try to simplify numerical measures to rough estimations, 
interpreting risks as 'fifty-fifty' when they are not, and translating recurrence 
rates "into 'binary' views - it either will or will not happen" (Shiloh, 1996, p 
88). Third, there is the well-known and often-cited example of people's 
attitude towards risk being affected only by presenting risk differently: the 
formulation of risk in "positive" CX percent chance of survival') or "negative" 
('100-X percent risk of dying') terms can affect the estimation of the 
seriousness of risk, making people more inclined to take the risk if it is 
formulated positively (Beauchamp & Childress, 2001, p 90). Because of all this, 
to ensure understanding when it comes to genetic information seems crucial 
for its prospect of promoting the autonomy of people. I will return to this 
when discussing genetic counselling (II.3). From this we can also conclude that 
information as such is insufficient for the promotion of autonomy. It is also 
necessary that the information have been properly understood. Otherwise, 
information rather increases the risk of reduction of autonomy. 
However, even if properly understood and not confusing in itself, genetic 
information may still reduce autonomy. In fact, there are at least two ways in 
which genetic information relevant to a person's decision-making can decrease 
that person's autonomy. First, avoiding genetic information can be a basic 
desire. If one receives genetic information while having an authentic and basic 
desire not to, this is clearly a reduction of one's autonomy. To be true, having 
one's autonomy promoted in other respects may counterbalance this 
reduction. However, it is an open question to what extent this should be seen 
38 This is so, since the risk-numbers are based on the correlation between a gene and disorder in a 
population and the selection of the persons that has been investigated are very likely t o be biased 
in favour of a positive correlation, since those are detected first. This is p robably true of BRCA1 
and BRCA2 (see Adelswärd & Sachs, 2002, p 66 for further references). 
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as morally justified, since different normative ideas may assess the relative 
importance of respecting and promoting autonomy differently. This issue will 
be further clarified in chapter HL, and developed in the chapters on rights 
(chapters IV and V). Second, genetic information can get in the way of realizing 
one's other basic desires and/or being an autonomous person. Since this other 
possibility seems less obvious, I will d evelop it. 
There are two ways genetic information can get in the way of realizing 
one's other basic desires and/or being an autonomous person. First, it may 
harm one's psychological well-being in a way that has negative effects on the 
autonomy of a person. Second, it may give rise to "faulty choices". 
To begin with the first point, we have seen that presymptomatic genetic 
testing may have adverse psychological consequences. For instance, it may 
result in depression. A typical reaction of depression is that it becomes 
difficult to realize one's plans, since both one's capacity to make decisions and 
one's capacity to act on these decisions can be seriously impaired.39 We have 
also seen that genetic information may result in confusion, which may make it 
difficult to evaluate one's alternatives, and thus damaging one's decision 
competence. So, both in terms of the ideal of self-realization and capacity, 
genetic information may be harmful. To see this, consider the case of Jolene.40 
Jolene is a writer. Several of her female relatives on her mother's side, 
including her mother, have contracted breast cancer in their adult years. 
Therefore Jolene's sister took part in a genetic study, which established that 
she is a carrier of the mutation BRCA1 (1.4.2). When the study was done, Jolene 
was asked to test herself. Jolene declined, however. She knows that she has a 
predisposition for depression. She underwent periods of deep depression in 
her adolescence, when her mother contracted breast cancer. She then became 
unable to live a n active life for several years. She therefore considers herself to 
have good grounds for believing that a test that would show her to be a c arrier 
of the gene would make her equally, if not more, depressed. She is on the 
verge of finishing her great novel. This project she considers to be her most 
important aim in life. She therefore declines the test in order to be able to 
realize one of her basic aims of life (which, we may take for granted, is an 
authentic one too). 
39 
"Weakness of will" in the sense of lacking the "motivation" (e.g. energy and self-esteem) 
required to realize one's plans is a part of being depressed. See Smith, 1994, p 120-121. 
40 I will return to this example (see V.3.1.1). 
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Let us assume that Jolene is not mistaken about her own reaction that a 
positive result would make her too depressed to finish the book. Assume that 
a test would be positive, but that if she were to contract cancer eventually 
without being tested, she would have finished the book before that. In 
addition, assuming that she has no life plans that would be promoted by 
testing, she will really realize her basic plans to a greater extent without 
testing.41 This means that genetic testing will make her life worse in terms of 
the ideal of self-realization. Furthermore, since her capacity to act on her 
decisions and her decision competence would diminish as a result of her 
depression, she would become a less autonomous person, leading a life worse 
in terms of the ideal of capacity. 
Moreover, even without the negative consequences of well-being that can 
damage autonomy, information may lead persons to make "faulty" choices in 
terms of realizing their own authentic and basic goals, thus leading a life that is 
worse according to the ideal of self-realization. Consider once again the 
example of Jill, who abandoned the option of education and career in light of 
a positive test result of Huntington's disease. However, let us change the 
example slightly, now supposing she had made incorrect estimations of time: 
in fact, if she embarks on the career option, she will have in fact have time to 
complete her education and engage in a successful career for some time 
before symptoms become too grave. If we assume her career plan to be more 
important to her than her hobby and continue to assume that she will abandon 
her career plan because of the test result, she will in fact lead a life where she 
realizes her authentic and basic goals to a lesser degree than she would have 
without testing. 
The example will have the same implications if we instead assume that she 
has underestimated her capabilities: in fact she is capable of realizing both 
plans. It is not unlikely that an exaggerated perception of one's future as bleak, 
manifesting itself in e.g. underestimation of time and capacity, is a result of 
receiving the "death sentence" a positive test can be perceived as. And the risk 
of this may increase the earlier before onset one gets the result. 
Furthermore, especially positive results may damage one's authenticity, by 
"forcing" or "tricking" one, psychologically, into seeing some options as more 
attractive than what is actually reflected by the strength of one's desires. Think 
41 This could be true even if she had a negative test result, if we assume that she were paralysed by 
such a r esult, due to feelings "survivor's guilt" towards her sister. 
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about a woman planning to start a family and having children, receiving the 
result that she is a carrier of BRCA1. This may give rise to a felt obligation not 
to bring "sick" children into the world.42 If this feeling is a result of social 
pressure and fear, rather than considered judgement on what life one wants to 
lead, acting on this is (probably) to act on an inauthentic desire (HI.2.2.1 an d 
m.2.2.3). 
2.4 Concluding remarks on the value of presymptomatic genetic testing 
We have now seen various positive and negative values presymptomatic 
genetic testing can realize for the tested person. The positive values are reasons 
for the person in favour of testing and the negative values are reasons against 
testing. If one grants the traditional view that the ultimate rationale for 
providing testing to start with is the value for the tested persons, the possible 
positive and negative values are also arguments for and against offering testing 
in the first place. 
I have argued that the positive and negative values that I have taken from the 
existing literature are about well-being and autonomy. However, some of the 
values that I have discussed are rarely mentioned: perhaps most obviously, the 
general remarks about genetic information not necessarily being conducive to 
autonomy (II.2.3.2). The analysis of the conception and different moral ideals 
of autonomy I briefly presented showed why these general remarks are 
plausible. I will elaborate further on this analysis in the next chapter, which 
will further underpin this claim. This, in turn, shows that declining genetic 
information is not necessarily in conflict with moral ideals emphasising the 
importance of autonomy, contrary to what some authors have claimed (Harris 
& Keywood, 2001; Rhodes, 1998). I will return to this in chapters to come (see 
V.3.1.1). 
The discussed values and negative values of presymptomatic genetic testing 
can be summarized in the following list. 
42 This reaction does not seem to be uncommon. See Adelswärd & Sachs, 2002, p 108. 
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Table H Positive and negative values that may result from presymptomatic 
genetic testing (for the index-person that receives the information that results 
from the test)  
Positive values of presymptomatic genetic testing 
General (regardless of whether the test is negative or positive) 
• Psychological well-being 
The index-person does not have to suffer the anxiety of uncertainty. 
• Autonomy 
Possibility to plan life in accordance with one's own basic desires (e.g. plans 
about carrier, family formation, reproduction). 
Becoming more authentic, competent, and efficient. 
Of positive results 
• Health-related well-being 
Preventive measures to avoid, ameliorate or delay the onset of symptoms of 
genetic disease. 
• Psychological well-being 
The index-person strengthens emotional bonds with other carriers in family. 
Time for psychological adjustment to cope with the (more or less p robable) 
disease. 
Of negative results 
• Health-related well-being 
Avoidance of unnecessary medical procedures that may be harmful. 
• Psychological well-being 
Avoidance of burdensome preventive measures and health controls for the 
disease in question. 
Feeling of relief fo r not being a carrier if one has suspected that one might be 
before testing. 
Reduction of anxiety (e.g. for the disease in question, for burdensome 
preventive measures (if there are any), for stigmatisation, for knowledge of 
possibility to pass genetic disorder on to children). 
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Negative values of presymptomatic genetic testing 
General (regardless of whether the test is negative or positive) 
• Psychological negative well-being 
Unwelcome change in self-image. 
Strained family relations. 
Distressing confusion over content of result. 
• Reduction of autonomy 
Reduced possibility to plan life in accordance with one's own basic desires 
(e.g. plans about carrier, family formation, reproduction), due to e.g. 
confusion and depression caused by test result. 
Autonomy reduction as a direct result of unwanted test result. 
"Faulty choices" as a result of knowledge of test results. 
Becoming less authentic, competent, and efficient, due to e.g. confusion and 
depression caused by test result. 
Of positive results 
• Psychological negative well-being 
Anxiety (e.g. for the disease in question, for burdensome preventive measures 
(if there are any), for stigmatisation, for knowledge of possibility to pass 
genetic disorder on to children). 
Depression. 
Feelings of isolation and self-stigmatism. 
Loss of well-being due to being stigmatised and discriminated by family or 
society at large (e.g. in surance companies and employers). 
Of negative results 
• Psychological negative well-being 
Feelings of distress for not being a carrier if one has expected that one might 
be before testing (e.g. feeling not being the proper subject of the care of 
others, feeling of demanding obligation "to do something with one's life"). 
Survivor's guilt. 
Feelings of isolation from other family members. 
I do not have an ambition to exhaust all possible positive and negative values 
of presymptomatic genetic testing with this list. Moreover, as the discussion 
above showed, the specific items on the list are of rather different kinds. For 
instance, the first item under the heading of general psychological negative 
well-being mentions "unwelcome change in self-image", which is by 
conceptual necessity directly detrimental to well-being.43 On the other hand, 
43 At least according to preferentialism, which will be presented later in this chapter (see II.4.1.2). 
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the "strained family relations"-item is something that is presumed to cause a 
reduction of well-being in most cases, while not being a reducdon per se. 
However, despite thus being both heterogeneously organized and 
incomplete, the list does contain such items that have in fact bee n mentioned 
in the debate. Moreover, it should be taken to serve as a rough classification 
that can be used as a starting po int for a fuller and more systematised account 
of the possible advantages and disadvantages of testing for the index-person. 
Another important point of the foregoing discussion, which has also governed 
the organization of the list, is that all the specific positive and negative values 
put forward in the debate really boils down to two basic and classic values of 
medical ethics, namely well-being and autonomy. If that argument and the 
analysis of the values presented here are accepted from a moral point of view, 
the heterogeneity just m entioned is in fact a chimera. What matters are these 
two basic values a nd because of this, we have an instrument to evaluate the 
practice of presymptomatic testing: it is acceptable to the extent that it is 
conducive to these values and should be designed t o promote them and avoid 
their reduction. 
Of course, it will be difficult in practice to determine whether a certain 
practice is conducive in this way, since there are methodological problems 
with predicting the effects of particular tests and to measure the presence of 
the respective values.44 Furthermore, in order to determine how the values 
should be promoted, one has to settle normative questions, for instance about 
the importance of respecting and promoting autonomy respectively, autonomy 
as compared to well-being, and the issue of the just distribution of values 
among the affected parties. These kinds of questions will be repeatedly 
addressed in coming chapters. 
However, the discussion above nevertheless does indicate a number of 
conclusions of direct relevance to the practice of presymptomatic genetic 
testing. One such conclusion is that the justificatory basis for some types of 
testing is weaker than for others. For instance, the basis for performing 
presymptomatic genetic testing fo r diseases for which there are no preventive 
measures whatsoever are weaker than testing for diseases for which there are 
44 The measurement of autonomy will be discussed in the next chapter (III.3.2.3). The 
measurement of well-being is a much debated question. See Resnik, 1987, p 81-100, for a 
discussion of measurement of preferentialistic well-being and Tännsjö, 1998b, p 67-77 for a 
discussion of measurement of hedonistic well-being. 
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such measures (H.2.1). T his is so simply because there are no health-related 
reasons to perform these tests. Since the "therapeutic gap" (1.1), i.e. the gap 
between our ability to test for diseases and to treat them, is large especially 
regarding monogenetic diseases, this point applies to a great number of such 
diseases, for instance Huntington's disease, and some forms of hereditary 
Alzheimer's.45 
It would thus be impossible to justify testing for such conditions if the 
only point of health care was to cure, ameliorate or prevent disease. All this 
evokes the intriguing but difficult question of what the goals of health care in 
fact should be, a question far too extensive to discuss here. Nevertheless, it is a 
question that ultimately must be tackled in order to finally answer if, and to 
what extent, health care should provide presymptomatic testing. Another result 
of the discussion is, then, to point out the questions that still need answers. 
In addition, the discussion indicates that the justificatory basis for 
presymptomatic genetic testing becomes weaker the more uncertain the test in 
question is. This is true of uncertainty in two senses: risk of false positives and 
negatives, i.e. reliability, and the likelihood of the disease, i.e. predictability. 
This is so, since the more uncertain a certain test is in any of these senses, the 
less likely it is to be advantageous and the more likely it is to be 
disadvantageous in terms of autonomy and well-being. This is so since the 
more uncertain a test is, the less likely it is to remove possible anxiety of 
uncertainty and the less useful it will be in making predictions about the 
future that may be useful for the planning of one's life in accordance with 
one's own basic desires and the implementation of medical preventive 
measures conducive to health. And despite the uncertainty of the test, it may 
still lead to anxiety, depression, feelings of isolation and self-stigmatism, 
discrimination and stigmatisation. This makes the prospect of defending 
testing for many multifactorial diseases very bleak indeed, since the 
predictability of these diseases will be low. This factor might be 
counterbalanced by the presence of effective preventive measures to take in 
order to reduce the possibility of onset of the disease in question (if there are 
any). However, if these measures are burdensome and risky in themselves, it 
may be argued that either it would be indefensible to apply them on the basis 
of very uncertain predictions, or they may be applied to people without the 
need for prior testing. 
45 See Harper, 2001, Part II, for further examples. 
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Another general conclusion that the discussion indicates is that the way and 
the context in which the test result is disclosed is of the utmost importance 
for what positive and negative values will be realized. I draw here on empirical 
research to which I have referred earlier (II.2.2-II.2.3). But it should come as no 
surprise that e.g. stress can distort decision-making and thus autonomy, and that 
stress can be evoked by shortage of time or lack of understanding. This 
emphasises the relevance of the way information is disclosed and the need to 
have a setting in which genetic information is disclosed in a manner 
conducive to the values that testing can realize. I will return to this when 
discussing genetic counselling below. Also, wider concerns of the context of 
disclosure arise. Societal attitudes will determine the level of stigmatisation that 
can result from a positive test and societal institutions the level of 
discrimination. This underlines the point that the context of disclosure will 
affect to what extent positive and negative values will be realized. I will return 
to the question of the impact of societal institutions on the value for the 
individual already in the next section (see II.3.3.1 and II.3.3.2). 
Furthermore, a general conclusion is that proper understanding of 
information seems to be a particularly important prerequisite for promoting 
the positive values and avoiding the negative values (see H2.3.2). This is 
important to notice, since it underlines that the value of presymptomatic 
genetic testing will not so much be a result of disclosure of information as 
such. Rather, it is the individual's possibilities to use the information that in 
various ways can be conducive to her well-being and autonomy and that thus 
determines the prospect of presymptomatic genetic testing for being a 
reasonable health care practice at all. 
Finally, the discussion reveals that the goals of presymptomatic genetic testing 
may come into conflict, both within and between persons. First, health-related 
well-being may be both promoted and reduced by the very same measure 
taken as a result of testing. For instance, a person may be both damaged and 
saved as a result of prophylactic mastectomy. Second, there is a potential 
conflict between health-related and psychological well-being, since a person 
may be benefited medically but at the same time depressed as a result of 
presymptomatic genetic testing. Third, there is a potential conflict between 
well-being and autonomy, to which we will return (see H3.4.1). Fourth, there 
are various conflicts of autonomy, for instance since not respecting someone's 
autonomy at one time may promote her autonomy in the long run, and 
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respecting her autonomy at one time may reduce her autonomy in the long 
run. I will return to this possibility as well. Furthermore, all these conflicts 
may arise interpersonally. Due to all these potential conflicts, there is reason 
indeed to try to ponder how they should be solved, i.e. to ponder the morality 
of presymptomatic genetic testing. To start with, we will consider the ethical 
issues of the pracdce surrounding much presymptomadc genedc tesdng: 
genetic counselling. 
3. The value of genetic counselling 
As we have seen, the way in which genetic information retrieved through 
presymptomatic genetic testing is presented can affect the decision-making of 
the recipient of that information (H2.3.2). This means that whether or not the 
positive values of presymptomatic genetic testing are in fact realized, and 
whether or not the negative values are avoided, depends not only on the 
content of the information, but also on the manner in which it is disclosed. 
To be more precise, three factors besides the content of the information 
seems to be relevant to the perception of genetic information and hence the 
way it will be subsequently used: the sender, the formulation of the 
information (the message), and the receiver. The values, beliefs, attitudes, and 
behaviour of the sender can affect how the receiver perceives the information. 
For instance, the identity of the sender may be of importance, e.g. if she is 
regarded as an authority according to the social standards applicable in a 
particular case. In addition, the values, beliefs, and attitudes of the sender will 
probably affect what she emphasises and how she presents the information.46 
This regards not only the linguistic form in which the information is 
presented, but also aspects such as body language. And, as we have seen, the 
presentation of the information (which, in turn, is affected pardy by the 
sender) can affect the perception of it. For instance, the formulation of risk in 
"positive" or "negative" terms can affect the estimation of the seriousness of 
risk (II.2.3.2). Furthermore, the values, beliefs, and attitudes of the receiver will 
affect her perception of the information, e.g. risk perception is often affected 
by perception of seriousness of outcome, and not just it s likelihood (Michie & 
46 The finding of an investigation of the directiveness of genetic counselling indicates this: the 
explanation to the fact that counsellors tend to be more directive towards those with low socio­
economic status indicates that the beliefs and attitudes of the counsellors affects the way they 
present information (Michie et al, 1997). 
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Marteau, 1996, p 107). Furthermore, the recently mentioned factor of the 
sender's identity is, of course, also dependent on the receiver's perception. 
Let us call the three factors of sender, message, and receiver the situation of 
disclosure. Genetic counselling is a practice that aims at designing the situation of 
disclosure so that it is conducive to promoting the positive and reducing the 
negative values of (presymptomatic) genetic testing. It then works under the 
assumption that how information is disclosed and processed is crucial for the 
realization of this aim. As we will see, studies of the practice of genetic 
counselling seem to have rendered some empirical support for this 
assumption. 
Much has been said on what genetic counselling is and what the ultimate goals 
of the practice should be, and not all of these accounts coincide.47 However, 
there seems to be considerable consensual overlapping on the nature and goal 
of the practice.48 For instance, the following characterisation of genetic 
counselling is, I think, fairly uncontroversial: "Broadly speaking, genetic 
counselling is a communication process aimed at helping people with 
problems associated with genetic disorders or the risk of these in their 
family."49 (Michie & Marteau, 1996, p 104) 
In the following, after a very brief historical account of the practice of 
genetic counselling, which hopefully will provide some clarification of why 
the goals or values of genetic counselling are embraced, I will give a more 
precise description of what genetic counselling involves, and what the goals of 
genetic counselling are usually taken to be. I will then consider the ethos of 
genetic counselling, which I think is most naturally seen as more specific 
47 For instance, see Michie & Marteau, 1996, p 104-105 for different definitions of genetic 
counselling, either in terms of the objectives or the process of the practice. Compare also 
Munthe, 1999, p 82-85, who emphasises autonomy as the goal of genetic counselling and 
Brandberg, 2003, who emphasises psychological well-being as the goal of genetic counselling. 
Further accounts that emphasises different aspects of the practice can be found in Clarke, 1994. 
48 In order to keep within the "received wisdom" on what genetic counselling is and should be, I 
will dr aw heavily on Piatt Walker, 1998. The fact that her text is a textbook account of genetic 
counselling should suffice to ensure that the account of genetic counselling is a reasonably 
"standard" one. 
49 Michie & Marteau, 1996, p 104, thus presupposes that it is th e family as a collective entity that 
genetic counselling aims at helping. I will for now remain neutral on the issues of whether, and 
what parts of, the family that should be included in genetic counselling and thus assume that the 
index-person can be alone. The question of whether the family should be included cannot be 
setded by definition. 
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norms and rules of thumb, the compliance to which allegedly will tend to 
promote the goals and values of genetic counselling. As we will see, some of 
these norms are really about society at large, giving rise to questions about what 
characterises the good and just societ y, questions that cannot be tackled within 
the discussion of the value of genetic counselling.50 The focus of my 
treatment will instead be the much-debated idea of non-directive genetic 
counselling. While doing that, I will elaborate some of the possible conflicts 
of values in general and autonomy in particular. These conflicts will also give 
rise to larger questions, like what the aims of health care in general should be. I 
will in this section also say something of how the ethos of genetic counselling 
should be evaluated. On the basis of this, I will, to some extent, argue that 
genetic counselling, at least if some requirements on the practice are assumed 
to be met, can be an efficient way to realize the positive and avoid the negative 
values of presymptomatic genetic testing. 
3.1 The history of genetic counselling 
The history of genetic counselling runs parallel to the history of genetics.51 
The rapidly growing possibilities to predict and diagnose genetic disorders 
have created a need for a pr actice that can explain and give support to patients 
who are faced with the suspicion of hereditary disease. Genetic counselling 
has developed to answer to these growing needs. During the last decades, 
genetic counselling has developed from an activity normally performed by 
clinical geneticists to a profession of its own, providing a service that 
combines elements of the professions of geneticist, social worker, 
psychologist and administrator (Piatt Walker, 1998, p 2). 
It is customary to claim that Sheldon Reed introduced the term "genetic 
counselling" in 1947.52 He considered it to be vital to provide genetic 
information while withholding advice, leaving the ultimate decision on what 
to do to the patient. Another root of today's genetic counselling is 
psychoanalyst Carl Roger's client-centred psychotherapy, which gave the 
patient (or client) the role of controlling "the agenda, pacing and direction of 
therapy" (Oduncu, 2002, p 56) These ideas are clearly connected to the idea of 
protecting and promoting autonomy being a primary task for genetic 
50 However, these kinds of questions will receive s ome attention in chapter VII. 
51 For an overview of the history of genetics, see Connor & Ferguson-Smith, 1997, p 3-8. 
52 See e.g. Oduncu, 2002, p 54; Piatt Walker, 1998, p 2; Resta, 1997, p 255. 
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counselling: the patient's values and wants should dictate counselling and 
decisions. 
It is a widespread opinion that this emphasis on autonomy and the client 
taking centre stage is largely due to the eugenics movement and the massive 
abuses that this movement was responsible for.53 Eugenics was socially 
implemented studies and programs, which aimed at improving the "genetic 
quality" of the population by trying to eliminate undesired traits from the 
gene-pool. These programs, which flourished throughout the developed 
world during a large part of the 20th century, were regularly based on 
ignorance of genetic mechanisms together with the adoption of political 
agendas of racial or population hygiene. The gross atrocities that were made in 
the name of eugenics are well documented,54 ranging from "advising" 
mentally retarded and social misfits not to reproduce, prohibition of marriage, 
compulsory sterilisation, all the way to the Holocaust, where 70.000 people 
with hereditary disorders were murdered, besides Jews and others (Piatt 
Walker, 1998, p 3). 
The urge to avoid eugenics has been a strong motivating force in the 
genetic counselling of today. This explains the strong emphasis on "genetic 
counselling as a service aimed at meeting the needs of individuals rather than 
society, the nation, the population, the race, the gene-pool or some other 
abstract entity." (Munthe, 1999, p 82) This also explains the emphasis on 
autonomy, leaving it entirely up to the individual what decisions, including 
reproductive one's, to make in the light of genetic information. 
3.2 The nature and goals of genetic counselling 
If there ever were a standard account of what genetic counselling is, it must be 
the following often-cited one55 from Fraser, 1974, that was adopted by the 
American Society of Human Genetics in 1975: 
53 Resta, 1997, p 257, seems to deny this. He argues this by showing that Reed and other clinical 
geneticists responsible for the practice of today still had "eugenic" opinions. However, this seems 
to me to be compatible with wanting to avoid eugenics by focusing on patient's autonomy. I 
rather think that they favoured what Piatt Walker, 1998, p 3, calls the medical/preventive model 
of genetic counselling, which has some paternalistic features. 
54 The objective here is not to present or discuss the massive literature on eugenics or its effects 
o n  t o d a y ' s  g e n e t i c  c o u n s e l l i n g ,  b u t  o n l y  t o  p r o v i d e  a  br i e f  b a c k g r o u n d  o n  w h y  a u t o n o m y  a n d  
individual well-being is at the heart of genetic counselling. For further reading and references, see 
Buchanan et al, 2000, p 30-40. 
55 See e.g. Michie & Marteau, 1996, p 104-105; Oduncu, 2002, p 54; Piatt Walker, 1998, p 5. 
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Genetic counseling is a communication process which deals with the 
human problems associated with the occurrence or risk of occurrence 
of a genetic disorder in a family. This process involves an attempt by 
one or more appropriately trained persons to help the individual or 
family to: (1) comprehend the medical facts including the diagnosis, 
probable course of the disorder, and the available treatment, (2) 
appreciate the way heredity contributes to the disorder and the 
recurrence in specified relatives, (3) understand the alternatives for 
dealing with the risk of recurrence, (4) choose a c ourse of action which 
seems to them appropriate in the view of their risk, their family goals, 
and their ethical and religious standards and act in accordance with that 
decision, and (5) to make the best possible adjustment to the disorder in 
an affected family member and/or to the risk of recurrence of that 
disorder. (Fraser, 1974, p 637) 
This account has sometimes been described as a "definition" of genetic 
counselling (Michie & Marteau, 1996, p 104; Piatt Walker, 1998, p 5). I will not 
enter a debate on whether it is a definition in the rigid traditional sense of 
strictly necessary and sufficient conditions for the proper application of a 
notion in every possible situation. It could for instance be questioned if the 
emphasis of the family as the receiver of the counselling ought to be 
considered necessary in order for it to be genetic counselling. I will for now 
remain neutral on the issues of whether, and what parts of, the family that 
should be included in genetic counselling and thus assume that the index-
person can and, perhaps, sometimes should, be alone. The question of whether 
the family should be included, even if they often are from the start, is a 
difficult moral problem that cannot be settled by definition. It could also be 
questioned whether "to make the best possible adjustment to the disorder" is a 
necessary condition, since it seems to imply a too narrow scope of the 
definition; presumably, rather few instances of what is commonly viewed as 
genetic counselling lead to the best possible (whatev er that means) adjustment. 
However, engaging in the enterprise of finding a traditional definition will 
most likely not be fruitful. This is so partly since genetic counselling is a 
practice that changes over time, and there is probably no way to encode the 
necessary and sufficient conditions of (changing) practices in an 
uncontroversial way. More importantiy, such an enterprise would be beside 
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the point, since the focus here is on the goals and ethics of the practice. The 
above-mentioned standard account of genetic counselling is perhaps not 
flawless in the sense of providing a crystal clear traditional definition, but it is 
clear enough as to give an account of what is being discussed so as to enable 
us to evaluate the practice. 
Having said this, the reason why this general characterisation of genetic 
counselling has become so popular as to be "subsequently adopted by the 
society" (Piatt Walker, 1998, p 5) is that it contains the most commonly held 
components and goals (or va lues) of genetic counselling in its contemporary form, 
i.e., an account of how, according to currently accepted standards, genetic 
counselling is to be performed and what it should accomplish. 
Regarding the goals or values of genetic counselling, they are most commonly 
interpreted as being the same as those for presymptomatic genetic testing, 
namely autonomy and well-being. This is perhaps most clear in point 4 of the 
characterisation: "choose a course of action which seems to them appropriate in 
view of their risk, their family goals, and their ethical and religious standard and 
act in accordance with that decision." (My italics) This is naturally seen as an 
"emphasis on the client's autonomy in decision making" (Piatt Walker, 1998, p 
5), since such decisions are considered to be "appropriately... different 
depending on the personal, family, and cultural contexts in which they are 
made." (Ibid.) That is, it is as it should be when the values and standards of the 
person(s) tested are directing the counselling: "Today... the main objective of 
genetic counselling is to help individuals to make decisions in accordance 
with their own basic aims and desires - i.e., to promote and protect the 
patient's personal autonomy(Munthe, 1999, p 82) 
However, even if autonomy then certainly is one main objective of genetic 
counselling, the characterisation of genetic counselling indicates that there are 
others too. Point 5 makes the goal of making "the best possible adjustment to 
the disorder" explicit, which is naturally interpreted as helping the index-
person^) coping with the consequences of the disorder and knowledge of it. 
This interpretation is widely acknowledged: "there should be a psychotherapeutic 
component of genetic counseling" (Piatt Walker, 1998, p 5. My italics) "The 
goal [of genetic counselling] is to give the ability t o use genetic information in 
a way meaningful to the person that reduces psychic stress and increases personal 
control." (Brandberg, 2003, p 89. My translation and italics) "Its [genetic 
counselling's] most uncontroversial goal is to improve the quality of life of the 
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families that seek such help" (Michie & Marteau, 1996, p 104. My italics). All 
this is well in line with the value of psychological well-being presented earlier 
(ÏÏ.2.2). 
The components of genetic counselling become intelligible in light of these 
values. Firstly, the characterisation says that genetic counselling is a 
"communication process". The communication-part indicates that it is a 
question of interaction between the counsellor and counselee, rather than the 
doctor telling the patient what the medical condition is and what she should 
do about it. This is also how genetic counselling is seen (Piatt Walker, 1998, p 
5). And it is well in line with the autonomy-inspired idea that it is the values 
and concerns of the person that should govern genetic counselling. The 
process-part indicates that genetic counselling "ideally takes place over a 
period of time so that the client can gradually assimilate complex and 
potentially distressing information." (Ibid.) This is well in line with the 
psychotherapeutic idea of promoting well-being, as well as autonomy, since, as 
we have seen, psychological "ill-being" can damage autonomy (II.2.3.2). 
Secondly, according to Fraser's characterisation, the counsellor should be 
"one or more appropriately trained person". The idea is that the complex 
information that is communicated and the sensitivity of the process of doing 
so requires not only knowledge of genetics, but also pedagogic skills to ensure 
comprehension or understanding (which is mentioned rather than just disclosing 
information), caring skills of helping the patient to cope with psychological 
and social consequences in order to accomplish the goals, and so on. 
Acquiring such a blend of skills will presumably require some training. 
Fraser also mentions a number of more concrete components of genetic 
counselling, stating what stages the process involves. The process can roughly 
be divided into two parts: pre-testing and post-testing.56 Pre-testing refers both 
to the process before the decision whether or not to take the test and the 
actual testing situation. Pre-testing involves information gathering (Piatt Walker, 
1998, p 9), both information of a "medical" kind and information of more 
"psychological" and "social" kind. Usually, in order to determine the medical 
56 There are genetic analyses made without molecular or other biochemical testing, most notably 
by making a pedigree of a family history of disease. For those cases, it is m ore appropriate to talk 
about pre- and post-analysis. However, these kinds of genetic investigations are not discussed in 
this context, and neither is te sting for other purposes than predicting onset or risk t hereof, e.g. 
diagnostic testing. 
78 
indication supporting the suspicion of risk for genetic disorder, the medical 
history of the patient and often also the family members57 need to be 
gathered.58 This normally results in a pedigree (Harper, 2001, p 5-9), i.e. a family 
tree containing the relevant genetic information about the relatives. 
Furthermore, in order to help the patient with achieving her aims and coping 
with result of the test, the counsellor needs to investigate the aim of the 
patient, what she expects to learn from testing, how she is likely to respond to 
different test results, what her fears and hopes are, and so on. The patient must 
be informed about possible outcomes, not merely in terms of risk for disease 
for herself and involved family, including potential children, and available 
preventive measures and treatments, if there are any (point 1-3 in Fraser's 
characterisation), but also in terms of psychological reactions and social and 
economic consequences (important to achieve point 4 in the characterisation). 
She must also be informed of means of support to cope with such 
consequences (point 3 and 5 in Fraser's characterisation). 
If the patient decides in favour of testing and testing is subsequently done, 
then enters the stage of post-testing. Post-testing involves information giving (Piatt 
Walker, 1998, p 10) of risk for disease. But post-testing may also include 
psychological counselling and other means of support from the counsellor 
(Piatt Walker, 1998, p 10) in order to handle the possible psychological effects 
of learning the result, such as distress, anxiety, guilt and strained family 
relations (II.2.2.2). 
3.3 The ethos of genetic counselling 
Genetic counselling has developed its own norms or principles, what could 
be called the "ethos" of genetic counselling (Piatt Walker, 1998, p 7). The most 
natural way to think of these norms, I believe, are as more specific action-
guiding norms the compliance of which allegedly will tend to promote the 
overall values of genetic counselling, namely autonomy and well-being. There 
are several reasons to think of the ethos of genetic counselling in this way. As 
we will see, one reason is that the norms of the ethos often are justified in this 
57 I will r eturn to the question of whether this should mean that the consent of the relative has to 
be obtained in chapter VI. 
58 This is not to say that it is obvious that testing should be denied if there is no medical 
indication whatsoever. If psychological well-being is a major rationale for testing and testing is t he 
only way of improving the psychological well-being of the index-person, there is at least a good 
reason for testing (even if t here may be reasons against testing as well). 
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way, primarily with reference to autonomy. Another is that these justifications 
often seem reasonable, especially if one refers to the conception and ideals of 
autonomy adumbrated earlier in this chapter (EL2.3) and further elaborated in 
the next one. Moreover, if one conceives of the ethos in the way, one will 
have a critical tool for assessing the norms, seeing more clearly how they 
should be interpreted and when and how they should be complied to. 
What, then, is the ethos of genetic counselling? Well, there probably are 
several ways to carve up the moral territory. I will use one way that I find to be 
relatively clear and exhaustive, namely Piatt Walker's, 1998, p 6-9, textbook 
account used in the training of genetic counsellors. This account distinguishes 
between seven norms of genetic counselling, making up its ethos: 
voluntariness, equal access, client education, complete disclosure of 
information, non-directiveness, attention to psychosocial and affective 
dimensions, and confidentiality/privacy. I will discuss "client education" and 
"complete disclosure" under the same heading.59 In addition, complete 
disclosure will be discussed under the heading of non-directiveness, since it 
should be viewed as a part of that norm. Voluntariness and equal access will be 
argued to be about society at large, leaving us with additional questions about 
the good and just society, questions that are left open. However, the norm that 
has received most attention is the one about non-directiveness, "perhaps the 
most defining feature of genetic counseling." (Piatt Walker, 1998, p 8) 
Therefore, I will fo cus on that norm, treating the others more schematically. 
3.3.1 Voluntariness 
The core idea of voluntariness in this context is that the decision to use 
genetic services, including presymptomatic genetic testing, should be 
voluntary, i.e. entirely up to the individual herself. However, how this idea 
should be understood is far from evident. Voluntariness could be construed 
in libertarian terms (see IV.2.2.1 and VII.5.2.2), claiming that decisions are 
voluntary if they are made without coercion, i.e. threats of sanctions or 
outright force, and without deception. However, a more extensive idea of 
55 
"Client education" would have deserved its own heading if it explicated the idea that only 
disclosing information is insu fficient: one also has to ensure proper understanding of it. But in 
Piatt Walker's account "client education" just contains an enumeration of various types of 
information that should be explained, and may therefore be seen as a part of the requirement of 
complete disclosure. The requirement of understanding might then just as well be discussed 
under the heading of "complete disclosure" as in Piatt Walkers account, p 7-8. 
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voluntariness seems to be at work here, requiring that decisions about genetic 
testing should be "unencumbered by pressure or any intimation that a 
particular course of action is fiscally or socially irresponsible." (Piatt Walker, 
1998, p 6) 
Consider a destitute single woman who is aware of having a substantial 
genetic risk of giving birth to a disabled child,60 who cannot expect financial 
or other support from society or otherwise, and who thus would have very 
grave difficulties in meeting the needs of this child. Given the extensive idea 
of voluntariness, her decision to take the test (assume that this is free of 
charge) and terminate her pregnancy if genetic risk is detected is probably not 
voluntary, since there is serious "fiscal" pressure on her to take the test and to 
terminate the pregnancy should the result of the test turn out positive. The 
same goes for someone who has to take a test in order to get a private health 
insurance in a society where private health insurance is necessary to get health 
care at all. A nother kind of pressure incompatible with the extensive idea of 
voluntariness is a society where everyone finds it morally irresponsible not to 
take various genetic tests when pregnant and therefore express strong dislike 
of those who elect not to take such tests. 
Obviously then, the norm of voluntariness is not so much about genetic 
counselling as an isolated practice, but about society as a whole. This is so, 
since whether the practice can fulfil the norm depends on society as a whole, 
as these examples demonstrates. Of course, the cherishing of voluntariness is a 
result of the insight that decisions to take or abstain from taking a genetic test 
is sometimes made for other reasons than personal goals and well-being, e.g. 
out of (at least perceived) economic necessity (see VH2.3). If the norm of 
voluntariness were confined to genetic counselling in isolation from the 
surrounding circumstances, requiring that the counsellor should abstain from 
coercion, manipulation, bias, and other kinds of pressure to affect the 
decision-making of the patient, it would collapse into some norm of non-
directiveness (see II.3.3.5). 
However, in light of the idea of autonomy as a value to promote, it 
becomes intelligible why the extensive norm of voluntariness is favoured as a 
part of the ethos of genetic counselling. If a crucial goal of genetic counselling 
is to make people live their lives more in accordance with their basic aims, or 
60 For instance, imagine that she knows that she is t he asymptomatic carrier of the mutation for 
Fragile-X (see 1.4.1). 
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at least to enable them to do so, this goal will be compromised if there is a 
strong societal pressure to make certain kinds of decisions over others, since 
these decisions may not be in accordance with these aims. Take the example of 
someone who desires to find out whether she carries the mutation for 
Huntington's, but refrains from finding this out due to risk of not being able 
to purchase health insurance.61 At least one of her aims will thus be 
compromised as a result of the design of society. The important point here is 
that whether the goals of genetic counselling can be accomplished is not only 
determined by genetic counselling, but also by the structure of society at large. 
So, rather than being a norm for the practice of genetic counselling as such, 
e.g. saying something about how genetic counsellors should behave, 
voluntariness expresses a norm for society at large that most likely has to be 
fulfilled in order for the values of presymptomatic genetic testing to be 
realized for all t hose tested. 
3.3.2 Equal access 
Roughly, the norm of equal access says that genetic testing and counselling 
should be equally available to all those who want it. Like the norm of 
voluntariness, the norm of equal access is not really about the internal design 
of genetic counselling, but rather addresses the design of societal institutions. 
What kind of access to genetic services that society should implement is a 
question of justice, since it is one about the distribution of the goods of 
genetic testing and genetic counselling. I will say more about the question of 
justice in later chapters, which at least has indirect bearing on the question of 
the distribution of genetic testing and counselling. I will thus leave it for now, 
just making a few remarks. 
First, the norm of equal access is not taken in a politically neutral way. Piatt 
Walker, 1998, p 7, claims, for instance, that "genetic services... should be 
available to all who need and choose to use them" and "they are to be available 
to all who might benefit". What is claimed is a p ositive rather than a n egative 
right to genetic services. That is, equal access is not only taken to mean that no 
person should be prevented from using genetic testing and counselling, but 
that everyone who wants and needs it should have access to it, regardless of 
e.g. ability to pay (P iatt Walker, 1998, p 7). As will be seen in later chapters, this 
61 I will return to this (see VII.2.3). 
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idea is not compatible with some influential ideals of the just society — in 
particular libertarian ideas (see VII.5.2.2). 
Second, the norm of equal access is ambiguous. For one thing, it is unclear 
whose access it is that should be equal. Is it enough to want and ask for the test 
in order to have a legitimate claim to equal access or should access be granted 
only to persons fulfilling additional conditions, like e.g. severity of condition, 
medical indication, and other parameters of "need"? Furthermore, it is unclear 
what equal access implies. For instance, is there equal access if not everyone 
knows that the services exist? In one sense there is, since everyone will get the 
service if they ask for it (at least given some other conditions, e.g. medical 
indication). In another sense there is not, since you will not ask for the services 
if you do not know that they exist. In fact, this would mean that only informed 
people, presumable mostly well-educated urban people, would use the service. 
This could be claimed to be incompatible with equal access in the normatively 
interesting sense.62 
Third, since the number of possible tests is growing rapidly, more and 
more persons most likely will use them. This will make it more and more 
expensive to ensure equal access, giving rise to questions of distribution 
between genetic and other health care services. So, numerous questions of 
justice are actualised by the norm of equal access: should the wealthier 
individuals be obliged to support the poorer in order to reach the ideal? 
Should resources be invested in letting everyone know about the services? 
How should we distribute resources between genetic and other services? I will 
not try to answer any of these questions, but rest content with pointing out 
that some norms of genetic counselling gives rise to them and that they merit 
further investigation. Furthermore, trying to arrive at an answer by applying the 
values (of genetic counselling) of well-being and autonomy will only take us 
so far, since they need to be supplemented with normative principles: should 
the values be maximised or distributed equally or what (see IH.3.2)? Finally, 
even if one has resolved such issues, it will be hard to know what to do. If one 
finally opts for, say, maximisation as an answer to the normative question, there 
remains the difficult question of how genetic services should be distributed in 
order to maximise the net sum of autonomy and well-being. 
62 Since Piatt Walker, 1998, p 7, points to e.g. the factor of education as a problem for equal 
access, she would probably claim this. 
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The question of the value of genetic counselling thus gives rise to broader 
issues of the good and just society. This connection calls for further 
investigation in the relation between the ethics of genetic counselling, and 
other health care services, and society at large. This task seems to me too huge 
to tackle in this context and I will therefore leave it for now. 
3.3.3 Attention to psychosocial and affective dimensions 
This norm does not only say t hat patients should be informed about possible 
psychological and social consequences of genetic testing but also that genetic 
counsellors should help them in coping with these consequences, which may 
require "long-term therapy" (Piatt Walker, 1998, p 4). This emphasis on 
psychosocial and affective dimensions is a more recent development in 
genetic counselling and a response to a previous emphasis on providing 
genetic information and abstaining from advice (Piatt Walker, 1998, p 3-4).63  
The reason for this shift in emphasis is that the disclosure of genetic 
information from genetic testing can and sometimes does have the negative 
effects on autonomy and psychological well-being discussed earlier (see H2.2.2 
and n.2.3.2).64 
By attending to psychosocial and affective dimensions, possibilities to 
promote patient's autonomy and well-being can then be improved in several 
ways. First, by learning about possible detrimental consequences due to 
societal institutions, e.g. lack of private insurance, patients have more 
information relevant to their decision and can avoid testing options that are 
considered to be too detrimental. Second, by considering the patient's 
psychological and social, e.g. family, state pre-test, patient and counsellor can 
communicate in order to enable the patient to make decisions that is not too 
distressing or damaging to important relations. Third, pre-test, therapy with the 
counsellor, or with someone referred to by the counsellor, can be helpful in 
order for the patient to be become more clear about what she really wants, 
which can be conducive to autonomy (II.2.3.1). Fourth, post-test, the counsellor 
63 Michie & Marteau, 1997, points to investigations showing that "patients presents emotional 
and social agendas to a greater extent than do doctors" (p 113). 
64 See also the story of the anonymous woman in Marteau & Richards, 1997, who considers 
testing for BRCA1: "I feel that the doctors and consultants I have met as a result of my cancer 
story do not appreciate the inner feelings I have; they have all b een very matter of fact" (p 38). 
This indicates an overestimation with medical facts and underestimation of attention to 
psychosocial and effective dimensions in some counselling. 
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can support the patient and his family emotionally, for instance through 
therapy, or by referral to therapy. Fifth, the patient's social, cultural, 
educational, economic, emotional, and experiential background influences the 
way in which she understands and copes with test results, and awareness of 
this in counselling is necessary in order to help the patient with understanding 
and coping. And, as we have seen, proper understanding is important both to 
realize patient's well-being and autonomy (II.2.3.2). 
3.3.4 Confidentiality and protection ofprivacy 
Privacy regarding genetic information is respected when the individual 
controls who has access to this information. This idea relates to confidentiality, 
since breach of confidentiality consists in further disclosure of information 
without the consent of the patient. Since issues of privacy and confidentiality 
are actualised only when there is a reason to breach confidentiality to protect 
some vital interest of relatives or third parties, I will discuss the question of 
privacy and confidentiality in these contexts (see VI.2.2). We will then see that 
the scope and content of this norm is far from evident. However, it is 
common to assume that the basis of respecting privacy and confidentiality is 
patient's autonomy and the consequentialistic concerns of upholding trust in 
the doctor-patient relationship (Husted, 1997, p 56; McGleenan, 1997, p 44). The 
norm is thus well in line with the idea of autonomy and well-being being the 
basic values of genetic counselling. 
3.3.5 Non-directiveness 
There are controversies about the meaning of non-directiveness (Oduncu, 
2002) and doubts have been expressed whether it is a plausible, or even 
feasible, norm for genetic counselling at all (Clarke, 1991; Lippman, 1991). 
However, there seems to be consensus on the view that the point of non-
directiveness is related to concerns about the patient's autonomy. The idea is 
not only that the decision of the patient should be respected, i.e. the traditional 
one in biomedical ethics, but also that "ND [non-directiveness] describes 
procedures aimed at promoting the autonomy and self-directedness of the 
client." (Kessler, 1997, p 166)65 This calls for developing a conception of 
65 See also Munthe, 1999, p 82, describing the objective of genetic counselling and non-
directiveness as being "to promote and protect the patient's personal autonomy", and Oduncu, 
2002, p 61, discussing non-directiveness in genetic counselling: "the duty of the counselor is, 
primarily, to empower the patient/client to make autonomous decisions." 
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autonomy as a value that, besides calling for respect, is to be actively promoted, 
a task that, as mentioned earlier, will b e undertaken in greater detail in the next 
chapter. Although the promotion of well-being is another goal of genetic 
counselling, it is not as salient as autonomy in the discussion of non-
directiveness. Since non-directiveness is often held to be the primary norm of 
this practice, this seems to indicate some favouring of autonomy over well-
being as the overarching goal of genetic counselling. 
Despite the above mentioned doubts about the plausibility of the norm of 
non-directiveness, it seems to be widely acknowledged among practitioners of 
genetic counselling.66 However, this may be due to the fact that the concept of 
non-directiveness has not been very precisely defined - the wide 
acknowledgement thus perhaps revealing a verbal rather than a substantial 
agreement on the plausibility of the norm. But even if there are differences as 
to how non-directiveness is conceived of, some components of non-
directiveness are recurrent. In order to get things off the ground, I will use a 
characterisation of non-directiveness put forward by Henk ten Have, which I 
think captures these components: 
Accurate information should be provided to the person concerned 
regarding the nature of potential genetic conditions, the prognosis, 
possible treatments and preventive strategies. The experts providing 
such information should not, in any respect, try to influence decisions 
made by persons who are counseled or screened. The moral ideal 
underlying this practice is value-neutrality. The genetic expert is 
withholding any normative judgement regarding the obtaining and 
application of genetic information; his aim is merely to provide 
information and to help the patients or clients to work through possible 
options.67 
Three components, of which the third can be seen as a part of or a 
clarification of the second, can be discerned in this characterisation of non-
directiveness. First, there is the provision or disclosure of information. In ten 
Have's characterisation of non-directiveness, the emphasis is on genetic and 
66 Extensive surveys of genetic counsellors reveal this: 90% in one study considers non-
directiveness as appropriate in genetic counselling in one study, and 96% considers it as very 
important in another (Oduncu, 2002, p 56-57). 
67 ten Have quoted from Oduncu, 2002, p 56. 
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other kinds of medical information, but additional kinds of information may 
be relevant to the patient's decision-making in the context of genetic 
counselling, e.g. ps ychological and social information. The traditional lack of 
recognizing the relevance of such kinds of information has led to an increased 
focus on these other kinds of information, i.e. a ttention on the psychosocial 
and affective dimensions (ffl.3.3.3). So the aim of non-directive counselling 
should be "to see to it that the decision they [the patients] make are based on 
as full, correct, precise, relevant and comprehensible information as p ossible". 
(Munthe, 1999, p 82) This could then be called the idea of complete disclosure 
of information. That idea merits a d iscussion of its own, and therefore I will 
return to it below. 
Second, there is the emphasis on abstaining from (attempts to) influence 
the decision of the patient. Third, in abiding by the norm of non-
directiveness, the counsellor (or other "expert") "is withholding any normative 
judgement regarding the obtaining and application of genetic information" 
(Ibid.) or, rather, should withhold such judgement. It is unclear whether 
withholding normative judgement is sufficient for avoiding illegitimate 
influence or if it is only a part of such avoidance. The addition of "in any 
respect" when talking about influence indicates that abstaining from normative 
judgement is not sufficient, s ince there are other ways to (try to) influence the 
decisions of others. 
However, avoiding any influence over the patient seems to be (almost) 
impossible, a fact that is widely acknowledged.68 Just by presenting some 
information, a patient's decision can be affected. For instance, revealing some 
piece of information about preventive measures, previously unknown to the 
patient is not unlikely to influence her decision, e.g. to use that measure. There 
are other more subtle ways of influencing, e.g. by the way information is 
presented (through choice of words, body language, etc). So non-directiveness 
in the sense of avoiding any influences whatsoever on the patient's decision is 
neither a feasible, nor a plausible (see below), ideal for genetic counselling. 
There are two ways of reacting to this criticism: either by denying the 
importance of the norm of non-directiveness (Clarke, 1991; Lippman, 1991) or 
by trying to reformulate it in a way that makes it feasible and plausible. Kessler 
adopts the second route, defining non-directiveness directly in terms of its 
68 See Oduncu, 2002, for a discussion and further references regarding this. 
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goal, namely the promotion of autonomy: "ND [non-directiveness] describes 
procedures aimed at promoting the autonomy and self-directedness of the 
client." (Kessler, 1997, p 166)69 I think the route of trying to reformulate such a 
widely cherished ideal is to be preferred to the discarding of it, at least if it can 
be justified with reference to the basic values of the practice and if it is 
helpful for guiding practical action. Kessler's definition has the first property, 
but in order to be action-guiding, it must be supplemented with regard to 
what autonomy is and how to act in order to achieve the aim. Without a m ore 
precise idea of autonomy, we will not have a way of determining whether 
some type of behaviour is promoting autonomy, and without a more precise 
idea of how to act in order to realize autonomy, the definition is not so much 
a norm as a repetition of the idea that the aim of genetic counselling is 
autonomy. As mentioned, in the next chapter, I will specify a fuller conception 
of autonomy and above, I have said some things about how genetic testing and 
counselling can promote autonomy in this sense (II.2.3.1). This leaves us with 
the second task of describing in what way one should act in order to be non-
directive. That is, the task is to take a stand on the various ways in which 
genetic counselling is supposed to be non-directive and see if it indeed 
should be non-directive in these ways. I will now enumerate various ways in 
which genetic counselling can be claimed to be non-directive and evaluate 
these in light of the value of genetic counselling that is supposed to be 
promoted by non-directiveness, i.e. autonomy. 
First, non-directiveness should not mean that information that is not asked 
for by the patient and which is not part of the prior reason for testing should 
not be disclosed. This will be demonstrated when discussing complete 
disclosure of information below. For now it is enough to say that such 
information may help the patient to realise that she has options she had not 
previously considered. For instance, the recognition of the option to use PGD 
in order to avoid a c hild with Tay-Sachs may help a c ouple in realizing their 
plans of starting a family. 
Second, non-directiveness should not mean that counsellors should abstain 
from giving other information than genetic, since we have seen that 
psychological, social, economic and other kinds of information can be crucial 
69 Kessler defines directiveness as deliberate deception, threat or coercion (Kessler, 1997 p 165-
166), which makes much communicative behaviour neither directive or non-directive, since it 
neither contains deception, threat or coercion or promotes autonomy. 
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for the formulation of realistic and efficient plans. Neither should non-
directiveness mean that counsellors should behave in an emotionally detached 
manner, withholding support from the patient in her decisions. Actually, 
persons with experience of counselling emphasises the need of "support to 
families whatever their decisions may be." (Harper, 2001, p 15)70 This should 
come as no surprise, since such support is important in order to cope with 
possibly paralysing psychological reactions, as we have seen. 
Third, traditionally, a common interpretation of non-directiveness has been 
counselling without advising or recommending the patient what to decide (Munthe, 
1999, p 82; Oduncu, 2002, p 54). However, giving advice can in fact promote 
the patient's autonomy, and in various ways. For instance, the counsellor's 
giving advice can be conducive to the authenticity of the patient's desire. 
Consider the following statements: "[Sjerving the patient's autonomy may even 
include recommending her to see a psychologist in order to get a better grasp of 
what she ac tually is tying to ach ieve, so that the counsellor can act in her own best 
interests." (Munthe, 1999, p 85. My italics) "[T]he doctor's role is to help clarify 
the values, possibilities and consequences and, so far as possible, create valuable 
options s uited to the individual's unique situation." (Husted, 1997, p 63. My 
italics) 
It is obvious that these authors are not solely concerned with autonomy in 
the sense of respecting decisions or improving the possibility to achieve 
already formulated aims. Rather, they are concerned with the process of 
formulating desires, aims, and values. This process is best cast in terms of 
authenticity, since authenticity is precisely about the "self-determination" of 
the desires, aims and values of the person. This is why genetic counselling 
needs an idea of authenticity, and for this reason, I will formulate and defend 
one in the next chapter (11.2.2). One idea that will be proposed in that context 
is that the process of critically evaluating one's basic desires makes them more 
authentic. This can be done, for instance, with the aid of a genetic counsellor 
or a psychologist referred to by a g enetic counsellor. Thus, the advice to go 
through with such a process can increase the authenticity of the person. 
Another way in which such advice from a counsellor can promote autonomy 
is by securing that the patient actually acts on desires that are truly hers, 
10 This does not mean that counsellors should explicitly say the words "I will support any decision 
you make", since this can come through as a reminder of the professional's greater power, 
creating an emotional distance (Kessler, 1997, p 170). Rather, support should be expressed, also by 
helping the patient go through alternatives she maybe has not thought of. 
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something that will make acting more efficient in autonomy terms (see 11.23 
and III.2.4). 
Advice can also help the individual's capacity for autonomy, thus making 
her a m ore autonomous person according to the ideal of capacity (see 11.23 
and HI.3.1.2). For instance, advice to see a p sychologist leading to therapy can 
help people in coping with paralysing emotional distress, helping them to 
become more decision competent and capable of efficient action. Since a 
more autonomous person is more likely to actually succeed in leading a more 
autonomous life, a dvice may thereby also help the person in realizing her aims 
in accordance with the ideal of self-realization (see II.2.3 and III.3.1.1). 
So abstaining from advice should not be an integral part of non-
directiveness.71 Rather, it is a c ertain kind of "advice" that one should have in 
mind when being critical against advice-giving from the counsellor, namely 
advice aimed at making the patient decide in one direction regardless of the desires, 
aims, and values of that patient. Bu t the promotion of the patient's autonomy 
consists in successfully assisting the patient in realizing her desires, aims, and 
values, or at least enabling her to do so. If the counsellor disregards these 
desires, aims, and values, she will not succeed in this assistance, other than 
perhaps by pure luck. But then the problem is not advising, or in other ways 
influencing the decision-making of the patient, but disregarding the basic aims 
of the patient. Information and advice given should then be given in the light 
of the aim to promote the patient's deciding and acting on her own basic aims. 
Problems thus arise when the counsellor brings her own normative agenda 
to counselling sessions. When this happens all kinds of influence, not just 
advice, becomes problematic. Overemphasising the risk of certain alternatives 
while playing down risks of others, failure to bring out certain information 
about possible consequences (including psychosocial), manner of behaviour, 
like expressing, however subtle, discontent when patients want to develop 
certain aspects, are all examples of ways of illegitimately influencing the 
decision of the patient. These ways of acting are even more problematic in 
terms of autonomy than open advice and even open condemnation, since they 
are more manipulative by being less overt and thus more difficult to detect 
and react against. They are also damaging to authenticity, since an open 
communication without prior ideas of what is desirable for the patient from 
71 This is also increasingly recognized in the discussion about genetic counselling. See Shiloh, 1996. 
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the counsellor is important in order for the patient to be able to make up her 
own mind about what she really wants. 
The conclusion of all this is that the sound core of non-directiveness is 
abstaining from certain kinds of influence, but embracing other kinds. 
Roughly, all influence should be exercised only in order to assist the person 
in becoming more autonomous, letting the desires, aims, and values of the 
patient guide the counselling.72 I will not take a stand on whether it is the 
ability to realize one's aims (the ideal of capacity) or actually succeeding in 
doing so (the ideal of self-realization) that is to be the aim of genetic 
counselling.73 This will depend on which of these ideals (if any) are plausible 
in the end. 
When it comes to the practical question of how to achieve this kind of 
non-directiveness, training in counselling skills and practical experience of 
counselling is essential. Since I have no expertise in either, I will not say 
anything about the more practical sides of this. Experienced counsellors have 
done that with much more accuracy than I could ever hope to achieve 
(Kessler, 1997; Harper, 2001). The aim in this context is restricted to provide a 
standard of evaluation for genetic counselling practices, and indicate in a very 
general way how it may be used to evaluate, and make more precise, norms 
like non-directiveness. 
Before moving on, one note must be added about the limits of non-
directiveness. There may be actual limits on non-directiveness, due to pressure 
from society at large to decide on one alternative rather than another. This was 
discussed under the heading of voluntariness earlier in this section. However, 
there may be actual normative limits of non-directiveness, due to alleged 
duties of disclosure primarily to relatives. This possibility will be discussed in 
chapter VI. 
72 Kessler makes the same point, Kessler, 1997, p 169-170. 
73 Different authors seem to have different intuitions. When discussing genetic counselling, 
Munthe says "The essential thing is that such activities have the effect of promoting and 
protecting the patient's autonomy, i.e. her ability to attain and fulfil her own basic aims and 
desires." (Munthe, 1999, p 85. My italics.) This points to the ideal of capacity. Compare to Husted, 
1997, p 62, who, when discussing disclosure of genetic information, says: "what primarily has value 
is th e autonomous life, the value of autonomy in the capacity sense being only contributional to 
this", pointing to the ideal o f self-realization. 
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Complete disclosure of information 
There is still the question of the first component of non-directiveness: 
disclosure of informadon. It is commonly assumed that "all relevant 
information should be disclosed" (Piatt Walker, 1998, p 7) to the patient in 
genetic counselling. This assumption leads to two related questions: Why 
should all relevant questions be disclosed? What information is relevant? Not 
surprisingly, the answer to the first question is in terms of "individual's 
autonomy" (Ibid). T his also provides an important clue to the answer of the 
second question. Since autonomy is an overarching goal of disclosure, it 
becomes natural to say that "any information relevant to decision making in ways 
that the client can interpret and act on" (Piatt Walker, 1998, p 8) should be 
disclosed. The underlying line of reasoning to this interpretation of "relevant 
information" should be familiar by now: if a person has information relevant 
to decision-making she is more likely to decide on a course of action that is 
efficient in realizing her basic aims. To abstain from disclosing this 
information is then to decrease the possibility of accomplishing autonomy for 
the individual.74 
We have seen that this line of reasoning can be questioned, since there is 
no guarantee that more information leads to increased efficiency and 
autonomy. For instance, psychological distress, confusion and "faulty choices" 
can be consequences of more information, resulting in a reduction of 
autonomy (H2.3.2). However, to the extent that genetic counselling can 
counteract such consequences, e.g. by attending to psychosocial and affective 
dimensions, the line of reasoning seems sound: (genetic) information is likely 
to improve the patient's ability to choose a Une of conduct conducive to her 
basic aims. Let us, at least, assume that this is so in order to be able to focus on 
the question of disclosure of information. 
In order to disclose information relevant to decision-making, it seems to be an 
obvious advantage if the counsellor finds out the reason(s) why the patient is 
considering genetic testing in the first place. This may be straightforward 
enough when the patient has some background knowledge and a clear purpose 
of testing. For instance, a couple from a population where a certain genetic 
74 Another criticism in terms of autonomy to deliberately withhold certain information is that this 
withholding seems to express the paternalistic view that the patient is u nable to handle it, thus 
showing disrespect for her autonomy in a sense. I will return to this in short. 
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disorder is more common, e.g. Tay-Sachs disease among the Ashkenazi Jewish 
population, may come to see a genetic counsellor in order to do genetic 
carrier detection for making reproductive decisions. Or someone, like Jill 
(II.2.3.1), may consider presymptomatic genetic testing in order to make career 
plans. In these cases, the purpose of considering genetic testing reveals what 
kind of information is relevant for decision-making. 
This, however, does not mean that the norm of complete disclosure 
implies that genetic counsellors can abstain from disclosing information that 
falls outside the patient's explicit purpose of testing. There may be 
information that would be relevant to the patient's decision-making if she had 
only had the opportunity of considering it. It would then affect the patient's 
decision-making, but not through being related to the purpose of testing. For 
instance, a woman with recurrent breast cancer among her relatives may 
consider genetic testing in order to decide on issues of family planning, 
without knowing that there are some preventive measures, like regular check­
ups or prophylactic mastectomy. It is not unlikely that this kind of information 
would affect her decision-making if she received it. (In fact, it would be 
considered to be gross negligence if the counsellor failed to inform her of 
this.) 
This means that the norm of complete disclosure, in order to be practically 
usable, has to be supplemented with some idea of what information that 
presumably will be considered relevant by patients in general. The following 
list, which draws on Fraser's generally adopted characterisation of genetic 
counselling (TL3.2), co ntains the items considered to be important to educate 
about in genetic counselling: 
(1) [I]he features, natural history, and range of variability of the 
condition in question, (2) its genetic (or non-genetic) basis, (3) how it 
can be diagnosed and managed, (4) the chances that it will occur or 
recur in various family members, (5) the economic, social, and 
psychological impacts - positive as well as negative - it may have, (6) 
resources that are available to help families deal with the challenges the 
disorder presents, and (7) strategies for amelioration or prevention the 
family wish to consider. (Piatt Walker, 1998, p 7) 
Let us suppose that this list of items presents a plausible account of what most 
people would consider relevant for decision-making. However, there are cases 
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when following the list seems to exclude too much and when it seems to 
include too much information. 
For instance, consider the occasional cases of genetic testing revealing 
unexpected facts about paternity, i.e., the test reveals a man who is believed (by 
himself and his family) to be the biological father of a c hild not to be so. Let 
us assume that this information has no implication for risk of disease, the risk 
being on the mother's side of the family. It is thus not part of the list of 
information considered important to educate about, that is, information that 
normally can be considered to be relevant. Should this information be 
disclosed to the patient, even if the patient has not asked for this kind of 
information? 
It is not obvious that this piece of information should be disclosed on 
grounds of autonomy. First, it may be deeply disturbing, leading to various 
types of paralysing distress. Second, even though it may affect decision-making, 
it does not have to. The patient may not redefine any family relations or in 
other ways act on the information. So the information may be irrelevant to 
decision-making, just being a disturbing piece of perhaps unwanted 
knowledge. 
Still, it seems questionable for the counsellor to withhold the information 
of non-paternity. First, withholding the information seems disrespectful to the 
person's autonomy, according to the idea that we should be treated as if we are 
autonomous. Withholding the information from the individual seems to be to 
make a decision on behalf of the individual that one really is not entitled to 
make, treating her as a person that cannot handle the information. This is a 
kind of paternalism, treating someone as a minor rather than a competent 
adult.75 
Second, maybe the patient would have wanted the information of non­
paternity if she had known that the counsellor had it. Even if one is sceptical 
of attributing the satisfaction of such hypothetical desires any value, this relates 
to a third point: the patient may find this information out in other ways, 
realising that the counsellor kept it a s ecret. This would not only (probably) be 
upsetting to the patient, reducing her well-being for at least some time. What is 
worse, it might undermine the trust and confidence in genetic counselling in 
75 See III.3.3 for an elaboration of this rather neglected idea of autonomy. 
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particular and health care institutions in general, perhaps leading to a wider 
public distrust in the long run, if it becomes routine.76 
This reason of trust to disclose information is a general one, holding 
regardless of whether the information will be relevant to decision-making or 
not. This is so, since this basis of reason for disclosure relates to the 
consequences of norms of health care in terms of well-being (see VI.2.2). S o 
the interpretation of "relevant" as "relevant for decision-making" seems 
misconstrued, or at least insufficient, since information may be irrelevant to 
decision-making, but withholding it would undermine patient-doctor trust. So 
just revealing information that is relevant to decision-making, even if we 
include information from the list that normally would be considered relevant, 
seems to exclude too much information. 
However, revealing all in formation relevant to decision-making may be to 
include too much information too. This is so since such information may be 
damaging to both the autonomy and well-being of the person. I have argued 
this point (II.2.4) and I will further corroborate this argument (see V.3.1.1), so I 
will not repeat that argument here. The general point of those arguments is 
that if autonomy (and well-being) is the rationale of disclosure, there can be no 
reason to disclose when disclosing damages the autonomy and well-being of 
the patient. 
However, there is one point in relation to this that I will elaborate on. If 
some piece of information is not asked for by the patient, nor relevant for the 
patient's risk of disease, it is not self-evident that the patient would want this 
information. Take once again the example of a genetic test revealing non­
paternity. Just as some patients would resent not being told about this, other 
may resent being told about it. The following would not be strange reaction: "I 
did not come to find this out. I would have preferred if you had never told 
me." 
The problem posed by this possible reaction seems to be the following. It 
would seem desirable if one could disclose information to those who want it 
or would want it, partly since this seem to be a reason in itself for disclosure 
and partly because they would be upset and mistrusting if they were to find 
out the information in other ways. Furthermore, we would like to avoid 
76 In fact, according to anecdotal "evidence" from several health care professionals, withholding 
this information is quite common. However, to substantiate this claim would require more 
thorough investigations. 
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disclosure of unwanted information, much for the same reasons. But the only 
way to find out if a person wants to know a certain piece of information 
seems to be to bring that information to the person. So only by finding out 
whether someone would like to know, one would frustrate the wants of those 
who would like to remain ignorant. "Would you or would you not like to 
know whether or not the man you think is your biological father is not really 
so?" is a q uestion that in practice excludes the second alternative. 
A possible way to sidestep this problem is to find out before testing what 
of the possible information a genetic test may reveal that the patient would like 
to remain ignorant about. One could ask something like the following: "If we 
were to find out things that is not related to your risk for disease or reason for 
testing, would you like to know this?" However, the patient is likely to wonder 
what kind of information that might be. If one then answers something like 
"Well, things like non-paternity" it may be difficult for the patient to answer 
no to a question like this, even though she is not sure of the answer. She may 
feel that it is disturbing that someone else has information of such an intimate 
nature about her life, without knowing it herself. This is not to say that a 
counsellor should hesitate to inform that a possible result of genetic testing is 
that it may reveal non-paternity. Not doing so seems disrespectful to the 
autonomy of the individual, since it seems obvious that this possible result can 
be relevant for the decision of the index-person to take the test. 
However, and more importantly, there may be unexpected information that 
not even the counsellor has thought about beforehand. Then the question of 
whether the person would like to have this information arise again. And there 
is still no way to be certain about what information the patient would like 
without at the same time revealing the information in question. 
I think that the problem demonstrates that there is no neat answer to the 
question of what information that should be disclosed. Of course, there is a 
very general answer, relating to the values of genetic counselling. "Disclose the 
amount and kind of information that is most conducive to the autonomy and 
well-being of the patient." However, we have seen that it is difficult to say 
what information that will be for practical purposes. It does not obviously 
coincide with the information asked for in relation to the purpose of testing, 
the information relevant to decision-making, or the information that normally 
would be relevant to decision-making (i.e. information from the list above). 
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And it seems as if the only way to find out whether some information is 
wanted is to disclose it, at least once testing is done. 
However, the default posidon seems to be to disclose "everything" since 
there are traditional reasons of autonomy (non-paternalism) and well-being 
(doctor-patient trust) against withholding informadon. So, as a rule of thumb, 
the counsellor should not know anything about the test result that the padent 
does not also get to know. Such a rule of thumb would, however, require 
measures to ensure that the values of genetic counselling are promoted also by 
potentially disturbing knowledge. As our discussion of voluntariness showed, 
this does not only include setting up the internal structure of genetic 
counselling in a way conducive to these values, but also that society as a whole 
is structured in certain ways. Finally, it must once again be underlined that 
disclosure of information is not the most important objective, but rather 
ensuring understanding of it (see e.g. II.2.3.2). 
3.4 Two practical problems of autonomy in genetic counselling 
As was seen at the end of the section on the value of presymptomatic genetic 
testing (II.2.4), t he alleged values of such testing may conflict in various ways. 
Expectedly, these conflicts reappear in the context of genetic counselling. 
Some of these have been briefly touched upon above. However, before 
closing this section, I will further elaborate on two of these possible types of 
value conflicts that seem to be of practical importance for the practice of 
genetic counselling. 
3.4.1 Autonomy versus well-being 
I have claimed that there basically are two values that constitute the goal of 
presymptomatic genetic testing in general and genetic counselling in which 
information from such testing is disclosed in particular, namely autonomy and 
well-being.77 Different authors emphasise one value over the other to different 
degrees (III.3). However, those authors who discuss non-directiveness seem to 
favour, or at least put emphasis, on autonomy as the overarching goal of 
genetic counselling (HI.3.3.5). Since non-directiveness is considered to be 
perhaps the most important part of the ethos of genetic counselling (EŒ.3.3.5), 
there seems to be a tendency to favour autonomy over well-being. 
77 I will further elaborate why these values really are different one's, at least if well-being is 
understood as subjective well-being, below in this subsection and in section 4 of this chapter. 
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But obviously, the actual favouring of autonomy does not in itself provide 
any justification for autonomy being more important. Since health-related 
well-being in particular is a traditional goal of health care, health care 
professionals can be inclined to "direct" patients towards alternatives that are 
considered to be favourable from a medical point of view: "Genetic 
professionals are almost always d irective about behaviours that are considered 
therapeutically beneficial to their counselees". (Oduncu, 2002, p 57) 
So there seems to be a tension between the goal of autonomy and well-
being in genetic counselling. Is this a problem in practice? 
In order to answer this question, one can start out by noticing that autonomy 
and well-being consists of different states of affairs and can therefore part 
ways. For someone, leading a life that is autonomous to a high degree may 
mean leading a life t hat consists of less well-being than a less autonomous life 
would have consisted of. This is not so hard to see when well-being is 
understood in terms of "feeling good" (see II.4.1.1). Striving to become more 
in control of one's decisions and the actions and circumstances that guarantees 
the efficient realization of them can be quite arduous. And the accompanying 
feelings of responsibility and anguish of striving for self-determination is a 
well-known theme in the tradition of existentialism. Even if inner feelings of 
satisfaction are the natural result of accomplishing a self-determined and 
arduous task, a less ambitious life or life of mauvais fois may very well be a 
happier one. 
Less obvious perhaps, is t hat a more autonomous life may be less fulfilling 
in terms of actual satisfaction of one's desires than a less autonomous life. As 
will be more fully explained in the next chapter, autonomy is not just about 
getting what you want but about being able to realize and/or realizing what 
you want yourself, through your own decisions and actions. Even though it 
may seem unlikely, it is not inconceivable that a person who never does 
anything much, just "hanging around" gets more preferences satisfied than she 
would have if she had tried to accomplish her ends on her own. (For instance, 
such person may evoke the (perhaps misplaced) pity of others, so they give her 
what she wants.) 
However, regarding genetic counselling, in many cases, promoting well-being 
is to promote autonomy as well. For instance, as I argued, affective states such 
as depression, anxiety and hopelessness will be detrimental to both autonomy 
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and well-being (Ü.2.3.2). Genetic counselling is, or should be, helpful in 
dealing with such psychological reactions. If this is accomplished, both well-
being and autonomy are likely to be improved. 
Of course, there may be cases when some course of action promotes one 
of the values and reduces the other. Someone may realize her plans to a greater 
extent from getting to know that she will have Huntington's disease because 
she draws her plans more realistically in light of this knowledge, but at the 
same time becoming worse off in terms of well-being from knowing about 
the Damocles' sword hanging over her head (but at the same time not so bad 
off that it affects her capacity to realize her plans). However, even if there are 
such cases, it seems difficult to point them out before and during genetic 
counselling, since it would depend on the long-term effects on the index-
person. If these cases cannot be identified beforehand, we will not need to 
take a stand on which value is more important for practical purposes. This is 
so, since only when one can have good reasons to believe that counselling will 
promote one of the values at the expense of the other, the conflict between 
autonomy and well-being is important to sort out for practical purposes. 
Nevertheless, autonomy and well-being can part ways, and there may be 
examples of cases when a counsellor can hold that she has good reason to 
believe that they will. Perhaps this is so in some cases where there is a 
preventive measure that is likely to be efficient and, thus, is likely to improve 
quality of life, but has some risks and the patient is risk-aversive. For instance, 
consider the case of surgery to prevent hereditary colon-cancer. Let us assume 
that the counsellor has good grounds for believing that the patient in question 
would "play it safe" by avoiding surgery if she knew about the slight but 
existing risks to die as a consequence of the procedure. In this case, the 
counsellor can either honour non-directiveness by telling about the risk, 
whereby the patient probably would refuse the surgery, and thus probably 
would lead a worse life in terms of well-being (or this is what the counsellor 
is convinced of is the case). Or the counsellor can try to affect the choice of 
the patient in various ways, e.g. by not talking about the risks, by presenting the 
surgery as the "only" or "obvious" choice, and so on, in which case the 
counsellor probably is reducing the autonomy of the patient.78 
78 Of course, being directive in cases like this may have negative side-effects in terms of well-being 
that make honouring of autonomy justified in cases like thi s too (Tännsjö, 1999). In that case, the 
practical conflict between autonomy and well-being is lessened. 
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Besides situations similar to this, there is a p ractical conflict between well-
being and autonomy when deciding what to prioritise when it comes to 
comparing genetic counselling with other health care pracdces in a system 
where health care is funded through taxes. This conflict becomes most 
obvious when it comes to presymptomatic genetic testing for disorders for 
which there are no health-related gains to be made, e.g. Huntington's disease. Is 
the autonomy-promotion that such testing can lead to important enough to be 
financed, maybe even at the expense of health-promotion in other areas? 
These situations of practical conflict gives rise to the question of whether 
autonomy should be considered to be a value of health care in general at all: 
should promotion of autonomy be a goal of health care? In order for the 
question of priority to arise at all, that question must be answered affirmatively. 
So concerns about the potential conflict between autonomy and well-being in 
genetic counselling gives rise to two major questions that have to be further 
investigated: What are the ultimate goals of health care? And: Given that 
autonomy is such an ultimate goal, how much weight should it be given in 
comparison to other values, like the well-being of the patient? Questions of 
such magnitude cannot be meaningfully dealt with here. I merely want to 
point out what work that lies ahe ad. 
3.4.2 Autonomy versus autonomy 
As we have already briefly touched upon (II.2.3), the idea of autonomy being a 
right that should be respected and a value that should be promoted are 
different ideas (this claim will also be further elaborated, ffl.3.3). For instance, 
autonomy as a right to respect gives rise to negative duties towards others, i.e. 
duties to abstain from certain things like manipulation and coercion, while 
autonomy as a value to promote can give rise to positive duties towards others, 
i.e. duties to do certain things towards others, like helping others becoming 
more autonomous persons or leading more autonomous lives. 
However, this must be qualified. First, the distinction between positive and 
negative duties is far from crystal clear, due to the fact that the underlying 
distinction between acts ("to do") and omission ("to abstain from doing") is 
unclear (IV.1.1.1). For instance, the duty to abstain from manipulation in health 
care is o ften taken to imply a d uty to inform the patient of medical procedures 
(III.3.3), and informing someone about something is intuitively an action rather 
than an omission. Second, even if one grants that the idea of respecting 
autonomy is different from the idea of promoting autonomy, the ideas are not 
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mutually exclusive and can even be argued to be mutually reinforcing. This is 
so, since disrespecting someone's autonomy probably will make the person 
less autonomous, by making her realize her aims to a lesser degree.79 Because 
of this, a case for respecting the autonomy of individuals in general can be 
built on the basis of autonomy being a v alue that should be promoted, just like 
it may be argued that a d efence of respecting the autonomy of individuals can 
be built on well-being as a value to promote.80 
Nevertheless, these are different ideas (EH.3.3) and they may come into 
conflict: it may be possible to make someone more autonomous in the long 
run in terms of any ideal of autonomy as a value, by not respecting that 
person's autonomy at one point in time. It then follows that not respecting 
autonomy can be permissible even if one grants that people have a basic right 
to have their autonomy respected or if one grants that negative value is realized 
just by not respecting someone's autonomy, given that one grants that the right 
is only prima facie and that the negative value is n ot infinite. This is so, since it 
then becomes permissible to not respect the right to autonomy if the value in 
terms of the autonomy promoted is great enough to override the right to 
respect or negative value of failure to respect autonomy. 
This possibility opens for justifiable paternalism in the name of autonomy. 
Roughly speaking, X is exercising paternalism when X prevents someone else, 
Y, from deciding and/or doing something, and X justifies this prevention by 
the goal of benefiting or avoiding harm to Y. Traditionally, discussions of 
paternalism has revolved around the conflict between the right to autonomy 
(or liberty) and the promotion of well-being (or avoidance of ill-being): is it 
ever justified to disregard the will of someone in order to make that person 
better off? However, if autonomy is considered to be a good of persons in the 
same manner as well-being, i.e. as something that can be promoted or reduced 
and is valuable in proportion to degree, the same question can be asked with 
regard to autonomy. Since the answer to this seems to be yes, at least in 
principle, it is conceivable that it sometimes may be permissible, and perhaps 
even obligatory, to disrespect the autonomy of someone in order to make that 
79 However, it is n ot equally self-evident that disrespecting the autonomy of someone will ma ke 
her a less a utonomous person according to the ideal of capacity. However, being manipulated 
probably will d ecrease one's capacity to realize one's basic aims, i.e. one's capacity for being 
efficient. For more about this, see chapter III. 
80 Like in Tännsjö, 1999. 
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person more autonomous.81 In an incisive wording, this can be called the 
paradox of autonomy. 
In the following, I will only consider this paradox intrapersonally. That is, I 
will only consider cases where it may be argued that it is permissible to 
disrespect the autonomy of someone in order to make that very same person 
more autonomous. In principle, however, the conflict between autonomy as a 
right and as a value can also arise interpersonally: it may be permissible to 
disrespect the autonomy of someone in order to make someone else more 
autonomous. I will return to this in chapters III and VI. 
There may also be interpersonal and intrapersonal conflicts of autonomy as 
a value. That is, one may increase the autonomy realized by first decreasing it, 
and the value of the increase may well weigh in favour of it. Let us once again 
focus on intrapersonal conflicts. It may then be true that the most efficient 
way of increasing someone's autonomy overall is to decrease it first. Take for 
instance a di sabled person who is reluctant to engage in physical exercise in 
order to improve her physical agility. It may then be the case that this person 
becomes more autonomous in the long run if she is coerced into getting 
started with the exercise. 
Since autonomy is increasingly being considered as a value to promote 
besides a r ight to respect in genetic counselling, the conflicts of autonomy 
will arise in that practice. I will now argue that this theoretical possibility is in 
fact also a part of the practical reality of genetic counselling by using two 
examples and say something about how they could be tackled. I will then pose 
some general questions that will hav e to be answered in order for the conflict 
to be resolved. 
The first example of the conflict is when genetic counsellors refuse to be 
directive against the explicit wishes of their patients. Experienced counsellors 
report that they frequently get the question What would you do in my place?' 
(Harper, 2001, p 14; Shiloh, 1996, p 86) Often, questions like these should not 
be taken literally as a request to be directed, but maybe, for instance, as a way 
of making the counsellor less detached. In fact, there may be several ways to 
answer this question in a non-directive way (Kessler, 1997, p 168-169). As we 
81 One could even claim that this is to show proper respect for someone's autonomy. See Lindley, 
1986, chapter 6. 
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have seen, giving advice as such is not contrary to non-directiveness and 
promotion of autonomy (HI.3.3.5). T he question becomes problematic only 
when the patient wants the doctor to decide for the patient in important issues as 
family planning, treatment and testing or the like. In the name of non-
directiveness and, thus, ultimately in the name of autonomy, counsellors may 
refuse to do so (Harper, 2001, p 14). 
But should not respect for autonomy entail the possibility of deciding not 
to decide oneself? This certainly has been held: "We defend a principle of 
respect for autonomy with a correlative right t o choose (not a mandatory duty to 
choose)." (Beauchamp & Childress, 2001, p 61) And moreover: "There is a 
fundamental obligation to ensure that patients have the right to choose... 
Forced information, forced c hoice an d evasive disclosure are inconsistent with this 
obligation." (Beauchamp & Childress, 2001, p 63. My italics) So, influential 
biomedical ethicists hold that the right to respect for autonomy entails that not 
making the decision for the patient if she wants it is disrespectful of the 
autonomy of the patient. In line with this, one could argue that if the patient 
makes an autonomous choice to delegate her decisional authority to the 
counsellor, for the latter to act on that delegation would be proper from the 
point of view of autonomy. 
If that is so, deciding on behalf of the patient in such circumstances would 
seem to be compatible with the ideal of respecting the autonomy of the patient. 
However, it is highly doubtful whether refusing to direct or decide for the 
patient in such a situation is to fail to respect the right to autonomy of the patient. 
The right to autonomy does not entail that patients have rights to get certain 
things from health care, like directions on what to do. It only entails that 
services performed by health care should be performed in certain ways, i.e. 
without coercion, manipulation or treating the patient as a minor (ffi.3.3). T o 
abstain from directing or deciding on behalf of the patient in questions of 
great importance to the patient's life is neither coercion, nor manipulation, and 
certainly not to treat the patient as a minor (rather, demanding that the patient 
should make up her own mind is to treat her like a competent adult). Of 
course, as we have just seen, one could argue that patients should have a right 
to decide whether or not to decide. However, this right does not imply a duty 
of anyone else to make the decision in the patients place. For such a duty to 
follow, we need to transcend the ideal of respecting au tonomy and claim that it 
would promote th e autonomy of the patient if the counsellor complies with her 
103 
wish of deciding in her place. However, this move nonetheless makes the 
refusal to decide on behalf of the patient a conflict of autonomy. 
Since non-directiveness can be defended with reference to the promotion 
of autonomy and the right to delegate decisions maybe also can be defended 
in such a manner, it is hard to settle the question of whether counsellors 
should abstain from direction when asked for just with reference to 
autonomy. What other kinds of arguments are there? Well, there are arguments 
that refer to the well-being of patients. But they are also inconclusive. In 
relation to discussing the question of what to do as a counsellor when asked: 
'What would you do in my place?' on the one hand the following has been 
claimed: "Denying counsellees' request for advice may impede the counselling 
relationship, be interpreted as lack of care, and even become a bitter struggle" 
(Shiloh, 1996, p 86). On the other hand, the following claim seems equally 
plausible: "It is very tempting to give a clear direction in these circumstances, 
but frequently these are the very couples where this may be most inadvisable. 
Such a plea often indicates an unwillingness to face up the consequences of a 
serious situation, or a serious disagreement between marriage partners, and for 
the physician to take on the responsibility that can only really be taken by the 
couple themselves may have serious long-term consequences." (Harper, 2001, p 
14) 
This only goes to show that it is difficult to give a general answer to the 
question of whether direction in important issues, such as whether or not to 
undertake a genetic test, should be given when asked for by the patient. 
However, when there is effective treatment or preventive measures, there 
seems to be more reason to decide for patient when asked to than if there is 
not. When there are no such measures, as in the case of Huntington's disease, 
the very point of testing is often to decide about what to do regarding such 
central and personal issues of one's own life as forming a family or planning a 
career. To leave decisions like these to someone else expresses a desire to 
leave responsibility of consequences one has to live with oneself to someone 
else. To grant such a desire is for the doctor to take on a role she should not 
have, "leading the life of others" and furthermore probably will be 
detrimental to trust in the profession in the long run. However, when there 
are effective preventive measures, and thus apparent health-related reasons for 
the individual to test herself, there is some reason to answer the inherently 
directive question of what one would do oneself. This is so, since in these 
cases there is an additional reason for testing: health-related well-being, in 
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which the professional has some expertise (as opposed to the question of what 
life the patient should live). But the health-related reasons must then really be 
apparent. For instance, in the case of BRCA1, the most radical measure is 
prophylactic mastectomy. Besides not being failsafe prevention and bringing 
some risks of physical harm, this surgical procedure can be experienced as 
almost as grave a consequence as the disease itself. Being a case where the 
"cure" is very painful in itself, to take on responsibility to make a decision for 
the patient that she later can resent seems less wise. 
The second example of the conflict is displayed by the common requirement 
of pre-test counselling. That is, in order to be tested at all, t he patient has to go 
through with a rather lengthy counselling procedure (Marteau & Richards, 
1996, p 6). The reason for this requirement should be obvious by now: genetic 
counselling aims to help the patient to consider what she wants and make a 
decision that is as informed and well-considered as possible, so that she 
decides in accordance with this want. In short, the aim of genetic counselling 
is to promote the autonomy of the patient.82 One straightforward way in 
which genetic counselling tries to accomplish this is by giving the patient 
more time to ponder her decision whether or not to go through with testing 
(Harper, 2001, p 17). 
However, this requirement of pre-test counselling, at least seemingly, is at 
conflict with the right to respect the autonomy of the patient, since, pre-test 
counselling being a requirement, the patient cannot go through with testing 
without this counselling even if she wants to. Is refusal to give the test to the 
patient without genetic counselling to disrespect her autonomy? 
The answer may be argued to be no, along similar lines that refusal to make 
decisions for the patient is not obviously to disrespect her autonomy. Respect 
for autonomy does not imply that patients should be given any service they 
demand. Health care does offer some services (like genetic testing), but not 
others (like homeopathic treatment). Furthermore, health care makes access to 
most services conditional. For instance, you will not get certain treatments or 
tests unless there are medical indications. Not to provide all services people 
ask for unconditionally is not to disrespect their autonomy. Respect for 
autonomy only limits the way in which services offered should be given. For 
instance, it implies that patients should not be coerced or manipulated into 
82 I ignore the well-being part in this context. 
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testing or treatment. Rather, they have the right to be informed what the 
procedure in question is about, and should be allowed to decline it i f they so 
want. That is, respect for autonomy implies informed consent, at least for 
persons autonomous enough. Therefore, health care has the right to choose 
what services to offer and what conditions should be fulfilled in order for 
people to access these services and patients have the right to accept and reject 
this offer. 
However, this line of reasoning may be questioned when it comes to 
requiring pre-test counselling. Health care is offering certain services of 
genetic testing. Generally, if health care is offering a service and there is 
medical indication that the service is needed and informed consent is 
obtained, the patient has a right to get that service. Why should genetic testing 
be any different? The point of genetic counselling is to promote autonomy. 
But what if the person is uninterested in this? Should we force the patient to 
become more autonomous? Besides looking almost paradoxical, it seems 
paternalistic to demand her to go through counselling for her own good with 
the threat of sanctions if she does not (then she will not get testing) and thus 
disrespectful of the patient's autonomy. 
One could of course argue that the point of genetic counselling is to 
ensure informed consent and nothing more. Since genetic information is 
often complicated it just requires more time than most other medical 
interventions, which make the procedure of pre-test counselling necessary. 
But this is not credible. First, it is not in line with how the aim of genetic 
counselling is conceived of. Genetic counselling aims at and does more than 
just ensure informed consent. Second, to require pre-test counselling in order 
for consent to be counted as in formed would set the standard of informed 
consent higher when it comes to genetic testing than in health care in general. 
Normally, when a normal adult is given information, says that she understands 
it and consents to the procedure, this is taken as enough evidence that one has 
obtained informed consent. This is so, since trusting the patient to be 
competent enough to understand the information and not to he when she says 
she does is part of treating her like an autonomous person and, in this sense, 
respecting her autonomy. Why should standards be stricter when it comes to 
genetic testing? Is that not to treat the patient as a minor, assuming that 
assurance that the information about testing is understood is in sufficient? 
It then seems to be a case in favour of claiming that requiring genetic 
counselling in order to get genetic testing can be disrespectful to the patient's 
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autonomy. At least this is so if the patient has prior indications of being a 
carrier of the gene in question, that is, there is medical indication, and if the 
patient shows understanding of what the test tests for and wants testing, that is, 
she has given informed consent to testing. Does this mean that the 
requirement should be abandoned? 
This is a tricky question indeed. But a general answer should go along the 
following Unes. The very point of providing much presymptomatic genetic 
testing to start with is to promote the psychological well-being and autonomy 
of the individual. This is especially obvious regarding those genetic diseases 
for which there are no cures, palliations, or preventive measures whatsoever, 
like Huntington's disease. Genetic testing of these kinds of diseases has no 
health-related advantages at all. The point of genetic counselling is to see to it 
that the values of autonomy and psychological well-being are realized. As we 
have seen, there are good reasons to believe that the realization of these values 
are dependent on how the decision is made and the information disclosed. 
Genetic counselling provides a setting aimed at ensuring that decisions are 
made and information disclosed in a manner conducive to the values. 
Since the point or reason to provide these tests is psychological well-being 
and autonomy and genetic counselling is an institution that tries to accomplish 
these values, there is no reason to offer these tests without genetic counselling. 
That is, the health care system has no reason to offer this particular service if it 
were not for the promotion of autonomy and psychological well-being that 
the service can lead to. Since genetic counselling seems to be a prerequisite for 
the values to be realized, they have no reason to offer presymptomatic genetic 
testing without it. And it seems unreasonable to claim that patients have a right 
to demand a service from health care that it has no or little reason to offer. 
However, for some presymptomatic genetic testing, health-related values 
can be realized. This is the case when there is preventive measures or other 
kinds of therapeutic advantages with knowing beforehand that disease is 
probable. Health-related values can be realized without genetic counselling. So 
for these diseases, there seems to be less reason to require genetic counselling. 
However, it should be observed that the force of this line of reasoning resides 
on a sliding scale. As was pointed out above, in some cases where preventive 
measures are available, there may still be doubts as to whether these would 
really b enefit the patient or not. 
So the conclusion seem to be that it is harder to justify a requirement of 
pre-test counselling for diseases for which there are (sufficiently safe and 
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efficient) medical or other health-related measures to take, but not for those 
where there are no such measures. This is so, since the very point of offering 
these tests are undermined if they are not preceded by genetic counselling. 
However, the conclusion that genetic counselling should not be required for 
genetic diseases for which there are health-related measures to take must be 
further modified. Since genetic information is about one's blood relatives, the 
patient's understanding of the possible implications of this must be ensured, 
which can require a more lengthy procedure of informed consent than usual. I 
will return to the question of relatives in the chapter IV. 
3.5 Concluding remarks on the value of genetic counselling 
We have seen that the ultimate goals of genetic counselling is the same as t he 
ultimate goals of presymptomatic genetic testing, namely the promotion of the 
autonomy and well-being of the patient. An important part of the explanation 
of the allegiance to these values is the grim history of eugenics. Even though a 
traditional crystal clear definition of what genetic counselling is cannot be 
obtained, a standard characterisation of the practice contains a number of 
components: that genetic counselling is a professionally lead process of 
communication that contains pre-test information gathering and post-test 
information giving, as well as support to cope with the psychosocial 
consequences of testing. 
In order to ensure that the goals of genetic counselling are obtained, 
genetic counselling has developed an ethos, containing particular norms or 
principles. The goals of genetic counselling provide an instrument to evaluate 
these norms. The norms of voluntariness and equal access are about the 
societal institutions surrounding the practice of genetic counselling. The norm 
of voluntariness leads to questions about how society should be organized in 
order to ensure that the decision of whether or not to have genetic testing 
should be entirely up to the individual herself, ultimately questions about 
justice. The norm of equal access leads to questions of who should finance 
genetic testing and counselling and who should receive it, which are also 
ultimately questions of justice. T hese questions need further investigation. The 
norms of attention to psychosocial and effective dimensions, as well as, 
confidentiality and protection of privacy, are most naturally justified with 
reference to the ultimate goals of genetic counselling. 
Non-directiveness, being the most salient norm of the ethos of genetic 
counselling, can be usefully evaluated with reference to the ultimate goals of 
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genetic counselling. I have argued that non-directiveness should not be taken 
as equivalent to withholding advice, but rather as abs taining from influencing 
the patient without regarding the patient's own basic aims. Non-directiveness 
thus requires of the counsellor not to pursue a normative agenda 
independently of the patient's own values and wants. Furthermore, it is argued 
that, as a rule of thumb, the counsellor should not know anything about the 
test result that the patient does not get to know about. Sometimes such 
"complete disclosure" will be detrimental to the well-being and autonomy of 
the patient, but this cannot be found out beforehand. This means that 
sometimes genetic counselling will be acting contrary to its own goals. 
Finally, I have argued that having autonomy-promotion as a goal may give 
rise to conflicts with well-being, as well as intrapersonal conflicts between 
autonomy as a value to promote and as a right to respect, and intrapersonal 
conflicts of autonomy as a value to promote. Two such practical problems of 
autonomy in genetic counselling have been presented: the first being about 
refusal to be directive and the second about requiring pre-test counselling as a 
condition of testing. It is proposed that the way to solve these conflicts is to 
treat different kinds of tests differently. Generally, when the value of testing is 
primarily about traditional health-related reasons rather than autonomy, refusal 
to be directive and requiring genetic counselling is more problematic. But 
when the very point of testing to a large extent is promotion of autonomy, 
"forcing" the patient to be autonomous by refusing to be directive and 
requiring genetic counselling seems more easy to justify. However, we are left 
with more questions: should promotion of autonomy really be a goal of health 
care practices and to what extent should they then be prioritised in relation to 
more traditional health care practices? 
The analysis undertaken in this section on genetic counselling, as well as the 
one above on presymptomatic genetic testing, has left open a number of 
theoretical issues regarding the more exact nature of the goals of autonomy 
and well-being. In some cases, particular solutions to such issues have even 
been presupposed. In the next chapter, I will pr oceed to investigate such issues 
(and substantiate the presuppositions made with regard to them) as concerns 
autonomy. This will be a task of a chapter of its own since, as remarked, the 
idea of autonomy as a goal of health care practices is a rather novel one that has 
not been much analysed. Before that, however, I will close this chapter by 
making some notes with regard to the more traditionally embraced goal of 
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promoting well-being. Hopefully, some remarks on well-being that may have 
come through as unclear, controversial or questionable will become less so as 
a result. 
4. Well-being 
According to standard accounts of biomedical ethics, the goal of health care in 
general is to improve the quality of life, the welfare, or the well-being of the 
patient (Beauchamp & Childress, 2001, p 177).83 Another way to put this is to 
say that well-being is the rationale or value of health care. This idea is often 
referred to as the principle of beneficence, "whereas respect for autonomy 
(along with nonmaleficence and justice) sets the moral limits on the 
professional's actions in pursuit of this goal." (Ibid.) As we have seen, another 
goal of presymptomatic genetic testing is autonomy, which then is a value to 
be promoted and not just something that provides "moral limits" on the 
pursuit of the goal of well-being (11.23). This idea will be elaborated in the 
next chapter. 
In general, the goal of health care has been to promote health-related well-
being, but regarding presymptomatic genetic testing, another goal is to 
promote psychological well-being, e.g. by reducing the anxiety of uncertainty 
(Piatt Walker, 1998, p 12; Munthe, 2002, p 78). This kind of promotion of well-
being84 is not part of health-related well-being, at least not conceptually 
(II.2.1).85 Therefore, the discussion of the value of presymptomatic genetic 
testing requires a broader grip on the concept of well-being. 
What is well-being, then? The essential characteristic of well-being is that it is 
always about the good or (intrinsic) value for any being or person.86 Theories 
of well-being are, then, theories of what makes someone's life go better, or 
what makes a person better off, or values for someone, or personal, or prudential 
values. Theories of well-being are thereby a subclass of theories of value, since 
there may be values that cannot be properly attributed to any person, but only 
83 I will use the term well-being from now on and consider the other two terms as synonymous. 
84 Or perhaps, rather, reduction of (health-related) "ill-being", e.g. sickness. I will not put 
emphasis on this distinction, unless needed. 
85 See Briilde & Tengland, 2003, p 165-270, for a discussion of the concept of health. 
86 In order to simplify, I will conform to the convention of using "person" as a label on the sort of 
beings that well-being can be attributed to, even if it is co ntroversial whether non-persons can be 
well or bad off or not. 
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to outcomes or state of affairs (Temkin, 1993, p 277). One such example could 
be structural features of the distribution of well-being among persons, such as 
equality.87 
Theories of well-being thus try to answer the question: what makes a 
person's life go well or bad, better or worse? Or (rather): what does the good 
and bad of persons consist of? This question should be carefully distinguished 
from other, related, questions. First, the question is not one about the meaning 
of linguistic expressions "personal value" or "well-being", i.e., it is not a m eta-
ethical question (1.3). Rather, it is a question of what constitutes the good life. 
Second, it is not a question of what actually affects the good of someone, i.e., 
what has causal impact on the value of a life. Rather, it is a question of what a 
good life consists of, regardless of how it comes about. Theories of well-being 
are thereby concerned with final or intrinsic values, i.e. what is of value in itself, 
rather than instrumental values, i.e. what factors that in fact affect value.88 
Third, the question is evaluative rather than normative, i.e., it is a question of what 
is good (and bad) for someone rather than a question of what someone ought 
to do. Certainly, evaluative and normative questions are intimately related. If 
something is good for someone, at least someone has a reason to promote it, 
ceteris paribus. However, what kinds of reasons of actions are provided by 
values is a tricky question, to which I will return (II.4.2, III.3.2). 
4.1 Theories of well-being 
Nowadays, it is customary to distinguish between three main theories of well-
being:89 hedonism™ the desire fulfilment theory or preferential m, and the objective 
list theory. I will present the basic tenets of these theories. My primary purpose 
is to explicate the concept of well-being that I have used so far, so that it 
becomes clearer why I have made the claims regarding well-being that I have 
made and will make. 
87 However, it may be possible to construe even equality as a personal value, if the intuition is t hat 
it is bad for someone to be worse off (in terms off other constituents of well-being) than 
someone else, through no fault of one's own. See Francén, Gren & Juth, 2003, p 31-33. 
88 For a brief discussion of final and intrinsic values, see III.3.1. As we have seen, this makes most 
of the discussion of the practice of presymptomatic genetic testing one about the instrumental 
values of the practice. 
89 At least since Parfit, 1984, p 493-502, even if vocabulary differs somewhat between writers. See 
e.g. Briilde, 1998; Kagan, 1998, p 29-41; Sandman, 2001, p 26-40; Temkin, 1993, p 258-280. 
90 Strictly speaking, hedonism is just a subgroup of mental state theories, but the most important 
one. 
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4.1.1 Hedonism 
Hedonism is the view that well-being consists of certain mental states, namely 
pleasure and the absence of displeasure. The basic tenet of hedonism is thus 
that feeling good is good and feeling bad is bad. The term hedonism is often 
used to designate the theory of welfare h edonism, which says that the pleasure and 
displeasure of a person is the only thing of relevance in order to determine 
the well-being of a person (Kagan, 1998, p 31).91 This version of hedonism is, 
of course, much more controversial than the weaker form that only states that 
pleasure is a good thing (and displeasure a bad) without taking a stand on 
whether or not there are other components of well-being. Naturally, I will not 
assume the truth of welfare hedonism. However, from now on, I will use the 
term hedonism for welfare hedonism, unless otherwise explicitly stated. 
Hedonism should be carefully distinguished from other related doctrines. 
For instance, hedonism does not state the normative doctrine that one should 
act as to maximise the net balance of pleasure over displeasure, i.e. hedonistic 
utilitarianism, or that pleasure is the only thing of intrinsic value, i.e. value 
hedonism, since hedonism as a theory of well-being is compatible with claiming 
that there are states of affairs o f intrinsic value that are not personal. 
But even carefully formulated so as to avoid conflations with other related 
doctrines, hedonism comes in many versions.92 For instance, there are 
different versions due to different accounts of what it is that makes a p leasant 
experience pleasant (and unpleasant experiences unpleasant): there are quality 
theories, according to which (the valuable kind of) pleasure is a felt quality of 
our experiences (or a "hedonistic tone"),93 and there are preference theories, 
according to which (the valuable kind of) pleasure is a matter of intrinsic 
preferences towards the experience.94 Furthermore, there are different 
versions due to different opinions on whether only the intensity and duration 
91 I will to a large extent use the terminology of Kagan, 1998, for the theories of well-being and 
consequentialism. 
92 For a thorough exposition and discussion of different versions of hedonism, see Briilde, 1998, p 
68-153. 
93 There are monistic and pluralistic versions of quality theories, the first saying that there is o ne 
kind of hedonistic tone that all pleasurable experiences have in common, and the other one 
saying that there are several such kinds. See Brülde, 1998, p 84-86. 
94 More specifically, the preference theory says that an experience is pl easant if, and only if (and 
because), the person wants to go on having it because of the experience it is ( and is u npleasant if 
the person does not want to go having it because of the experience it is). 
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of a pleasure is relevant to the value of it (pure hedonism), or whether other 
things matter too, such as the quality of the pleasure or the fact that the cause 
or object of the experience is "proper" (different modified he donisms). In deed, 
there are numerous questions on which different versions of hedonism can 
take different stands, for instance the question of whether and where there is a 
zero-point between pleasure and displeasure, and whether and how pleasure is 
measurable.95 
Needless to say, I will not take a stand on all these vexed questions. And for 
practical purposes of this book, I need not do so either. The reason for this is 
that all hedonistic theories will agree in practice regarding the questions of 
value discussed in this context. For instance, regardless of whether one is 
defending a quality theory or a p reference theory of pleasure and displeasure, 
there will be almost total agreement on what kinds of experiences that are 
pleasant or unpleasant. Sensations, such as the taste of delicious food, 
emotions, such as the joy, hope , or love of something or someone, or moods, 
such as energy or peace of mind, can almost without exception be reasonably 
argued to be pleasant.96 Similarly, pain, anxiety, worry, frustration, shame, guilt, 
sadness, despair, depression, and apathy are typical examples of unpleasant 
experiences (Briilde, 1998, p 73-78). And, as we have seen, it is the impact of 
genetic testing and information on feelings such as these that are the focus of 
the practical debate of well-being at issue in this book (II.2.1-II.2.2). 
4.1.2 'Preferentialism 
Preferentialism is the view that the well-being of a person consists of that 
person having her preferences satisfied or, to put in more ordinary language, 
to have it the way she wants to. It is commonplace and intuitively appealing to 
assume that the more and the "more important", or stronger, the preferences 
satisfied, the better it is for the person. Furthermore, it seems intuitively 
appealing to say that only the satisfaction of intrinsic preferences, i.e. things 
one wants for their own sake, adds to well-being. This is the case since it 
seems strange to claim that it is good for a person to have instrumental desires 
satisfied. If you want to exercise only because you think it will be an effective 
means to stay in shape, which is your ultimate motivation for exercising, it 
95 For a discussion of the mentioned questions, see Tännsjö, 1998b, p 67-77. 
56 This should also hold regardless of the account of the relationship one thinks is holding 
between these feelings and pleasure, i.e., regardless of whether pleasurable experiences consist of, 
are supervenient on, or are caused by these feelings. 
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seems natural to say that it is your staying in shape that makes your life better, 
while exercise is only a contingent cause of this without any independent 
value. 
Just like hedonism, preferentialism must be carefully distinguished from 
other related doctrines.97 And just like hedonism, preferentialism comes in 
many different versions.98 Although a popular doctrine, preferentialism is 
hardly ever defended without qualifications. Different proponents of the 
doctrine have different ideas on how it should be qualified, giving rise to 
different versions of it. The qualifications are united by the idea that the 
satisfaction of some kinds of preferences or desires that the person actually 
has is irrelevant to the well-being of the person. Basically, there are two kinds 
of such arguments (Tännsjö, 1998, p 82-89). First, we have arguments of 
idealisation, stating that only preferences that the person would have in certain 
circumstances are relevant to the well-being of the person. Commonly, the 
idea is that it is only preferences that the person would have were she more 
rational that is r elevant. Different conditions of rationality have been proposed: 
that the person is rational in decision theoretical terms (i.e. that she has 
complete, non-contradictory, and transitive preferences),99 that she has all 
relevant information and has deliberated carefully (Harsanyi, 1982, p 55), or that 
she has undergone cognitive psychotherapy (Brandt, 1979).100 Second, we have 
arguments of elimination, stating that the satisfaction of some actual 
preferences of a person should be disregarded altogether for the purpose of 
determining the well-being of that person. Examples of preferences that has 
been claimed should be disregarded are preferences one wish one did not 
have (Tännsjö, 1998b, p 83), preferences one does no longer have when they 
can be satisfied (Hare, 1981, p 102), other-regarding preferences (Tännsjö, 
1998b, p 85-86), and "anti-social" preferences (such as sadistic or envious ones) 
(Harsanyi, 1982, p 56). 
97 For instance, preferentialism as a theory of well-being should be distinguished from 
preferentialistic utilitarianism and value preferentialism, which are the preferentialistic 
counterparts of the hedonistic doctrines (see II.4.1.1). I t should also be distinguished from the 
doctrine of neo-classical welfare economics, which says that the rational agent acts to maximise 
the satisfaction of her preferences. 
98 For a thorough exposition and discussion of different versions of preferentialism, see Brülde, 
1998, p 154-285. 
99 See Resnik, 1987, p 22-25. 
too p or a fuller list of such conditions of rationality and a discussion of them, see Brülde, 1998, p 
236-260. 
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Unlike hedonism, it is plausible to assume that the different versions of 
preferentialism will have very different practical consequences. At least, an 
idealised version of preferentialism, claiming that only the satisfaction of fully 
informed and carefully considered preferences increases well-being, will give 
any person different recommendations of what she should do in order to live 
a good life than a theory claiming that the satisfaction of the person's actual 
preferences are of value to her, given the highly plausible empirical 
supposition that everyone has at least some preferences that are not fully 
informed and carefully considered. 
Thus I have to state if I am presupposing idealistic versions of 
preferentialism or not: I have not presupposed any kind of idealisation. I have 
two reasons for this. The first is that ideal preferentialism is not the one 
favoured in bioethics in general and in the discussion on genetic information 
and testing in particular (TIL2.2.1). The second is that idealisations of the sort 
mentioned changes preferentialism so as to approximate objective list theories 
of well-being,101 to which I will turn shortly. Moreover, I have not, and will 
not, specifically discuss any kind of preferences that anyone has argued should 
be eliminated, according to the arguments of elimination. So, I disregard this 
complication as well.102 
4.1.3 Objective list theories 
Objective list theories propose the view that the well-being of a person 
consists of the person having certain goods, whether or not the person herself 
likes these goods or not. This is not one theory of well-being but, of course, 
there is one separate theory for every list of goods. However, all objective list 
theories share some common characteristics, which make it appropriate to treat 
them under the same heading. First, all obje ctive list theories are objective, in the 
sense that they claim that certain things (or states of affairs) are good for 
persons, regardless of whether they enjoy or want these things or not. Second, 
objective list theories (usually) are pluralistic, in the sense that they claim that 
there are different kinds of things that contributes to well-being. 
101 For arguments to this effect, see Kagan, 1998, p 38-39; Tännsjö, 1998b, p 87-88. 
102 However, I find the arguments to accept that now-for-now preferences and self-regarding 
preferences are the only kind of preferences that adds to the well-being of persons compelling, 
given that one accepts preferentialism. For an argument for just counting now-for-now 
preferences as relevant, see III.3.2.2. For arguments for just counting self-regarding preferences, 
see Briilde, 1998, p 205, 224-225, Kagan, 1998, p 37-38; Tännsjö, 1998b, p 85-86. 
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Different lists of objective goods will provide different versions of the 
theory or, rather, different theories of well-being.103 However, there are some 
goods that tend to crop up regularly as o bjective goods of well-being: certain 
activities (such as artistic, intellectual, political activities, games, moral action), 
certain human relations (such as friendly, romantic, family, citizen), contact 
with reality, certain abilities (such as physical, intellectual, moral), autonomy, 
and freedom are typical examples (Brülde, 1998, 288-302). Mere enumeration is 
of course not enough to warrant an objective list. O ne has to provide some 
kind of justification of why the included goods on the list are included. Such 
justifications do almost without exception refer to some essential characteristic 
of human nature, like some ideal of human life, perfecting typical human 
abilities (i.e.. perfectionism), or human needs (Kagan, 1998, p 40). 
4.1.4 Subjective well-being 
I take it for granted that these theories provide the major candidates for what 
may be the ultimate value (or point, goal, rationale) of presymptomatic genetic 
testing. It is perhaps unnecessary to point out that I will not try to investigate 
the implications of all these theories of well-being to presymptomatic genetic 
testing. As already mentioned, the reason for presenting the theories is to 
explicate the concept of well-being I presuppose when discussing the value of 
genetic testing. 
I have to a large extent ignored objective list theories. The most important 
reason for this is that the discussion of presymptomatic genetic testing, of 
which this book is a part, shares this negligence, and on good grounds too. 
The reason for the negligence is that arguments for the value of 
presymptomatic genetic testing from most goods on objective list theories 
would be farfetched. For instance, it seems to require an advanced exercise in 
sophism in order to defend that the point of genetic testing is that it promotes 
patients' political engagement, creativity, intellectual capacity or something of 
the like. 
However, there is one very important exception to the negligence of 
motivations for presymptomatic genetic testing of an objective list kind. Of 
course, I am primarily thinking of autonomy. As we have seen, autonomy is 
one of the most salient subjects of discussion in the moral debate of 
103 For a thorough exposition and discussion of different brands of objective list theories, see 
Brülde, 1998, p 286-366. 
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presymptomatic genetic testing and one of the most common values brought 
to stand in order to defend the practice. Therefore it has a salient place in this 
book. For now, I just want to make one point about autonomy that relates to 
the theories of well-being in general. Modern conceptions of autonomy 
occupy an interesting middle-ground between preferentialism and objective 
list theories. It is an objective theory in the sense that it is saying that one 
should be a certain way (autonomous) and/or live a certain kind of life 
(achieving one's goals); regardless of whether this is something that one wants 
to do or enjoys. But it is also related to preferentialism in the sense that it is 
saying that the goals one should achieve (and/or the goals that other should 
respect) are one's own goals — not some alleged goals that all s hould pursue.104 
I will to some extent elaborate on the value of relations, when discussing 
relative's value of and right to genetic information (VI.3.2.2). However, my 
focus of attention will be on if the index-person has any duties to reveal such 
information and not if the value of relationships can be improved upon by 
presymptomatic genetic testing. Nonetheless, I will address questions of 
whether the alleged value of such relationships founds such duties. 
A further value of an objective list kind that sometimes enters the context 
of presymptomatic genetic testing is "contact with reality" or, as it is usually 
phrased within this context, knowledge (Shickle, 1997, p 72).105 Of course, 
presymptomatic genetic testing can provide knowledge. However, knowledge 
is a very controversial value and, to my knowledge, no one has claimed that the 
point of genetic testing is merely to give the patient knowledge about some 
genetic fact(s) regarding herself. Rather, the quest has been for a firmer and 
more uncontroversial basis of presymptomatic genetic testing, like avoidance 
of harm,106 subjective well-being (see below) or autonomy. I will join this 
assumption and, therefore, to a large extent ignore the intrinsic value of 
104 Unlike (Aristotelian) perfectionism that says that some goals are desirable for all men, e.g. 
friendship. 
105 If someone knows something, she also by implication has true beliefs about it (according to 
the standard account of knowledge as true, well-founded beliefs) and thus is "in contact with 
reality" regarding his p iece of knowledge. However, one may have contact with reality in the sense 
of being causally related to the external world in various ways, w ithout having knowledge, and 
one may have knowledge while not being in much contact with reality in ways that can be 
considered valuable (e.g. being a brain in a vat knowing that one is that). So in theoretical 
discussions of intrinsic value, these ideas should be kept separate. 
106 With harm, I mean unpleasantness and/or frustration of preferences, i.e. w hat hedonism and 
preferentialism counts as n egative values. 
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knowledge as a possible rationale for presymptomatic genetic testing.107 This 
book cannot deal with all questions of relevance to the subject and the 
question of knowledge as an intrinsic personal value as a basis for the pracdce 
of presymptomatic genetic testing I leave for someone else to discuss. 
I will also leave another possible personal objective value, but one that has 
not been attended to (as far as I know), namely the value of "realizing one's 
potential" in the sense of cultivating one's natural talents. This essay focuses on 
presymptomatic genetic testing that can be done today, testing that informs of 
(risk for) future disease. However, testing that reveals other kinds of 
information could perhaps be done in future. Genes that are advantageous to 
"positive traits" like athletic capacity, musicality, and mathematical ability may 
be discovered (if t hese traits are partly genetically explained) and one might be 
able to test for these genes. If we could realize this theoretical possibility, it 
might be argued that we should do so on perfectionist grounds. The 
argument, then, is that if one knows what genetic advantages or "natural 
talents" one has, one has more opportunity to cultivate skills in areas in which 
one is more likely to excel. There is some common ground between this 
question and the "science fiction" question of enhancements of traits through 
gene therapy. However, as remarked in chapter I, I will not discuss any of these 
questions. 
Thus, when talking about well-being, I exclude objective list theories. I only 
presuppose subjective theories of well-being, i.e. hedonism and (the non-
idealistic version of) preferentialism. So, whenever I speak of well-being in 
general, I will mean only pleasure and/or preference satisfaction and 
whenever I speak of ill-being, I will mean displeasure and/or preference 
frustration, unless I explicitly sta te otherwise. 
But which of the theories of hedonism and preferentialism is 
presupposed? Well, for most practical purposes, this will not matter, since they 
will agree on almost all practi cal issues I address, at least in general. In general, 
the possible effects of improving people's health or reduce their anxiety that 
presymptomatic genetic testing may lead to (11.2.1-11.2.2), will be favoured both 
by hedonism (improved health and reduced anxiety tends to promote feeling 
107 An exception to this is dis cussions of the idea that knowledge is a prerequisite, or at least an 
advantage, for the promotion of autonomy. In this regard, knowledge receives much attention. 
See e.g. chapter III. 
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good for most people most of the time) and preferentialism (most people 
want to be healthy and avoid anxiety most of the time). And, for instance, the 
possible effect of leaving positively tested persons without insurance will 
probably be problematic according to both hedonism and preferentialism, for 
parallel reasons. Of course, there are complications to examples of this sort 
and sometimes the two theories might part ways. For instance, as mentioned in 
n.2.4, unwelcome changes in self-image are conceptually a loss in well-being. 
However, this holds only given preferentialism.108 Nonetheless, it is very likely 
that such unwelcome changes will reduce well-being also in hedonistic terms, 
since it is likely to evoke emotional frustration. So unless there are good 
reasons to assume hedonism and preferentialism will part ways, I will not 
discuss them separately. This means that one may choose one's favourite 
theory of well-being, be it hedonism or preferentialism or some mixture 
between them. However, I will assume that there is something to at least one 
of these theories. This is not very controversial. Anyway, it seems unintuitive 
indeed to deny that both feeling good (and not feeling bad) and having it the 
way one wants are irrelevant to the well-being of persons. That at least one of 
these things (and maybe both) constitutes well-being is therefore assumed. 
4.2 Norms of well-being 
As previously pointed out, the theories of well-being presented are theories of 
value rather than normative theories (II-4). That is, they are theories about what 
constitutes the good (and bad) of persons rather than theories about what 
persons ought (and ought not) to do. However, theories of value are intimately 
related to theories of norms. An extreme version of such an intimate relation 
is consequentialism, which says that one ought to perform actions that produce 
better consequences than any alternative action, and only such actions. 
Consequentialism is traditionally conceived of as a theory of moral tightness, 
which claims that a particular action is right if, and only if, there was nothing 
the agent could have done instead in the situation, such that had the agent 
done this, the universe (on the whole) would have been better. A shorthand 
expression for the necessary and sufficient conditions for right actions is to 
say that an action is right if, and only if, there is no alternative with better 
consequences. Furthermore, the theory claims that if an action is right it is 
morally permissible to perform it and if it is wrong it is impermissible to 
108 A t least if the aversion to changing self-image is intrinsic, self-regarding and now-for-now. 
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perform it. That is, only optimal acts are right and, thus, morally permissible to 
perform. In effect, the theory claims th at only th e consequences are relevant in 
order to determine the moral status of any action. 
Consequentialism is, of course, void of content if it does not provide an 
account of what consequences that are good consequences. The theories of 
well-being presented provide such accounts. When combined with theories of 
well-being, consequentialistic theories are often called utilitarianism, a 
terminology I will use too. So there is hedonistic utilitarianism, claiming that 
an action is right if, and only if, there is no alternative a ction the agent could 
have performed instead that produces a greater balance of pleasure over 
displeasure, and preferentialistic utilitarianism, claiming the same thing 
regarding preferences. Of course, different accounts of well-being may be 
combined, e.g., ones that claim that both pleasure and satisfaction of 
preferences are valuable. Such theories have to say how these values should be 
compared in order to generate definite answers on what consequences that are 
better than oth ers. 
Consequentialism comes in many versions too. Firstly, one can favour 
some objective version, stating that the actual consequences of an action 
determines it tightness, or some subjective version, sta ting that the (reasonable) 
beliefs about the action's consequences (also) determine its Tightness. 
Secondly, one can favour a total vers ion, stating that it is the total value that 
should be maximised, or an average version, stating that the average level of 
value for all individuals sh ould be maximised. Thirdly, one could favour rule 
utilitarianism or act utilitarianism.109 I will only consider these different 
versions of consequentialism when I find that i t will be important for the 
discussion at hand. 
A common criticism of consequentialism and utilitarianism is that they 
demand too much of the agent, since nothing but "the best" is permissible. In 
light of this criticism, various "milder" forms of consequentialism have been 
formulated. The perhaps best known is Michael Slote's (1985) satisficing act-
consequentialism, which claims that if an action produces consequences that 
are "good enough", this is sufficient in order for it to be right.110 I will not 
discuss the plausibility of this idea. However, I will neither assume that the 
109 I will discuss these last two versions more closely later (see VII.6.2). 
110 What is counted as being good enough is de liberately left imprecise by Slote, leaving it up to 
judgement to decide. 
120 
traditional maximising version of consequentialism defined above, is the 
correct one. Instead, I will sometimes speak loosely of consequentialistic 
concerns and considerations and/or considerations or concerns of well-being. 
When I do so, I will only assume that subjective well-being (see above) is of 
some relevance in order to determine the moral status of actions and 
institutions and remain neutral on the issue of whether it ought to be 
maximised or just considered relevant in some other way. However, 
sometimes I will discuss maximising consequentialism. It should be clear from 
the context and terminology if this is so. 
5. Conclusions 
This chapter has dealt exclusively with the value-question regarding first parties 
or individuals, that is, what is the value of presymptomatic genetic testing for 
the individual? I have argued that there are basically two such values: subjective 
well-being and autonomy. I have argued that both these values may be both 
promoted or reduced, or even damaged, by receiving the result from 
presymptomatic genetic testing. I have also argued that, generally, these values 
show the basis for some types of testing weaker. For instance, this goes for 
testing for diseases for which there are no preventive measures, since these 
cannot lead to the realization of health-related values, and testing that is 
uncertain (testing with low reliability or predictability), since they are less 
likely to reduce anxiety and promote autonomy. I als o argued that the situation 
of the test, for instance, the way in which the test result is disclosed, is crucial 
for the realization of the values of well-being and autonomy. Perhaps most 
notably, ensuring proper understanding of the test result, as well as of the 
possible psychological and societal consequences, and providing support, is of 
importance for promoting the values in question. 
This renders some support for genetic counselling, a p ractice which aims 
at understanding and emotional support. We have seen that the ultimate goals 
of genetic counselling is the same as the ultimate goals of genetic 
presymptomatic genetic testing, namely the promotion of the autonomy and 
well-being of the patient. In order to ensure that the goals of genetic 
counselling are obtained, genetic counselling has developed an ethos, 
containing particular norms or principles. The goals of genetic counselling 
provide an instrument to evaluate these norms. Against this standard of 
assessment, I have argued that non-directiveness, being the most salient norm 
of the ethos of genetic counselling, should not be taken as equivalent to 
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withholding advice, but rather as abstaining from influencing the patient 
without regard for the patient's own basic aims. Furthermore, :t i s argued that, 
as a rule of thumb, the counsellor should not know anything about the test 
result that the patient does not get to know about. However, sometimes such 
"complete disclosure" will be detrimental to the well-being and autonomy of 
the patient, but this is difficult to find out beforehand. This means that 
sometimes genetic counselling will b e acting against its own goals. 
I have argued that having autonomy-promotion as a goal may give rise to 
conflicts with well-being, as well as intrapersonal conflicts between autonomy 
as a value to promote and as a right to respect, and intrapersonal conflicts of 
autonomy as a value to promote. This led to the discussion of some practical 
problems that arise as result of these conflicts. One important conclusion 
when discussing these practical problems was that when the very point of 
testing to a large extent is promotion of autonomy, as is the case w ith testing 
for serious diseases for which there are no preventive measures, "forcing" the 
patient to be autonomous by refusal to be directive and requiring genetic 
counselling seems more easy to justify. 
The discussion of the practice of presymptomatic genetic testing and 
genetic counselling left some question marks on how well-being and 
autonomy, being the values of these practices, should be understood more 
precisely. In the end of this chapter, I explicated the concept of well-being that 
I used, primarily arguing, but in some regards just assuming, that objective list 
theories of well-being should be regarded irrelevant. I thus revealed that the 
concept of well-being presupposed was a concept of subjective well-being, 
stating that the good of an individual consists in feeling good (hedonism) or 
having it one's own way (preferentialism). I have briefly argued why I think that 
one can remain neutral on which of these theories that are the correct one 
when discussing the issue of the value of presymptomatic genetic testing. A 
more precise analysis of autonomy is the task of the next chapter. 
However, the discussions of this chapter have left us with more questions. 
Two of the most important ones are: should promotion of autonomy really be 
a goal of health care practices? To what extent should the practices that 
primarily promote autonomy be prioritised in relation to more traditional 
health care practices? These are very interesting, but very difficult, questions, 
which leaves more work to be done for the future. 
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Chapter III 
Autonomy 
1. Introduction 
As demonstrated in the previous chapter, autonomy is one of the values most 
usually referred to when arguing why presymptomatic genetic testing can be a 
good thing for the person tested. This is especially so in the cases of 
presymptomatic genetic testing for diseases for which there are no medical or 
other preventive measures. In the previous chapter, we also saw that autonomy 
is not only considered as a right to be respected in this context, but also as a 
value to be promoted. Furthermore, autonomy as a value, rather than the 
traditional right, provides (part of) the justification for the practice of 
presymptomatic testing, as well as the basis of its ethos. Although I briefly 
adumbrated the general features of a theory of autonomy that also can describe 
and defend autonomy conceived of as a value, a more thorough exposition of 
the notion of autonomy is needed, a notion fit to illuminate ethical 
discussions, and primarily biomedical ones. 
The purpose of this chapter is, then, to elaborate an analysis of autonomy 
that is useful to analyse discussions in biomedical ethics in general, and the 
discussion of presymptomatic genetic testing in particular. In order to do that, 
a crucial distinction will be made between conception of autonomy and ideals 
of autonomy. Hopefully, the analysis will prove valuable for ethical theory in 
general. 
In order for there to be different opinions about the value of autonomy, 
there has to be unanimity on what autonomy is. A conception of autonomy 
should therefore be useful for formulating different competing ideals of 
autonomy. As a general rule in moral philosophy, it is fruitful to avoid 
discussions about what something (e.g. autonomy) "really is" (that is, 
discussions on how the word (autonomy) "truly" should be understood) and 
instead discussing what is valuable and what ought to be done (regarding 
autonomy). One and the same conception of autonomy has in fact often been 
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used to defend different moral ideals (Tännsjö, 1998b, p 99-113). A useful 
conception of autonomy should therefore allow this plurality of ideals. 
So this chapter will start of with the task of elaboradng such a conception 
that is useful to formulate different ideals of autonomy, which are explicit or 
implicit in modern biomedical ethical discussions. In these discussions, the 
meaning of autonomy is seldom clarified. An elaborated concepdon should 
then be useful in making sense of these argumentations. A fruitful conception 
should suggest why autonomy is considered to be valuable and how it can be 
used to defend normative judgements. A fruitful conception should also be 
useful to explain normative disagreements between different proponents of 
autonomy, e.g. with reference to differences in the weight different 
proponents attach to different aspects of autonomy. 
More specifically, the conception of autonomy presented in the 
following should primarily be useful for analysing the debate on the right to 
and value of genetic information, the subject matter of this book. As we have 
already seen, the best way of making sense of many lines of reasoning in this 
context is by considering autonomy as a gradual value, which could (and 
perhaps should) be promoted by genetic testing (see II.2.3 ). The enterprise is to 
develop a conception that can make such lines of reasoning intelligible and, at 
least prima facie, plausib le. For instance, authenticity is a part of autonomy that 
has been largely ignored in biomedical ethics. However, some claims about the 
value of genetic testing seem to be mainly about authenticity (see II.3.3.5). One 
therefore should try to say what authenticity is if one considers it to be of 
value. This is not to say th at authenticity, or autonomy, has value. I will not take 
a stand on that issue. I will only attempt to formulate a conception that is a 
good candidate for being such a value. That is, if one wants to claim that 
autonomy is a value, it should be construed in the way I propose. Or so I will 
argue. I will also demonstrate the usefulness of the conception by formulating 
two basic ideals of autonomy conceived of as a value (see section m.3.1). I will 
also try to show that the conception can be used to formulate alternative ideals 
of autonomy, also those which do not necessarily claim that autonomy is a 
value to promote but, rather, a right to respect (EEI.3.3). By showing that the 
conception can be used to formulate a wide range of different ideals, the 
conception will prove to be fruitful. 
There are, of course, other possible conceptions than the one I will be 
proposing in the following. I think that this conception is general enough to 
124 
formulate most reasonable modern ideals of autonomy. I will, however, also 
present interpretations of autonomy that are inconsistent with this one (e.g. a 
very orthodox Kantian one, see V.3.1.2). However, these interpretations are not 
only rare in the modern biomedical ethical discussion, as we will see, they are 
not really needed for formulating the ideals of autonomy that they have 
traditionally been employed to express. 
There has been scepticism about whether there is a consistent 
interpretation of the concept of autonomy to start with. Therefore, some 
authors have been reluctant to use the concept altogether (Christman, 1998, p 
109). However, since the discussion about the value of and right to genetic 
information is to a large extent cast in terms of autonomy, the discussion is 
unavoidable in this context. Furthermore, since the value of autonomy is so 
widely cherished, one should not dismiss it easily on purely terminological 
grounds. And finally, th e fact that a concept is vague and ambiguous does not 
rule out meaningful use of it.1 I think it could be worthwhile to attempt on 
another round of making sense of autonomy, before dismissing it altogether. 
2. A conception of autonomy 
The meaning of autonomy is controversial. What is not controversial is the 
positive value-ladeness of the concept. In these two regards autonomy is like 
concepts such as justice and happiness. Nevertheless, the etymology of the 
word reveals a generally accepted minimal core of the meaning: autonomy is 
about self-determination.2 Thus any conception of autonomy must depart 
from this minimal concept. 
Autonomy can be attributed to various entities, for instance states. In this 
context I am only interested in autonomy that can be attributed to individuals 
and their properties. One can talk about autonomous wants (or desires), 
decisions, actions and persons. Wants can be more or less autonomous, or so I 
will argue. Autonomous wants will be called authentic. Decisions can also be 
1 
'Knowledge' is an example of this. 
2 From Greek: autos = self; nomos = law - to legislate oneself. One cannot presuppose a single 
meaning that all users of the word are aware of when they use the word autonomy. However, all 
influential ideas on autonomy are somehow about self-government or self-determination 
(Christman, 1998, p 109). The concept allows the formulation of many divergent conceptions 
(one is explicated in this text). The distinction between concept and conception in this context 
should not be conflated with Rawls', however, since this conception, unlike Rawls' famous 
conception of justice, allows a wide range of different ideals (which makes the meaning of 
conception here come closer to Rawls' meaning of concept). 
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more or less autonomous, or so I will argue. Autonomous decisions will be 
called competent ones. And actions can be more or less autonomous. In order 
for an action to be autonomous there has to be the right sort of relation to any 
person's wants, decisions and acts. A person has, at least, to do what she 
decides to do and decide what she wants to do in a situation, in order for the 
action to be autonomous in that situation. 
However, this is not sufficient, since this is compatible with a contingent 
relationship between the desire, decision and act. There has to be (something 
of a) c ausal relationship between the desires, decisions and acts of person in 
order for the act to be autonomous.3 It should thus be clear that a person has 
to do what she does because she has decided to do it, in order for her action to 
be autonomous. If John turns on the stove, not because he has decided to do 
so, but because he has spasms that make him turn on the stove, the spasms, 
rather than any decision, has caused him to turn on the stove. This "action" is 
hardly an autonomous one. 
Moreover, one has to decide what to do because o ne wants it, in order for 
the decision to be autonomous. This is obvious if one imagines cases where 
the link between desires and decisions has been broken. For instance, imagine 
someone implanting a microchip in your brain, the triggering of which makes 
you decide to do something. Then your desires are irrelevant to your decision 
whenever the microchip is triggered. Such decisions are hardly autonomous. 
Furthermore, the desire must cause the decision and the decision must 
cause the act in the right way. How this exactly should be understood is hard 
to define, but has been made sufficiently clear in other contexts.4 Generally, 
lack of control of one's wants, decisions and acts, and of the relation between 
them, are paradigmatic examples of lack of autonomy.5 For example, if my 
present wants are the sole result of involuntary hypnosis, no decision or act 
3 The saving clause "something of a" is included because 'cause' should be interpreted widely in 
this context, not demanding any strict psycho-physical laws and compatible with those who claim 
that causal language is not appropriate for actions (who would rather say th at actions depends on 
or should be explained by wills and decisions). 
4 See Elster, 1990, p 53-54. One example of a w rong "causal" connection is when Jane decides to 
shoot someone and does so, not "directly" because of her decision, but because her decision 
makes her so nervous as to pull the trigger. Her act may then be caused by her decision, but not 
"in the right way", i.e. no t in the property of being a motivating reason, or something of the kind. 
5 Does anyone ever control what she wants? The kind of "control" of one's wants that lessens 
one's autonomy is discussed in t he following (III.2.2.2). 
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flowing out of these wants may make me more autonomous (this will be 
qualified, see III.2.2.3). 
2.1 Minimalist ic definit ion 
With this said, the following "minimalistic definition" of autonomous persons 
; will be used as a point of departure. A person, in a si tuation, is autonomous to 
the extent that she does what she decides to do, because she decides to do it, 
; and decides to do what she wants to do, because she wants to do it (Tännsjö, 
1998b, p 97). A person can thus be more or less autonomous, depending on 
the autonomy of her wants, decisions and actions. So this minimalistic 
definition can be used to characterise autonomous persons and defend ideals 
of autonomy. This definition will in the following be developed and made 
more precise in order to get a clearer idea about autonomy. 
Corresponding to the three components in the minimal definition: will, 
decision, and action, there are three components in the conception of 
autonomy: authenticity, decision competence and efficiency. Independent of 
each other, all these components may be present in varying degrees, or so I 
will argue. 
A couple of issues need to be added regarding this minimalistic definition. 
First, the definition may give the impression that autonomy is a p roperty that 
should be attributed to single actions rather than persons or lives. However, it 
has been claimed that the value of a utonomy shou ld be attributed to persons or 
person's lives taken as a whole (see e.g. H usted, 1997, p 59, 61-63) . This idea is 
formulated in many ways: a person lives a n autonomous life when she lives in 
accordance with her basic wishes or values, when the person realizes his own 
important projects, when the person lives according to his own idea of a good 
life and so on. I willingly accep t all th ese general characteristics of autonomy as 
a value. However, strictly speaking, they are about autonomy as an ideal rather 
than a conception. I will return to why I think that the conception of 
autonomy that will be fleshed out in the following is suitable to explicate 
these ideals (see section III.3.1). Which components of autonomy one thinks is 
most important from a moral point of view has to be defended within a 
framework of an ideal of autonomy. This framework can argue in favour or 
against taking wants, decisions, and actions into account. 
Furthermore, this minimalistic definition may also give the impression that 
the will in itself cannot be (more or less) autonomous. However, much of the 
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discussion of autonomy is about the autonomous (or authentic) will 
(Christman, 1988). The minimalistic definition does not exclude this idea. It 
will be a part of this conception of autonomy as one of the three components 
of autonomy (authenticity). An authentic will can then be attributed with 
different (including no) value, depending on the ideal of autonomy one wants 
to defend. 
IJoel Feinberg, 1986, p 28, has made a distinction between the capacity for autonomy and the actual conditions of autonomy. In order to understand this 
distinction, consider the slave who can make authentic, competent decisions 
and act on them, i.e. she has the capacity for autonomy, but is prevented from 
actually p utting the capacity into practice, i.e. t he actual conditions for putting 
the capacity into practice are not in place. The distinction is rather vague and 
draws on an intuitive difference between "internal" (capacity) and "external" 
(actual conditions) factors determining the degree of a person's autonomy. My 
characterisation of the different components of autonomy will disregard this 
distinction, assuming that all three components can be affected by both 
internal and external factors, thus making the actual degree of autonomy a 
result of both these factors. Anyone inclined to think that there is a moral 
difference between external and internal factors influencing this has to 
account for such an idea in an ideal of autonomy, a possibility compatible with 
the conception of autonomy presented here. 
This relates to the general point already made about the importance of 
distinguishing between conceptions and ideals. It is quite possible to say that 
there is an important moral difference between, on the one hand, the type of 
case where a person, P, fails to put her plans to work due to the "external" 
influence of others (such as p hysical coercion), and, on the other hand, the 
type of case where P fails to put her plans into work due to factors present 
within P's own mind independently of others (such as failure to grasp how to 
act in order to achieve the aim in question). However, whether or not such a 
suggestion is warranted is not a conceptual issue, since the claim that this 
distinction is not of any moral importance may be put forward by employing 
the same conception of what it is to be (more or less) autonomous. 
As will be seen when I now start to clarify further the nature of these 
components, there are quite a few opinions with regard to autonomy that may 
be handled in a similar manner. This, I claim, is a virtue of my conception, 
since it demonstrates how apparently opposing views on the value or moral 
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importance of autonomy really are opposing views about one and the same 
thing: autonomy understood in accordance with the minimalistic co nception. 
For instance, take the similar but nonetheless different distinction 
between the capacity for autonomy and actually exercising autonomy (Lindley, 
1986, p 68-69). This distinction is different from Feinberg's, since one can have 
the capacity for autonomy as well as the actual condition fulfilled for being 
autonomous without exercising one's autonomy: think of the non-slave with 
the capacity for autonomy, who never puts her plans into work. Also this 
distinction becomes interesting when formulating ideals of autonomy, since 
both the "capacity for autonomy" (including, perhaps, the actual conditions) 
and actually exercising autonomy can be considered to be valuable. I will 
discuss them under the headings of "ideals of capacity" and "ideals of self-
realization" (see section III.3.1). 
2.2 Authentiäty 
According to some influential contributors to the autonomy debate, 
authenticity is the most fundamental component of autonomy (Christman, 
n 
1998, p 109, 112). This since, roughly, autonomy is about living in accordance 
with one's own will and authenticity is about the extent to which one's will 
really is one 's own. In effect, it is crucia l to investigate what it takes f or the will 
of a person to be her own, i.e. authentic. 
In this subsection, after some preliminaries, I will first argue against some 
proposals of what authenticity is. After that, I will state what I consider to be 
reasonable conditions of authenticity. I will argue that the most important 
property of an authentic desire is that a p erson who has t he desire would be 
inclined to approve of having that desire if she came to know why she has it. 
The connection between rationality and self-determination can be thus 
described as a connection of identification: if a desire endures (or would 
endure) criticism and still is willingly embraced, it is authentic. Of course, a 
desire may endure different amounts of information on why one has it, and 
the resulting inclination to approve of having it may differ in strength. 
Therefore authenticity, just like a utonomy in general, is a matter of degrees: a 
desire can be more or less authentic. 
Before entering this discussion, there is need for making s ome general notes 
on the concept of desire. Much has been written on how to analyse what 
desires are (see e.g. Smith, 1994, p 104-129). However, I will not have much to 
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say about the often subtle details of this debate. In this context desires are 
supposed to be understood as p ropositional pro-attitudes,6 where the strength 
of the desire is determined by the strength of the attitude the person has 
towards the object of the attitude.7 For instance, "I desire to drink a cup of 
coffee" should be understood as me having a pro-attitude to the fact that I am 
drinking a cup of coffee, where the stronger the attitude, the stronger the 
desire. To do what one wants should be understood as doing what one desires 
mostly in a situation, which is a f unction of the strength and number of the 
desires present in that situation. Therefore, a person may not want to do 
whatever she desires most in a sit uation (if there are other conflicting desires 
in enough number and strength). 
The following point cannot be overemphasised: autonomy is not solely 
about satisfying desires, but also about having certain kinds of desires and 
about doing (or being able to do) what one wants (JH.2.2.2 and EEI.2.4.1). 
Therefore not all satisfaction of desires increases a person's autonomy. The 
latter, doing what one wants, regards competence and efficiency, to which we 
will return. The former regards the desire-component of autonomy. What 
kinds of desires are relevant from the point of view of autonomy, then? 
I will call th e desires that are relevant from the point of autonomy authentic 
and basic desires (goals, values, wants, preferences, projects). I will soon defend 
a view on authenticity. Basic desires are intrinsic:8 a person P does not desire 
X only because P thinks that X will (or is likely to) result in something else 
that P desires. For instance, Jenny desires to get up earlier tomorrow, because 
she desires to be a person that wakes up early by herself. Jenny's desire to get 
up early tomorrow is then instrumental in relation to her desire to be a person 
that wakes up early by herself. Moreover, basic desires are not derived from 
any false beliefs about the desired object. If a person wants to drink a cup of 
6 Pro-attitudes should be interpreted in a wide sense. Therefore 'projects', 'values', 'goals', 
'preferences' may be synonymous with desires as used here. 
7 It is important to note that this does not imply that the strength of a desire consists of the pull a 
person feels towards the object, but is compatible with desires being analysed functionally rather 
than phenomenologically (Brülde, 1998, 453-461). Furthermore, it does not imply that the 
strength of desires should be identified with hypothetical choices, even if hypothetical choices 
may constitute powerful evidence that a person has certain desires with certain strengths. 'Desire' 
should rather be understood as a theoretical concept that can explain certain (hypothetical) 
choices (Tännsjö, 1998b, p 83). 
8 In opposition to instrumental desires, rather than extrinsic desires or derivative (Brülde, 1998, p 
182-186). 
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coffee, because he thinks it will make him feel drowsy, when it really will 
make him feel more alert, drinking that cup of coffee does not satisfy any 
basic desire, since the desire to drink that cup of coffee is derived from the 
desire to become drowsy in conjunction with the (false) belief that drinking 
coffee will lead to that. The reason that instrumental and (other) derived are 
irrelevant from the point of view of autonomy is, of course, that it seems odd 
to say that the satisfaction of them makes a person live a life according to her 
own light to a greater extent, or a better life a t all, for that matter. 
Basic desires are often taken to be very general, like the desire to be happy 
or live a life according to the bible. This, in turn, due to the belief that most 
particular desires can be psychologically linked to more general desires 
through the presence of beliefs about how these latter desires may be satisfied. 
Probably, basic desires are quite often global, in the sense that they are about 
the person's life taken as a whole, for instance about long-term projects or 
about the kind of person one wants to be. However, this does not have to be 
so. Much more particular desires may very well be basic, like the desire to go 
for a walk or the desire to have one's family around when it is time to die.9 
Also people that are less inclined for long-term planning may have basic 
desires that are very much limited in their content (such as being about 
temporally isolated situations). 
As already mentioned, desires relevant from the point of view of autonomy 
should be authentic besides being basic. Most modern discussions of 
autonomy assume that conditions of rationality should be placed on desires in 
order for them to be autonomous or authentic.10 What, then, makes a desire 
rational? Can desires be more or less rational themselves? Hume seemed to 
9 However, these desires are probably (like most desires) complex in the sense that they are 
conditional, which is something else than instrumental or derived. I wish to take a walk, g iven that 
it does not begin to snow, given that I am not run over by a car, and so forth. I wish to have my 
family around me when it is time to die, given that they do not quarrel, and so forth. This does 
not make these wishes instrumental. I can wish something, e.g. happiness "for its own sake" 
(intrinsically), but conditioned on something else, e.g. that my happiness does not bring great 
hardship on someone else. This is im portant to emphasise, since it probably makes more desires 
intrinsic than what the first impression might be. 
10 See e.g. Lindley: "any conception of autonomy requires its own view of rationality. Indeed, one 
of the disagreements between different theories of autonomy is over the proper role of reason in 
the determination of desire and action", 1986, p 28. 
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deny this.11 A common interpretation of Hume is that he means that desires 
only can be the object of criticism if they are based on beliefs that can be 
made the object of rational criticism (Smith, 1994, 7-8). This means that desires 
in themselves can never be the object of rational criticism; they are neutral 
with regard to rationality. 
The question of interest in this context is not whether desires are radonally 
criticisable per se, but whether they are rationally criticisable from the point of 
view of autonomy. One has to remember that Hume was discussing means-
end rationality (to maximise the satisfaction of the desires one in fact has). 
Even if that kind of rationality is compatible with having no conditions of 
rationality on desires, it does not follow that there are no conditions of 
rationality on desires from the point of view of autonomy. In fact, I will argue 
below that some such conditions should in fact be accepted with regard to 
basic desires (see II.2.2.2). 
It is also important to make a distinction between substantial and 
procedural conditions of the rationality of desires. Hume can be interpreted as 
meaning that the content o f desires cannot be rationally criticised. With this a 
supporter of the conditions of authenticity that will be defended in the 
following can agree. There is no desire that solely due to its content is 
excluded on grounds of authenticity. The conditions of authenticity here 
defended are procedural in this regard. They are also procedural in the 
following regard: they demand that desires should be approved of given a 
certain procedure of (hypothetical) critical reflection and the higher the 
degree to which this condition is met, the more authentic is the desire in 
question. Before arguing in favour of this point, however, I will start by 
addressing some proposals on what authenticity is, but which should be 
rejected, or so I will argue. 
2.2.1 What authenticity is not 
In this subsection, I will address four conditions of rationality on desires, 
which I think should be rejected as conditions of authenticity. The first such 
kind of condition of rationality that I argue should be rejected is about 
consistency between desires. The second kind of condition of rationality, 
which is about consistency between levels of desires, should be rejected, or at 
least modified, since the fulfilment of it, in spite of initial appearance, does 
11 Hume, 1740, Book II, Part III, Section III, p 416. 
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not make desires more authentic. A third kind of condition, being about the 
origin of desires, should be rejected altogether, due to inherent implausibility. 
A fourth kind of condition of rationality should be rejected, since it is more 
about Tightness and impartiality than about autonomy and self-determination. 
Consistency between desires 
A fundamental condition of rationality is consistency. It is most commonly 
embraced regarding the justification of beliefs, but the idea can also be applied 
to desires. One could claim that in order for desire to be rational it has to 
stand in certain relations to other desires: it should not be contradicted by 
other desires (so that the possessor of the desire both wants and does not want 
a certain thing), it should not be a part of a cyclic preference structure (so that 
you prefer a state A to another state B to a third state C, which you prefer to 
A)12 and it should be ordered in comparison to other desires. All these 
conditions of rationality are well known in decision theory (henceforth: 
decision theoretical conditions).13 I have no business entering that whole 
discussion, but merely need to address the issue of how these conditions 
relate to authenticity as a part of the conception of autonomy. 
Of course, there is the possibility that desires can be contradictory: a 
person may both desire and not desire the same thing.14 It is probably more 
than just a possibility; who has not experienced that you both desire and do 
not desire something? This case of "mixed emotions" may be the result of 
many things: unclear or contradictory beliefs (about what will happen given 
that the desires are satisfied), cyclic preferences or simply due to the fact that 
one cannot order the desires in relation to others. 
12 Of course, one can argue that a desire being a part of a cycle does not make the desire irrational 
itself, but rather that the set of desires (or, rather, preferences) is irr ational. I will disreg ard this 
possibility, however, since I argue that none of these conditions are reasonable as conditions of 
authenticity anyway. 
13 In decision theory these conditions make unequivocal orderings and measurement of the 
desires of a person possible. See Resnik, 1987, p 22-25. 
14 With contradictory desires I do not mean "indifference" in the sense that one has considered 
the alternatives and is completely willing to trade the one for the other, i.e. d ecisions theoretical 
indifference. Furthermore, I do not mean that one does not know what one wants. I mean that 
one both wants and not wants something. It could be denied that this is pos sible (just like o ne 
could deny that it is impossible to hold contradictory beliefs at the same time as o ne is awa re of 
them being contradictory). In such case, there is no contradiction of desire-problem. 
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Contradictory desires may be thought to be good examples of inauthentic 
desires. If a person, P, both wants and does not want the same thing, it looks 
like P either does not know herself o r suffers from an incomplete personality 
in need of complementary goals, values a nd projects for her life. One could 
hold that the component of authenticity emphasises that autonomy is not just 
about realizing your plans yourself, but also about making plans for yourself 
and being aware what these plans are. Contra dictory desires seem to indicate 
that one is lacking in bo th these respects. 
However, even if one accepts the premises of plan-making and self-
knowledge as important parts of authenticity, this does not imply that decision 
theoretical consistency is a necessary condition of authenticity. Well-
considered basic desires may come into conflict. They may i n fact co me into 
conflict just because they are well considered. Pondering what kind of life 
one wants to live, one may find that one's two most cherished projects are 
incompatible (like a very time consuming hobby and a very time consuming 
career or a wish to work out very much and an equally strong wish not to 
become a narcissistic broiler). 15 From the perspective of rational choice, this is 
seen as a problem mainly because finding a rational answer to what to do in 
such cases is difficult, to say the least. This, however, is of no consequence for 
the issue of authenticity, i.e. to what extent these desires are really o ne's own. 
On the contrary, the fact that the desires are well considered (or could be) 
points towards them being more authentic (see III.2.2.2). If one happens to be a 
vacillating person, this should be reflected by the content of one's very own 
desires. 
Decision theoretical consistency can neither be a sufficient condition of 
authenticity. A person who is brainwashed by a sect may very well have 
consistent desires, but is (probably, see below) not a very authentic person. 
Decision theoretical consistency is therefore in itself not enough to guarantee 
authenticity. 
Decision theoretical consistency is, thus, not a condition or prerequisite of 
authenticity. But it may affect the capacity for decision-making of a person. If a 
person both desires and does not desire the same thing, she may be stuck as 
Burridan's ass, unable to reach a decision from the conflicting desires. 
15 Of course, these desires are contradictory due to them being impossible to realise in this world 
as it is, i.e., due to empirical facts. This does not ameliorate the contradiction, however. 
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Furthermore, conflicts in desires will make it harder for a person to live her 
life in accordance with these desires, i.e., it may affect the efficiency 
component of autonomy. 
Consistency between different levels of desires 
Harry Frankfurt, 1971, suggested, in a widely influential paper, that in order to 
be authentic, a person P's desires of a lower level (lower levels desire: T T T")) 
should be in accordance with or adjusted to P's desires of higher level (higher 
levels desire: HLD).16 This idea has been influential to the degree that 
autonomy has been identified with the fulfilment of this condition (Lindley, 
1986, p 64-67; Dworkin, 1981). Despite its popularity, I will argue that this idea 
is, at least partly, mistaken. However, there is a sound core to be found in the 
suggestion that will be distilled and developed in the next subsection (III.2.2.2). 
A LLD is a d esire that does not have another desire as its object.17 A HLD is 
a desire that has a T .TP or a HLD at a lower level as its object.18 So, there may 
be more than two levels of desires. This idea of autonomy is often held to be 
an expression of a thought of authenticity as identification: a desire is authentic 
(and the action performed on the basis of it is autonomous) only if the agent 
who performs the action identifies herself with the desire in the sense that she 
perceives it as genuinely her own. Another way of putting this is to say that the 
desire must not be "alien" to the person. More specifically, the idea is that I do 
not enhance my autonomy if I satisfy a desire that 1 would prefer to be rid of. 
Common examples are the junkie's desire to have the next fix or the smoker's 
desire to have the next cigarette. Despite the fact that the smoker desires the 
next cigarette, she often desires that she did not have that desire, i.e. desires not 
to be a smoker. The desire to have the next cigarette is thereby not authentic, 
or so the reasoning goes according to the idea under consideration. 
Let me first rebut the idea that a HLD in accordance with the LLD is required in 
order for the T .TP to be authentic. If this is the case, at least two problems 
16 More precisely, the will, i.e. the desire(s) that one ultimately is motivated to act on, should not 
be undesired (Frankfurt, 1971, p 8). 
17 The object of LLD is not (in any unqualified sense) state of affairs. In one sense, the object of 
LLD is a cts. This may seem odd (especially when it comes to intrinsic desires). But autonomy, 
unlike preferentialism, is about the realization of the desire through the act of the agent (III.2.4.1). 
18 Instead of levels of desires, it sometimes customary to talk about first order (LLD), second order, 
third order, etc (HLDs) desires. 
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appear. Firstly, it becomes impossible to be autonomous without a HLD, 
contrary to intuition. My desire not to have life sustaining treatment may not 
be accompanied by a desire to be such a person who does not desire to have 
life sustaining treatment. I may only have the desire not to have life sustaining 
treatment, tout court. However, it seems to be unreasonable to claim that 
coercing life sustaining treatment upon me therefore is not a v iolation of my 
autonomy. This example indicates that requiring a HLD with which a desire is 
in accordance in order for this desire to be authentic is much too strong. 
Secondly, an infinite regress seems to be the implication of requiring a 
HLD. This is the case since more than one level of HLD seems to be possible. 
Should a desire of the second level be desired in order to be authentic? This 
seems to be reasonable, since a person may have a d esire of the third level that 
does not approve of the desire of the second level. If this is valid for the 
second and third level, it seems to be valid for any level. But then any desire 
on any level always must be approved by a desire on a higher level. The 
regress is thus established. In order to avoid this, the highest level at which a 
desire is actually entertained by the agent should be counted as the one that 
lower levels of desires should conform to. But then a LLD must be enough, if 
that desire is in fact unaccompanied by a h igher level. The requirement of a HLD 
is thereby given up. 
However, the idea may be modified so that one only considers the actual 
desires the person has. LLDs should then be consistent with the highest actual 
level of desire. However, this modification also has problems, general to the 
basic ideas of correspondence between levels of desires. 
To start with, this idea is unclear. And any more precise understanding 
seems insufficient or implausible. Let me elaborate. 
First, is inconsistency between levels sufficient for /«authenticity and, thus, 
consistency necessary for authenticity? Or is consistency sufficient for 
authenticity? If consistency is only necessary for authenticity, the suggestion is, 
at best, incomplete, since we would need to know what else is required to 
make a desire authentic. So the suggestion should rather be the latter: that 
consistency between different levels of desires is sufficient for authenticity. 
Second, it is unclear what kind of inconsistency one has in mind. Is it 
enough that LLDs are in accordance with HLDs, so that when they are 
inconsistent, it does not matter which we change? Or should LLDs be adjusted 
to (the actually highest level of) HLD? 
136 
However, the first proposal, i.e. that inconsistency between levels just has 
to be removed in order to achieve authenticity, has serious drawbacks. First, 
this proposal must be fleshed out with some idea on which desire should 
confirm with which and why this type of inconsistency (between LLDs and 
HLDs) leads to inauthenticity. The proposal is therefore, at best, incomplete. 
Second, and more seriously, the idea then collapses into being about 
consistency between desires. I have already argued that authenticity cannot 
consist of this. 
Therefore, let us move on to the idea that LLDs should be adjusted to 
HLD. This is natural in the light of the examples of the smoker above. 
However, also this suggestion also has serious drawbacks. One important 
problem is that it seems possible that desires of a higher level can be as 
inauthentic as desires of a lower level. If that is the case, authenticity probably 
does not only consist in adjusting lower to higher levels of desires. If the 
HLDs are not authentic themselves, it seems mysterious how LLDs can be 
authentic just by adjusting themselves to HLDs. An example may be the desire 
of a woman to iron her husband's shirts. Let us assume that this desire is a 
result of a systematic indoctrination, the purpose of which is to install the 
belief that the only task of a woman is to serve and please her man. The first 
impression of this example is that the woman's desire to iron her husband's 
shirts is not authentic (even if we would like to know more before drawing a 
definite conclusion). The condition of being a desire adjusted to the HLD is 
fulfilled, however. The condition therefore seems to be too weak, judging 
desires as authentic that intuitively are judged to be inauthentic. 
Indeed, sometimes a HLD seems to be more inauthentic than the LLP they 
are directed towards. An example may be the homosexual man who desires to 
engage in intimate relations with another man, but who desires not to have this 
sexual orientation. That HLD may very well be nothing but a reflection of the 
negative attitudes of the surrounding society towards homosexuals, rather than 
a self-determined desire. 
From this and similar examples it could even be claimed that the LLDs of 
people, to a greater extent than their HLD, constitute the "core" of their 
personality and that it is a weakness of Frankfurt's suggestion that it is unable to 
acknowledge this. The theoretical background of this claim can be that HLDs 
often are the result of demands of the surrounding society - a "cultural 
varnish" or a "super ego" censuring the desires people would otherwise try to 
realize. If there is something to these kinds of theories and authenticity is 
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somehow about expressing one's core personality, the HLDs of a person has in 
fact less to do with authenticity than the LLD of the person.19 
Let me emphasize that examples, such as the one with the woman above, is not 
sufficient to refute suggestions of what authenticity is, merely due to being at 
odds with our initial intuitions about authenticity. The idea of authenticity 
soon to be presented may very well imply that the woman in the example 
above is authentic. But then it seems to be for the right reason. The main 
problem with the idea that authenticity has to do with LLDs being adjusted to 
HLDs is th at it is unclear why the first should be adjusted in accordance with 
the second. Firstly, it does not seem to be unreasonable to claim that T .TD can 
be more self-determined than HLD, in the sense that they express the core of 
personality to a higher degree. For instance, a person's LLDs may be stronger 
than a corresponding HLD. And this may be nothing the person resents. 
Because of this, the present idea of authenticity is not in tune with the general 
idea of identification, despite the initial appearance to the contrary. Secondly, it 
seems possible that a LLD can be less vulnerable to criticism than a HLD So, it 
seems that the fact that a LLD has adjusted to a HLD is not only insufficient 
for the authenticity of that LLD; it is also not necessary. In the next subsection 
an idea of authenticity that more appropriately captures the ideas of the core 
of the personality, identification and rational criticism will be presented 
(m.222). 
Being one's own origin 
Objections of the kind mentioned have resulted in stronger conditions of 
desires being proposed and thus stronger conditions of authenticity and 
autonomy. The moral of the examples mentioned about the housewife and the 
homosexual may be thought to be that inauthenticity somehow has to do with 
the origin of the desires; whether the forming of the desires has been self-
governed or not.20 However, if non self-governed forming of desires makes 
the desires inauthentic, what then does it mean to govern the forming of a 
desire? Is not this idea absurd? Are not all desires formed by factors the 
person cannot govern if the story of the forming is told from the start? In 
19 See Friedman, 1986, for an elaboration of this critique. 
20 To see why ideas that refer to the origin of desires (so-called genetic theories of rationally-
oriented modifications of desires, see Brülde, 1998, p 253-256) as authenticity-making all are 
mistaken, see II.2.2.3. See also Lindley, 1986, p 46. 
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order to say no, we would have to presuppose an "unmoved mover" who out 
of nothing creates a sel f, and it is certainly not desirable to build such a h azy 
and controversial idea into the concept of authenticity. On the contrary, this 
conception must allow for us to be able to have authentic desires without 
having to assume anything more about ourselves than what we normally do. 
For this reason, the idea of authenticity that will be presented in the next 
subsection does not presuppose any such ideas. There are no "unmoved 
movers" that out of nothing creates a self or an I in order for this conception 
to be meaningful. This conception is thus compatible with the apparent fact 
that we are all fo rmed in a society with certain values, norms and rules that take 
part in the shaping of persons. There is no single moment in the history of a 
human individual at which she becomes a person with the ability to create 
herself. The development of a person is a continuous process influenced by 
many sources, but — and this will b e my lever for finding a sound conception 
of authenticity - in which the individual becomes more capable of critically 
evaluating the grounds on which she makes her decisions. We do not choose a 
character, but we have a character from which we at times are able to make 
choices with character forming effects from. But to be able to evaluate the 
grounds from which one chooses is to have the capacity for authenticity. And 
this capacity we have to different degrees in different circumstances, and we 
use it to different degrees in different circumstances, which suggests that 
authenticity is a g radual concept. 
The authenticity of desires should therefore not be understood as the self-
governed creation of desires. In fact, since all desires entertained by a person 
have a causal history that is (at least partly) uncontrolled by the person herself, 
the self-governance of the creation of the desire cannot very well be the mark 
of authenticity (unless we would like a theory of authenticity implying that no 
actual person can have authentic desires).21 
Idealisation and impartiality 
Besides ideas of being the origin of one's own desires, another type of 
stronger 'idealistic' conditions of authenticity and autonomy are sometimes 
21 For much the same reasons, one should reject conditions that says that a desire that is the 
result of someone else's deliberate attempt to install that desire are inauthentic, since this would 
mean that all desires that are the result of ordinary parental efforts of raising are inauthentic. Not 
many basic desires may remain given such a strict condition. 
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presented. Such idealistic condi tions require that only the desires that a person 
would have were she more or ideally rational are authentic.22 One version of 
idealism has substantial criterions on what is to be taken as a rationa l desire. That 
is, a n irrational desire is so due to its content (regardless of who has it and 
why), e.g. because its object is not worth desiring.23 Kant can be interpreted in 
this direction:24 the rational is also the morally right. The reason for this is that, 
according to Kant, a p erson governs herself only if s he acts out of her rational 
will (otherwise she is governed by uncontrolled impulses or "empirical 
inclinations"). Moreover, Kant means that the will is rational only if it is in 
accordance the moral law or the Categorical Imperative. Only the person acting 
out of (and not just in accordance with) the moral law is thus autonomous, 
according to this line of reasoning.25 
Rawls has a similar idea in mind when he writes: "acting autonomously is 
acting from principles that we would consent to as free and equal rational 
beings" (1972, p 516). He then claims that all such beings would agree on the 
same principles. What the individual in fact desires is thereby irrelevant to the 
question of rationality, authenticity, and autonomy. It is what we would desire 
if we were in these idealised conditions that is of relevance.26 
It is obvious that one can live a life in accordance with one's actual basic 
desires without being autonomous at all accordi ng to all these idealised senses 
of authenticity. It is therefore natural to assume that these conditions of 
rationality are different from the ones most adherents of autonomy would 
defend. They seem to be about satisfying pe rceived requirements of rational 
impartiality or morally praiseworthy action rather than authenticity and self-
determination. For this reason alone, it may be argued that the proper place for 
22 In one sense, the idea of authenticity defended below (III.2.2.2) is idealistic: desires are 
authentic to the extent that they would be approved of, given knowledge about why one has 
them. 
23 This is so metimes called intrinsically irrational desires (Brülde, 1998, p 257-259; Parfit, 1984, p 
121). 
24 Even if Kant would deny that desires ever are rational; rationality is attributed to the 
(noumenal) will. 
25 This Kantian line of reasoning can be found in Kant, 1785, especially chapter III. 
26 How rational one has to be in order to be rational enough has to be settled. Rawls can be 
interpreted as taking "rational" to mean something like "only taking impartial reasons into 
account" and his account autonomy is then very close to an analysis of moral rightness or 
justifiability (Feinberg, 1986, p 36). 
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these requirements is i n an ideal rather than a conception of autonomy. I will 
return to this point shortly. 
One primary reason not to accept this account of autonomy and authenticity 
in the present context is that it is at odds with most modern conceptions of 
autonomy, especially those that are popular in biomedical ethics (see e.g. 
Christman, 1988; Lindley, 1986). On the contrary, these conceptions of 
autonomy have often been used to formulate the idea that people to some 
extent should be free to make unwise and even immoral choices (Mill, 1859). 
As we saw in the previous chapter, this also seems to hold regarding the 
(sketchy) ideals of genetic testing and counselling. A conception that 
presupposes a very strong connection between morals and autonomy would 
therefore not be suitable for making sense of this type of ideas. 
Another reason is that the idea seems to be mistaken; it seems to be 
possible to be autonomous and immoral at the same time (in every common 
sense meaning of the word moral). I have never seen any proof that a person 
who governs herself could not do that in accordance with evil or selfish 
values or principles. Why should it be impossible for a person to live after the 
maxim that she should try to inflict as much suffering as po ssible upon others 
(she might be a sadist or a Satanist)? In the words of Feinberg: "For us to hold 
that an evil person does not truly governs himself, we must identify his "true 
self" with impersonal reason, rather than with his actual values and 
commitments." (Feinberg, 1986, p 36) 
This objection takes us back to the first objection above. It should not be a 
part of the very conception of autonomy that autonomous actions exhaust the 
field of morally justifiable actions. We might want to say t hat it is better to be 
autonomous than not, ceteris paribus. But it is not inconceivable that it is 
sometimes worse to be an autonomous person than not (see III.2.6.2). Per haps 
it is better if a stern sadist suffers from weakness of will. 
I will not, then, demand that desires should fulfil idealistic conditions à la 
Rawls and Kant in order to be authentic. In the discussion I will be focusing 
on, namely the biomedical ethical, the empirical tradition of autonomy from 
Mill to Glover (1977, p 77) is the more relevant and not the idealistic tradition 
from Kant to Rawls. Therefore I will opt for the non-idealistic version. 
However, this conception of autonomy does not in itself preclude that one 
adds such conditions and still stick to the conception's central components 
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and structure by formulating an ideal of autonomy, specifying under what 
conditions autonomy is morally desirable. Such an ideal would then use the 
conception and would thereby not contradict this conception. 
At the same time, however, the problems with these very stern versions of 
idealism illustrate the sound core in the idea of consistency between different 
levels of desires: it is my own acce ptance of my desires that decides whether 
they are authentic (/^determined). That is not to say that any acceptance 
whatsoever will do. As I have argued, to desire what one desires is not enough, 
since that second order desire may be as non-governed by myself as m y first 
order. The solution is perhaps some sort of compromise, the possibility of 
which will n ow be addressed as I proceed to say s omething positive about the 
conception of authenticity. 
2.2.2 What authenticity is 
What, then, should the conditions of authenticity be? As already indicated, I 
propose that authenticity should be understood as a pro-attitude towards (or 
"approval of', "liking of' or "acceptance of') the desires, given knowledge of 
the explanation of why one has the desires.27 The more it is approved of given 
a c ertain level of knowledge, the more authentic it is. If the approval would 
remain given more knowledge, the more authentic the desire is. So 
authenticity is matter of degree depending on two factors: level of knowledge 
and level of approval. It is t hus not the approval, or liking, or acceptance of the 
explanation t hat is of relevance in itself but, rather, the approval, or liking, or 
acceptance of the desire itself, given knowledge about why one has it. 
Inauthentic desires, then, are desires that we would dislike having and, thus, 
be inclined to abandon, if we were to find out the causal history or, more 
widely and correctly, the explanation of us having them.28 More precisely: the 
27 The origin of a certain desire may only be a part of the explanation of why a person has that 
desire, since many factors in the present may be a part of the correct explanation. For instance, 
one factor that explains why a person is holding on to a desire might be fear, which nonetheless 
may be absent in the explanation of why she came to have the desire in the first place. 
28 The following question is of course vital: what (true) explanation of why some person's desire is 
it that the person should know? "The more detailed and objective the story is, the more authentic 
the desire is, given a certain level of acceptance" is the answer that immediately comes to my mind 
and favoured here, but this, of course, has to be developed and defended. This will b e a future 
project. There also has to be a time limit, since (explanatory) causal chains reaches back to the 
starting point of the universe. "The to authenticity relevant causes" is an appealing, but 
unfortunately circular, suggestion. The problems are building up. 
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more we disapprove of a desire given that we know why we have it, the more 
inauthentic it is. 
This gives the following proposal on what determines the degree of 
authenticity and inauthenticity of a certain desire: 
• P's desire X is authentic to the degree that P would have approved of 
her having X, if she had knowledge about why she has X. 
• P's desire X is inauthentic to the degree that P would have 
disapproved of her having X, if she had knowledge of why she had X. 
Another way of putting this idea is to say that authentic desires are desires that 
would be embraced also in the light of criticism. There is no fact about the 
explanation of why an agent has them, e.g. about the forming of them, that 
would make the agent inclined to disapprove of them. In that sense, the agent can 
identify herself with her desires: if she were to find out why she had them, 
she can still willingly acknowledge that they are hers. It will thus be true that 
she will not be inclined to give them up just because she learns new things 
about herself. 
It should be noted that according to this formulation, it is enough that P 
would have a positive pro-attitude towards X if P knew about why she has X, in 
order to be (more) authentic, regardless of P's actual knowledge. The 
"acceptance" does not have to be factual: mere hypothetical "acceptance" is 
enough. 
A requirement of authenticity presupposed in this idea is the following: in 
order for it to be possible that the explanation of one's desires is of any 
consequence at all, a person must be able to imagine other "values" or desires 
than the ones she has. Otherwise critical evaluation of one's desires and values 
would be of no consequence. This, of course, does not imply that a person 
has to change his values or desires when faced with others. It only means that 
one realises that there are other possible values and desires, and that other 
persons do not necessarily value or desire the same things as one self does. A 
person totally incapable of understanding other values than her own cannot 
critically evaluate her own values. 
Besides the shortcomings of alternative suggestions of autonomy, what 
positive reasons are there for accepting this account of authenticity? This idea 
has the advantage of accounting for several intuitions about authenticity. It 
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accounts for the idea that identification is relevant to authenticity, since it put 
emphasis on the person's attitudes towards his own attitudes. In this regard it is 
much like the 'consistency between levels of desires'-idea, but it goes further 
by, in a sense, making the idea of the ancient idea of "knowing thyself' an 
important part of authenticity: an authentic person can "accept" herself, also if 
she were to gain knowledge about why she is whom she is. This gives 
I rationality, in the form of knowledge about oneself, a more prominent role 
than the 'consistency between levels of desires'-idea, which is in line with the 
classic idea that (at least some degree of) self-knowledge is a prerequisite for 
authenticity,29 even if this idea settles for hypothetical self-knowledge. This 
account of authenticity thus makes the connection between identification and 
rationality clear. 
It also further explicates the sound core of the "consistency between levels 
of desires"-idea. This idea is sound because it develops the thought of a 
hypothetical consent to the desire. The details may be wrongly put: the mere 
adjustments of lower levels to higher, but the "consistency between levels of 
desires"-idea agrees with the idea presented here on the following important 
point: authenticity in particular and autonomy in general is primarily about 
authorship (the person herself being the judge of her desires) and not about 
rationality (even if it is a bout rationality too). This agreement differs drastically 
from the idealistic views presented earlier (HI.2.2.1), which see autonomy 
primarily as a question of rationality and impartial acceptability. 
This idea of authenticity is inspired by Brandt's theory of cognitive 
psychotherapy (1979, p 113). There are similarities. Firstly, the ideas agree on 
the presupposition that beliefs can (causally) influence desires. Secondly, the 
ideas agree on the emphasis of knowledge or, rather, how one would react if 
one had certain knowledge (Brandt, 1979, p 111): both self-knowledge and 
knowledge about the object of desire (since both these kinds of knowledge 
plausibly affects the attitude a person has towards the desire in question). 
Thirdly, they agree that the relevant knowledge is of a value-free kind, i.e. it is 
not any kind o f moral acceptability of the desire that matters. 
Nevertheless, there are differences. Firstly, Brandt's theory is about what 
kind of desires there is value in satisfying (for the person having the desire). 
This idea here is more narrowly confined to what desires that are authentic. 
29 This idea of an authentic life originates from the "seven wise" of pre-Socratic Greek philosophy 
(Marc-Wogau, 1970, p 15) and is a central tenet in the existential t radition. 
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Secondly, this idea does not require that the person having the desire should 
survive the knowledge of why it is produced and maintained (Brandt, 1979, p 
113), but only that a negadve attitude towards it, given knowledge about it, 
affects its authenticity. The reason for this modification is to preserve the idea 
of identification: it is whether you can approve of having the desire with 
knowledge of why you have that is of relevance to the idea of authenticity (to 
know yourself and "accept it"). Furthermore, the psychology of this idea 
becomes more realistic than Brandt's, since it may be difficult to give a d esire 
up, even if you want to and realise that you should, given your own basic aims. 
However, settling for hypothetical approval may seem insufficient. It may be 
reasonable to claim that actually using the capacity for evaluating one's values 
makes one even more authentic. That is, one may hold that someone who has in 
fact thought about why she has the desires (or more generally, pro-attitudes, 
including values) she has and has contemplated whether these desires hold for 
this scrutiny is more authentic than a person who has not done so, even if the 
other person's desires also were approved given this process. The reason is 
simply that it is difficult to think of someone as authentic if she never 
seriously contemplates about who she is and why.30 
Mill most famously formulated the argument in favour of this idea. When 
defending freedom of speech in On Uberty (1859) Mill argued that, especially in, 
matters of opinion, i.e. c ontroversial and value-laden issues of religion, moral, 
and politics, an authentic person is a person who has considered opposing 
views.31 To consider opposing views is, naturally, also to consider the view 
one holds - to critically evaluate one's own opinions. Mill's idea was that this 
was the best way to avoid mindless dogmatism and uncritical conformism. 
There are namely two ways of acquiring opinions without considering 
alternative ones: by authority or by inclinations (Mill, 1859, p 97). To have an 
opinion only because of authority or inclination is not to have because of 
one's consideration that this is the opinion one ought to have. In opposition, 
to actually consider alternative opinions is to critically evaluate one's own 
opinions. A person who never does this runs a g reater risk of leading a life not 
30 It is probably something like this Lindley has in mind when he writes: "An autonomous agent 
does not just act on existing desires and beliefs, but subjects the desires and beliefs to rational 
scrutiny." (1986, p 56) 
31 Although Mill did not use the term authenticity, but freedom, since he did not distinguish 
between the components of autonomy, and autonomy and freedom. 
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according to a standard she would like if she gave it a closer look, but to a 
standard she merely has conformed to. And uncritical conformism seems to 
be in opposition to authenticity in particular and autonomy in general.32 
Besides Mill's argument, the link between identification and self-knowledge, 
on the one had, and authenticity, on the other, becomes even stronger than if 
one settles for the hypothetical version, since Mill's idea puts emphasis on 
actual identification and self-knowledge, and not just hypothetical. 
However, this Millian conception of continuous critical self-evaluation as a 
precondition of authenticity might have too intellectual a ring to many. Of 
course, a person could lead a fulfilling life without ever considering her basic 
values and aims. But many, including myself, have the intuition that a person 
who, at least sometimes, engages in critical self-evaluation in the Millian sense 
is, at least, more authentic than someone who never does. However, those who 
do not share this intuition could still agree to the basic idea of authenticity 
here presented and drop this further condition. Generally, someone who has a 
different idea of what authenticity is altogether, can replace the idea presented 
here with her own, and still keep the basic structure of the definition of 
autonomy presented here. 
To sum up: the authenticity of desires is determined by the (hypothetical) 
attitude the person has towards the desire: given a certain level of 
(hypothetical) knowledge about why one has the desire, the more positive the 
person is to the fact that she has it (and therefore the more enthusiastic she is 
about keeping it), the more authentic it is. A nd given more knowledge, if the 
attitude remains the same, the more authentic it is. To this it could be added 
(as I am inclined to do) that a person is even more authentic if she actually 
engages in critical self-evaluation: finding out why she has the values and 
attitudes she has and questioning them in the light of other values and 
attitudes. 
32 Lindley (1986) defends this Millian idea as a central component in authenticity, but puts 
emphasis on "active theoretical rationality", that is, "a disposition to seek the truth" (p 47) since 
he thinks that this is the best way to ensure critical self-evaluation. Though this might be a 
plausible interpretation of Mill, it is b y no means obvious that such a general disposition is needed 
in order to consider alternative opinions. 
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2.2.3 What authenticity is affected bj 
It is easier to present examples of what is, or at least seems to be, paradigmatic 
cases of inauthenticity than to present a crystal clear definition of what 
authenticity is. I n this section various such examples will be mentioned. If the 
idea of authenticity presented is reasonable, it should be able to account for 
these examples, showing why they are examples of inauthenticity if they are, 
and why they are not, if they are not. 
Now, the following empirical hypothesis concerning the examples to come 
seems reasonable: most people would typically be inclined to disapprove of 
these desires if they learned that this is the explanation why they hold them. 
Of course, it might be the case that a person, P, is not inclined to change some 
desire at all, even if P has realised tha t it is the result of some of the processes 
below. P might think that this desire is something he would have tried to 
develop anyway or goes well along with the kind of person she is or wants to 
be. I think it would take an unduly strict view on the self-government of 
desires to consider these desires as inauthentic anyway, in opposition to the 
more idealistic and self-governed accounts of authenticity (III.2.2.1). 
In order to make this last point more credible, consider the example of 
hypnosis, which seems to present an intuitively s trong image of inauthenticity. 
If hypnosis may cause someone to hold a desire, then, generally speaking, the 
forming of the desire is in a sense not self-governed. But there is a huge 
difference between, for instance, the hypnosis of an unsuspecting victim in 
order to use her for some end she would not approve of herself and the 
voluntary subjection to a h ypnotist in order to quit smoking. Presumably, in 
the first case, th e person would not approve of the desire she has come to 
hold in the face of knowledge about why she has come to hold it. This is 
probably not true of the last case. Even if the person unsuspectingly and 
against her expressed desire were made to desire to quit smoking, she might 
not be inclined to give that desire up when she found out why she has this 
desire. Therefore it is not true of any origin as such that it makes a desire 
inauthentic. It is the person's own attitude towards the origin that matters on 
this account of authenticity. And in the light of this example, this only seems 
reasonable. It is made even more reasonable if I am right that the following 
examples typically are such that one would be inclined to disapprove of the 
desires in question if one came to know that the desires were the result of 
some of these mechanisms. It would show that this account of authenticity is 
in line with how we normally conceive of authenticity. 
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Desires and values that are the result of indoctrination, brainwashing, 
hypnosis, self-deception, fear, phobia and other psychological pathologies are 
typically such that we would be inclined to disapprove of having if we were 
convinced that this is how they came about. 
Other examples are desires that are the sole result of non-reflected 
reactions to our social surroundings: desires that we acquire just because 
everyone else has them (conformism) or just because they go against everyone 
else (anti-conformism). Just because we would feel, if we realised that this is 
why we have these desires, that they are not self-governed, we would feel 
reluctance towards them.33 
Other examples of desires that most of us would react to in a similar way 
are what Elster has called the "sour grapes"-attitude and "the grass is always 
greener on the other side"-attitude (Elster, 1983, p 22-25). The first mentioned 
attitude is to put into your head that you do not want a thing just because you 
cannot get it for the time being or because it is hard to achieve (so-called 
"adaptive preference formation").34 The latter attitude is to put into your head 
that you wish for everything you cannot get, just b ecause you cannot get it (so-
called "contra-adaptive preference formation"). Both these attitudes could be 
described as forms of self-deception. 
The relation of desires to beliefs can also cause the desires to be less 
authentic. Wishful thinking is a good example (also a form of self-deception).35 
Furthermore, previously unknown information can, of course, assist one in 
33 These examples, like the following ones in this section, are Elster's, 1983 (p 22). However, 
Elster's idea is about the rationality of desires in general, and he advocates the idea that desires are 
irrational if and only if (and because) they have been shaped or formed in the "wrong way", i.e. 
due to their causal origin (p 15-16), the relevance of which this idea of authenticity denies. 
34 This attitude should be carefully distinguished from intentional character formation, i.e. to try 
to mould one's character with the aim to conform one's desires to one's possibilities. Adaptive 
preference formation typically results in degrading what you do not have, and intentional 
character formation typically results in upgrading what you have (Elster, 1982, p 224). Adaptive 
preference formation is also something else than changing your values in the light of new 
experiences. If this change of attitudes is a result of adaptive preference formation, the change 
will typic ally be reversible and have a tinge of resignation. If it is a result of new experiences she 
starts to value, the change will not be reversible and resigned (Elster, 1982, p 220-221). 
35 Wishful thinking may be conflated with adaptive preference formation. I could to cease to 
desire a promotion, either because I persuade myself that the job probably is not much fun 
anyway (wishful thinking) or because I persuade myself that I do not value it (adaptive preference 
formation). 
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realising that a desire is not as authentic as one thought, since such new 
information of why one holds the desire can lead to the disapproval of it. 
This relates to another point that does not regard the question of whether a 
desire is authentic, but whether it is basic. New information can help a person 
to form a d esire if the person is unsure about what she wants. If I find out 
more about a medical procedure, my initial reluctance towards it may fade 
away, for instance. This shows that proper informadon can be crucial to 
achieve what one really wants, i.e. to achieve one's basic desires. We will return 
to this point (see III.2.3.2 and III.2.4.2). 
To conclude, both internal and external factors affect the degree of 
authenticity. External factors that, as a matter of empirical fact, tend to reduce 
the authenticity are indoctrination, deception and other forms of manipulation 
from others than the individual herself. Internal factors that tend to reduce the 
degree of authenticity are self-deception, ignorance, psychological pathologies, 
fear and confusion. 
2.2.4 The regress revisited 
The strength of the idea of authenticity presented here (from now on called 
the 'informed approval idea of authenticity') is that it accounts for several 
intuitions of authenticity, while avoiding shortcomings of alternative ideas. 
However, it also has some problems of its own, of which I will address one 
here. I will try to explain why I think that this problem really is no problem, or 
at least why it is not insurmountable. 
It might seem as if an argument of regress can be levelled against the 
'informed approval'-idea, similar to the one levelled against (one version of) 
the 'consistency between levels of desires'-idea. The line of reasoning behind 
this goes a follows. If I come to know why I have a certain basic desire and 
approve of having it, the question remains if I would have approved of this 
approval, had I learned about why I had it. So the question is, do I have to 
(hypothetically) approve of an (hypothetical) approval of a d esire in order for 
the desire to be authentic? If the answer is yes, a regress is looming, since the 
"second order-approval" also can be approved or not, given knowledge of the 
explanation of this approval, and so on. 
However, I think the answer to the question of whether I have to approve 
of the approval in order for the desire to be authentic is no. One may think 
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that this way of biting the bullet is to blunt, but I believe the following 
example demonstrates (or, at least indicates) this to be a legitimate move. 
Imagine an enthusiastic citizen of a totalitarian regime. She has been 
indoctrinated all h er life to be willing to sacrifice her life to the great leader. It 
is a basic desire of hers to do so, if she has to. Let us assume that this citizen 
were to find out why she had this desire, e.g. t hat it was the result of systematic 
indoctrination, that the purpose of the indoctrination was not the best interest 
of the citizens but the maintenance of the regime,36 that the leader would not 
sacrifice himself for her,37 and so on. Let us moreover assume that this would 
result in her disapproving of her having the desire to sacrifice herself for the 
leader. However, she also comes to realise that this disapproval is explained by 
her desire "to be the own architect of her own life", a desire founded on 
individualistic bourgeois values she disapproves of. Thus, she comes to 
disapprove of her disapproval. 
When considering this example, it seems to me as though the fact that she 
comes to disapprove of her disapproval to sacrifice herself to the leader does 
not affect the inauthenticity of her desire to sacrifice herself for the leader. It 
seems strange to say that her disapproval of her disapproval to sacrifice herself 
for the leader would make her desire to sacrifice herself for her leader more 
authentic. Possibly, it makes a possible desire not to have that desire anymore 
less authentic. But that does not rob the hypothetical disapproval of its ability 
to reduce the authenticity of desires. The 'informed approval'-idea says that the 
(hypothetical) approval of a desire if one knows why one has it affects the 
authenticity of that desire, nothing more. So, in fact, the regress never arises. 
To put it in terms of a sl ogan: authenticity is not hereditary. 
This is unlike the version of the 'consistency between level'-idea that requires 
a higher level of approval in order for lower levels to be authentic. Then the 
regress arises. This is not so regarding the 'informed approval'-idea. This idea 
only admits the possibility that the disapproval of a desire may be disapproved, 
if one has knowledge as of why one disapproves of the desire, but denies that 
this affects the authenticity of the desire due to the disapproval of it. 
36 This is (a part of) the explanation of why the indoctrination takes place (or so I a ssume), and, 
thus, (a part of) the explanation of why she has the desire. Generally, the explanation of a 
person's desires is (partly) "external", i.e. not about the person herself. 
37 Let us (realistically) assume that the explanation of the maintenance of her desire is 
conditioned on beliefs like t his. 
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However, one may still feel that the 'informed approval'-idea is too liberal, 
counting too many intuitively inauthentic desires as authentic. Change the 
example above to say that the enthusiastic citizen still approves of the desire to 
sacrifice herself for the leader. However, I think it would take an overtly 
rigorous idea of authenticity to say that this desire is still not (more) authentic 
(than it would be if she were to disapprove of it given this knowledge). It 
would probably require some reference of a notion of a "true self' or 
impartial reasons ("what really is in her best interest"). I have already argued 
why I think those to be mistaken (II.2.2.1). 
However, if we were to say that one would be even more authentic if one 
actually has knowledge of why one has a d esire (which I am, see II.2.2.2), then, 
of course, the process is, in principle, indefinite. That is, if you have subjected 
yourself to something like the process of cognitive psychotherapy and the 
result is approval of some attitude, this approval (or "the person you have 
become") can also be subject to the same process. But this only goes to show 
the well-known fact that the process of knowing and developing oneself is and 
endless one. And it is not implausible to claim that a person who engages in 
such a process is more authentic than someone who does not. 
2.3 Decision competence 
In biomedical ethics, much discussion has revolved around autonomous 
decision-making, rather than authenticity, i.e. properties of the will that may 
affect the autonomy of someone. When talking about the capacity for, or 
ability to, make autonomous decision, one often refers to the term 
competence (Beauchamp & Childress, 2001, p 69-77). Just like authenticity, 
decision competence is linked to rationality, since being at least minimally 
rational seems to be a prerequisite of competence: one has to be able to 
consider some alternative courses of actions and some possible impact of 
one's own doings, even if only very sketchily, in order to reach a d ecision on 
what to do. However, unlike authenticity there is less controversy about what 
competence consists of, namely the ability to make decisions from one's own 
desires. 
Obviously, the conditions of rationality for competence may vary in 
strength. Most theories of autonomy includes an idea of a threshold, over 
which everyone should be counted as decision competent and under which 
everyone should be counted as incompetent. In order to avoid excessive 
paternalism, many writers have been generous in trying to establish when one 
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should be counted as competent, so that at least all normal grown up 
individuals are above the threshold (Beauchamp and Childress, 2001, p 72-73; 
Tännsjö, 1999, p 13-15). 
However, the question: "When should an agent be considered to be 
decision competent?" is normative and the answer thereby falls in the domain 
of the ideal of, rather than the conception of, autonomy. Since the purpose 
here is to elaborate a conception that can be useful to formulate different, and 
possibly contradictory, ideals of autonomy this question will not be addressed 
further in this context. It suffices to establish the fact that different individuals 
may be more or less competent and that an individual may be more or less 
competent in different situations. It certainly seems reasonable to postulate a 
lower limit under which it makes no sense to ascribe a person any 
competence at all. But the question about when we should consider an agent 
to be competent does not automatically settle the question of when we should 
treat a n agent as competent in particular and autonomous in general. I will 
return to this point when discussing ideals of autonomy (see III.3.3). 
2.3.1 What decision competence is 
Decision competence, that is, the ability to make decisions from one's desires 
is, then, another component that affects the autonomy of someone. For 
someone to be able to make a d ecision about what to do, it is not enough to 
want something. One also has to have an idea about how to act in order to 
achieve what one wants. However, any old idea will not do — hence, the need 
to talk about competence. Therefore, this component is essentially about the 
rationality of beliefs. 
More precisely, to be decision competent is to be able to decide what to 
do on the basis o f one's desires and beliefs in cases where several options are 
open. This presupposes, among other things, a minimum of imagination, so 
that one's options and what they might lead to may be contemplated. This is 
necessary in order to realise that there are alternative courses of action at all, 
but also for the next ability of importance for decision competence: that of 
being able to judge the alternatives one considers. This presupposes that one 
understands that what one does (but not only what one does) affects the 
outcome, and that different outcomes are possible. To be able to make the 
judgement one must also have an idea about how much one values the 
possible outcomes of the alternative actions. In other words, one roughly has 
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to know what one wants38 (this has already been discussed in the section about 
authenticity). However, besides this, one also must be able to scrutinize one's 
options in the light of this knowledge about what one wants and beliefs about 
how these wants may be achieved. This last point calls f or some elaboration. 
Consider the following illustration. Jenny wants to gain some weight. This 
desire, of course, presupposes that she can imagine a possible state of affairs 
that is not realized (the state of Jenny weighing more). Let us moreover assume 
that this desire is basic and authentic. In order for Jenny to be able to reach a 
decision at all on the basis of this desire, she must have some idea (belief) 
about how she is to act in order to achieve what she wants. If she has many 
alternatives she believes might accomplish this end she will have to deliberate. 
However, any way of going about this will not do if Jenny is to be competent. 
Consider, for instance, if Jenny knows that eating more sugar and fat will help 
her gain weight, but concludes that, therefore, she should avoid sugar. Or 
consider if she in her deliberation pays most attention to her belief that gin 
and vermouth makes a d ry martini, and then concludes that she should switch 
to green pants instead of blue. 
These examples show that decision competence is not just about having 
beliefs relevant to one's desires. It is also about having the capacity of relating 
the relevant beliefs and desires to each other in a psychological process that 
has the potential of becoming a d ecision. Of course, having the capacity for 
competence does not imply that one actually uses this capacity to make rational 
decisions. And if one does not, one is less likely to be efficient I realizing 
one's decisions. I will r eturn to this shortly. 
To avoid further confusion, one should carefully distinguish between being a 
decision competent person in general and in fact being decision competent in 
a certain situation regarding a certain desire. It is the last sense of decision 
competence that will be of relevance in the following. A person may of 
course have the capacity for competent decision-making in general without 
having any desires and beliefs at all (if she had them, she would be able to 
make a decision). However, to be able to make a decision in a ce rtain situation 
38 This, of course, is not to say that a person has to know exactly what she wants and how strong 
she wants it in order to reach a decision, but a person has to have some desire to act from in order 
to reach a decision. Too much confusion about what one wants may make it impossible to reach 
a decision (see III.2.3.2). 
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to realize a particular desire, one has to have certain beliefs, e.g. about how to 
realize that' desire. Moreover, it may be more difficult to reach decision in a 
certain situation if I have vague conceptions, if I am confused and so on (see 
m.2.3.2). In that sense my decision competence (the psychological process I 
mentioned) can be affected negatively from more or less information. 
This leaves one final point to investigate. Consider again Jenny and assume that 
she is fully capable of relating her beliefs to her desire to gain weight and to 
make the rational conclusion in the form of a decision. However, it so 
happens that her beliefs are the opposite of the facts of the matter. She 
believes that eating more fat and sugar will cause her to loose weight and thus 
decides to avoid eating food containing much of such ingredients. Moreover, 
she lacks any rational reasons for believing what she does. In this case, it is a 
tempting thought that the fact that she lacks true or rational beliefs relevant for 
her decision makes her less competent. And conversely, the better reasons she 
has for the decision in question, the more competent she would be. So, given 
an authentic and basic desire, is a person more decision competent (and 
thereby more autonomous) the better reasons she has for her beliefs about 
possible outcomes (and the probability for them)? 
In one sense, it seems reasonable to answer yes. To be true, I increase my 
possibilities of succeeding in living my life in accordance with my plans if I make 
decisions from well-founded and carefully deliberated judgements. To really 
succeed in realizing one's desires one should have (to a large extent) true 
beliefs, since false beliefs about the consequences of one's decisions and acts 
may result in one's desires not being realized.39 In other words: my ability to 
succeed in acting in accordance with my decision in the way I desire 
(probably) increases the more relevant and well-founded information I have. 
So, while my decision competence does not necessarily increases with more 
knowledge (EH.2.3.2), my ability to successfully act according to my basic 
desires (probably) increases.''0 In consequence, having well-founded beliefs is 
39 Lindley expresses a similar line of reasoning in a concise way: "If anyone arrives at a decision 
through bad reasoning, it is a matter of luck whether the decision best promotes his fundamental 
projects." (1986, p 26) It made thus be added that the same goes for erroneous information. 
40 The careful reader will here notice an ambiguity in the conception of autonomy: is au tonomy 
about doing what one decides to do (because one decides to do it) and deciding what one wants 
(because one wants it) or getting what one wants (when my desire causes my decision and my 
decision causes my action). I will return to this question (III.2.4.1). 
154 
more relevant to the efficiency-component, which I will return to below 
(m.2.4). R emember that decision competence is about the ability to make a 
decision. This does not require one's beliefs to be well-founded at all. Of 
course, one may be psychologically unable to reach a decision in a situation 
because one feels that the information one has is too uncertain for making a 
decision in that situation. So, even if rational beliefs foremost affect the 
efficiency of a person, it may affect her decision competence. 
2.3.2 What decision competence is affected by 
As already mentioned, getting informadon may affect a person's decision 
competence. With more information regarding what alternative courses of 
action one has and what will happen given these different alternatives, it may 
be easier to know what to decide in order to achieve one's aims. However, it is 
important to emphasize that all additional information does not necessarily 
increase the decision competence of a person. The competence of a person 
may b e damaged by a lot of things, for instance further informadon. Fear and 
confusion are two types of states of mind that may impede a person's ability to 
make a decision. A person may be paralysed or may "shut down", thereby 
becoming unable to weigh alternatives or, at least, less discerning due to fear 
and confusion. A lot of, very complicated and/or dramatic information, e.g. 
information about genetic susceptibility for fatal disease, can result in such 
fear or confusion and, thus, reduce autonomy. On the other hand, the 
information may mitigate the worries of a person who feels uncomfortable 
with uncertainty, making her sufficiently confident as to decide on plans for 
the future. This relates to the argument in the previous chapter, that genetic 
information may both reduce and enhance autonomy (see subsecüon II.2.3). In 
the light of this, I already at this point dare to hint that it is hard to 
unequivocally argue for duty to know or even a right to know about genetic 
information about oneself on the basis of autonomy (a point I will argue in 
chapters IV and V). 
Other factors that can influence a person's decision competence are 
obsessions, phobias, unclear beliefs and cyclical preferences. A person who is 
obsessed with the thought of returning to her home in order to check the 
stove at least three times on every occasion she walks out may very well wish 
she did not have to do this, but may be unable to make that decision (or 
unable to act on it once she made it). It seems obvious that this person's 
autonomy is thereby reduced. Phobias, neuroses and other psychological 
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pathologies can naturally result in the same sort of incompetence to make a 
decision (the decision one would like to make in that situation, that is). 
Unclear beliefs about what will happen may make it difficult to make a 
decision. Cyclical preferences and other inconsistencies of desires can make it 
difficult to reach a decision (see III.2.2.1). 
Just like values that are immune to revision defeats authenticity, beliefs that are 
immune to revision defeats decision competence. "Immunity towards 
revision" should be taken in a very narrow sense, however. It is enough that 
there is a possibility of revision of beliefs in the light of new information or 
new experience. This does not exclude strange or unusual beliefs. However, 
they must not be of a c ompulsory nature. It is hard to demarcate "compulsory 
beliefs" in another way than to refer to impossibility to revision in the light of 
new information or new experience, and this is not crystal clear either. An 
example might be illuminating, however. Assume that Jane believes that she 
cannot talk t o a certain doctor because the doctor is possessed by the devil. If 
Jane is unable to revise this belief, because she hears voices in her head telling 
her that this is so , her belief is of a compulsory nature. However, the belief is 
not of a c ompulsory nature due to its content, although it is strange. Jane might 
have that belief because she has seen the doctor speaking delixiously at a secret 
order and she believes that the devil exists and is capable of possessing people. 
In that case, the belief about the doctor does not have to be of a compulsory 
nature. 
2.4 Efficiency 
As we have seen, the extent to which a person is autonomous, i.e. "her own 
master", "in control of her own life", "self-determined" or something of the 
like, hinges on the extent to which her plans, projects, wants, or, as I have 
called it most of the time, desires, are really her own, that is, authentic. 
Furthermore, it depends on the person's ability to make decisions from her 
desires, that is her decision competence. However, in order to be autonomous 
in a fuller s ense, we also want to "put our plans into action", so to speak. It is 
fine and well to rule one's inner world, but we also feel that autonomy is 
about (having the capacity to) achieving or accomplishing or realizing what we 
really want and decide to do. This is what efficiency is about. 
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2.4.1 What efficiency is 
Autonomy, thus, is about efficiency too. Efficiency, in the context of 
autonomy, consists in the ability to implement one's decisions through action. 
More precisely, the more ability a person has to, through her own acting, 
realize what he has decided to do (determined by what he wants), the more 
efficient she is. Of course, ability to act in some way is not enough efficiency in 
any interesting sense of the word. Efficiency rather consists in the ability to 
realize the desires one has. 
However, one may think that having the ability to realize one's decisions is 
not enough for efficiency and, thus, autonomy. Instead, one may hold that 
efficiency consists of the actual realization of one's desires, i.e. actually 
achieving one's goals. I would say that this is a perfectly legitimate use of the 
term "efficiency" in the context of autonomy. This means that efficiency can 
have two meanings: having the ability to act as to realize one's desires, and 
actually doing so. Which one of those, if any, or both, is valuable is a question 
for an ideal of autonomy to settle.41 
Thereby, another ambiguity in the conception of autonomy rises to the 
surface. Am I autonomous when I do what I have decided to do (because I 
have decided to it) and decide to what I want (because I want it) or when I get 
what I want (when my will causes my decision and my decision causes my 
act)? T he answer is that autonomy is not only about acting or only about 
getting what you want; it is about achieving or realizing what you want through 
your own action. Let us use an example to elaborate the point. 
Jill wants to lose some weight. Jill thinks that she will accomplish this by 
eating loads of pastries every day (a false belief). Therefore she decides to eat 
loads of pastries every day. Since Jill is efficient with regard to this decision, 
she effectuates this plan: Jill starts to eat loads of pastries. This action (or, 
rather, these actions) seems autonomous. But Jill does not achieve her end to 
lose weight; to her own surprise she starts to gain weight. Is Jill autonomous? 
In one way it seems reasonable to say s he is: s he acts on the basis of a (let us 
assume) basic desire, without (let us furthermore assume) being manipulated 
41 The ideal of self-realization holds that it is actually achieving what one wants that is o f value 
(see III.3.1.1), and the ideal of capacity holds that it is the ability to do so that is o f value (see 
III.3.1.2). 
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or forced in any way. In another way it seems reasonable to say that she lacks 
autonomy, since she does not realize her basic desire to lose weight. 
It should be observed that the point is not only about making the 
distinction between basic and derived desires. Of course, the basic desire Jill 
wanted to fulfil was the desire to lose weight. Jill mistakenly thought that 
eating loads of pastries is a good means to reach that end. That false belief is 
the explanation why Jill did not succeed in fulfilling her basic desire, although 
she succeeded in fulfilling her derived one. This relates to another point that 
has already been made: in order to succeed in living in accordance with one's 
basic desires by one's decisions and actions one has to have, to a large extent, 
true beliefs (see I II.2.3.1). Irrational, in the sense ill fou nded, beliefs can damage 
a person's efficiency. 
The crucial point in the present context, however, is that autonomy is not 
about maximising the satisfaction of preferences — it is about being able to 
realize and, in fact, realizing one's own basic desires through one's own 
decisions and actions. The lack of autonomy in the example above is due to 
lack of efficiency; Jill could not effectuate her basic desires due to false 
beliefs. Granted, she satisfied one of her desires (eating pastries) and she did it 
through her own acting. But that is not enough to make her more 
autonomous, since she did not satisfy her basic desire . But even if her basic 
desire had been satisfied, for example through divine intervention, this would 
not have made her more autonomous either. The central idea of autonomy is 
.redetermination — that you yourself realize your plans. In opposition, the 
central claim of any form of preferentialism is that it is of value for a person, 
P, to have her preferences or desires satisfied. How, and by whom, the 
preferences are satisfied is, in itself, irrelevant. It is thus essential to any idea of 
autonomy that an autonomous person does not only get what she wants, but 
that she achieves what she wants: there has to be connection between my acts 
and the satisfaction of my desires. A person in "the matrix"42 can have all of 
her desires satisfied — even desires about the world outside the machine if we 
track the person's experienced desires and realize them in the external world. 
However, this person does not govern her own desires, never makes a 
decision and never acts. She is completely non-autonomous and gets it exactly 
42 I am thinking about the great computer from the movie "The matrix", where all people are 
hooked up, believing that they are leading a life in the external world. The same point applies to 
Nozick's "experience machine" (Nozick, 1974, p 44-45), for those familiar with that example. 
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her way. Thus, autonomy cannot just be about getting what one wants. Rather, 
it is about accomplishing one's basic projects (or being able to do so). This is 
the crucial difference between preferentialism and autonomy. And this is why 
efficiency has to be a component of any conception of autonomy: an 
inefficient agent cannot realize her plans through her own acts. 
However, the fact that efficiency is a component of autonomy does not imply 
that one cannot reduce the autonomy of an inefficient person. The following 
example can be used to illustrate why. I am facing death, paralysed and in 
terrible pains. I do not desire anything stronger but to end my suffering. The 
only way to accomplish this in this situation (we assume) is to inject such a 
large dose of morphine that I will die as a result. I understand this, but still 
want to have the injection. This is so, since ending my suffering is a basic 
desire of mine, and much stronger than the desire not to end my life. 
However, since I am paralysed, I cannot effectuate the decision to take the 
injection myself. However, I ask my doctor to administrate the morphine. He, 
alas, refuses. 
In the light of this example, it seems reasonable to claim that I am less than 
fully autonomous in this situation and that this is due to my inefficiency. 
However, despite the fact that I am inefficient, it seems as though the doctor 
reduces my autonomy. In order to live my life according to my own basic 
desires and values it is not enough to try. I have to succeed in doing this. This 
may require the help of others. Of course, there may be reasons for them to 
refrain from helping me. Nevertheless, it seems reasonable to claim that the 
more I succeed in living according to my own basic desires, the more 
autonomous I am. Through refraining from giving me this help, the doctor 
makes my life less autonomous than it would have been if he had helped me. 
Therefore, in a way, the doctor is reducing my autonomy. 
This example demonstrated that one can, in a sense, talk about an 
inefficient person being autonomous. For instance, one may very well have 
authentic desires and make autonomous decisions on the basis of those, even 
if one cannot effectuate them. Then, naturally, we can talk about autonomous 
decisions and the person making these decisions being autonomous (in this 
sense). One can also formulate ideals of autonomy that do not deal with 
efficiency at all, b ut rather respecting autonomous decisions (in fact, this seems 
to be the standard in biomedical ethics). According to such an ideal, it could 
be claimed that the doctor, by refusing to give me the lethal injection, is not 
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respecting this decision and my autonomy is, in this way, vio lated. Of course, 
such an ideal would have to be further elaborated in order to be reasonable.43 
However, any such ideal is perfectly compatible with, and even well 
formulated by, this conception of autonomy. Even such an ideal would not 
deny that a person, who can realize her plans herself without the aid of others, 
is more au tonomous than someone in constant need of the help of others. This 
is compatible with claiming that the only duty or value of autonomy is to 
respect the autonomous decisions of others. 
Another ideal of autonomy could claim that we should make the agent 
herself maximally autonomous. The doctor may be able to accomplish this by 
palliating my paralysis enough to enable me to administer the drug myself. In 
this way, t he doctor has helped me to live my life according to my own basic 
desires. Being such a person, or living such a life, may be taken as valuable. If 
the doctor refrains from doing this, he omits to realize value for me he could 
have realized. In this way, my autonomy could be claimed to have been 
"violated". 
2.4.2 What efficiency is affected by 
Many factors affect the ability to, through action, realize one's decisions, and 
the extent to which one actually does so. The example with the doctor in the 
previous subsection demonstrates that other persons can help one to become 
more autonomous (e.g. through palliating the paralysis). Repeatedly, I have 
pointed out how ignorance or lack of information may render one inefficient, 
since ignorance about the effects of one's actions may lead to opting for a 
course of action that one thinks will realize one's aims, when it actually will 
not. So knowledge affects efficiency. However, we have also seen that 
knowledge may affect efficiency negatively, e.g. due to giving rise to paralysis 
or depression (see II.2.3.2). 
This relates to other examples of factors affecting efficiency, which are 
"internal" forms of obstacles to carry through one's desires, e.g. weakness of 
will, ine rtia, or compulsive acts, like the compulsion of the alcoholic to start to 
drink again (despite not wanting to) and the compulsion of the kleptomaniac 
to steal whenever she enters a store. These people fail to effectively carry 
43 For instance, it seems unreasonable to claim that we always have to respect the autonomous 
decisions of others, especially when we have to carry them through due to the inefficiency of the 
agent herself. 
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through their decisions — even if they decide to stop drinking and stop 
stealing they may fail to act on these decisions. This kind of inefficiency can 
of course come in degrees, depending on the extent to which the person is 
still abl e to avoid the failure in question. 
Also external coercion and obstacles can affect a person's ability to act on 
her decisions in a way that makes her achieve her own basic aims. Threat of 
reprisals may make it more psychologically difficult for me to carry through 
my decisions (given that I do not want to expose myself to these reprisals). In 
this way, threat of reprisals can reduce my autonomy. Just as other persons can 
decrease my efficiency, they may also increase it. A partially deaf person may 
become more able to realize her desire to complete a c ourse at the university 
if she is provided with hearing aid and other facilities. 
All this may come through as farfetched to some. Does this mean that I am not 
autonomous unless I can realize all m y authentic and basic desires? If I wish to 
fly like a bird or abolish global capitalism but cannot do this, am I thereby not 
autonomous? 
To answer this I must once again stress 1) that autonomy is a matter of 
degree, and 2) the distinction between conception and ideal. I may have the 
authentic and basic desire to fly like a bird. I do not find it strange at all to say 
that I would live a life more in accordance with my basic desires if I could do 
this compared to now when I cannot. This does not mean that I am not 
autonomous since I cannot fly like a bird (except perhaps if this was the only 
thing I ever wanted), but that I would be more autonomous if I could. Nor 
does this mean that other people have an obligation to help me to succeed in 
flying like a bird. Possibly, my life would be better if I could (given that 
increases in autonomy always is valuable), but this still leaves open to what 
extent people are obliged to make my life better.44 
Likewise, it is probably unreasonable to demand that other people should 
give me the capacity to abolish global capitalism. But if I controlled the 
external circumstances to such a degree that I could do this if I wanted to I 
would be more able to realize my decisions than I am at present, i.e. more 
efficient. And it is not inconceivable that this would be something of value for 
me. 
44 But what is it that is valuable? To fly like a bird or to be able to? We will return to this (III.3.1.1 
and III.3.1.2). 
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2.5 What autonomy is not 
The notion of autonomy is ambiguous and has been understood in a 
multitude of ways throughout history.45 The purpose here is not to account 
for every possible use of the concept of autonomy. The purpose is rather to 
elaborate a c onception that is useful in order to explicate recent ideals and, 
foremost, ideals that has been discussed or presupposed in the area of 
biomedical ethics during the last decades (ULI). In this section I will address 
some ideas that are closely related to autonomy. These ideas are not identical 
to the idea of autonomy presented above, but are sometimes taken to be so. In 
order to avoid conflations and misunderstandings I will therefore present 
these ideas and explain how they differ from the conception of autonomy just 
presented. 
Autonomy has often been taken as being equivalent, or at least closely related, 
to the idea of free will. Kant is perhaps the most well known spokesman for 
this view: a person is only free if she is autonomous. In this relation Kant saw 
the meaning of free will. A ccording to Kant, we act freely when we act out of 
reason, not governed by our "empirical" motives.46 To act out of reason is to 
act on the maxim through which you can at the same time will that it should 
become a universal law, i.e. the Categorical Imperative. But this is also what it 
means for Kant to act autonomously. According to Kant, acting autonomously 
(to govern one's own behaviour by acting out of reason) is thus equivalent to 
acting freely. I will not try to investigate the possible merits of this conception 
of autonomy,47 mainly because I am able to formulate the Kantian ideal of 
autonomy with my own conception and that the Kantian conception of 
autonomy is of no help to formulate any other ideal of autonomy than the 
Kantian one. In addition, it has few modern spokesmen in biomedical ethics.48 
Modern discussions of free will are often about the possibility of acting 
differently than one actually does and whether this possibility (if it is a 
45 See Schneewind, 1998, for a robust discussion of the history of the idea of autonomy in western 
philosophy, especially up till an d including Kant. 
46 Fora discussion on the difference between empirical and pure motives, see Nell, 1975, p 103-
104. 
47 There are some good reasons to be sceptical towards it. See Lindley, 1986, 22-26. 
48 To my knowledge, the only one relying on a conception that can be interpreted in this 
direction in the debate of genetic testing is Rhodes (1998, 2000). For a discussion, see V.3.1. 
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possibility) is compatible with determinism. My own conception of autonomy 
is neutral regarding that discussion.49 Seemingly, there is a connection between 
determinism and the conditions of non-compulsive desires and beliefs. 
However, contrary to impression, these conditions do not say t hat it should be 
(nomologically) possible to have different desires and beliefs in a certain 
situation than the one's you actually have, but only that the desires and beliefs 
you have should be possible to revise in the light of new information or 
experience (see III.2.2.2 and III2.3.2). This does definitely not imply that anyone 
should be able to act differently than she actually does in any way 
incompatible with determinism. Free will in the sense "can act differently than 
one actually does" is thus not identical to autonomy as explicated here. 
Freedom, in another sense of the word than "free will", also tends to crop up 
in relation to discussions of autonomy, namely freedom understood as liberty 
to act. However, questions about restrictions of someone's liberty to act are 
rather about social freedom than autonomy. The idea of social freedom is not 
the same idea as the idea of autonomy. (Even if there is a re lation between the 
ideas, since restrictions in a person's social freedom may also reduce her 
ability to realize her basic desires (see III. 2.4.2).) 
Social freedom is often defined as absence of social obstacles (to do what 
I you want). More precisely, a person P is free to perform a certain action X if there is no other person (or groups of persons) Q that prevents P from doing X.50 This makes freedom a r elation between three variables, two persons (or 
groups of persons) and one action. It is possible to be free without being 
autonomous. If I am hypnotised to want something and no one prevents me 
from realizing this wish, then I am socially free (to perform the action), but 
(probably) not autonomous. This since my wish is (probably) not authentic. To 
be socially free is thus not sufficient for being autonomous. 
Social freedom is not necessary for autonomy either. If I am faced with the 
alternatives "your life or your money" I think I would prefer "both, please". In 
such circumstances, this alternative is not open to me. This does not prevent 
49 This seems to be the case for most modern conceptions of autonomy. See Lindley, 1986, p 24-
25. 
50 This idea seems to presuppose some notion of a free will, since absence of the prevention of 
others can be of interest only if t he person can perform the action if not prevented. "Prevent" is, 
of course, unclear. For instance, is the threat of sanctions always prevention? 
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me from autonomously choosing between the alternatives I am facing, 
however.51 
Freedom can also be interpreted as access to alternatives or options: the 
more alternatives a person, P, has in a c ertain situation, the freer P is in that 
situation (Räikkä, 1998, p 51).52 Let us call this interpretation "freedom as 
opportunities". Jill may have opportunities that others lack, like the 
opportunity to buy a yacht. Despite this, Jill may be non-autonomous (she may 
be inauthentic due to manipulation or she may be decision incompetent).53 Jill 
may also lack the opportunity to buy a yacht, but may nevertheless be able to 
form her own idea of a good life and live in accordance with this idea. 
The fact that autonomy should be separated from these ideas does not 
preclude that autonomy is about acting. On the contrary, it certainly is. An 
authentic and decision competent person may nonetheless be unable to act 
according to her out of her basic wants and decisions. That is, she may be 
inefficient in the sense here adumbrated (EII.2.4.1). A person who is constantly 
suffering from weakness of will or a person who all the time hears voices in 
her head forbidding her to act in accordance with her decisions is hardly 
autonomous. Nor is a person who is prevented from realizing her basic 
desires due to external obstacles, e.g. through imprisonment. 
2.6 Autonomj's relatives 
How should one assess this conception of autonomy? As already mentioned, 
the most important measure of success in this context is if this conception 
captures and makes sense of modern discussions in biomedical ethics and 
then primarily those that are about the right to and value of genetic 
information. I think the discussion in the previous chapter proved that to be 
the case (II.2.3). Th is will be further demonstrated in the chapters to come. 
However, a good conception should also be in accordance with and explain 
51 However, the person robbing me can be said to circumscribe or affect my autonomy negatively 
(see III.2.4.2). 
52 This idea is probably pointless, since a person may be facing an infinite or at least 
indeterminable number of alternatives in every situation ("alternatives" in the sense "actions that 
could have been performed by the agent, had he chosen any of them"). (Tännsjö, 1998b, p 40). 
53 It may be claimed that a person, P, who is d ecision incompetent in fact has no possibility of 
buying a yacht. "Possibility" should, in this context, be interpreted as "P could do so if P decided 
to" (P has enough money, is not prevented by someone else and so forth). 
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our linguistic intuitions or platitudes about autonomy. A test of the conception 
is therefore to see whether such platitudes of autonomy can be formulated in 
terms of this conception. The most important platitudes about autonomy 
(authenticity, decision competence and efficiency) are already a part of the 
conception. However, there are more particular ideas of what autonomy is, or 
platitudes of autonomy, that can be used to test and clarify this conception. 
The method consists in formulating a number of properties often ascribed to 
the ideally autonomous agent and then seeing how they match the conception 
of autonomy presented. This section will be about this.54 
2.6.1 Platitudes of autonomy 
Control. The autonomous person has control of his life. She is neither under 
the uncontrolled mercy of inner compulsions and impulses, nor outer 
obstacles like the coercion or manipulation of other people. 
This platitude expresses, I would say, th e heart of autonomy and in obvious 
ways connects very well indeed to the conception of autonomy fleshed out 
above. However, "control" must be specified. Consider the following 
characterisation of autonomy: 
To have autonomy is to have the various aspects of one's life under 
one's control. Typically, if I have autonomy over some aspects of my 
life... then I can deliberate over how I want that aspect of my life to go, 
choose among the various alternatives open to me, and act so as to make 
m y  l i f e  t h e  w a y  I  w a n t  i n  t h i s  r e g a r d .  ( K a g a n ,  1 9 9 8 ,  p i l l )  
Firstly, the control relevant for autonomy is the control one has over one's 
wants, decisions and actions, as this quote indicates and as the conception of 
autonomy favoured here spells out. Secondly, the "control" is not of some 
metaphysically extravagant kind, presupposing a homunculus or noumen 
managing the wants, decisions and actions. The idea is rather "control" of 
wants in the sense of an at least potential conscious reflective relation of the 
person to herself, embedded in social context that is the root of most values 
54 This enumeration of properties draws heavily on the one made by Feinberg, 1986, p 32-44. 
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and desires (see m.2.2.2).55 And control of decision is the actual ability in a 
particular case to deliberate over the alternatives one faces in order to reach a 
decision. And control of action is the actual ability in a particular case to act 
"so as to make my life the way I want in this regard" (Ibid.). This, of course, 
presupposes of any person that she is not in the grip of "internal" 
compulsions or "external" obstacles. 
Self-possession. An autonomous person has no guardian. The autonomous person 
is definitely no one's slave, no one else's property. 
This clearly is an ideal that prima facie is related to autonomy. In the next 
section, an ideal of autonomy that put emphasis on being an autonomous 
person (the ideal of capacity) will b e presented. This ideal corresponds well to 
the idea of self-possession. A person who is g overned by others can to various 
degrees be prevented from realizing her own decisions. This person's 
efficiency is thus reduced. This also reduces the person's possibility to live an 
autonomous life (see the ideal of self-realization, HI.3.1.1). Furthermore, a 
person who is not allowed to run her own affairs is not being treated as if she 
were autonomous, which is another ideal of autonomy that can be formulated 
with the help of my conception (see IH.3.3). Moreover, such a person is not 
encouraged to form her own plans and projects by critical evaluation, which 
can be viewed as bad from the point of view of authenticity (III.2.2.2). 
Self-identitj. An autonomous person does not define herself solely in relation to 
someone else, but has an identity of her own. 
The idea of self-identity is loosely connected to the component of 
authenticity. However, it is important to account for the relationship more 
precisely, since self-identity is not a part of what authenticity is, but rather a 
likely result of being authentic. It may be the case that the most important 
project in a person's life is being a good husband (to X). The most important 
trait of the person, according to the person himself, is thereby defined in 
relation to someone else (X). If this basic desire is the result of a mechanism, 
55 I emphasise this once again in order to avoid popular, but often tedious and misconceived, 
allegations of "social atomism" and/or "Kantian noumenalism". It should be clear by now that 
such ideas are incompatible with my favoured conception of autonomy. 
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knowledge of which in no way would make him inclined to disapprove of it, 
then this conception of autonomy will not regard this desire as inauthentic. 
This conclusion may seem to be at odds with the idea of self-identity. I 
think we should accept it, however. The correct connection between 
autonomy and self-identity is that a person may sometimes properly object to 
the picture other people have of that person. If someone says that Jack is 
nothing but his wife's husband he may object in two ways. Firstly, he may 
object that he has other projects and values that are genuinely his own. 
Secondly, he may retort that this is described as s omething not self-governed, 
and thereby as something condescending, when it in fact is something he 
himself has chosen or he himself has no problems with. 
The idea of self-identity could be understood as an idea of independence 
or authenticity in a more direct sense: to be short of self-idendty could be 
understood as not having the capacity to critically reflect upon who one is and 
wants to be. The idea of self-idendty will then be almost identical to the idea 
of authenticity. The person who in fact critically reflects on his person and 
values could be said to be more autonomous than a person who does not (see 
III.2.2.2) but does not have to be. This depends on the version of authenticity 
one thinks is the most defensible in the end, i.e., what idea of authenticity one 
believes is most plausibly combined with the idea that authenticity is valuable. 
Moral independence. A proponent of autonomy could be interested in autonomy 
in a "fuller" or "more substantial" sense than the one presented here. She 
could hold that it is not enough to live one's life according to one's basic 
desires or something like this. Instead the claim is that one has to live one's life 
independent of others to the largest extent possible in order to be 
autonomous. More specifically, an autonomous person is a person diat has as 
few and weak commitments towards others as possible. A person who 
constantly has to consider obligations towards others may be thought to be too 
dependent to be ideally autonomous. This idea has the minimization of moral 
commitments towards others as an ideal for the autonomous person; one 
should promise as little as possible, avoid engaging in obligating relationships 
(such as marriage and parenthood) and avoid binding contracts. The idea, then, 
is to maximise some kind of "private sphere" where one can engage in 
projects that only concern oneself. 
This idea of autonomy can be formulated with the conception of 
autonomy presented. To be sure, this conception does not in itself exclude 
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any kinds of basic values, projects and plans (i.e. desi res in the wide sense used 
here) for a person, as long as they are authentic. However, anyone attracted by 
the ideal of moral independence could argue that a reasonable ideal of 
autonomy includes the idea that the fulfilment of certain authentic projects 
lacks value, at least from the point of view of autonomy, e.g. t he fulfilment of 
projects that are the result of obliging relations to others 
However, I myself find the platitude deeply implausible. It is hard to see 
why voluntary, well-considered commitments towards others should reduce 
the autonomy of a person. The idea of moral independence implies that a 
person who intendonally chooses to concentrate on her family or political 
engagement is les s autonomous and leads a less desirable life than the person 
who intentionally devotes her life to her collection of stamps. This 
implication is not attractive, neither from the point of view of morality in 
general, nor from the point of view of autonomy in particular. Nonetheless, it 
can be formulated as an ideal within this conceptual framework. 
Self-reliance. This idea is similar to the previous. The idea is that an autonomous 
person does not have to trust in the help and support of others. 
The idea can be interpreted as stating that others should have as little 
commitments towards oneself as possible. Interpreted in such a way, the idea 
of self-reliance becomes the reversal of the idea of moral independence and 
susceptible to the same sort of objections: why should voluntarily and 
authentically entered relations with others make me less autonomous?56 
Another, more plausible, interpretation takes self-reliance to be the ability 
to manage on ones own, if necessary. More precisely, the thought is that one 
has the inner and outer recourses required in order to live one's life as one 
sees fit. Interpreted in this way the ideal of self-reliance becomes an integral 
part of the thought that it is of value to be an autonomous person (the ideal of 
capacity, III.3.1.2). 
The idea of self-reliance can also be interpreted as the idea that self-
realization presupposes that it has to be my own desires that are realized by 
myself (otherwise the accomplishment is of no value and could hardly be 
called /^realization). This idea is well integrated in my conception (the ideal 
of self-realization, see III.3.1.1). This is a further reminder about the difference 
56 Although it can be formulated by this conception, then. 
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between autonomy and preferentialism: in order for you to be autonomous it 
is not enough to get what you want. The will and its realization have to be 
your own in a more qualified sense. 
Initiative. The plans and projects of an autonomous person are not solely the 
result of the initiative of others. She does not just "tag along", but has her own 
suggestions of projects she considers to be of value. 
This idea seems to connect with autonomy in a natural way. A person who 
never initiates her own projects may be thought of as lacking in independence. 
However, "initiating a ne w project" can be understood in various ways. Ho w 
common is it that a person is initiating a totally unique project that no one ever 
has initiated before? And is this a requirement of autonomy? Of course, 
projects are formed against a background of interests. These interests are a 
result of influence from growth and environment. If Jill decides to start up a 
choir it is probably because she is interested in music and singing. This 
interest has an explanation. Not even the most original projects (like the artistic 
movement of the dadaists) lacks reactive elements. They are initiated as a 
response to the acts an d expected reactions of others. It is thus unreasonably 
strict to have a c ondition of uniqueness on the ideal of initiative. Th e projects 
of a p erson will always be similar to or affected by others in some substantial 
way. 
It all seems to boil down to the question of how independent the plans and 
projects of a person should be in order to be authentic (genuinely her own). It 
is ha rd to see why an honest acceptance of the explanation of the project of a 
person is n ot enough for authenticity, even if that person has n ot contributed 
to the plan of the project. Why should a person who wholeheartedly commits 
herself to the project of the Salvation Army be considered less autonomous 
than William Booth? On the other hand, the impression may remain that a 
person who never has any own ideas about the projects she wants to realize is 
somewhat lacking in independence and thus, maybe, in autonomy. However, it 
is not obvious that an alleged value of initiative should be subsumed under 
autonomy. It could be considered to be a value o f its own ("the value of being 
original" or something like this). 
169 
Integrity. A person has integrity if she follows her own principles.57 A person of 
integrity is characterized by not being tempted to depart from her basic goals 
and principles. She is, in a sense, "untouchable". 
As previously explained, basic desires should not be interpreted in such a way 
that a person automatically acts in accordance with them (EH.2.2). T emptations 
can overrule a person's basic desires. If that is the case, that person is short of 
integrity. If this is how integrity should be understood, the conception of 
autonomy presented clearly can account for a perceived value of integrity, 
since lack of integrity is due to lack of decision competence and/or efficiency 
(see IIL2.3.2 and DL2.4.2). 
However, it is far from obvious that integrity in this sense always is 
something desirable. A person may depart from her principles due to short-
term self-interests or passions. But a person may also depart from her 
principles due to benevolence or compassion. Dworkin has provided an 
excellent example of this. Huckleberry Finn betrayed his principle that slavery 
is morally justified, and that one therefore should not help slaves to escape, by 
helping Jim to escape. Finn was thus "willing to sacrifice his integrity in favour 
of his humanitarian impulses" (Dworkin, 1988, p 41). I have already argued the 
point that autonomous principles do not have to be moral ones (II[.2.2.1). The 
principle "inflict as much pain to others as you possibly can" (Charles 
Manson) and "To any human price maintain your political power" (Josef 
Stalin) also are principles one could try to live after. 
One could perhaps say that there is something admirable about a person 
who without compromise lives according to her own principles without ever 
being the prey of temptations and weakness of will. However, this may only 
hold ceteris paribus: it may be a good thing, all-things-considered, if 
principally egoistic or evil persons also lacks integrity. Autonomy does not fill 
the moral space. However, this conception of autonomy allows us to 
formulate an ideal that tell us what is good about integrity, namely the ideal of 
capacity, which says th at, ceteris paribus, it is good to be a person who can live 
by her own basic "principles" (one kind of basic desires). 
57 This is not the only interesting sense of "integrity", but the one of relevance in this context. 
170 
2.6.2 Fruits of autonomy 
There are some further ideas intimately linked with discussions about the 
concept of autonomy, namely certain suggestions regarding what makes 
autonomy valuable (Young, 1982, p 39; Feinberg, 1986, 43-47). The most 
common of these are responsibility, self-esteem and dignity.58 I will not probe 
deeply into the question of the relationship between these (alleged) values and 
autonomy. The reason is that none of these things are identical to or a 
conceptual part of what autonomy is.59 For instance, self-esteem is not 
identical to or a p art of autonomy. Indeed, it may plausibly be claimed that 
being autonomous and living an autonomous life i s crucial for a person's self-
esteem (Young, 1982, p 39). But this connection between self-esteem and 
autonomy is, then, an empirical one about our psychology. 
However, it may be argued that the connection between responsibility, self-
esteem, and dignity is stronger. They are not part of what autonomy is but, 
rather, autonomy can be thought of as the necessary precondition for them.60 
They may thus be thought of as fruits of autonomy rather than as parts of 
autonomy. However, it should be noted that it by no means self-evident that 
autonomy is valuable, even if one grants that responsibility, self-esteem and 
dignity is valuable and autonomy is a necessary precondition for these things. 
Consciousness is a necessary precondition for happiness, but it is not obvious 
that consciousness is valuable even if happiness is valuable. Furthermore, the 
conception of autonomy presented here can be used to formulate ideas that 
take autonomy to be finally valuable, regardless of connections to other 
possible values. Since the conception and value of autonomy is one thing, 
then, and the conception of responsibility, self-esteem and dignity is quite 
another, I will n ot go much further into these ideas. 
However, one important note on responsibility must be added, since some 
ideas of responsibility may have a significant impact on ideals of a utonomy. The 
58 I will ret urn to responsibility. Self-esteem is a concept with a contested meaning, but "the sense 
of worth that an individual has" (Thomas, 1995, p 254) should be a characterisation general 
enough to satisfy most users. T he meaning of dignity is even more controversial, but is o ften 
treated as similar to Rawls' concept of'self-respect' in contexts of autonomy (Rawls, 1971, p 440; 
Young, 1982, p 39). 
55 See previous footnote. 
60 This is how Kant seems to have thought about dignity: that autonomy is a necessary, and 
perhaps sufficient condition for it (1785, p 77-79). 
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connection between autonomy and responsibility has been strong indeed in 
the history of philosophy. For instance, according to one interpretation of 
Kant, a person is responsible only if she acts autonomously.61 This is surely 
plausible, given one very minimal conception of autonomy, which says that an 
act is autonomous if, and only if, it is intentional under some true description 
of it (see V.3.1). 
Nevertheless, it is not without at least prima facie plausibility to claim that 
being more autonomous, according to the conception of autonomy presented 
here, also makes one more responsible. The reason for this is twofold. First, 
one may argue that the more authentic one is, according to the idea of 
authenticity presented here, the more responsible one is. The argument could 
be something like the following. Acting on authentic desires is acting on 
desires that one can approve of in the light of knowledge about why one has 
them. This trait of (more) authentic desires makes them good candidates for 
being (part of) the "core" of the person (see H.2.2.2). A nd it is common to 
think that the more one is acting from one's "core personality", the more 
responsible one is (Feinberg, 1986, p 43). Second, the conception of autonomy 
presented here is about "being in control" (see IH.2.6.1) in , e.g., the sense of 
having the ability to realize one's desires, if one chooses to do so (see 13.2.4.1). 
And it is also common to think that the more in control (in this sense) one is, 
the more responsible one is. 
But what is the idea of responsibility connected to autonomy in these ways 
about? Well, being morally responsible is to be praise- or blameworthy for one's 
actions. And an intuitively appealing idea to many is that the more 
autonomously one acts, the more responsible one is. So autonomy adds, so to 
speak, to the responsibility of the action. That is, an evil or wrongful act is 
more blameworthy the more autonomous it is and a good or right act is more 
praiseworthy the more autonomous it is.62 Furthermore, it is not farfetched to 
think that praiseworthiness adds to the goodness of and act and 
blameworthiness to the badness of an act. 
There is not sufficient space here to evaluate this line of reasoning. 
However, if one is inclined to accept it, the implications for any ideal of 
61 Since Kant's idea of autonomy is r ather different than the one presented here, I will ignore his 
idea of the connection between autonomy and responsibility in the following. 
62 This requires that we have an account of right/good and wrong/evil that is, a t least partly, 
independent of autonomy. 
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autonomy will be profound. Perhaps the most noteworthy implication is that 
autonomy cannot then simply be a positive intrinsic value, not even ceteris 
paribus. Rather, autonomy will be a contributive value, adding to the goodness of 
otherwise praiseworthy actions and to the badness of otherwise blameworthy 
actions.63 The connection mentioned above between autonomy and 
responsibility will thus result in a complex moral theory in the spirit of 
Moore's idea of "organic wholes" (Moore, 1903, p 236-273). To some, the 
"messiness" of such a theory will co me through as an unattractive feature. 
3. Ideals of autonomy 
Up till now, this chapter has dwelled on the question of how autonomy 
should be understood (the conception of autonomy). In this section, different 
ideals o f autonomy will be discussed. Generally, ideals of autonomy tackle 
questions of what is valuable about autonomy and/or what moral reasons we 
have that connect to autonomy. More precisely, the following questions 
regarding ideals of autonomy can be posed: 1) In what way is autonomy 
valuable (or what is it about autonomy that is valuable)? 2) Why is autonomy 
valuable (if i t is)? 3) When (under what circumstances) is autonomy valuable? 
The answers to these questions are, of course, related. Moreover, for each of 
these questions, one may add queries about the moral reasons for actions 
autonomy gives rise to, both as a value or as something else, e.g. as a non-
derived right.64 
The Erst question is about how the value of autonomy should be 
understood. What kind of entity should be ascribed "autonomy value"? Single 
decisions or acts or lives taken as a whole? Is it the capacity to be autonomous 
or in fact being autonomous that is of value? Is it a right that ought to be 
respected rather than a va lue that ought to be promoted? Or both? In that case, 
how ought conflicts between promoting the value and respecting the right be 
resolved? If it is a value to be promoted, can this value ever give rise to moral 
duties to act as to promote ones own autonomy? 
The second question is about the normative justification of the value. Is 
autonomy a value in itself or an instrumental value? Is it a personal value (an 
63 Personally, I am inclined to think that it is more plausible to hold that autonomy is an intrinsic 
value rather than a contributive one. That is, it is better (for me) to be in more control of my life, 
even if my using of this control to "do bad" may make things worse all-things-considered. 
64 I will return to a closer inspection of non-derived rights (IV. 1.1.2). 
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ingredient of the good life) or an impersonal value?65 If autonomy is a right 
that should be respected, what kind of right is it? Is it an absolute right? Or is it 
a right, the violation of which is always intrinsically negatively valuable? Or is it 
a right we should acknowledge because the acknowledgement of this right 
results in something else of value? Obviously, autonomy as a right and as a 
value are not mutually exclusive accounts of autonomy. For instance, maybe 
we should acknowledge some right to be autonomous because autonomy is 
valuable or results in something else of value. 
The third question is about the scope of autonomy. Given that it is a value 
in itself, how does it relate to other values when they conflict? Does it weigh 
more or less? Given that it is a right, how strong is that right? Can it be 
overridden and, if so, when? To what extent should person have the capacity 
of autonomy in order for the right to be respected? To what extent should we 
treat persons as if they are autonomous even if they in fact are not 
autonomous or autonomous only to a very low degree (the actual conditions 
and capacity is not at hand)? The question of the scope of autonomy is of 
course related to the question of its justification. For instance, if autonomy is 
an absolute right, it should probably have a greater scope than if it is an 
instrumental value. 
Naturally, all these questions will not be settled in the discussion to come. I 
will tak e a stand on some of these questions, but not others. For instance, I will 
not take a stand on the question of whether or not autonomy is a value in 
itself, although I assume that it is taken to be so in some contexts.66 The most 
important in this context is to discuss ideals of autonomy relating to the 
overarching question of the right to and value of genetic information. Many 
substantial questions of the value of autonomy have been and will b e tested on 
this applied level.67 The methodological point of departure is the idea of a 
reflective equilibrium (see L3). Particular judgements about the value of 
genetic information may then influence judgements on the value of 
autonomy, and the other way around. The applied level is then also a test of 
whether or not the conception of autonomy that was presented in the 
65 
"Impersonal value" is a value of an outcome that cannot be assigned to any particular person. 
66 Like the context of genetic counselling in the previous chapter. A lot of what is sa id about this 
practice becomes hard to interpret in a way that is not farfetched otherwise (see e.g. II.3.3.5). 
67 For instance the question of whether there is a basic right to genetic information. I argue that 
there is no such right (see IV.2.1). 
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previous section is tenable. I think the usefulness of it in the previous chapter 
shows that it is. 
I will thus not argue in favour of one particular ideal in this chapter. 
Instead, I will pres ent a n umber of possible ideals of autonomy. I will not have 
very much to say about what can be considered to be arguments for and 
against them. T his discussion has two related purposes. One is to try t o create 
some order in the existing discussion on autonomy in biomedical ethics. T he 
presented ideals of autonomy can help us to ask what ideal of autonomy, more 
precisely, a spokesman of autonomy is defending. This will enable us to better 
evaluate the argumentation at hand. The other is to elaborate more carefully a 
tool to analyse the discussion of the right to and value of genetic information 
from the point of view of autonomy. 
3.1 Autonomy as a positive value 
In defending the value of genetic testing and genetic information, the most 
widespread ideals of autonomy are those that regard autonomy as a positive 
value (see ch apter II). This is not always explicit. But much of what has been 
said in this context is intelligible only given this interpretation of autonomy 
(see chapter II).68 A utonomy as so mething that should be promoted is different 
from seeing autonomy as a right that should be respected. This has already 
been argued (see II.2.3) and will be fu rther elaborated in this chapte r. 
Furthermore, in discussions of genetic information in particular and 
biomedical ethics in general, autonomy is claimed or presupposed to be 
something that is of value in itself, as opposed to something that merely 
inherits its value from something else that, ultimately at least, is of value in 
itself (B eauchamp & Childress, 2001, passim). That is, autonomy is often taken 
to be finally valuable (Briilde, 1998, p 390-391), rather than just an instrumentally 
valuable.69 Furthermore, it is common to assume that if autonomy is finally 
68 To an increasing degree, this goes for bioethics in general. One example is Beauchamp and 
Childress, 2001, p 90-91, when claiming that it can be justified not to respect the autonomy of a 
patient in order to increase his autonomy (e.g. by giving the patient informadon he has declined 
in order to make it possible for him to make an informed decision). 
69 Something inherits its value by causing, or being a necessary precondition, or the like for 
something that is of value in itself. That is, instrumental value in this context is u nderstood rather 
widely, as synonymous with derived value (Briilde, 1998, p 6). 
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valuable, it is of intrinsic value, i.e. it is valuable because of its intrinsic 
properties (Lindley, 1986, p 73).70 
What does it mean to say t hat something has intrinsic value? I will not enter 
this complicated issue at length. I will just assume the standard view that X 
being intrinsically valuable is closely connected to anyone having a pro tanto 
reason to promote X (Kagan, 1989, p 61; Tännsjö, 1998b, p 119).71 A reason is 
pro tanto if, and only if, it always has "weight" or "force" (even though it may 
be overridden by other weightier reasons). So, if e.g. autonomy is an intrinsic 
value, there is always a reason to promote it.72 This is n ot crystal clear, but clear 
enough for our present purposes. 
Now that we have a general grasp of what it means to be intrinsically 
valuable, what kind of value is autonomy? That is, what aspects of autonomy 
ought we to promote? I think that it is appropriate to make a distinction 
between two basic ideals of autonomy: to live a n autonomous life (the ideal of 
self-realization) and to be an autonomous person (the ideal of capacity). After 
developing these ideals, I will move on to say s omething about how they can 
be used to formulate normative ideals, i.e. suggestions of what one ought to do 
(III.3.2). This will give rise to questions of how autonomy should be measured 
when comparisons of autonomy are necessary, due to conflicts of autonomy 
or conflicts with other values. 
3.1.1 The ideal of self-realisation 
A reasonable interpretation of the idea that autonomy is a va lue that should be 
promoted is the following. The value of autonomy consists in living one's life 
in accordance with one's own authentic and basic desires, through one's own 
70 So all i ntrinsic values are final, but not necessarily the other way around, since there may be 
things that are valuable for their own sakes, but which is n ot valuable because of any intrinsic 
properties (e.g. something that is valu able because of its relational properties, e.g. being the first 
manufactured object of some kind). 
71 There are different views on the relationship between having a pro tanto reason to promote X 
and X being intrinsically valuable. One view is the Moorean idea that X is intrin sically valuable if, 
and only if, X's value supervenes on the intrinsic (or non-relational) properties of X, and add that 
anyone has a pro tanto reason to promote X if X is intrinsically valuable. Another view says that X 
is intrinsically valuable if, and only if, X has intrinsic properties that gives anyone a reason to have 
a pro-attitude towards X for its own sake (a so-called "buck passing"-theory of intrinsic value). I 
wish to thank Sven Nyholm for bringing these views to my attention. 
72 I will return to the implications of this idea (see I1I.3.2.1). 
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decisions and actions.73 Crudely put, the more a person in fact succeeds in 
living according to her authentic and basic desires in this way, the more 
autonomous she is. And the more autonomous the person is (in this regard) 
the better is it for that person, ceteris paribus.74 The ideal of self-realization, 
then, sees autonomy as a personal value. The ideal emphasises the individual's 
actual realization of her own ends through her own acts and decisions, rather 
than just being a person that is capable of this. It is thus not an ideal of 
character. 
A person's degree of autonomy is then a function of the realized basic 
desire's authenticity (the more authentic they are, the more autonomous the 
person become given their realization), number and strength in comparison 
with the non-realized basic desire's authenticity, number and strength. In other 
words, the more "important" (strong) and "self-governed" (authentic) desires 
that the person succeeds in achieving or realizing (of the desires she has), the 
more autonomous the person is, a nd the better for her. This ideal may thus 
naturally be dubbed the ideal of self-realization. 
The strength of this ideal75 is that it accounts for the idea that the valuable 
thing about autonomy is actually leading an autonomous life. The ideal 
explains why it is bad for a person not to realize his important projects and 
plans, and delivers the explanation in terms of autonomy. 
However, there is not one ideal of self-realization. This ideal can be specified 
in various substantial but non-equivalent ways. For instance, there is an 
absolute version, which says that the more desires76 that a p erson realizes, the 
better off she is, and a relative version, which says that the higher the quota of 
desires that a person have that she realizes, the better off she is. An example 
may illuminate the difference. 
Imagine two persons, A and B. A has 100 basic, authentic desires and 
realizes 90% of these. B has 200 basic, a uthentic desires and only realizes 50% 
of those. According to the absolute version, B is better off than A, since B 
73 The last mentioned proviso is of course necessary to distinguish ideals of autonomy from 
preferentialism (III.2.4.1). 
74 This can be modified if the idea is combined with some thought of responsibility (III.2.6.2). 
75 Besides that it makes various arguments on the value of genetic information intelligible. 
76 Of course, given a c ertain strength and degree of authenticity and given that they are basic. 
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realizes 10 more basic, authentic desires than A77 However, according to the 
relative version, A is better off than B, s ince A realizes a higher quota of the 
desires she has than B. 
Even though both versions can be formulated with my conception of 
autonomy, I think that the relative version is much more plausible. The most 
important reason in favour of the relative version is that the absolute version 
seems to fly in the face of how we perceive an autonomous life. This is easy 
illustrated if one keeps in mind that the number of autonomous decisions can 
be large even if the number of basic, authentic desires is small.78 Assume that 
Jolene only has one basic, authentic desire: to write as innovative and well-
composed novels as possible. This desire can be realized to different degrees, 
depending on her decision competence and her efficiency. Assume that she 
succeeds in realizing this desire to a h igh degree. Every year she decides to 
write a new, innovative and well-composed novel and succeeds. Compare this 
to Jane, who has many basic, authentic desires: to wear the most fashionable 
clothes, to learn French, to go to a restaurant at least once a week, to work as a 
veterinary surgeon, and so on. Jane realizes some, but not all of these desires. 
Altogether, Jane realizes a greater number of desires than Jolene. However, I do 
not believe that anyone would claim that Jane leads a more autonomous life 
than Jolene just because of this. This indicates that the relative version is the 
more plausible one. 
Besides the fact that there are versions of the ideal of self-realization, this ideal 
can be combined with other ideals of autonomy that holds autonomy to be 
valuable. A pure ideal of self-realization does not contain the idea that only 
having authentic desires is valuable in itself, since it says that it is the realization 
of them that is valuable. Neither does it say t hat it is valuable in itself to be 
competent or to have the capacity to efficiency. Of course, efficiency in the 
sense of actually accomplishing one's basic and authentic desires is part of 
what has value according to the ideal. Furthermore, authenticity has value in 
the sense that only the realization of authentic desires is valuable, and the 
realization is more valuable the more authentic and the stronger the desires 
are. Moreover, decision competence and capacity for efficiency are necessary 
77 Let us assume that all these desires are of an equal strength. Another simplification is 
presupposed. Single desires can be realized to different degrees, which this example ignores. 
78 This actualises the question of how to individuate desires. I will not tackle this problem. 
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presuppositions to realizing the desires autonomously, since the decision 
competence and efficiency of the person will causally determine the extent to 
which the person will succeed in realizing her desires. However, the capacity 
for efficiency is not considered to be a value of itself, according to the pure 
ideal of self-realization, and neither is decision competence as such. 
However, even if the ideal of self-realization does not in itself include that 
having authentic desires, decision competence and capacity for efficiency are 
valuable states in themselves, it can be combined with such ideas. This 
demonstrates that that the ideal of self-realization can be combined with the 
ideal of capacity (HI.3.1.2), which claims that having authentic desires, 
competence and capacity for efficiency is in trinsically valuable. 
Let me try to illuminate with an example. Imagine two persons, A and B. A 
has a very authentic (or strong) basic desire. B has a not so authentic (or strong) 
basic desire. Both manage to realize their desires, i.e. they decide and act as t o 
satisfy the desire they have. However, A regularly suffers from weakness of 
will, and her capacity to act on the decision in question is thus much lower 
than the other person, i.e. due to her weakness of will, she was much less 
likely t o actually succeed in accomplishing her end. However, in this situation, 
she overcomes her weakness and succeeds in realizing her desire. According 
to the pure ideal of self-realization, which does not think that the capacity for 
efficiency has value, A is clearly better off than B, due to her desire being 
more authentic (or stronger) (even though the fact that she had the desire did 
not make her life any better, before she realized it). However, the possible 
ideal of autonomy that says that the capacity for efficiency has value in 
addition to the actual realization of one's desires (through one's decisions and 
acts) can reach a d ifferent conclusion regarding who of the two persons in the 
example above that is better off. Maybe the second person is, if her higher 
capacity for efficiency outweighs the lower authenticity of her desire. 
A residual ambiguity could be seen in this ideal, however. Is it valuable to 
realize single desires or living an autonomous life? I think one soon realises 
that there is something odd about this question. It is not the one or the other. 
Autonomy is a m atter of degrees. How autonomous a life one leads depends 
on how one manages to achieve one's basic aims. The degree of autonomy of a 
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life cannot be independent of how one manages in the parts of one's life of 
which the life total is composed.79 
3.1.2 The ideal of capacity 
The ideal of capacity says that, rather than living an autonomous life, the value 
of autonomy consists of being an autonomous person. This is a person with 
authentic desires, and enough decision competence and efficiency to 
implement these desires. The autonomous person, then, both has the capacity 
required and the actual conditions fulfilled in order to independently 
consider her own basic projects and values, make decisions on the basis of 
them and realize them through her own action. This ideal is to a g reat extent 
an ideal of character, since it claims that having certain traits and capacities is of 
value. An autonomous person is not weak of will, self-deceiving, confused, 
phobic, and so on, since all these things tend to reduce autonomy in the sense 
defined here. This ideal also emphasises the importance of on not being 
manipulated, coerced or in other ways prevented by others from realizing 
one's life plans. This ideal is widely cherished (Young, 1982). 
Also this ideal makes autonomy a matter of degree. The more authentic, 
decision competent and efficient I am, the better for me. The value, then, is to 
be such a person that can realize his desires, that is, if the person has desires, it 
is better if they are authentic and the person is capable of realizing them. 
However, the extent to which she actually does achieve her ends is of no 
consequence as such for her degree of valuable autonomy. Rather, such 
achievements are to be seen as side-effects of the presence of those features of 
autonomy that affect one's quality of life (at least according to a pure version, 
not combined with the ideal of self-realization). 
Moreover, also this ideal can be specified into different versions. One 
version can emphasise the capacity to be autonomous rather than the actual 
conditions of autonomy (IIL2.1), i.e. elaborate a pure ideal of character. As 
previously noted, both external and internal factors affects one's actual capacity 
to be competent and efficient. Some may want to include internal but not 
external factors in their ideal. This version may seem attractive for those who 
would like to claim that actual conditions of autonomy belongs to the realm of 
freedom rather than autonomy. I will not enter a d ebate with those who have 
79 Of course, this is not incompatible with claiming that the distribution of autonomy over a life 
makes a difference to its value. 
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this terminological inclination. They can also use the conception adumbrated 
here to formulate their ideals. 
3.2 From value to morality 
Even if one has formulated and defended a certain idea regarding the value of 
autonomy, this is not sufficient in order to argue in favour of a certain practice 
or line of conduct on the basis of autonomy. In order to make a value of 
autonomy practically use ful or action-guiding o ne has to answer several additional 
questions. First, one has to formulate norms of autonomy — what is right or 
what we ought to do with respect to the value of autonomy. For instance, 
ought one to maximise autonomy or ought one to realize autonomy to a 
certain degree, e.g. equally for everybody? Without answers to questions like 
this, we will not know how we should promote the value of autonomy. Second, 
just as one has to say h ow autonomy should be distributed among people (as 
the norms do), one also has to say how it should be distributed over time. To 
what extent, and why, should one consider past and future desires from the 
point of view of autonomy? Third, there is the methodological question of 
comparing degrees of autonomy. In order to determine whether a norm has 
been fulfilled (e.g. the norm that the total self-realization should be 
maximised) one has to be able to measure the relevant individuals' level of 
autonomy and compare these levels. I s this possible, and to what extent? 
My primary focus in this section is to pose these questions and to make 
them more precise. The aim is to show what kind of questions someone 
defending an action, institution, policy, or other practice on the basis of 
autonomy must consider. Nonetheless, whenever I can, I will argue that some 
answers are more plausible than others. For instance, I will propose that 
neutrality regarding time is plausible (even though this conclusion may not 
have much practical relevance) and that autonomy may be difficult indeed to 
measure with any accuracy. But I will not answer all three questions at any 
length, and especially not the first. Nevertheless, a full ideal of autonomy 
would have to answer such questions, and it may thus be useful to point them 
out. 
It should be noted that not all norms of autonomy are based on the idea 
that autonomy is a positive value. On the contrary, the most widespread 
discourse on autonomy in biomedical ethics conceives of autonomy as a right 
that should be respected, regardless of the values this promotes (at least to 
some extent). I will return to autonomy as a right in the next section (HI.3.3), 
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where we also will see how the conception presented above can be used to 
formulate such ideas. 
3.2.1 The norms of the value 
The following line of thought has seemed attractive to some moral 
philosophers: if something is of value in itself, then the more of this, the 
better. And, surely, we should choose and act so as to make things better rather 
than worse. Thus, for these thinkers, the idea that the mark of intrinsic value is 
that it ought to be maximised has seemed natural. Indeed, this may come 
through as part of the very meaning of intrinsic value,80 as opposed to 
instrumental values, such as resources of different kinds, which can have 
diminishing marginal utility. The reasoning behind this move, which has made 
it seem natural, can be spelled out in something like the following manner: 
(1) If something, V, has intrinsic value, anyone has a pro tanto reason to 
promote V. 
(2) It holds for any agent that, if she has a pro tanto reason to promote V, 
if there are no independent reasons not to promote V,81 and she can 
promote V, she ought to do so. 
(3) It holds for any agent that, if she has more reason to promote a f eature 
Fl rather than a feature F2, she ought to promote Fl rather than F2. 
(4) V has intrinsic value (or "is good for its own sake"). 
(5) V can come in different degrees (more or less). 
(6) The higher degree (the more) of V that an agent can act as to realize, 
the more reason she has to do so. 
(7) If Fl realizes more V than F2, and the agent can act as to realize Fl and 
act as to realize F2 , and there are no independent reasons not to realize 
Fl, the agent ought to act as to realize Fl rather than F2. 
This conclusion amounts to saying that, in the absence of reason to the 
contrary, it is wrong (an a gent ought not) to act as to realize less of the good 
than one can do. If there is just one kind of value (e.g. "pleasure" or well-
80 I use the term intrinsic rather than final value here. However, see III.3.1. 
81 For instance, there is an independent pro tanto reason not to promote V if t hat promotion 
would realize something of negative intrinsic value, or if it w ould require the violation of a moral 
right or duty. 
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being) and only one corresponding kind of disvalue ("displeasure"), and no 
reasons that depend on other things than how much value is realized, then the 
only thing we have reason to do is to maximise the net balance of pleasure 
over displeasure. This is, of course, the credo of utilitarianism. Following the 
same line of reasoning, it might thus be tempting to conclude that if autonomy 
is an intrinsic value, autonomy being a matter of degree, it is one that ought to 
be maximised. Of course, the clause of reasons to the contrary in premise (2) 
probably would kick in, since there are plausibly other values than autonomy. 
That is, one has to say something about the moral weight of autonomy in 
comparison to other intrinsic values but, nonetheless, if premises (1) to (6) are 
accepted regarding autonomy, then autonomy ought to be maximised, ceteris 
paribus. 
However, the above line of reasoning can be, and has been, questioned. 
Even if one subscribes to the premises (1) to (3) and to autonomy being an 
intrinsic value that comes in degrees, premise (6) is far from uncontroversial. 
In fact, even writers with an openly utilitarian bent of mind have been inclined 
to reject it (Lindley, 1986, p 82-83; Tännsjö, 1998b, p 119-120). 
So, one cannot legitimately infer from something being an intrinsic value 
that it ought to be maximised. How the value in question should be realized 
or, put differently, what norms that are implied by the statement that something 
is of value is an open question. One possibility, besides maximisation, is that 
the value in question ought to be distributed equally. Whether the equal 
distribution of, say, au tonomy also is the distribution that realizes most value 
is, of course, a contingent matter. It may well be, in a situation, that an equal 
distribution is less effective than some unequal one and if autonomy should 
be distributed equally, autonomy should not, then, in this situation, be 
maximised. If equality in distribution is not possible, it may nonetheless be 
claimed that the less unequal the distribution is, the better.82 Even if one 
denies that a lesser inequality in the distribution of a certain value always 
overrides a greater amount of it, one could claim that some amount of the 
value should be "sacrificed" in order to reduce inequality.83 This claim is in 
no way incompatible with claiming that autonomy is a n intrinsic value. 
82 How "less unequal" or, rather, "less badly unequal" should be interpreted is a complex issue. 
See Temkin, 1993. 
83 Which is tantamount to saying that inequality is a negative value that is n ot lexically prior to 
other values (see III.3.3). 
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Another possibility is that the amounts of the goods in question should be 
weighted with regard to their value. That is, the relation between the amount 
of something that is of value and how valuable this amount is need not be one 
of 1:1. One such suggestion is that benefiting people matters more the worse 
of they are. This is sometimes called the doctrine of the priority of evil or, 
more recently, prioritarianism or the Priority View (Parfît, 1997, p 213). This 
view implies that the moral weight of improvements decline or, 
correspondingly, that it is of more value to improve the lot of someone who 
is worse off than someone else.84 Prioritarianism expresses a strong intuition 
many have regarding well-being. One may, of course, have a similar intuition 
regarding autonomy. 
A more commonly stated idea about the weight of value with regard to 
autonomy is that there is a level of autonomy above which farther increases of 
autonomy is of little, o r perhaps no, value or moral importance (Lindley, 1986, 
p 107). To stipulate such a level has several purposes. One purpose is to 
prevent the ideal of autonomy from being too demanding by always providing 
reasons for even further improvements of autonomy. Another related purpose 
is to make the ideal attainable for most people. 
Another related possibility is to argue that autonomy only is valuable above 
a certain level. This idea is perhaps most plausible when combined with the 
claim that the autonomy of a person ought to be respected only when the 
person's capacity for autonomy is above a certain level. Below this level of 
autonomy there is not enough autonomy to command respect, since it lacks 
value, one may argue. We will return to ideals that consider autonomy 
primarily as a right to respect later on in this chapter (III.3.3). 
As already mentioned (DI.3.2), the reason to formulate all these norms is that 
any ideal of autonomy just stating that autonomy is a value, in this and that 
respect, is insufficient. In order to be action-guiding, any such ideal of 
autonomy has to say h ow the value should be promoted, i.e. it has to take a 
stand on the normative issue. Is autonomy to be maximised, weighted 
somehow (and, if so, how), or to be distributed equally (and, if so, to what 
84 Prioritarianism should be carefully distinguished from (the version of) egalitarianism, since the 
last position, as opposed to the first, states that a less unequal state is b etter than a more unequal 
state (at least if s ome other conditions are met, e.g. that no one deserves to be worse of than 
another), even if no one is better off with regard to e.g. well-being in the more unequal state. See 
Temkin, 1993, p 245-248. 
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extent)? And what is the weight of autonomy in comparison to other values? If 
no answers to these questions are provided, defences of practices on the basis 
of the value of autonomy will remain indeterminate, since the implications of 
the ideals will b e as unclear as the ideal itself. 
3.2.2 Autonomy and time 
Another matter that a normative ideal of autonomy must address is questions 
of time. One such question is whether moral ideals in general, and ideals of 
autonomy in particular, should be neutral with regard to time, that is, should 
hold that the fact that a state of affairs with intrinsic value, A, occurs at a 
different time than another state of affairs with intrinsic value, B, cannot in 
itself affect the value of A relative to B, or conversely. In other words, 
temporal neutrality says that when something occurs does not make any direct 
evaluative or moral difference. 
Applied to ideals of autonomy as a value, the idea of temporal neutrality 
states that a person being authentic with regard to a desire, and autonomous 
with regard to the realization of the desire and/or in fact, realizing an 
authentic desire, is, ceteris paribus, good for the person, regardless of when it 
happens. The ceteris paribus clause is important to emphasise in order to 
avoid confusion. As a matter of fact, it may make all the difference in the 
world when something occurs. For instance, consider an ideal of capacity 
claiming that having authentic desires is of value in itself. As previously argued, 
authenticity is a matter of degree (see EII.2.1 — IH.2.4.2), s o one desire can be 
more or less authentic than another, and one and the same desire can be more 
or less authentic over time. It may even be the case that a desire can become 
more authentic over time (partly) because it is loca ted at a di fferent point of time 
(if, e.g., time is connected to the maturity of a p erson and the maturity of the 
person makes her more prone to authenticity). To accept the possibility of this 
is not to deny temporal neutrality. In order to deny this idea in the present 
context one would have to affirm the possibility that two desires (or the same 
desire at two different points of time) that are equal regarding their degree of 
authenticity (and strength) nonetheless are different regarding their intrinsic 
value, only because they are located differently in time. This seems strange 
indeed. 
As I said earlier, the primary task here is to say what kind of questions a 
practically useful ideal of autonomy has to answer, not to defend any particular 
answers to these questions. Having said that, neutralism regarding time must 
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nevertheless be the default position. In order to give this position up, strong 
reasons indeed would be needed and I, for my part, know of no such reasons. 
On top of this, one argument that supports neutralism regarding time has 
already been given: the implications would otherwise be strange. Of course, it 
should not be denied that time often matters in practical decision-making. 
Perhaps the most important fact regarding time to practical decision-making is 
the epistemological one: very often, the more distant in the future a certain 
possible state of affair is, the more uncertain it is. For instance, it would 
certainly be foolish to reject a ce rtain 100€ today in order to preserve a 50% 
chance of getting the same amount of money tomorrow.85 Thus, since future 
events regularly are more uncertain than present one's, we are surely rational to 
act with more consideration to the present. This is no violation of temporal 
neutrality. It only shows that we should not disregard time in our practical 
decision-making.86 So, even if temporal neutrality is plausible, it may be rather 
inconsequential for practical purposes. 
Another question of time that ideals of autonomy must address is when there 
is a d ifference in time between a desire, and the realization of that desire.87 
The question becomes most pressing when one does not hold the desire that 
is realized anymore. Is it still of value for the person that this desire is realized? 
Answering no to this question implies that if you act as to spoil a project of 
mine that I have fought hard for in the past but no longer care about, you will 
not have made my life worse. Nevertheless, the most intuitively appealing 
answer seems to be no: if realizing desires is of value, then how can realizing 
something make my life better if I no longer desire it? 
85 Unless, of course, one likes to gamble, there is a danger with possessing the money today, and 
so forth. 
86 In fact, the most influential arguments against temporal neutrality (Williams, 1981) only remain 
forceful if directed against temporal neutrality as a practical guide of conduct or decision-making 
rather than against the principle itself. I am thinking about the kind of arguments that tries to 
establish that trying to take all one's life into equal consideration (and in that sense being n eutral 
regarding time) will ine vitably make one fail t o do so. This is t he idea of neutrality as indirectly 
self-defeating, i.e., that trying to accomplish something will make this accomplishment impossible. 
This question has been thoroughly discussed elsewhere (Parfit, 1984, p 3-52, 149-186), also 
specifically regarding autonomy (Lindley, 1986, p 88-93), so I will not dwell upon it further. 
87 This question only concerns ideals of self-realization, since these ideals, unlike ideals of 
capacity, regards realization of desires. 
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But if we are to ignore past desires in this way, should we not also ignore 
future ones? But to ignore future desires does not seem to be intuitively 
appealing. 
This problem is well known in the discussion of preferentialism.88 I think 
the theoretical solution to the problem is to be found in this discussion. Once 
again, thi s is another problem that an ideal of autonomy must tackle and my 
primary motive is to point it out but, just like the general question of time bias, 
there seems to be a p lausible solution. The solution is to preserve the central 
idea of temporal neutrality: there should be no time bias, while at the same 
time recognize that the only preference-realization that is of value is the 
realization of preferences that are held when they can be satisfied. Thus, from 
the point of view of autonomy, my life does not fare any better if I realize 
some desire while not having it anymore, and my future desires are relevant 
insofar as I can realize them whilst having them.89 Symmetrically, my life does 
not fare any worse if I do not have a desire anymore and someone else acts to 
frustrate that past desire now.90 Furthermore, if you perform an action now 
with delayed effects that prevents the realization of my desires in the future 
when I still have them, you have made my life worse off regarding autonomy. 
This preserves the intuitions regarding time and value just m entioned above. 
3.2.3 Comparisons of autonomy 
In order for an ideal of autonomy to be practically useful, we need to be able 
to compare di fferent state of affairs regarding (the morally relevant parts of) 
autonomy. This is so, since conflicts are possible: conflicts between respecting 
autonomy and promoting autonomy, conflicts between promoting autonomy 
now versus later, or conflicts between promoting the autonomy of one person 
88 However, it should be noted that the problem of how past and future desires should be 
accounted for is somewhat less from the point of view of autonomy compared to preferentialism, 
since an agent is unlikely to try t o realize some desire she does no longer hold and thus is unlikely 
to succeed in d oing so (remember that autonomy presupposes not just s atisfaction but also the 
person realizing the desire in question). So even if one claims that realizing desires before or after 
one has them is of value (contrary to what is argued here), this will prob ably seldom be a realized 
value. 
89 This is w hat Hare, 1981, p 102-106, has called preferences 'now-for-now' and 'then-for-then' 
and what have elsewhere been called "the theory of simultaneous satisfaction of preferences" 
(Tännsjö, 1998, p 83). 
90 Unless that person can act so as to frustrate my desire when I had it, which would require 
backward causation or a time machine. 
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versus another. Sometimes, conflicts with other ethical considerations arise 
too. For instance, we may have to choose between respecting someone's 
autonomy and promoting her well-being or avoiding harm to her. This means 
that we sometimes will n eed some idea of how to compare autonomy to other 
values as well. Whenever conflicts such as these arise, we have to compare 
pros and cons in order to try to take a s tand on what to do. 
In this subsection, I will disregard the very important question of how 
autonomy should be compared to other values. The reason that I disregard this 
question is that, although very important, it is very difficult, and to start to 
tackle that question would require, at least, a book of its own. Furthermore, in 
order to compare autonomy to other ethical considerations, we must first have 
some idea of how to perform comparisons of autonomy. I will thus focus on 
this question. 
Really, the question of comparisons of autonomy is not one, but two. 
First, there is the theoretical question of whether or not such comparisons are 
meaningful at all, tha t is, the question of whether or not a measurement of 
autonomy can be created. Second, there is the practical question of whether or 
not this measurement can be used to settle conflicts in practice. In order to 
use a measurement in practice, it has to be meaningful to start with. So, the 
possibility of answering the practical question depends on a positive answer to 
the theoretical one. 
However, the need for comparisons and measurement depends on the 
normative theory of autonomy. In a normative theory of autonomy that holds 
autonomy to be an absolute right and nothing more, and thus that autonomy 
should never be violated, the comparisons needed will be rather 
straightforward, since we only need a binary scale to determine whether an 
action was wrong: either it violated autonomy, in which case the action was 
wrong, or it did not, in which case it may be permissible, due to other 
normative considerations. However, even on such an uncomplicated 
normative theory of autonomy, we will need to determine who is autonomous 
enough to fall un der the principle of an absolute right to autonomy. The more 
factors one thinks are relevant to determine that limit and the more these 
factors are matters of degree, the more complicated becomes the problem of 
measurability. 
By making the normative theory of autonomy more complicated, more 
complex kinds of comparisons and, thus, measures will be needed. If rights to 
autonomy are thought to be prima facie, one will have to specify under what 
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circumstances such rights are overridden.91 If the theory says th at only certain 
qualitative states override the right to autonomy, for instance if someone will 
die as a r esult of respecting the right, then comparisons will be easier than if 
one claims that amounts of something, for instance well-being or autonomy, 
can override autonomy. 
This brings us to quantitative normative theories, that is, theories that claim that 
amounts of a value matter. To this group not only utilitarianism and other kind 
of consequentialistic theories belong, but also prioritarianism, and theories that 
claim that equality matters, since one may distribute a good more or less equal 
(Temkin, 1993). If autonomy is a m atter of degree, which I have argued that it 
is, and autonomy is to be thought of as a value to promote, then we can 
promote this value to different degrees. This calls for some way of measuring 
degrees of autonomy. Since I will deal with ideas of rights to autonomy later in 
this chapter (UL3.3.), an d since the problem of measurement regarding such 
theories is pardy less serious, I will in the following focus on normative 
theories that claim that amounts matter, like theories that holds that autonomy 
is a value to promote. 
In the following, I will first say something about what measurability is. T hen I 
will try to show why different practical problems calls for different kinds of 
measurement. I will then try to argue that theories that consider autonomy to 
be a value that should be promoted will have difficulties solving the 
theoretical problem of measurement. However, given some simplifying 
assumptions, we may at times be able to compare outcomes with regard to 
autonomy, which can be sufficient for practical purposes. 
What is, then, measurability? Some kinds of "things" (objects or states of 
affairs) are measurable if they can be assigned values according to some rule. 
According to this definition, it may seem as if we can measure anything. For 
instance, we could create a m easure of love through applying the method of 
electric shock and the rule that the more electric shock a person, A, is 
prepared to endure to see another person, B, the more A loves B. However, 
measurements should ideally be both (sufficiently) valid, i.e. be an adequate 
measure of the objects or states of affairs it is measuring, and reliable, i.e. be 
exact and unambiguous.92 So, even if the proposed measure of love is 
91 I will give a closer account of prima facie-rights in III.3.3 and IV. 1.1.1. 
92 Both validity and reliability are matter of degrees. 
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relatively reliable (will generate determinate answers on how much different 
persons "loves" other persons), it will probably not be valid at all. T his is the 
case since the measurement will not measure that which most of us call love 
but rather, among other things, how a person manages physical pain. It is thus 
desirable with a measure that is both (sufficiendy) valid and reliable. 
Different practical problems call for different kinds or degrees of 
measurability. The simplest case is if the goal is to enhance the autonomy of a 
particular person. Then we only need intrapersonal measurability, i.e. we only 
need a scale on which we can compare the autonomy of a particular 
individual.93 Furthermore, in order to determine only whether the autonomy 
of the individual has been enhanced or not, we need only to be able to 
compare the autonomy with regard to more or less, i.e., on an ordinal scale. 
However, this is hardly sufficient in the context of evaluating medical 
practices, such as presymptomatic genetic testing, and the institutions 
surrounding them, if an important goal of these practices is to promote 
autonomy. These practices do not only concern one individual. An action, 
which is a part of such a practice, which is favourable to the autonomy of one 
person, may be unfavourable to the autonomy of another. At least, we cannot 
presuppose that this is not the case. Thus, one will need interpersonal 
comparisons of autonomy in order to evaluate the introduction and regulation 
of a medical practice such as presymptomatic genetic testing. 
Furthermore, there are often more than two alternatives, both regarding 
choices of courses of action within a practice and regarding choices of 
practices. Of course, the general question of whether a certain practice should 
be introduced at all can be answered with a "yes" or a "no", leaving us with 
only two alternatives. However, when it comes to questions of how a practice 
should be introduced and what regulations it should be subjected to, there are 
many alternatives. Since different people may benefit to different degrees 
given different practices, we will need a measurement that tells us how much 
more these different people will benefit from a certain practice in comparison 
to others in terms of autonomy. This requires a scale that enables us to 
93 It may be possible to do such comparisons intertemporally, (at different points of time) or, 
perhaps, only intratemporally (at th e same point of time). 
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compare differences or intervals between the objects or state of affairs, i.e., an 
interval scale.94 
To complicate matters further, presymptomatic genetic testing is often 
used to make reproductive decisions and, thus, will affect not only the 
autonomy of existing people, but also who will exist. If the goal of 
presymptomatic genetic testing is autonomy promotion in general, one will 
have to take these "potential", non-existing persons into account. This requires 
a sca le with some natural zero point, like scales of height and weight, since we 
will have to be able to determine, for instance, whether a certain life will 
increase overall autonomy in comparison with no life at all. T hese kinds of 
scale are called ratio scales. 
To this last complication, it may be retorted that the goal of 
presymptomatic genetic testing in reproductive decisions is not to promote 
autonomy in general, but only to promote the autonomy of the parents. This 
could be defended by claiming that the concern of the health care 
professionals should be the client/patient at hand and not someone else. But 
taken to an extreme, this claim is surely false. Even if it is plausible to claim 
that the primaiy concern of health care professionals should be for the patient 
at hand (see VI.3.1.2), this cannot be their only concern. If devastating 
consequences would result from only caring about the patient at hand, it is 
hard to see why health care professionals should be allowed to ignore this just 
by pointing to their position as health care professionals. For instance, a doctor 
has some d uties also to third parties. It is by no means obvious that e.g. a 
geneticist should pay no consideration to the unborn child (e.g. by allowing 
parents to choose a fertilized egg with Krabbe's syndrome (see 1.4.1) to be 
implanted after PGD). Some kind of an idea of a life not worth living, and thus 
a ratio scale defining a zero point, is thereby plausibly required. 
All this means that some scales allow for "more" measurability than others. 
If autonomy can be ordered on a r atio scale, one can also settle the intervals, 
but the possibility of settling intervals is insufficient for a ratio scale. A ratio 
scale is necessary in order to use the scale arithmetically, a p recondition for it 
being meaningful to say t hat something is, e.g., tw ice or three times as much as 
something else, something an interval scale does not allow. A similar point 
relates to interval and ordinal scales. If we can determine differences in 
interval regarding autonomy, we can also settle whether someone is more or 
94 Of course, the same goes if th e goal is to minimize the inequality of autonomy. 
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less autonomous, but not the other way around. Furthermore, each of these 
scales may be partial, ordering just some objects or states of affairs of some 
kind, or complete, ordering all objects or states of affairs of some kind. As we 
have seen, for practical purposes, sometimes nothing short of an, at least 
partial, ratio scale would do. 
Can we, then, construe such a m easure for autonomy, even theoretically? Or, 
more precisely, is there a (sufficiently) valid and reliable way of comparing 
different degrees of autonomy? What kind of such a measurement can we 
create? An interpersonal or only an intrapersonal? Is it possible to construe a 
ratio scale of autonomy or only an interval scale or, perhaps, only an ordinal 
scale? Or is it implausible to claim that there is any valid and reliable scale at 
all? 
I will start with considering the creations of complete such scales and my 
conclusion will be rather negative. For various reasons, it is not likely that even 
an ordinal intrapersonal scale can be construed, and, thus, much less likely that 
stronger kinds of measurements can be construed. 
Consider the ideal of self-realization that claims that the more "important" 
(strong) and "self-governed" (authentic) desires that the person succeeds in 
achieving of the desires she has, the more autonomous the person is (and in 
virtue of that, the better off she is, ce teris paribus). According to this ideal, we 
will n eed a measurement of the strength and authenticity of (realized) desires 
in order to determine the level of a person's autonomy. Furthermore, we will 
need a measurement that determines the relative weight of the authenticity and 
the strength of desires. 
When it comes to the measurement of strength of desires, there are some 
answers to be had in classic decision theory. Given that desires can be analysed 
in terms of preferences, so that someone's, P's, desire X is stronger than P's 
desire Y if, and only if, P prefers X to Y, and given that we can ignore 
"irrational" desires,95 then intrapersonal-intratemporal ordinal scales of 
strength of desires can be construed (Resnik, 1987, p 22-25). That is, we can 
order all desire s that a c ertain person has at a certain time on a scale that tells us 
95 According to classic decision theory, a set of preferences are rationally ordered if they are 
asymmetrical (so that the person does not prefer X to Y and Y to X at the same time), transitive 
(so that if the person prefers X to Y and Y to Z, she also prefers X to Z) and connected (so that 
the person prefers X to Y, or prefers Y to X or is indifferent between X and Y for all relevant 
outcomes X and Y (she "knows what she wants")). Otherwise, they can be said to be irrational. 
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which state of affairs the person prefers to other state of affairs and which 
state of affairs the person is indifferent to. Furthermore, if a pe rson can take a 
stand on some hypothetical lotteries according to the principle of maximised 
utility, then intrapersonal-intratemporal interval scales of strength of desires 
can be construed (Resnik, 1987, p 88-100).96 Perhaps, it is even plausible to talk 
about a natural zero point, and thus a ratio scale, o f strength of desires. This 
may b e plausible if it is reasonable to assume that t here are states of affairs to 
which someone is genuinely indifferent, th at is, it does not matter at all for the 
person whether the possible state of affairs is a fact o r not (Brülde, 2003, p 154-
155). I see no reason to deny this possib ility.97 
However, despite these theoretical possibilities of comparing strengths of 
desires intrapersonally, things looks much more gloomy when it comes to 
interpersonal comparisons of strength of desires.98 The reason for this is the 
following. In the case of one person, the person herself can compare one 
desire to other desires and thus determine the strength of the desire in 
question. However, regarding different persons, there is no common person 
whose ordering of the preference-orderings of different people we may use 
as a basis for comparing the strength of the desires of different people. I can 
compare the strength of my desire to learn Russian to my desire to learn 
Greek by pondering what I prefer to the other. But I cannot compare my 
desire to learn Russian to your desire to learn Russian. The only thing I can 
ponder is whether I prefe r that I learn Russian to you learning Russian. But 
this is once again to compare two desires of mine, rather than your desire to 
mine. To state the case differently, there is no "overindividual super-subject" 
that has both the desires directly accessible for comparison (Brülde, 2003, p 
156). This is not to say that one cannot create an interpersonal measure of 
strength of desires, but only that there is no reason to believe that such a 
measure will be valid, since we have no reason to believe that the estimat ion of 
96 The basic idea is that if you have (at least) t hree alternative "outcomes" or states of affairs and 
you can order them on an ordinal scale, the "utility" of the middle alternative is de termined by 
how great a c hance you would need to get the most preferred alternative in a lottery between the 
most preferred and the least preferred alternative in order to be indifferent between the lottery 
and getting the middle al ternative for sure. 
97 If desires are above the point of zero, aversions can be said to be below it (i.e. sta te of affairs 
that the person prefers not to be the case). 
98 I will ignore the case of intrapersonal-intertemporal comparisons, since this kind of 
comparisons are vulnerable to very much the same arguments as those directed at interpersonal 
comparisons. 
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the strength of different person's desires will be adequate." The problem is, 
thus, an epistemological or methodological one. 
The problems of measurability are even larger regarding au then deity. On 
my account of authendcity, at least two factors determine the level of 
authenticity of a desire: level of (hypothetical)100 knowledge of why one has 
the desire and level of approval (or disapproval) of the desire.101 If a desire is 
approved of to a certain degree given a certain level of knowledge of why one 
has it, it is more authentic than if it is less approved of at this level of 
knowledge. If the level of approval remains given more knowledge, the desire 
is more authentic than if the approval decreases given this increase in 
knowledge. So, degree of authenticity is in this way a function of level of 
approval and level of knowledge. Where does this leave us regarding 
measurability of authenticity? 
If "approval of' can be construed as a pro-attitude in the same way as 
desires (which I assume it could), measurement of "approval of' can be 
construed in the same way as measurement of strength of desires. As we have 
seen, this will probably mean that there is no valid way of comparing 
"approval of' interpersonally. 
Furthermore, and to make things worse, it is hard to see how a valid 
measure of the level of knowledge can be construed at all. Of course, one 
could stipulate a scale, such that each true statement102 that the person is 
holding about the relevant subject matter constitutes a "natural unit of 
knowledge".103 Unfortunately, this is hardly plausible. First, the received idea 
of (propositional) knowledge is not only about holding true beliefs, but rather 
99 Attempts to avoid this difficulty of interpersonal comparisons have been proposed through 
ideas of sympathy or "putting oneself in someone else's shoes" (Hare, 1981, p 128). However, 
these kind of proposals has epistemological complications of their own: we will only know if we 
have succeeded in putting ourselves in someone else's shoes if w e already can make the relevant 
comparisons (Bergström, 1982). 
100 I will implicitly assume this qualification in the following. 
101 Measurement will naturally become even more complicated if the idea of authenticity 
becomes so, e.g., if one argues that actually engaging in criticism of the desire makes it even more 
authentic. 
102 Of course, we would need to have a theory of statements that make it illegitimate for two 
different statements that describe the same state of affairs in different ways to be counted twice, 
for instance by individuating statements according to prepositional content, and which also rules 
out that the conjunction of two statements counts as a third. Let us disregard these 
complications, since there are plenty of others anyway. 
103 Thus giving a ratio scale. 
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about holding well-founded true beliefs (perhaps because they are well-founded). 
In order to make the measurement valid one would thus have to setde the very 
complicated epistemological matter of (degree of) well-foundedness. Second, 
and more importantly in this context, some knowledge is probably more 
relevant to the authenticity of a d esire than other knowledge.104 For instance, 
one fact that is part of the explanation of why I have a certain desire is that I 
have a brain. It is hard to see why knowledge of this fact with remaining 
approval of a certain desire would make it more authentic. That is, we will 
probably need a measurement or criterion of the relevance of certain knowledge 
to the authenticity of desires. One cannot dismiss the possibility of creating 
such a measurement a priori, but I cannot even imagine how this measurement 
would look. 
Regarding ideals of capacity, the prospect of creating any kind of complete 
measurability is even bleaker, since they would also require a way of assigning 
values to decision competence and efficiency in a way that makes 
measurement (sufficiently) valid and reliable. Moreover, such ideals would also 
need some way of weighing together these factors with the factor of 
authenticity to determine the level of autonomy of a person. 
Consider decision competence, to start with. It seems plausible to claim 
that the capacity to reach a decision from one's desires by considering 
alternatives, relating relevant beliefs and desires and reaching a judgement on 
what to do on the basis of this, is a matter of degree. For instance, more 
information may make this psychological process easier for the person. 
However, it is very hard to imagine how one could assign numerical values to 
such a complicated psychological process in a non-arbitrary way. 
Very much the same point applies to efficiency. It seems plausible indeed 
to claim that one more or less has the capacity (and the actual condition 
fulfilled) to realize one's decisions. In other words, the extent to which one 
controls the circumstances necessary to realize one's decisions certainly seems 
to be a m atter of degree. For instance, a hearing aid can improve the capacity 
of a partially deaf person to complete a course in history, or cognitive 
behaviour therapy can improve a neurotic person's ability to abstain from 
going back to check the stove three times a day. Nonetheless, it is difficult to 
see how this could be measured in any valid and reliable way, partly, of course, 
since so many factors influence the capacity for efficiency. 
104 This is, of course, a general problem for my idea of authenticity that needs to tackled. 
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The conclusion must thus be that there is little hope of achieving a c omplete 
measurement of autonomy, not even an intrapersonal and ordinal one. 
However, this conclusion should not make us despair altogether regarding the 
possibility of partially comparing different outcomes with regard to autonomy. In 
a particular case, it may be meaningful to say that a certain line of conduct will 
improve autonomy more than another and one may even plausibly argue that 
this is in fact so. 
However, for this move to be credible, we probably have to make some 
rather controversial assumptions. One such assumption is that the persons 
involved are authentic roughly to the same extent throughout the practical 
situation we want to evaluate, since arguing in favour of someone being more 
authentic than another seems especially hard. Furthermore, we have to assume 
that there is at least a way in principle to measure the strength of desires, 
competence and efficiency of persons, since this is necessary for the practical 
comparison to be meaningful at all. Howe ver, in the light of the fact that t he 
major problems with the measuring all these things are epistemological and 
methodological, as we have seen, the assumption that there is a tr ue answer to 
which desire is stronger, and who is more competent and efficient may seem 
less controversial. The assumption seems even less contr oversial in the light of 
the fact that most people seem to think that we, in fact, are more or less of 
these things, even if it can be hard to find the answer out. 
Consider once again the example of the partially deaf person's hearing aid. 
It seems reasonable to claim that this facility makes this person more 
autonomous and that, if she manages the course partly because of this facility, 
she is thereby living a more autonomous life. It even seems reasonable to hold 
that one could argue that a much better hearing aid makes her even more 
autonomous and, perhaps, that the difference between no hearing aid and the 
worse is less than the difference between the worse one and the better one (or 
the other way around), even if one cannot quantify the comparisons in 
numerical terms. One can thus argue in favour of interval comparisons, 
although vague, in particular cases.105 One can even argue, even if one cannot 
prove or quantify it, that a certain policy will be more conducive to general 
autonomy than another. For instance, one may argue, with reference to various 
105 One has then found what Griffin, 1986, calls "pockets of cardinality", i.e., limited ranges where 
objects or state of affairs of a certain kind are comparable on an interval scale. 
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empirical indications, that spending a certain amount of money on hearing aids 
will improve the autonomy of those who need such facilities more than 
spending the same amount of money on higher salaries for directors in public 
office will imp rove these directors autonomy. 
If this is plausible, there may then be partial measurability of autonomy. 
Even if numerical assignments may be quite arbitrary, on e can thus sometimes 
meaningfully talk a bout more or less autonomy, and perhaps even m ore or less 
to different extents and for different persons. And sometimes, this is 
sufficient for practical pu rposes. For instance, in the examples just m entioned, 
comparisons of autonomy will be action-guiding if the goal is to promote 
autonomy. It should also be kept in mind that the difficulty of measuring 
autonomy is irrelevant to the question of the value of autonomy. Autonomy 
may be a good thing, even if it is impossible to measure. We have no 
independent reason to believe that the elements of a good life are easily 
detectable. 
3.3 Autonomy as a right 
There is a widespread discourse on the right to autonomy, (right to) respect 
for autonomy (or autonomous decisions) and (the right to) being treated as an 
autonomous person. This seems to be the dominant way to conceive of 
autonomy in the normative discussion of autonomy in biomedical ethics 
(Beauchamp & Childress, 2001, chapter 3). There is disagreement on the nature 
of these rights, what it is that should be respected more precisely and the 
scope of the rights. H owever, there are some characteristic ideas about rights 
in the context of claims to a right to autonomy in biomedical ethics. As I said 
earlier, there is a difference between considering autonomy as a value that 
should be promoted and a right that should be respected. A way of 
characterizing the idea of a ri ght to autonomy is to investigate this difference. 
As previously stated, something of value is something we have a pro tanto 
reason to promote (see m.3.1). Thus, values can give rise to obligations (the 
most obvious case b eing when a p erson can act in a certain way to realize a 
value and there are no other reasons not to act in this way). In this way, values 
and rights can be put upon a par. However, rights, unlike values, are essentially 
about obligations to others: what we are allowed to do to other individuals.106 
106 This is not necessarily true of rights-talk in general, since a right to do something, X, may be 
conceived of just as an option to do X, i.e., it is b oth morally permissible to do and to abstain 
197 
Rights thus give reasons to act (or to abstain from acting) towards others in 
certain ways: values may do so, but rights must do so in order to be rights in the 
context of the right to autonomy.107 To make a long story short: if P has a 
negative right to X (e.g. life), everyone else has a reason not to prevent P from 
having X, and if P has a positive right to X, (at least) someone else has a reason 
to see to it that P has X. So, if autonomy only is a value, Robinson Crusoe, 
alone on his island, has a reason to promote it. But if autonomy only is 
something there is a right to, reasons to act from that right becomes a practical 
concern when Friday enters the stage. 
The most common way to conceive of the right to autonomy in the 
context of biomedical ethics is as a negative right not to be prevented from 
deciding on medical measures (see below). However, it is of course possible 
to defend a positive rig ht to autonomy: a r ight to be helped to become a more 
autonomous person and/or to live a more autonomous life (Räikkä, 1998, p 54-
56). However, this amounts to saying that we have a pro tanto reason to make 
others more autonomous, i.e. that autonomy is a positive value.108 Thus, 
everything that can be said about autonomy as a positive right can be cast in 
terms of autonomy as a positive value, which I put forward earlier. I will stick 
to this terminology. 
This last remark about the possibility of positive rights to autonomy highlights 
the fact that there are basically two ways to account for rights. One is to say 
that rights are founded on values. The other is to say that rights are based on 
certain features of the person that in themselves give rise to constraints on 
what we are allowed to do in order to promote the good (or intrinsic values). 
The second way of accounting for rights is perhaps the most common and 
from doing X (see IV.1.1.1). But in the context of the right to autonomy in biomedical ethics, 
which is ou r concern here, the received way of interpreting rights is to conceive of them as 
corresponding to obligations to others (Beauchamp & Childress, 2001, chap. 3). 
107 Recall the disclaimer in the previous note. I am here talking about injunctions (the "heart of 
rights-talk"). This concept in particular and the concept of right in general will be given a much 
more thorough investigation when discussing the right to know (see IV.1.1.1). The present 
concern is merely to make the distinction between rights and values in the context of the right to 
autonomy in biomedical ethics. 
108 It might be claimed that autonomy as a positive right, rather than a value, gives every person a 
reason to promote the autonomy of everyone else, but not their own autonomy. Even though 
this is a possible position, it is h ard to see why one should endorse it: why should the person 
herself be excluded? 
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straightforward (Kagan, 1998, p 172-173), especially in biomedical ethics 
regarding the right to autonomy (Beauchamp & Childress, 2001, p 177). The 
basic idea is that one ought not to be prevented from autonomously deciding 
what to do and to act upon one's decision (at least if one does not seriously 
harm anyone else and is at least minimally rational), even if a greater amount of 
value would have resulted had one been prevented from doing so (i.e., if one's 
autonomy was not respected). That is, there is a moral constraint on the 
prevention of P from deciding and/or acting upon his autonomous decision, 
even if the value that would result from preventing P were greater than the 
value of not preventing P. 
This does not have to mean that no amount of value can justify not 
respecting P's decision. The right may be prima facie, i.e. overridden by stronger 
considerations, e.g. if the amount of value is great enough.109 That is, 
constraints may have thresholds-, limits above which the rights are overridden by 
competing reasons, such as values at stake in the situation. The value may be 
well-being, but may also be autonomy conceived of as a value. Sometimes 
considerations that may override a right are competing rights, conflicting with 
the right in question in a certain situation. If some right does not have a 
threshold, and it is alway s wrong to infringe the constraint no matter what the 
cost is in terms of value, the right is absolute (see also IV.1.1.1). 
However, if rights are founded on values, things get more complicated. 
Perhaps the most noteworthy feature of such rights is that they can be 
designated to produce a normative theory with the exact same content in terms 
of what is morally forbidden, allowed and prescribed as rights construed as 
constraints on the promotion of value. For instance, consider the idea that 
autonomy is a va lue to be promoted as well as a right to be respected (see e.g. 
Beauchamp & Childress, 2001, p 64). One way to make this idea intelligible is 
to claim, in line with the idea of rights as constraints, that autonomy is valuable 
and, thus, ought to be promoted, but that there is a constraint against 
preventing others to decide and act autonomously. So even if an act, A, would 
better promote autonomy than another act, B, it may be morally wrong to 
109 I am here using prima facie concerning rights as synonymous with pro tanto regarding values, 
i.e. as a reason that is always there, although it may be overridden. Sometimes it is used to 
designate reasons that apply in some circumstances but not all (Kagan, 1989, p 17). However, this 
use would collapse the difference between prima facie and absolute rights, on the one hand and 
special and general rights, on the other (see IV.1.1.1). 
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perform A, because A consists of preventing someone from deciding and 
acting autonomously.110 
Another way to reach the same conclusion is to say that autonomy is a value 
that ought to be promoted, but that not respecting autonomous decisions, 
besides being an instance of less autonomy-promotion, has a (considerable) 
negative value of its own. This is t antamount to saying that there is a c onstraint 
on promoting autonomy through not respecting autonomy, even if more 
autonomy is realized overall. And if the negative value of not respecting 
autonomy is lexically pr ior to all other values, this is tantamount to saying that 
there is a n absolute right to have one's autonomy respected. 
Thus, since "constraint-based" and "value-based"111 foundations of rights 
may result in the exact same normative theories, I will to a large degree ignore 
the difference between them in this context. Henceforth, for reasons of 
simplicity I will u se the 'constraint'-vocabulary when talking about the right to 
have one's autonomy respected. However, it should be kept in mind that this 
could be reformulated in terms of values. Nonetheless, the distinction 
between autonomy as a value that should be promoted and a right that should 
be respected is an important one. It provides us with alternative (but not 
incompatible) ideals of autonomy. The idea of autonomy as a right to be 
respected sets constraints on what we are allowed to do in order to promote 
autonomy and other values.112 It is this idea will be examined in this section. 
All ideals that consider autonomy as a right in some way have to demarcate a 
sphere around the individual where this right is valid. Otherwise individuals 
would have a ri ght to decide on matters that do not concern them or could 
damage others, which seems implausible. This is the background of the talk of 
the ideal of personal aut onomy (Feinberg, 1986, p 27; Tännsjö, 1998a, p 115): a 
private sphere where the individual should be allowed to make and live 
according to her decisions (Mill, 1859). This idea has been expressed in various 
110 The act, A, might, for instance, be the act of manipulating someone to undergo an autonomy-
enhancing psychiatric treatment. 
111 Value-based is n ot the same as derived rights, that is, rights that ought to be recognized due to 
the recognition being conducive to some value (see IV. 1.1.2), since value-based rights regards the 
nature of rights, while derived rights regards the justification of rights. 
112 As I said, these constraints can be formulated in terms of values, but it is n onetheless a moral 
"block" against e.g. promoting self-realization by not respecting an autonomous decision (even if 
not necessarily an absolute one). 
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ways, e.g. "she determines herself, i.e., makes by herself decisions which 
concerns only he rself, or more precisely, which concerns others only in such a 
way that in normal circumstances they cannot have any justified claim against the 
decision." (Räikkä, 1998, p 51)113 This, of course, gives rise to questions about 
what should be counted as concerning only oneself, damage to others, normal 
circumstances, when others have justified claims, and so forth. A rights-ideal 
of autonomy should say something about these questions in order to serve as a 
guidance of action. This will not be done here, however, since my primary 
purpose is merely to point out the type of questions that an ideal must try to 
answer. 
Besides setting a limit on what decisions are self-regarding enough to fall 
under the scope of the right to respect for one's personal autonomy, an ideal 
of this kind must set a limit for how autonomous a person must be in order 
for the right to be applicable.114 This is a normative issue, since it is one about 
how we should treat people - at what level of autonomy their decisions should 
be respected. This normative issue should be carefully distinguished from the 
empirical question of how autonomous someone is in a situation, i.e., how 
authentic, decision competent, and efficient someone is regarding a desire, 
decision and action. The normative issue is about whether any given degree of 
autonomy should give rise to moral reasons and must thus be settled within a 
normative framework, i.e., when arguing in favour of an ideal of autonomy. 
It may seem strange to let the questions of the right to autonomy and the 
actual level of autonomy part altogether, however, since respecting someone's 
autonomy may seem to presuppose that the person in question at least has one 
desire, and at least some capacity to reach a decision from it. H owever, it is at 
least theoretically possible to say that we should treat someone as if she is 
autonomous, i.e. let her go on in her "doings" without prevention, even 
though she is n ot deciding on how to act at all (she is just "behaving"). Taken 
113 In this quotation, as in the article as a whole, Räikkä gives the impression that he considers this 
condition to be a part of the conception of autonomy. Conditions on when autonomy should b e 
respected are here taken to be a question of the ideal of autonomy. 
1,4 It is important to make a distinction between the generally autonomous person, who may be 
non-autonomous regarding some decision (e.g. the normal adult who decides on a treatment 
without any prior knowledge of its likely effects) and the generally non-autonomous person, who 
may be autonomous regarding some decision (e.g. the mentally disabled who decides on what 
shirt to wear). 
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to an extreme, such an ideal is surely absurd,115 but if qualified, it has 
proponents (Rhodes, 2000, p 115). The idea is then that we should apply a k ind 
of principle of charity, saying that people who we can assume have a general 
capacity to be autonomous get the benefit of a doubt. That is, even if we are 
unsure whether they are autonomous regarding some particular decision, we 
should treat them as if they are and, thus, respect their decision, in the sense 
that we should not try to prevent them from going through with their doings. 
Nevertheless, even this idea presupposes that there is some normatively 
relevant limit on how autonomous someone must be in order for her to have 
a right to be treated as (if she were) autonomous. So any rights-ideal of 
autonomy must specify some, perhaps vague, level of actual autonomy over 
which the person's decision should be respected and under which this 
obligation is not applicable. 
A couple more things should be mentioned with regard to the right to respect 
for one's personal autonomy that concerns the biomedical context in 
particular. The first is the emphasis on decision competence, which is a 
recurring theme in biomedical ethics, while questions of authenticity are often 
ignored.116 A standard account of what competence is required for a principle 
of respect for autonomy to be applicable can be found in Beauchamp and 
Childress: 
Patients or subjects are competent to make a d ecision if they have the 
capacity to understand the material information, to make a judgement 
about the information in the light of their values, to intend a certain 
outcome, and to communicate freely their wishes to care givers or 
investigators. (Beauchamp & Childress, 2001, p 71)117 
Of course, this account plausibly makes competence a matter of degree (e.g. 
since "capacity to understand material information" is), but Beauchamp and 
Childress, like many others, proposes a charitable interpretation, including at 
least all no rmal adults in most situations, as well as, at least in some situations, 
115 If e.g. applied on lethal viruses or collapsing houses. 
116 This is obvious in standard textbooks like Beauchamp & Childress, 2001, p 69-77, and Tännsjö, 
1998a, p 112-114,140-142. 
117 The first three conditions on competence are well in line with my characterisation (even if 
differently put), while the fourth and last regard efficiency rather than competence (see III.2.4.1). 
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the mentally retarded, children, and those suffering from psychiatric disease 
(Ibid). As already mentioned (see III.2.3), the central idea is to be rather 
generous in applying the principle of the right to respect for one's personal 
autonomy in order not to invite to the type of paternalism in medicine that the 
principle was originally designed to avoid. Thus, if one favours this 
mainstream conception of autonomy in health care, situations in which one 
may legitimately disregard someone's desires, due to lack of competence, are 
rare. Respect for autonomy is the default position. 
A related feature of standard accounts of respect for autonomy in 
biomedical ethics is the emphasis on decisions rather than acts. The standard 
situation discussed with regard to the right to respect for autonomy is the 
health care professional offering a medical test or treatment, explaining what it 
amounts to and asking for affirmation or rejection from the patient. The 
central act of the patient is thus a "speech-act", consisting of the expression of 
the patient's decision. This explains the predominant vocabulary of respecting 
decisions', it is seldom respecting autonomy by not preventing the actions of the 
patient that concerns health care, but taking heed to what the patient has 
decided.118 
One further point regarding ideas of respecting autonomy in the context of 
biomedical ethics is the focus on exercising such respect primarily by 
avoiding coercion or manipulation. The typical example of coercion in care is 
the administering of medical tests or treatments against the desire of the 
patient by physical force or by threats of sanctions. Coercion disrupts the 
connection between decision and action and thus prevents the individual 
from exercising her autonomy. The standard case of manipulation is when 
health care professionals knowingly abstain from disclosing information that is 
relevant to the decision of the individual about the medical intervention in 
order to have the individual make a certain decision. Rather than disrupting the 
connection between the patient's decisions and attempts to act on this, health 
care staff is here interfering with the individual's process of decision-making 
and causing the decision not to be the result of the desire of the individual 
(even if she thinks it is), but the result of the health care professional's opinion 
on what should be done. This, thus, also clearly prevents the individual from 
118 Take e.g. the standard case of respecting someone's desire not to prolong her life (i.e. 
euthanasia). See III.2.4.1. 
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exercising her autonomy. Thus, both coercion and manipulation constitute 
failures to respect the autonomy of the individual. 
However, even though coercion and manipulation are important, probably 
the most important, ways of not respecting the autonomy of someone, there is 
another way of restricting autonomy that is sometimes brought to stand in the 
general debate on autonomy in moral philosophy, but which is seldom 
mentioned in the context of medical ethics. The following characterisation 
this kind of autonomy restriction is pertinent. 
Consider the way parents might violate the autonomy of, say, their 
adolescent child by constantly pre-empting her choices about clothes, a 
place to live, what car to buy, and the like, and buying these things for 
her secretly and surprising her with them. The parents violate the 
person's R-autonomy [right to be treated as autonomous] by treating 
her as if she could not adequately do so herself. (Christman, 1988, p 110) 
The idea is that one can restrict someone's autonomy by making decisions and 
acting on her behalf in matters that really ought to be decided by her, thus 
treating her as if she could not manage to decide on these matters herself. This 
way of not respecting the autonomy of someone does not neatly fall into the 
category of either coercion or manipulation (although some definition of the 
latter might be strained to include cases like Christman's). This is surprising, 
since one of the main concerns of autonomy is to avoid that someone else 
makes decisions on one's behalf, disregarding the desires and values of the 
person (or supposing one has better knowledge about what a person "really" 
wants more than herself). This idea will not be disregarded in the following 
(see IV.2.2.2). 
3.3.1 Justifications of autonomy as a right 
Thus far, we have concentrated on the nature of the right to respect for one's 
personal autonomy. I will now say something about the justification of such a 
right, which may basically proceed in two ways. First, one may claim that 
respecting people's autonomy constitutes a constraint on what we are allowed 
to do in order to promote the good (either of the person in question or all 
things considered). This constraint may be argued to be absolute, always 
making it morally impermissible to abstain from respecting someone's 
autonomy in order to promote the good. The constraint may also be argued to 
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be prima facie, i.e., overridden if the values or other competing moral 
considerations at stake are important enough. Secondly, one may claim that 
respecting people's autonomy is, in general, a good means to promote some 
value (e.g. well-being), i.e. that the right to respect for one's personal autonomy 
is of instrumental value. I will now say something about each of these ways of 
justifying the principle of right to respect for one's personal autonomy. 
Generally, the task of determining which justification is the most plausible one 
is a d ifficult and controversial one. The method of a reflective equilibrium 
favoured in this book, roughly states that we should seek a coherent match 
between principles, thought experiments, particular judgements that are 
reasoned and considers our intuitions (see 1.3). Needless to say, which of these 
justifications is the most plausible one cannot be settled in this context. 
However, I will make some remarks that at least suggest that an absolute right 
to respect for one's personal autonomy is implausible. I say, carefully, suggest, 
since there is no neat knock down-argument to this effect. 
First, there is a contra-proportionality between the scope and the 
plausibility of the principle of an absolute right to respect for one's personal 
autonomy. Recall that the principle of respect for autonomy requires a sphere 
around the individual where the right is valid; hence the talk of personal 
autonomy. The broader this sphere is construed, the wider the scope of the 
principle. For instance, take the classic idea that the principle applies whenever 
no on else is h armed by an action. If one interprets harm as "serious physical 
harm that is a d irect consequence of the action", the scope of the principle 
becomes very wide. However, it also becomes very implausible, since it would 
imply that no a mount of non-physical suffering that an autonomous action 
leads to can ever justify preventing it. On the other hand, if harm is construed 
so as to include every consequence of an action that makes someone 
somewhat worse off, it becomes much less controversial, especially if one 
includes omissions to perform actions one could have performed. However, 
to conceive of harm in such a broad way, would rob the principle of practical 
significance, since it is very difficult to think of actual situations where no one 
else is affected somewhat negatively by one's actions, at least in the sense that 
had one acted differently, at least someone else would have been somewhat 
less w orse off. An action with the alternative of giving money to the Red Cross 
would then probably fall outside the scope of the principle. So what the 
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principle can gain in plausibility, it will loose in scope and, thus, practical 
interest. 
Second, and more importantly, it seems oudandish to think that no amount 
of bad effects could ever make it morally permissible to violate a person's 
autonomy in a p articular case,119 even if the bad prevented only is bad for the 
person whose autonomy is violated. This seems especially obvious when the 
decision or action prevented is not one that the person herself considers 
important, e.g., when the desire not respected is less strong, a less permanent 
one for the person, or less authentic in some way. Moreover, it seems even 
easier to accept this possibility if the bad effects consist of the severe 
reduction of autonomy in the future. And if we add cases where the well-being 
or autonomy of others is at stake, regarding restrictions of autonomy as 
permissible seems even more plausible. 
Thus, it is probably more reasonable to consider the right to respect for 
one's personal autonomy as a prima facie-right, i.e., as a right that can be 
overridden if enough value is at stake. As already mentioned, there are two 
ways of accounting for this idea: as a constraint (with a t hreshold) on what we 
are allowed to do to promote overall good or as a (considerable) negative value 
ascribed to the restriction of autonomy (III.3.3).120 However, both these ways of 
accounting for the prima facie-right has the same implication: we should 
"sacrifice" some other values in order to respect autonomy. For instance, if an 
alternative action, A, generates more well-being than another alternative, B, B 
may nonetheless be the right thing to do, if A consists of the restriction of 
autonomy (given that these are the only alternatives). Since the right is prima 
facie, there is, however, an upper limit (although it may be vague) to what price 
in terms of well-being, other values or other morally relevant considerations 
we ought to pay in order to respect autonomy. 
One interesting consequence in this context is that the same goes for 
autonomy as a positive value. The prima facie-right to respect for one's 
119 Examples that demonstrate this point have been construed, I think, convincingly elsewhere 
(Glover, 1977, p 82;Tännsjö, 1998a, p 100-102). These examples contain a violation of someone's 
autonomy, but the violation nonetheless is morally required or, at least, permissible (at least 
seemingly after careful consideration). One such example is en ough to demonstrate that there is 
no absolute right to autonomy, i.e., that the violation of autonomy is always wrong. 
120 Another, though somewhat misleading, way to put the second idea is, of course, to say that 
the negative value founds the constraint in the promotion of other things of value (and the "un-
promotion" of other things of negative value). 
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personal autonomy implies that there is a "moral price" to preventing someone 
from deciding and acting autonomously, even if the prevention would 
promote the individual's overall autonomy (by making him live a more 
autonomous life or being a more autonomous person). Therefore, the 
constraint on the violation of autonomy also regards the promotion of 
autonomy: according to the proponent of the prima facie-right, the fact that we 
cannot always trade a violation of someone's autonomy for more autonomy 
overall (for her or anyone else) is w hat makes the right a constraint. The prima 
facie-right to respect for one's personal autonomy thus has a built in time bias: 
it is having my autonomous will re spected (in the sense that I ought not to be 
manipulated or otherwise prevented from deciding and acting from it) here 
and now that is of relevance.121 
Finally, one may justify the right to respect for one's personal autonomy by 
arguing that general adherence to such a right promotes overall good. A 
traditional way of doing so is to use a M illian line of reasoning, arguing that 
respecting autonomy (in health care) promotes overall well-being (Tännsjö, 
1999). However, even if such an argument is successful, it does not establish a 
right to respect for one's personal autonomy in the sense defined here. This is 
so, since this argument denies that there is a principled m oral constraint on 
violating autonomy: whenever violating someone's autonomy produces more 
well-being, we ought to do so.122 However, one could argue that general 
acceptance and/or observation123 of the right to respect for one's personal 
autonomy has good consequences in terms of well-being (better than if there 
were less or no such acceptance and/or observation). One can thus, on general 
121 However, it is a time bias compatible with the idea of temporal neutrality (see II I.3.2.2). 
122 An exception is rule utilitarianism, since it claims that we ought to act in accordance with the 
rule, general adherence to which produces more overall well-being than any alternative rule. If the 
rule of respecting the autonomy of others is su ch a rule, we ought to adhere to it, even if s ome 
action would produce more well-being by not adhering to it. However, I will disregard this 
possibility, since rule utilitarianism is n either plausible (see VII.6.2), nor a common position in 
biomedical ethics. 
123 The distinction I have in mind here is the one between consequentialistic arguments in favour 
of installing a disposition in individuals to act as if there is a right to respect for one's personal 
autonomy (with or without believing that there is s uch a right) and consequentialistic arguments 
in favour of implementing regulations in an institutional setting, demanding that the professionals 
in this setting act in accordance with the right to respect for one's personal autonomy. Of course, 
one could argue in favour of both. 
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consequentialistic grounds argue in favour of the recognition of the right to 
respect for one's personal autonomy, a recognition that perhaps should take 
the form of a policy. 
It should be kept in mind that such an argument does not imply that health 
care professionals or state officials should try to find out or think about when 
the violation of someone's autonomy produces more well-being, since a firm 
disposition to confirm to or strict observance of the rule to respect the 
autonomy of others may produce more overall value than if these parties 
deliberate on when to respect autonomy and when not to. The Millian 
argument in favour of the right to respect for one's personal autonomy may 
therefore produce recommendations in practice that are identical to those of 
the position that claims that there is a moral prima facie-right to respect for 
one's personal autonomy.124 Therefore, it may be difficult to decide on which 
of these justifications is the plausible one by just considering their practical 
implications. We may have to turn direcdy to our moral intuitions about these 
principles, for instance, through thought experiments. However, I will not do 
this, since, as al ready mentioned, the purpose here primarily is to point out the 
question that an ideal of respecting autonomy must address. 
4. Concluding remarks 
In the previous chapter, we noticed that in the context of presymptomatic 
genetic testing and genetic counselling, arguments are often made with 
reference to autonomy, where autonomy cannot be understood only as a right 
to respect, but also as a value to promote. Although this kind of argument is 
common, the idea of autonomy as a value to promote is seldom elaborated. An 
idea often used but seldom clarified calls for a more thorough exposition of 
the idea, as well as the concept it is formulated by. This is important, for 
instance so that the plausibility of arguments using the concept and the idea 
becomes more evident. This more thorough exposition of autonomy as a 
concept and the idea of autonomy as a value to promote has been the task o f 
the present chapter. 
The exposition rests on the distinction between conceptions of autonomy, 
stating what autonomy is, and ideals of autonomy, stating what is morally 
124 Of course, there is the theoretical possibility for the consequentialist to argue that it is in fact 
true, due to the way t he world as a matter of fact works, that respecting autonomy always will 
produce more well-being than not respecting autonomy. However, this argument is hardly 
plausible. 
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relevant about autonomy. So the first task was to develop a conception of 
autonomy. Autonomy, generally characterised, says that to be autonomous is to 
govern oneself or to decide one's own way. To live autonomously is then to 
live in accordance with one's basic desires or values. From this it should be 
obvious that autonomy is a m atter of degrees: a person can more or less lead 
the life she has chosen, more or less choose how to live, and her desires can 
be more or less her own. Against the background of this general 
characterisation, I used the following minimal definition of autonomy as my 
point of departure: a person is a utonomous in a situation to the extent that she 
does that what she has decided to do, because she has decided to it and 
decides to do what she wants, because she wants it. Here three components are 
discernable: will (or desire, or value, i.e. pro-attitude), decision, and action. I 
then argued that how autonomous a person is, is determined by all these 
components and that all these components can vary in degree. 
First, the will one acts from can be more or less authentic. Generally 
speaking, an authentic desire is a self-determined desire, or a d esire that is truly 
the person's own. I rejected some suggestion on how this is to be understood, 
e.g. the idea that authenticity merely consists of consistency between desires, 
or consistency between different levels of desires, or that authentic desires are 
desires created from a " true I", free from social and other external influences, 
or that authentic desires are morally praiseworthy ones. 
Instead I proposed an account of authenticity, according to which an 
authentic individual should be able to critically evaluate the basis from which 
she makes her decision: an authentic desire can be upheld in the light of 
knowledge about why one has it, so that knowledge of why one has it would 
not make one disapprove of it. The agent can, at least hypothetically, identify 
herself with the desire, willingly acknowledge that she has it and will not be 
inclined to abandon it just because she learns new things about herself. 
Inauthentic desires are desires that one would disapprove of if one were to 
find out why one has them. This idea connects the thought of identification 
and rationality as ideas of authenticity, and is in correspondence with our 
intuitive idea of an authentic individual, or so I argued. I then confessed my 
conviction that actual critical evaluation increases authenticity even more than 
just the ability of desires to withstand hypothetical critical evaluation, but left it 
to the reader to decide on the plausibility of this. 
Another factor that determines the autonomy of an individual is the 
capacity to make decisions from one's desires, or decision competence. 
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Decision competence is also a matter of degrees, since a person can be more 
or less capable of successfully performing the task of deliberation. 
The last component in the conception of autonomy, efficiency, is to, 
through action, realizing that what one has decided, or at least the ability to do 
so. A number of factors affect the efficiency of a person. An important factor 
for the arguments of this book is how well founded the beliefs that one acts 
upon are. This since ill founded believes are more likely to be false, and false 
beliefs about the consequences of one's decisions and actions probably will 
make one take a non-efficient route for the realization of one's ends. Thus, 
receiving information, including genetic information, can improve one's 
efficiency and, thus, autonomy. However, information can also affect 
information negatively, for instance by inducing emotional paralysis. These 
results of the discussion of conception are well in line with the findings of 
chapter H, that autonomy can be both promoted and reduced by genetic 
information. 
A virtue of this conception is that it allows for the formulation of 
different, and sometimes competing, ideals of autonomy, both ideals that 
consider autonomy to be a value that should be promoted and as a right that 
should be respected. I presented two basic ideals of autonomy conceived of as 
a value to promote, cast in the terms of the conception: the ideal of self-
realization and the ideal of capacity. 
The ideal of self-realization says that the value of autonomy consists of 
living one's life in accordance with one's own basic authentic desires, through 
one's own decisions and actions. Crudely put, the more a person in fact 
succeeds in living according to her basic authentic desires, the more 
autonomous she is, the better off she is, ceteris paribus. This ideal captures the 
idea that the good thing about autonomy is to in fact succeed in living the life 
one wants to live. The decision competence and efficiency of the person 
causally determines the extent to which the person in fact succeeds in 
realizing her desires. However, decision competence and efficiency does not 
have to be ascribed a value of their own, according to this ideal. They can be 
taken solely as necessary presuppositions to realizing the desires 
autonomously. 
The ideal of capacity says that the value of autonomy consists of being an 
autonomous person. This is a person with authentic desires, and enough decision 
competence and efficiency to implement these desires. The autonomous 
person, then, both has the capacity required and the actual conditions fulfilled 
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in order to independently consider her own basic projects and values, make 
decisions on the basis of them and realize them through her own action. This 
ideal is to a great extent an ideal of character. An autonomous person is not 
weak of will, self-deceiving, co nfused, phobic, and so on, since all the se things 
tend to destroy autonomy in the sense defined here. Also this ideal makes 
autonomy a matter of degree: the more authentic, decision competent and 
efficient I am, the better for me, ceteris par ibus. The value, then , is to be such 
a person that can realize her desires, that is, if the person has desires, it is better : 
for her if they are authentic and she is capable of deciding and acting on them. J 
However, these ideals do not themselves imply any answers on what one 
ought to with respect to autonomy. Therefore, I pointed out what additional 
questions proponents of these ideals must tackle in order to render them 
action-guiding: questions of norms, time and comparisons. Regarding norms, I 
did not argue in favour of any specific one, but only presented some 
alternatives. Reg arding time, I argued in favour of temporal neutrality and the 
relevance of now-for-now preferences. Regarding comparisons of autonomy, I 
argued in favour of a rather sceptical position on the possibility of measuring 
autonomy adequately, even in principle. However, I left open the possibility 
that one may in some circumstances use empirical indications to make some 
comparisons more credible, which may at times be sufficient for practical 
purposes. 
Also ideals of autonomy conceived of as a right to respect were 
formulated, using the conception. Also regarding these ideals, I pointed out 
questions proponents of them must tackle in order for them to be practically 
useful: perhap s most notably the question of when one is au tonomous enough 
to deserve treatment as autonomous and the question of how widely one 
should construe the personal sphere in which the right should be respected. 
In this context, I indicated why an absolute right to autonomy is imp lausible. I 
also explicated some implications of the traditional idea of respect for 
autonomy in biomedical ethics, and primarily the constraint on coercion and 
manipulation in health care. Finally, I presented two ways of justifying the 
right to autonomy, and rights in general, which will be of consequence in 
following chapters. 
Just as chapter II, this chapter leaves us with further questions to be tackled 
in the future. Some questions seem to be of a more technical nature, for 
instance questions that arise from the discussion of authenticity, like "How 
should desires be individuated?" and "Which knowledge is relevant for the 
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authenticity of desires?" However, there are also questions of a more 
fundamental nature. Perhaps most noteworthy, I have said nothing, besides 
some hints, about the justification of ideals of autonomy conceived of as a 
value and even less about the justification of normative ideals based on these 
alleged values. However, one hint regarding the justification of the ideal of 
self-realization is that this ideal captures the intuition that it is of value to 
actually lead the life one considers to be good oneself. However, any attempts 
to a more full-fledged defence of these ideals are absent in this book, and I 
thus have to remain neutral on the question of whether autonomy really is 
valuable in itself or not. Nonetheless, that autonomy is a value to promote 
seems to be presupposed by many authors in the debate on the value of 
genetic testing, as we saw in the previous chapter, so the question certainly 
merits a more thorough investigation. I hope I have at least provided a useful 
framework for such an investigation. Moreover, if one accepts my sceptical 
conclusions regarding the possibilities of comparing amounts of autonomy, 
questions remain on what conclusions to draw from this: does this have only 
practical implication, or does it also have theoretical implications regarding the 
plausibility of autonomy conceived of as a value? Although, I think, this an 
intriguing question, I will leave it for now. 
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Chapter IV 
The Individual's Right to Genetic 
Information 
1. Introduction 
"The ethical questions surrounding genetic information are often addressed in 
terms of rights." (Häyry & Takala, 2001, p 403) They are indeed, and particularly 
discussions of access to genetic information. More often than any other rights 
regarding genetic information, the individual's right to genetic information 
about herself1 is often defended or, at least, claimed.2 This right is often 
referred to as the right to know (about genetic information about oneself) 
(Chadwick et al, 1997; Hermerén, 1999). Of course, there may be other 
possessors of a right to (know) genetic information about a person: for 
instance, the family and relatives of a person or parties who have an interest in 
the information for various reasons may be claimed to have such a right. These 
latter types of parties will be discussed in later chapters (VI and VII). This 
chapter will examine the question of the individual's right to (know) genetic 
information about herself; how this right could, and should, be understood, 
and whether there indeed is any such right. 
The question of the individual's right to genetic information is thus 
twofold. First, there is the question of how "P has a right to genetic 
information about herself' (or P has a right to know) is to be interpreted. Of 
course, if such a right is claimed, the proper interpretation of it cannot be 
made independent of the context in which it is claimed. However, as we will 
1 That is, about (some part of her) her own genetic constitution. 
2 This is so in both legal context (see e.g. C ouncil of Europe's Convention on Human Rights and 
Biomedicine, Chapter III, article 10.2; UNESCO's Universal D eclaration on the Human Genome 
and Human Rights, Paris, 1997-11-11, article 5.c; and WHO's Proposed International Guidelines 
on Ethical Issues in Medical Genetics and the Provision of Genetic Services, 1998, page 9) and 
philosophical context (Chadwick, 1997, p 14; Takala, 2000, 94-100). However, it should be 
mentioned that the Council of Europe writes more generally about an entitlement to know "any 
information collected about his or her own health." (Ibid.) For more on WHO's statement, see 
IV.3. 
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see, there are a great number of possible and non-trivial interpretations of what 
such a right may involve, and, it seems to me, many of them have been 
overlooked. In fact, it is often far from obvious which of these interpretations 
that is presupposed in discussions of the right to genetic information about 
oneself (see e.g. IV .1.2 and IV.3). A careful analysis o f the notion of this type of 
right might thus help us in evaluating arguments for and against it. 
Second, there is the question of whether there is such a right: does the 
individual (or index-person) have a right to genetic information about herself? 
Of course, the answer to this question will d epend on the interpretation of the 
question. But given an interpretation that is clear enough, what reasons do we 
have to think that someone has the right in question? In order to determine 
this, we have to scrutinize the arguments for and against right-claims of this 
sort. In this chapter I will first tackle the question of interpretation and then 
the question of argumentation or justification. 
1.1 The concept of a right 
"P has a right to genetic information about herself' is an instance of the 
general claim A: "P has a r ight to X". An analysis of such rights-claims must 
answer the following questions: 
(i) Who is P? 
(ii) What is X? 
(iii) What does A imply (logically and/or conceptually (in a certain 
moral theory))? 
(iv) How is A to be justified? 
Of course, these questions are related in various ways, both generally and 
within the framework of a particular ethical theory. To answer the question of 
whether some person, P, has a c ertain right to something, X, one has to say 
something about the justification of the right. And if one can provide a 
tentative answer to this q uestion, it is hopefully possible to see or at least make 
plausible what implication the right has. Obviously, one point of ethical 
theories is to try to provide coherent and motivated answers to questions such 
as these. Nonetheless, even though interrelated, these are different questions. 
As regards question (i), the person P that is the subject of this discussion is, 
of course, the index-person, i.e. the person having, or the person that could 
have, a (presymptomatic) genetic test. Of course, sometimes there are several 
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index-persons: when a whole family performs genetic testing simultaneously, 
for instance. This does not alter the fact that the test is performed on some 
individual and that this (or these) individual(s) may or may not have some kind 
of right to the information resulting from such a test. I will not have to say 
anything more than this about question (i) in this context.3 
As regards question (ii) there are many ambiguities. What is the right in 
question in this context a right to? That is, how could "genetic information 
about oneself' be interpreted? This is the specific question to be discussed in 
this chapter and I will therefore return to it (see IV.1.2). Bef ore that, however, 
there are some general things that should be said about rights, relating to 
question (iii) an d (iv). 
1.1.1 The implications of rights 
When we say that someone, P, has a right to something, what does this imply 
(or presuppose)? In order to answer that, we have to make some distinctions. 
To start with, there is the distinction between the rightness or moral 
permissibility of an action and the right to perform an action. As will be clear 
in the following, different ethical theories have different ideas about the 
relationship between rightness and rights. These theories can be placed on a 
spectrum with extreme positions at the ends. On the one extreme, there are 
theories that claim that rights exhaust everything that can be said about moral 
rightness and wrongness (pure theories of rights à la Locke). On the other 
extreme, there are theories that claim rights to be totally irrelevant for the 
question of moral rightness or wrongness, at least on a basic level (e.g. pure 
consequentialist theories à la Bentham). 
It is not unusual for ethical theories to position themselves somewhere in 
between these two extremes (e.g. Rawls). One such position is that if an action 
violates a right, this is in itself a very strong (often overriding) reason for the 
wrongness of the action, and if one has the right to perform an action X, it is 
almost always morally permissible (but not necessarily so) to perform X (see 
Dworkin, 1977). Furthermore, most theories of this type seem to agree on the 
opinion that rights do not exhaust the moral field — there are actions that are 
wrong due to other reasons than being violations of rights. 
3 In the context of other types of genetic testing, such as prenatal diagnosis of PGD, the question 
of who is the possible right-holder may however be the most problematic one. 
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The focus in the following will be rights rather than moral tightness, since 
this interpretation of "right" seems to be the most common with regard to the 
question of the right to genetic information. However, there are some writers 
who sometimes seem to interpret the phrase "The person P in situation S4 has 
the right to genetic information" as "It is morally wrong of P in S not to have 
(access to or knowledge of) certain genetic information (about herself)". As 
will become evident, this interpretation seems to be the proper one when it 
comes to the authors who defend a duty of the individual to have genetic 
information about herself (see V.3). 
Moreover, there is a distinction between absolute and prima facie rights.5 
Absolute rights are inviolable in the sense that it is always wrong to violate 
them. That is, t here are no ethical considerations of any kind (including other 
rights) that can override the right in question. Prima facie rights, on the other 
hand, can be overridden (perhaps by other rights). If a right is prima facie, it is 
thus not enough to establish that a certain action is a violation of it in order to 
establish that the action is wrong. One also has to establish that there are no 
other ethical considerations that override the right in question in the situation.6 
As will be evident in the discussion of the right to genetic information, these 
rights, if there are any at all, are most plausibly defended as being of a prima 
facie kind. I have already argued that this is probably plausible for rights to 
have one's autonomy respected as well (III.3.3.1). 
Furthermore, there is a very basic distinction between negative and positive 
rights. The distinction can be characterised in terms of the moral reasons for 
others to act or abstain from acting towards the right-holder in various ways 
they give rise to. Positive rights, then, correspond to at least one other person 
having a reason to provide the right-holder with, or to help her keep hold of, 
that to which she has a right. Negative rights correspond to others having a 
4 This component is necessary, since the right may be thought to be valid only given that certain 
conditions are fulfilled. 
5 Terminology differs regarding this distinction. This terminology is from Beauchamp & 
Childress, 2001, p 357-358. Rii kka, 1998, makes the same distinction, using the terminology of 
strong and weak rights, and Thomson, 1990, p 153-169, speaks of different stringency of rights, 
and calls absol ute rights "maxima lly stringent" (Thomson, 1990, p 175). Of course, prima facie 
rights c an be of different strength or stringency (see ne xt footnote). 
6 Of course, different prima facie rights can differ in strength, so that one stronger, but 
overridable, prima facie right always overr ides another weaker. 
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reason7 not to deprive the right-holder of, or not to prevent her from 
acquiring, that to which she has a right. Negative rights are therefore sometimes 
described as the right not to be prevented from doing or having something, or 
the right to non-interference. 
A common example to clarify the distinction is the right to life. If one has 
negative right to life, others have a reason to refrain from taking one's life. If 
one has a positive right to life, at least someone else has a reason to ensure that 
one keeps on living, even if it requires active measures being taken. Since 
genetic information is different from life in that the former is not something 
that one initially has, a more relevant example in this context may be a r ight to 
eat. A negative right to eat implies that other have reasons not to prevent me 
from eating, while a positive right implies reasons for actively assisting me in 
eating (e.g. by giving me some food). 
Anyone familiar with the discussion about the distinction between acts and 
omissions — or between doing harm and allowing harm to occur - will see that 
the distinction is not as c lear-cut as might be the first impression. In fact, the 
distinction between positive and negative rights characterised as above is 
founded on the distinction between acts and omissions, since the reason 
corresponding to a positive right is a reason to do so mething (i.e. act, e.g. by 
helping someone) and the reason corresponding to a n egative right is a reason 
to abstain from doing something (i.e. an omission).8 
Rights, thus, imply certain moral reasons of others.9 More specifically, 
someone, Q, having a right with respect to something, A, is equivalent to P 
having a reason to act in certain w ays towards Q with respect to A. 
Another example perhaps will clarify. Take two persons, Jack and Jill, and 
the action of Jack giving Jill 100€. Let us assume that he owes her that amount 
of money due to a previous loan. Let us assume that this gives Jill a right to the 
money (that is, Jill has the right that Jack gives her 100€, or, she has a r ight to 
receive that amount if we grant that receiving something can be defined in 
terms of someone else giving it). J ack then has a corresponding reason to give 
Jill the money. So, Jill here has a positive right to receive 100€ from Jack. 
Assume further that Jane does not owe Jill any money, but is in a position to 
7 It is almost always presupposed that reasons connected to negative rights concern all others (see 
Häyry & Takala, 2001, p 404). 
8 I t ouch upon this distinction in several places in this book (see e.g. I II.3.3 and V.3.2). 
9 Unless we are talking about "rights" as pure options, without injunctions or enforcement 
privileges (see this section below). 
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stop Jack from paying his debt. Obviously, Jill has a right that Jane does not do 
this. Thus, she has a negative right to receive the money from Jack with regard 
to Jane. However, she has no positive right that Jane gives her 100€. 
In addition, the concept of negative and positive rights includes the 
possibility of "waiving". This means that a r ight-holder may always choose to 
abstain from that to which she has a right and thereby cancel the moral reasons 
of others to act in certain ways with regard to this. For instance, Jill may 
choose to cancel the Jack's debt, thus relieving him of the reason to provide 
her with the money. 
Moreover, saying that people have rights to things (such as food or money), 
or state of affairs (such as being alive), is often an elliptical way of saying that 
people have rights to do things (eating or buying food, retrieving money that 
has been lent, go on living, etc). I will sometimes use this kind of elliptical way 
of speaking. However, it should not be presupposed that all rights are of this 
kind. For instance, it is possible that the right to have genetic information only 
means that others have reasons to not to prevent one of being in the state of 
knowledge of certain genetic facts about oneself. 
Both positive and negative rights can be analysed into elements.10 When a 
person, P, has a r ight to (do) X, one or more of these elements can be referred 
to or be presupposed. More precisely, in Kagan's terminology, the following 
three elements constitute a full negative right (for P to do X): 
(1) an option for the agent to do X (or not do X, as h e chooses); (2) an 
injunction p rotecting the agent's decision — i.e., it is wrong for others to 
force the agent not to do X; (3) an enforcement privilege, giving the agent the 
right to enforce the injunction. (Kagan, 1989, p 219)11 
10 One such classic analysis is H ohfeld's account of different kinds of rights (Hohfeld, 1919; see 
also Lindahl, 1977, p 25-37 for an excellent summary of Hohfeld's analysis). I will disregard this 
analysis, primarily since it is more suitable for analysing legal than moral rights. See also footnote 
16 in this chapter. 
11 Kagan's analysis, although illuminating, can come through as misleading, since he does not talk 
in terms of reasons. This might give the impression that he excludes the possibility of prima facie -
rights. In order to avoid such possible misunderstandings, I will explain the elements of rights in 
terms of reasons, except regarding options, which I have never seen formulated in terms of 
reasons. 
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An option is most easily viewed as a guarantee that P is acting morally right, or 
at least morally permissible, when P does as she wants with regard to X.12 Take 
for instance the right to some piece of property, like a car. A right to property 
normally means a right to sell the property in question.13 If P has such a r ight 
regarding a car, in the sense that P has an option, then P does not do anything 
wrong morally when he sells the car and P neither does anything wrong if P 
abstains from selling it. 
An injunction is most easily view ed as a restriction upon others to react in 
various ways towards P, given P's right to X. If P has a negative right to X, other 
people have a m oral reason not to interfere with P's doing X.14 To be sure, 
"force" and "interfere" are vague terms, but they are usually defined as to 
include more than only physical prevention. To punish P in various ways if P 
does X is usually included, as ar e threats and deceit. These details need not 
concern us anymore at this point. However, if one argues in favour of a 
particular negative right, one has to be precise about what kind and degree of 
force that others have reason to abstain from, and why. 
An enforcement privilege is most easily viewed as a reason for the moral 
permissibility of reacting against anyone who tries to interfere with P's doing 
X, i.e. an yone who violates the injunction. As with injunctions, it is sometimes 
unclear what kinds and degrees of reaction are permissible. P may be allowed 
to use force of different kinds and to different degrees in order to ensure that 
P is not prevented from doing X. P may also be allowed to punish already 
performed violations of the injunction, perhaps with the aid of a third party, 
such as the state (which makes the enforcement privilege a positive right to aid 
with punishment). 
A full positive right is constituted by the same elements: (1) an option to do X; 
(2) a positive injunction - providing reasons for others to help the agent's 
doing X in various ways; and (3) an enforcement privilege. 
A full positive right to housing, e.g., w ould then presumably include the 
option to occupy and in various ways use a certain sheltered area with certain 
facilities. That is, one is morally permitted, but not obliged, to occupy and use 
12 Options are sometimes called 'licences' (Häyry & Takala, 2001, p 404). 
13 The right to property or ownership can be divided into several parts (or functions) of which 
one can have some, but not necessarily all, e.g. the right to use (in certain ways), sell, give away, 
destroy and so on. See Adler-Karlsson, 1969. 
14 Whether the reason to non-interference is identical to, corresponds to or just explains the 
injunction is not of interest in this context. 
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it in these ways. Furthermore, at least someone else has a r eason to act so as to 
make this possible, and if she or they do not, the right-holder has a right to 
take actions against the obliged party (for instance, by filing a complaint to a 
legal institution with the power to punish the obliged party). 
These elements of rights can be separated and are in fact so. There can be 
injunctions without options.15 This should not come through as very 
controversial, at least not on more common sense opinions of morality. 
Destroying some rare and antique piece of furniture that one owns, buying 
pornography, spending all o ne's money on liquor instead of sending even a 
dime to Tsunami-victims can all be considered to be blameworthy and/or 
wrong actions, but actions that others still are wrong to prevent one from 
performing. In any case, one cannot infer an option from an injunction.16 One 
has to argue in favour of them separately. 
Just as it is conceivable, and perhaps plausible, to have injunctions without 
options, options without injunctions are also conceivable (Dworkin, 1977, p 
188-189).17 For instance, an enemy may not have the negative injunction to 
15 Even such a radical theorist of rights as Nozick would agree to this (Nozick, 1981, p 498-504). 
He holds that an action a person has a right to perform can be blameworthy and even wrong. For 
instance, his theory of right does not imply that it is mor ally OK not to help people who will 
otherwise starve to death, even if they have no right to be helped. This seems to be overlooked by 
some standard accounts of Nozick (see Tännsjö, 2000, p 80-92). However, it is doubtful that 
Nozick would accept that the violation of a right ever is right, and he certainly argues that we 
have a right to enforce violation of rights (Wolff, 1991, p 24). So rights include injunctions and 
enforcement privileges, but not necessarily options, according to Nozick. Nevertheless, he does 
not hold that the moral field is ex hausted by rights and is, th en, not an extremist in the above-
mentioned sense. 
16 In the discussion of rights to genetic information, Hohfeld's concept of claim-rights, in which 
rights include both options and injunctions, are often presupposed (See Häyry & Takala, 2001, p 
4 0 4 ,  a n d  R h o d e s ,  1 9 9 8 ,  p  1 5 ) .  O f  c o u r s e ,  o n e  m a y  c h o o s e  w h i c h e v e r  t e r m i n o l o g y  o n e  s e e s  f i t ,  b u t  
one cannot, then, automatically assume that a right in the sense of an injunction includes a right 
in the sense of an option. At least this cannot be done in moral contexts, even if o ne does so in 
legal contexts (which is Hohfeld's area of discussion). This is why Kagan's analysis of rights should 
be preferred to Hohfeld's when discussing moral rights (and the basis of legal rights, which I 
assume to be morals). 
17 In fact, what Hohfeld calls privileg es (in law) c an be analysed as options without injunctions (in 
morals). According to Hohfeld, if someone, P, has a privilege regarding some action, A, this means 
that P has no obligation to abstain from doing A. However, from this we cannot conclude that Q 
does not have a privilege to prevent P from doing A. That is, P violates no one's right if s he does 
A, but Q may still be free to prevent P from doing A. Thus, in Kagan's terms, a privilege is an 
option without an injunction (and an enforcement privilege). That is, if a person is (mor ally) free 
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escape from war-camp (we have a r ight to stop him), but it may not be wrong 
of him to escape (or to abstain from doing so). If we have a right to prevent 
him from escaping and he is morally permitted to escape or abstain from 
escaping, he has an option without an injunction or an enforcement privilege. 
The reasons referred to in the explanation of these elements may vary in 
strength or stringency. This corresponds to the distinction between absolute 
and prima facie rights mentioned above. If the reasons are conclusive, i.e. 
guarantee the permissibility or impermissibility of the actions mentioned, the 
right in question is a bsolute. If they are not, the right is prima facie, and other 
reasons may thus override the reasons implied by the right in question. On the 
basis of this, it is easy to see how different prima facie rights may vary in 
strength: the more powerful reasons they imply, the stronger is the right, that 
is, the more powerful reasons are needed in order to override the reasons 
implied by the right. As mentioned in HI.3.2.3, their strength may be taken to 
be determined either by qualitative or quantitative factors, or both. I will return 
to what determines the type and strength of reasons implied by various rights 
to genetic information. 
Let us follow up on Kagan's analysis of rights and introduce the term thin 
rights. A thin right is an injunction. As Kagan remarks, thin rights are "the heart 
of right-talk" (p 221-222). This remark is easily validated. General 
characterisations of the distinction between positive and negative rights, like 
the one above, put emphasis on the reasons of others to provide for (or do) or 
abstain from doing certain things (see also e.g. B uchanan et al, 2000, p 380-381 
and Wolff, 1991, p 19). Certainly, when someone claims that her right was 
violated when she was prevented from speaking her mind or had her property 
appropriated, she need not mean anything more than that there are reasons for 
it being wrong for someone else to prevent her from speaking her mind or 
for someone else to appropriate her property. The fact that injunctions are the 
core of rights is also clear in the debate on the right to genetic information 
(see this chapter below).18 Thus, until discussing the duty to know (V.3), thin 
to perform an action, she is pe rmitted to do so (and permitted to abstain), but others may be 
allowed to prevent her from doing so. 
18 For instance, Räikkä's analysis of rights is obviously about injunctions: "On a reading of 'rights' 
that has no difficult ontological burdens, 'S has a right to live' is simply a short hand for 'there is a 
moral reason not to prevent S from living or a moral reason to help S to live'." (Räikkä, 1998, p 58) 
This definition of rights is weaker than Kagan's definition of injunctions, since Kagan 
terminology is about moral constraints (it is wron g fo r someone else to violate the right of S), w hile 
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rights, or injunctions, will be the focus of our attention. So, whenever I speak 
of negative and positive rights henceforth, I have these kinds of rights in mind, 
unless I explicitly state otherwise. 
Finally, there is a distinction between general and special rights. General rights 
always holds, in all circumstances, whereas special rights holds only given 
certain circumstances. For instance, I guess many people would consider the 
(negative) right to life a general right. This means, then, that this right is not 
conditioned on something else being the case. This does not mean that the 
right is absolute: even though it holds regardless of circumstance, it may 
nonetheless be overridden by other morally relevant concerns. On the other 
hand, a special right may be the right to free speech. This right may not hold 
regardless of what you say a nd how and when you are saying it: it may not 
hold when you are slandering or stirring up a mutiny. Another example of a 
special right is the right of Jill in the example above to receive 100€ from Jack 
This right holds only on the condition that Jack owes her this sum of money. 
However, it is not always cl ear whether exceptions to a generally held right 
are due to it being special or prima facie. For instance, the right to free speech 
may be claimed to hold generally, and cases of slandering or instigation merely 
being cases of overriding ethical concerns (probably of an "risk of harm"-
kind). And exceptions to the negative right to life (e.g. to prevent a mass-
murderer going berserk in a kinder-garden) may be claimed to imply that this 
right is not general at all, but conditioned on certain (although normal) 
circumstances. It seems to be of little practical concern whether exceptions are 
due to the right being prima facie or special, as long as the circumstances in 
which the right does not hold are clear enough. However, it may be of 
concern in terms of motivation or justification of the right. My conjecture is 
that pure consequentialists would regard rights with exceptions as special 
rather than prima facie, since a right being overridden in a certain situation just 
shows that it should not be respected in this situation, and, thus, is no right 
(there are no special ethical considerations of rights according the pure 
consequentialist). On the other hand, someone who thinks that people have 
rights regardless of consequences would be more inclined to say that the 
Räikkä writes that it is e nough with a moral reason not to interfere or to help S with regard to 
some action or omission X in order to speak of S's right to X. In this regard Räikkä's analysis is t o 
be preferred. 
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exception of a right (e.g. the negative right to life) is due to the right being 
overridden by other ethical concerns, while the right, nevertheless, still holds 
(but the violation, or rather infringement, of it is still permissible or even 
obligatory, because of the overridingness of the other ethical concerns). This 
relates to the basis or justification of rights, which I will address in the 
following. 
1.1.2 The justifications of rights 
Moral ideals expressed in terms of rights are often put in opposition to 
consequentialist ideals. However, this alleged conflict does not follow in any 
simple way from the kind of normative categories that make up rights, since 
also consequentialists can grant these categories. To be sure, even a pure 
consequentialist can grant the existence of options, injunctions and 
enforcement privileges. Regarding options, a person has an option between 
two alternative actions, which truthfully can be described as d oing X and not 
doing X, if, and only if, it is true of both the actions that they are optimal, that 
is, there is nothing else the agent could do in the situation that has better 
consequences.19 A person, P, has a negative thin right with regard to X if 
preventing P from doing X always, as a matter of fact, is a su b-optimal act (and 
a positive thin right if it is sub-optimal not to help P in doing X). And if 
enforcing an injunction is the optimal thing for P to do in a situation, P has an 
enforcement privilege in that situation. If all these conditions are fulfilled, a 
person has a full r ight in the sense defined above. 
The difference between theories of rights and consequentialist theories 
thus lies on a more fundamental level, namely on the level of justification.20 
Consequentialism grants options when, and only when, two or more 
alternative actions are optimal, and because they are optimal. It will not accept 
moral reasons that do not refer to consequences. Theories of rights, on the 
other hand, grant that if an action violates a right this, in itself, is a reason to 
reject the action, even if the act is optimal. Theories of rights thus grant 
options in the sense that we are, at least sometimes, allowed to perform actions 
19 In order to make the point in a simple way, I am here presupposing the maximisation version of 
consequentialism. See II.4.2. 
20 I will disregard the type of theories of rights that are sometimes called "right-utilitarianism", 
according to which we should maximise the actual respecting of rights, since I know of no 
proponent of this kind of theory in biomedical ethics. I presuppose the standard assumption in 
theories of rights, that rights are, perhaps overridable, constraints (see III.3.3). 
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that are sub-optimal. They also grant constraints in the sense that we are, at least 
sometimes, wrong to perform actions that are optimal. Why? Well, since 
performing the action would be a violation of a right. So theories of rights 
hold that there is a moral reason to respect certain rights, regardless of the 
consequences of doing so. However, I will not assume that a theory of rights 
has to presuppose that rights exhaust everything that can be said about moral 
tightness and wrongness. So a theory of rights does not have to be extreme in 
the above-mentioned sense. 
However, also theories of rights provide a justification or basis of the rights 
defended. The most common way o f doing this is to refer to a property of the 
individual or a relationship the individual stands to something in virtue of 
which the right should be granted. Common suggestions of properties that are 
the basis of rights are being a human, being rational, being an end in oneself, 
having a free will or having (the potential of) certain capacities. Common 
suggestions of relations that are the basis of rights are being the relative of 
someone, or being promised something by someone. In order to investigate 
the plausibility of a p roposed right to something in the following discussion, 
the proposed basis of the right has to be evaluated. In the context of the 
individual's right to her genetic information, the claim that the information is 
of a particularly sensitive and personal kind is particularly salient as a basis for a 
basic right to have the information. We will return to this (see IV.2.1). 
This difference from consequentialistic theories with regard to the 
justification of rights can be cast in terms of basic versus derived rights. A basic 
right is, then justified with reference to a property of the individual or a 
relationship the individual has to something in virtue of which the right 
should be granted. If a ri ght is basic, there is a moral reason to respect this 
right, regardless of the consequences of doing so. On the other hand, derived 
rights are rights that are justified on other grounds. Theories of rights are thus 
theories that defend at least some basic rights. Theories of rights can include 
derived rights, for instance rights that are derived from basic ones, but they 
also have to include basic ones. There is a moral reason to respect rights that 
are derived from basic rights regardless of consequences too, since they are 
derived directly from basic rights. 
This means that pure theories of consequence do not include any basic 
rights. However, derived rights can also be defended on consequentialist 
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grounds in various ways.21 One way is to argue that we have good reasons to 
believe that not respecting the right always will be sub-optimal, as a matter of 
fact. That is, our world is actually constituted in a way that always makes the 
respecting of a right better in terms of consequences than not doing so. 
Another way is to claim that there are consequentialist arguments in favour of a 
particular institutional setting that involves the recognition of some right, e.g. a 
regulation that recognize a right of someone to something. A consequentialist 
could, for instance, argue that we should implement regulations that protect 
the right to free speech, since the implication of such a regulation is 
conducive to general welfare. The right thus derived is then not a m oral one 
(it m ay still be morally permissible to prevent someone from speaking), but a 
legal right, which we have alleged moral reasons to uphold. 
It is important to emphasise this distinction between moral and legal rights. 
This also holds for theories of rights, since such theories may be open to 
societal regulations that do not perfectly mirror the moral rights recognized by 
such a theory. So even if there is a moral right to X, it does not follow that this 
right should be a legal right as well. It may seem natural, however, when it 
comes to basic injunctions. This is s o, since a basic injunction claims that it is 
(at least prima facie) wrong to prevent someone or to fail to assist someone. It 
then seems tempting to think that these injunctions should be enforced. 
However, it is not self-evident that such rights should be legally enforced, that 
the violation of rights should be sanctioned by punishment, or that these 
rights in any other way acknowledged by societal institutions. It takes further 
argument to establish that a certain right should be recognized as a legal right. 
From this we can conclude that arguing in favour of a right to genetic 
information does not imply arguing in favour of theories of right. We have to 
examine what kind of right and what kind of arguments that are presented. 
And what implications regarding the conduct of others the rights imply also 
depend on the basis o f the rights-talk. For example, if it is a libertarian talking, 
we can infer the presence of enforcement privilege from an injunction 
(Wolff, 1991, p 22) while this inference is illegitimate if we are confronting a 
consequentialist. 
21 Some writers would be reluctant to call derived rights (in the sense defined here) rights at all, 
since they would require a firmer basis than consequences (see Dworkin, 1977, p 193). 
1.2 The interpretations of the individual's right 
The previous subsections were about possible interpretations of the general 
claim that P has a right to X. The different possible interpretations are due to 
the fact that this claim may have different implications and justifications. Now 
I will tu rn to the interpretation of the specific right of interest in this context: 
the right of the individual to genetic information about herself. Beside the 
possible interpretations of rights generally, how is this more specific right to 
be understood? 
With having genetic information about oneself, I mean P having information 
about the genes of P. I will sometimes talk about this by saying that P has 
information about her genes or genetic information about herself. As has 
already been stated, the person P that is the subject of this discussion is, of 
course, the index-person, i.e. the person having the (presymptomatic) genetic 
test. Of course, not only persons that actually h ave tested themselves will be of 
interest. The right may (also) b e a right to be informed about the possibility of 
testing or a right to take a test that one asks for. The relevant P is, thus, the 
person who can have the genetic test performed. The right to test oneself is 
not of much concern here, however. The central element is the result of the 
test: the information that can be derived by it. Nonetheless, testing may be 
necessary to gain certain information. So a right to information may imply a 
right to testing. The individual discussed here is thus anyone who may gain 
information about herself from presymptomatic genetic testing.22 
Furthermore, there is the term 'genetic information'. What kind of genetic 
information are we talking about? We have already discussed the question of 
genes and genetic information (see 1.4). The point that needs to be emphasised 
here, is that we are not interested in any k ind of information about a p erson's 
genes, but certain facts about her genes that may be relevant to the person's 
decision-making. For example, the discussion is not about receiving a book 
containing the complete sequence of one's DNA (C, G, C, C, A, and so on). 
This will be of no interest to anyone, unless you are able to interpret this 
information. What is of interest is particular information, such as "being the 
carrier of a B RCA1 gene (see 1.4.1), which increases the risk of breast cancer 
with this-and-this magnitude during this-and-this period of time". 
22 Of course, I am presupposing the limitations made in chapter I, i.e. that the focus of attention 
is c ompetent, normal adults. 
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Given these specifications, what can it mean to have the right to one's genetic 
information? Besides the different possible interpretations of 'having a right' 
(see the previous section), I think we can discern three main interpretations: 
the right to gain access to genetic information, the right to receive genetic 
information and the right to use gen etic information.23 Let us look at these 
interpretations one at the time. 
What does it mean for a person, P, to have or gain access to genetic 
information? A minimum requirement for this to hold is that there is "a 
method or procedure for obtaining the information, not necessarily that he or 
she actually obtains it." (Pom, 1997, p 41) A stronger and more interesting, 
requirement is that P, in order to gain access to the genetic information, must 
acquire knowledge about the method or procedure for obtaining the 
information. One possible interpretation is thus to consider the right24 as a 
right of others not to be prevented from informing P about how to obtain 
genetic information about P, and perhaps also a r ight of the individual not to 
be prevented from being informed. An example of an argument in favour of 
such a negative right may be a libertarian argument that the state should not 
intervene when private companies advertise home testing (see IV.2). 
Another possibility is to interpret the right as a positive right to be 
informed about how to obtain this genetic information. This right would then 
imply reasons that others would act wrongly if they were to withhold such 
information from P. An example of arguments in favour of such a positive 
right could be consequentialist arguments in favour of genetic screening 
procedures (Munthe, 2002, p 91-94), i.e., arguments in favour of society's 
obligation to inform everybody that testing can be done. 
What does it mean for a person, P, to receive genetic information? Perhaps the 
most natural interpretation of 'receiving genetic information' is to learn about 
or getting to know about genetic information. I suppose that most talk about 
23 These main interpretations can be further specified, as we will soon see. They can also be 
conditioned on various circumstances, i.e., whether or not the right holds could depend on the 
situation in various ways. That is, th e right in question may be special rather than general (see 
IV.1.1.1). For instance, the right to receive genetic information may hold only given prior 
indication of increased risk (see IV.3.2.2). 
24 When I am talking about 'the right' in this context, it is, natu rally, a shorthand expression for 
'the individual's right to genetic information about oneself. 
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"the right to know" should be interpreted in this way.25 However, P's right to 
gain access to genetic informadon seems to be of mere academic importance, 
if P has no right whatsoever to learn about or getting to know about the 
informadon (and even more so if P has an obligation not to receive the 
information, i.e., if there is no element of option included in this right). 
The reverse is not as o bvious, however. One may argue that P has the right 
to learn about some genetic information about herself under certain 
circumstances, without P having the right to know about the possibility that 
she can learn about this information. For example, one may argue that a person 
has the positive right to learn about whether or not she is a carrier of the gene 
for Huntington's disease if she asks for this information from a gen etic clinic 
that reliably can perform these tests; i.e. she has the right to take the genetic test 
and learn about the result from it (and the genetic clinician has a duty to 
perform the test and the counsellor has a duty to reveal the result). This is, of 
course, compatible with arguing that the very same person lacks a (thin) 
positive right to be informed about the possibility to do the test (because no 
one has an obligation to inform her of this possibility). 
This position does not seem to be implausible (see IV.3.2.1-IV.3.2.2). 
Furthermore, it is an example of a position that is naturally described as both 
granting and not granting some person(s) the right to genetic information 
(granting a positive right to receive the information, under certain 
circumstances, and not granting a positive right to access to genetic 
information). Thus, it should be obvious that general talk about "the right to 
genetic information" or "the right to know" is not only an oversimplification, 
but also clouds the issue. 
What does it mean to 'learn about' or 'getting to know about' genetic 
information about oneself? The terms are certainly vague in general. Perhaps 
the most salient vagueness in this context is the following: what degree of 
understanding should we demand in order to say that the individual has learnt 
about or gotten to know about certain genetic information about herself? 
This question has been discussed previously (see II.2.3.2). I then reached the 
conclusion that the value of genetic information is conditioned on the proper 
understanding of it. We cannot exclude the possibility that the same goes for 
25 Even though one might also be talking about the right to know about how to gain access to 
genetic information. See e.g. Takala, 2000, p 87-105, where references are made to both the first 
and the second interpretation of 'know'. 
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rights — the right to genetic information may be conditioned on some degree 
of proper understanding of it, especially if the basis of rights is values (see 
IV.3.2.2). 
We should continuously bear in mind that genetic information is often 
hard to understand. For example, it often involves or implies estimations of 
probabilities that are difficult to grasp, and even if one grasp them on some 
abstract level, it may be hard to grasp their relevance in relation to one's own 
situation. Do we have a right to know in the sense that we have a right to "full" 
understanding (and perhaps only full understanding), or do we have a right to 
receive information even if w e barely understand it? Do we have some right to 
receive genetic information about ourselves even if we do not have the 
capacity or desire to understand it? We will of course return to these crucial 
questions. However, already now a h int will be dropped. To argue in favour of 
a r ight to receive genetic information without a corresponding obligation of 
others to ensure some level of understanding (or at least attempt to do so) may 
be very hard indeed, since using genetic information without understanding 
of it is at best pointless but is also more likely to lead to dire consequences 
than would receiving understood information (see II.2.3.2). 
This brings us to the third interpretation of 'the right to genetic information', 
namely 'use'. As we have already seen, the individual can use genetic 
information in a great number of ways. It may be used to plan one's future 
career. It may be used in reproductive or health care decisions. Thus, questions 
of rights to implement these decisions, with or without the aid of others, here 
rise to the surface. For instance, should we be allowed to withhold 
information about a serious disease from our employer? Should we be 
allowed to abort a foetus on the basis of certain genetic information? 
Obviously, the questions are legio, since the possible use a person can 
make of genetic information is vast. Therefore, these questions cannot be 
treated in a sy stematic and thorough matter. I will instead concentrate on the 
right to access to and the right to receive genetic information. What is 
important to note in this context is that the right to receive genetic 
information cannot be of much interest if there is no right whatsoever to use 
the information in any way at all. T hus, just as the right to gain access to 
genetic information only is of interest if there is at least some right to receive 
it, the right to receive it only is of interest if there is at least some right to use 
it. However, there may be rights to use genetic information in various ways, 
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given that one has it, without any right to receive it. But the fact remains, the 
right to know cannot plausibly be claimed only to be a right to have certain 
knowledge. The point to remember is thus that, even though a right to use 
certain genetic information in certain ways may not seem to be a reasonable 
interpretadon of the right to 'know' of it, some such right must be 
presupposed if the right to know genetic information is to be interesting at all. 
We have to suppose some right of the index-person to use genetic 
information if the discussion of gaining access to or receiving the information 
is to be of any concern. 
We now have the required tools to analyse the individual's right to have 
genetic information about herself. The easiest way to illustrate the possible 
interpretations is perhaps to use a matrix (see Table III). 
Table III: P's (the index-person's) right to genetic information (about herself) 
Gain access to Receive Use 
Option to It is morally permissible 
for P to gain access to 
genetic information or 
to abstain from doing 
so 
It is morally permissible 
for P to receive genetic 
information or to 
abstain from doing so 
It is morally permissible 
for P to use genetic 
information or to 
abstain from doing so 
Negative injunction There is a reason for 
others not to prevent P 
from gaining access to 
genetic information 
There is a reason for 
others not to prevent P 
from receiving genetic 
information 
There is a reason for 
others not to prevent P 
from using genetic 
information 
Positive injunction There is a reason for 
others to help P to gain 
access to genetic 
information 
There is a reason for 
others to help P to 
receive genetic 
information 
There is a reason for 
others to help P to use 
genetic information 
Regulated negative right There is a reason for 
the negative injunction 
to be implemented in 
regulation 
There is a reason for 
the negative injunction 
to be implemented in 
regulation 
There is a reason for 
the negative injunction 
to be implemented in 
regulation 
Regulated positive right There is a reason for 
the positive injunction 
to be implemented in 
regulation 
There is a reason for 
the positive injunction 
to be implemented in 
regulation 
There is a reason for 
the positive injunction 
to be implemented in 
regulation 
The row enlists different interpretations of 'right' and the columns different 
interpretations of 'genetic information about oneself. We thus have 15 
different interpretations of the individual's right to genetic information about 
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herself. However, even this is an oversimplification, to say the least. For 
instance, the three main interpretations can be made more precise, as w e have 
seen. 'Gain access to' can be interpreted (at least) as ei ther the existence or the 
knowledge of the existence of a procedure from which one can receive 
genetic information. 'Receive' can be interpreted differently, e.g. depending on 
the conditions one has for learning about or knowing of the information. And 
there are separate interpretations of 'use' for every possible use of genetic 
information. 
Furthermore, the interpretation of rights can be further specified. Every 
one of these rights can be general or special, absolute or prima facie and basic 
or derived, adding up to 120 possible interpretations, regardless of the other 
complications. And to this it might be added the possible variations regarding 
the strength of prima facie rights. Moreover, for every injunction there might 
or might not be a right to enforce the injunction, i.e. a n enforcement privilege. 
What is more, some may want to defend several of these rights. This is 
possible since, of course, the interpretations can be combined in various ways. 
That is, some of the statements in the matrix are compatible and can thus be 
defended without contradiction. In fact, logically, it is true that one can 
combine affirming or denying any one of the statements with affirming or 
denying any one of the other statements, as long as o ne does not affirm and 
deny the very same statement. If we concentrate on the 15 interpretations of 
the matrix, which, then, is a simplification, this gives 32.768 different possible 
combinations.26 And if we add the possibilities of further specifications, this 
number grows exponentially. 
Needless to say, all these possible combinations will not be explored, one by 
one. Luckily enough, there are some very plausible simplifying assumptions 
that can, and should, be made. For instance, while there indeed may be options 
without injunctions and the other way around, I will aim at the heart of "right-
talk" and concentrate on injunctions. This will not mean that I will ignore the 
question of whether there are options without injunctions or injunctions 
without options. The distinction between rights as o ptions and injunctions is 
an important one, the conflation of which gives rise to much confusion. 
26 This is so, since every statement can be affirmed and denied, i.e., hav e the truth-value truth or 
false (but not both). One statement thus can have two combinations, two can have two times 
two, and so on: add one statement and the possible combinations are doubled. So 2s, where 
s=number of statements. 
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Nevertheless, I will focus on injunctions, discussing options mostly to avoid 
misunderstandings. The exception is the discussion of a duty to know, a 
discussion that concerns the plausibility o f an option to know (see V.3 ). 
Another simplifying assumption is that if one can establish, or at least make 
a strong case in favour of, an injunction, this, in turn, is a powerful argument 
in favour of regulation in order to enforce or promote the injunction. Once 
again, t he distinction between (moral) injunctions and (legal) regulations is of 
utmost importance and should be separated in order to avoid confusion. 
However, if one can establish an injunction, it requires special reasons to claim 
that it should not be enforced by regulation (such reasons may consist of 
values or rights of enough importance being threatened by the regulation). Or 
at least, so I will assume. 
Furthermore, some combinations are of no practical interest whatsoever, 
and may thus legitimately be ignored. As we saw above, there is no interest in 
having a right to access to genetic information if there is no right whatsoever 
to receive it, and no interest in a right to receive it if there is no right 
whatsoever to use it. If this claim is granted (and I will assume it is) the 
following conclusion is valid. If there is no right to use genetic information, 
there is no right to receive it, and if there is no right to receive it, there is no 
right to gain access to it. H owever, the conclusion is not valid the other way 
around: there may be a r ight to use the information even if there is no right to 
receive it, and there may be a right to receive the information even if there is 
no right to gain access to it. 
Moreover, as I just argued, some right to use genetic information has to be 
presupposed in order for the right to receive and have access to genetic 
information is to be of any interest. However, such a right will be 
presupposed rather than argued for, since genetic information can be used in 
innumerable ways, m aking the number of rights verge on infinite. The focus 
will therefore be the right to gain access to or receiving genetic information 
on the assumption that some subsequent uses may be justified. However, some 
especially controversial uses will be explored in later chapters (e.g. the use of 
genetic information for purchasing insurance under favourable terms in 
chapter VII). 
2. Negative rights 
As we have seen, the negative (thin) right (or injunction) to have genetic 
information about oneself can be interpreted in (at least) three ways: the 
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negative right to gain access to, the negative right to receive, and the negative 
right to use genetic information. As previously stated, the focus here is the 
right to gain access to or receiving genetic information, while at least some righ t 
to use genetic information is only presupposed. This leaves us with two 
negative rights-claims: (i) th ere is a reason that it would be morally wrong of 
others to prevent P from gaining access to genetic information, and (ii) there is 
a reason that it would be morally wrong of others to prevent P from receiving 
genetic information. The aim in this section is to see whether and to what 
extent such negative rights to have genetic information about oneself can be 
defended and justified. When doing this, we will find use for the previous 
theoretical discussion of rights (section IV. 1). 
Of course, the boldest claim in this context would be to say that it is always 
wrong to prevent someone from gaining access to or receiving genetic 
information about herself. However, this position is a straw-man. No one has 
ever defended that position. So, instead of trying to fight that straw-man I will 
take a look at the most extensive system of negative rights that actually has been 
defended or, at least, indicated (the Radical Libertarian, see below) and see 
whether this defence is, o r can be made, sound. If this position can be argued 
to be too extensive, which I will argue, the straw-man will also have been 
successfully defeated. 
As noted in the previous chapter, rights are often defended within the 
framework of an ethical theory. The most salient defences of extensive 
negative rights can be found in liberal and libertarian theories.27 These theories 
emphasises non-interference of the state. This makes the tie between moral 
rights and regulated legal rights indissoluble, since the right not to be 
prevented explicitly includes the right not to be prevented by regulations. 
This liberal framework is the background of the actual discussions of the 
negative right to know. Since the discussion will be more interesting if we 
investigate some actual defence, I will as a point of departure consider the 
argument developed by Tuija Takala, 2000, p 85-105,28 who is one of the most 
outspoken defenders of negative rights to know, and, then primarily, of not 
being prevented from gaining access to or receiving genetic information by 
27 In Nozick's libertarian theory, the only positive rights there can be are either rights that are the 
result of voluntary agreements and the right to be assisted by the state in making sure that 
negative rights are respected (or to be compensated when they are not). See IV.3.1.1. 
28 This text was originally written as an article with Matti Häyry as a co-author. 
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regulation. She writes: "The 'right to know' normally implies that the 
information individuals want must not be withheld from them." (Takala, 2000, 
P97) 
A natural interpretation of this quote is that it states that if individuals have a 
right to know, then they should not be prevented from gathering (genetic) 
information about themselves.29 If there indeed is such a right to genetic 
information it is thus a negative right: other agents (including societal 
institutions such as the government in particular) should not force the agent 
not to get genetic information about herself (it wo uld be wrong of them to do 
so) or, at least, they have a reason not to do so. What is being stated is then a 
negative thin right (an injunction) to gain access to and receiving this 
information. 
Takala defends this injunction, at least with regard to societal institutions, 
since she also claims that, as a consequence of the right to know, "not many 
regulations seem justifiable in the context of genetic testing." (Takala, 2000, p 
101) She is thus not only claiming that the injunction should be legally 
enforced, she also hints that the injunction implies difficulties in justifying 
any type of regulation that would impede the individual from gaining access to 
or receiving genetic information, for example pre-test counselling 
requirements (see II.3.4.2).30 
How can the (alleged) right of the individual not to be prevented from 
gaining access to and receiving genetic information of herself be violated by 
regulation? One way, which has been the focus of discussion, is by being 
denied the possibility of freely a cquiring such information on the market. The 
discussion is thus about commercial genetic testing. Commercial genetic 
testing is here defined as genetic testing performed by commercial enterprises, 
i.e., enterprises that have economic profit as a motive.31 
29 As it stands, the quote seems to presuppose that someone already has the information in 
question with the possibility of withholding it from the individual the information is about. This is 
not primarily the kind of situation that Takala wants to discuss, which is ob vious from the rest of 
the text. 
30 We are probably entitled to assume that the right in this context includes a right to get help 
from society if anyone tries to force the right-holder (e.g. b y physical violence or threat of such) 
into not getting the genetic information, i.e. an enforcement privilege of some sort. There is 
hardly any point in society's granting rights if it does not have any ways of ensuring that the right 
is r espected or that violations of it are compensated. 
31 It is not necessary that profit is the only or primary motive of the enterprise. It is su fficient that 
profit is on e of its motives. Enterprises run by a government with partially economic motives 
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Commercial enterprises can offer genetic testing services to medical 
professionals (who then send samples from their patients for analysis) or to 
the general public directly. I will not discuss commercial enterprises selling 
genetic testing to medical professionals, although this is obviously an 
interesting question in its own right. However, it is not a question that has been 
discussed in terms of the individual's rights to her own genetic information, 
which is the focus of our interest here. This discussion will thus be about 
commercial genetic testing that is offered direcdy to the individual being 
tested, i.e. the index-person, by the commercial enterprise. The ultimate 
version of this is complete testing kits, which the individual may use at home 
without the assistance of medical or laboratory personnel. Therefore, although 
commercial genetic testing may also involve people sending blood-samples to 
laboratories, I will henceforth call th is type of tests 'home tests'. 
Home tests are already on the market in parts of the world. In the United 
States home tests for BCRA1 can be ordered by mail, and in London, genetic 
tests that reveal sensitivity to certain diets can be bought directly in shops.32 
Takala is thus discussing genetic home testing in terms of the right to 
genetic knowledge or information about oneself (Takala, 2000, p 85-105). She is 
claiming that individuals should have the right not to be prevented from 
receiving such information by buying genetic home testing or, at least, 
challenging those who claim otherwise to state their case (Takala, 2000, p 101). 
Furthermore, a similar right of the commercial enterprises is being defended: 
they should not be prevented (by regulation) from selling genetic tests.33 
Society thus has a corresponding reason not to interfere with the selling of the 
test.34 She is also questioning all kinds of regulation that can circumscribe the 
way in which the information is purchased (Takala, 2000, p 92-93, 100-101). One 
(such as the Swedish monopoly on the selling of liquor: Systembolaget) are therefore commercial 
in the sense defined here. A more narrow definition could exclude examples of what this really is 
about: the marketing and selling of genetic testing on a market. 
32 In the United States the tests are provided by Myriard Genetics in Salt Lake City (Capron, 2000) 
and in the United Kingdom by Sconia (www.genewatch.org). 
33 It is, of course, conceivable to have a prohibition against selling while allowing buying, or the 
other way around, as is the case with prostitution in Sweden: it is a punishable offence to buy, but 
not to sell, sex. 
34 However, perfectly in line with standard liberal ideas, other commercial enterprises are allowed 
to "prevent" some commercial enterprise, C, from selling a test by competing with them on a 
market, making it unprofitable for C to offer genetic testing. Towards them C only has a privilege 
in the Hofheldian sense, then. 
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such proposed regulation is the demand that selling genetic testing should be 
accompanied by genetic counselling (Hoedemaekers & ten Have, 1998, p 223; 
Takala, 2000, p 92).35 Another is to have quality controls of genetic testing or of 
the commercials for them (Ibid). 
However, Takala is n ot proposing a r ight to have home tests in the sense of 
a moral option. Takala is explicidy claiming that she does not intend to defend 
the view that individuals who purchase and use home tests are always doing 
something that is morally permissible.36 So, the right at stake in this context is a 
right not to be prevented from gaining access to and receiving genetic 
informadon, but not a guarantee that one is acting morally right or blameless if 
one does so. 
If we sum up Takala's position, it can be described in the following way. 
Marketing and selling genetic testing directly to the index-person should be 
allowed and that this practice should not be regulated, in any way different from 
other free exchanges on the market. This last clause means that prohibitions against 
pure coercion or deceit should be enforced on this market (by the state),37 in 
the manner libertarians think that they should.38 For instance, it should be 
prohibited to sell a pregnancy test, claiming it to be a genetic test or to sell it 
while threatening the potential buyer's family with a gun. Let us call this 
position the Radical Libertarian.39 
However, I will not presuppose that the Radical Libertarian regarding 
genetic testing has to defend libertarianism regarding society as a whole.40 For 
instance, libertarianism as c ommonly conceived, usually is taken to include a 
prohibition against taxes on transactions (at least for other purposes than to 
35 As we shall see, this could be said to be a positive right of the consumer: if an individual 
purchases a home test, she also has the right to be counselled about it. T his corresponds to a 
reason for the company to provide for the counselling. 
36 Takala writes: "people can be morally criticised by others for purchasing genetic information 
which it is, nevertheless, their legal right to purchase." (2000, p 99) 
37 As we will see, upon closer scrutiny, it is unclear how "deceit" should be interpreted. From this 
it may follow that libertarians have to defend a larger degree of regulation than commonly 
thought. See IV.2.2.1. 
38 This is not to claim t hat Takala herself is a libertarian in general. 
39 Since the Radical Libertarian is in favour of regulating against coercion and deceit, it is in a way 
misleading to say th at a Radical Libertarian in particular and libertarians in general, are arguing 
against regulations of the market. Really, they are arguing against certain forms of regulations. 
40 Although libertarianism in general may be though useful t o defend the Radical Libertarian view 
adumbrated here. See IV.2.2.1. 
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finance the minimal state). The Radical Libertarian's position in this context is 
thus compatible with a general tax on market transactions, including the selling 
of genetic tests. The position I am interested in is the one that denies that the 
marketing and selling of genetic testing should be regulated in any particular 
way, e.g. b y societal demands on the commercial enterprise to offer genetic 
counselling whenever offering genetic testing or by governmental bodies 
supervising the quality of the tests. In other words, the Radical Libertarian 
claims that there should be no constraints on the marketing of genetic testing 
that is not also a constraint on the selling of shoes, that is, no regulation at all 
(except against coercion and deceit and perhaps some tax on transaction 
common to all goods and services). 
As previously indicated, it is not obvious that this is the position Takala 
herself holds. Rather, it seems as though she wants to challenge those who 
favour regulation to provide arguments for this.41 Furthermore, it is not 
unequivocal from her text whether or not she is advocating that tests should 
not be the subject of the same type of regulations that surrounds other 
medical goods and services (for instance pharmaceuticals), e.g. official quality 
controls.42 If she does not, I have much less quarrel with her argument than the 
following text indicates. In any case, her arguments can be used to adumbrate 
the Radical Libertarian's position, which is the target of my criticism in the 
following. 
The position of the Radical Libertarian can be contrasted against two other 
positions that will be useful in the discussion to come: the Moderate Liberal 
and the Total Prohibitionist. These three positions answers the following 
questions: 1) Should home tests be allowed? 2) If home testing is allowed, 
should it still be regulated in some way? 3) If it should be regulated in some 
way, in what way should it be regulated? They are thus all a bout the scope and 
strength of a negative right to genetic information. 
The position of the Moderate Liberal says that marketing and selling of 
genetic testing should be allowed but regulated (over and above the minimal 
amount of regulation on coercion and deceit that should hold for any form of 
41 Foremost, Takala is as king for arguments in favour of a relevant difference between genetic 
testing and astrologer's advice, which is s ubject to very sparse regulation (Takala, 2000, p 101). I 
will r eturn to this (IV.2.4). 
42 Even though quite a few remarks indicates that she is (see quotes in IV.2.3.1, IV.2.3.2, and 
IV.2.4). 
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transaction. I will implicitly assume this qualification in the following.) Of 
course, this is not really one position. Rather, it is a common designation for all 
the positions that defend some kind of regulation but do not propose a 
complete ban. As already noticed, there are different possible regulations that 
can surround commercial enterprises selling and marketing genetic testing:43 
(governmental) control of the quality of tests and/or information about them 
and advertisement for them, and regulations requiring (access to) genetic 
counselling when performing genetic testing. The Moderate Liberal may also 
defend that commercial enterprises should be banned from doing some genetic 
tests altogether. They could either defend that these tests should be banned 
throughout the society in question or that only public health care should be 
allowed to perform them. Similarly, a Moderate Liberal can argue that some 
types of tests should not be regulated at all. W hat are reasonable regulations of 
very reliable tests may not be reasonable regulations of less reliable ones, and 
what are reasonable regulations of genetic testing on very serious monogenetic 
diseases may not be reasonable regulations of more complex or less serious 
diseases, and so on. However, there are some general a rguments in the debate 
implying that these differences are of no concern to how one should regulate 
(see e.g. IY.2.1). We shall address these arguments also. 
The position of the Total Prohibitionist says that there should be a ban on 
all marketing and selling of genetic testing. As should be clear, the Moderate 
Liberal could come very close to the Total Prohibitionist (for instance, if she 
argues that all but one tests should be banned). However, the Total 
Prohibitionist probably has some argument based on principle against genetic 
testing that justifies a general rejection of allowing them. However, this 
position has never been defended and is just characterised as a limiting 
possibility. 
In the following, I will argue against the Radical Libertarian's position. For 
most purposes, the distinction between the right to gain access to and receive 
genetic information need not to be upheld, since most arguments are directed 
towards both these rights. However, some arguments are directed towards one 
of the two rights, in which case they will be separated (see IV.2.3.1 and VI.3.2.1-
IV.3.2.2). In this context, the negative right to gain access to genetic information is 
most naturally interpreted as the right not to be prevented from being 
43 See Takala, 2000, p 92-93 and Hoedemaekers and ten Have, 1998, p 223. 
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informed about the possibility of genetic testing by state intervention in 
advertisements for commercial genetic testing. In contrast, the negative right to 
receive genetic information is most naturally interpreted as the right not to be 
prevented from buying genetic testing in the way one sees fit. These are 
obviously different rights, and they should therefore be distinguished, even if 
the distinction is sometimes irrelevant. 
In order to reject the Radical Libertarian, I will first argue that there is no 
basic negative right either to gain access to or receive genetic information 
about oneself (see IV.2.1). I will then argue that basic libertarian principles do 
not support the Radical Libertarian (see IV.2.2.1). I will then argue against an 
attempt to derive the Radical Libertarian position from a Kantian ideal of 
autonomy (see IV.2.2.2). The attempt to argue that the rights in question can be 
derived from autonomy conceived as a value and consequentialistic 
considerations of well-being are then being scrutinized (see IV.2.3). It is then 
argued that these ethical considerations speak in favour of some regulations, 
i.e. some limitations on the negative right to know. Lastly, I will look into some 
casuistic arguments that try to argue in favour of a Radical Libertarian position 
by analogy to relevantly similar cases (see IV.2.4). I t is argued that also this 
attempt fails. If my argument succeeds, we will be able to draw some more 
general conclusions about the scope and strength of a negative right to know 
(see IV.2.5). 
2.1 Basic rights 
Is there a basic right to gain access to and receive genetic information about 
oneself? Remember that if there is such a basic right, there is a moral reason to 
respect this right, regardless of the consequences of doing so. So if there is 
such a right, the case of the Radical Libertarian is ce rtainly strengthened. 
However, also basic rights must be justified somehow. As I said, this is 
commonly done by pointing to some property of or relation to the individual 
that is the right-holder (TV.1.1.2). In the case of genetic information, the most 
predominant foundation of a basic right is the following (in fact, I know of no 
other): "genetic information is particularly sensitive, or more profoundly 
personal than other types of knowledge, because it describes the deepest, 
immutable level of human biology." (Takala, 2000, p 9Ô)44 The fact that is 
44 Takala herself does not hold this argument valid, but only discusses its possible relevance for 
making a morally relevant distinction between genetic and other kinds of information (Takala, 
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supposed to ultimately support the right to genetic information is thus the 
property of the object of the right, namely genetic information, standing in a 
certain relation to oneself, being about one's deepest nature (or something of 
the like). Let us accept that genetic information is personal and sensitive due to 
its nature. How is this supposed to found a basic right to genetic information? 
The line of reasoning can be construed as follows. If this information is 
about my very nature or the essence of me, it may be thought that I have a 
special entitlement to gain access to and learn about this information. This, it 
might be claimed, includes a negative right not to be prevented from 
purchasing the information. The right is basic in the sense defined above: it 
should be respected, not because general respect of the right would promote 
overall good or being necessary in order to respect some other right, but 
because the violation of the right would be wrong in itself, at least prima facie 
(see IV.1.1.2). This argument will be called the sensitivity-argument. 
Many authors, including Takala, have argued that genetic information is not 
especially sensitive or personal (as op posed to other kinds of information), at 
least not in any normatively relevant way (Holm, 1999; Launis, 2000; Takala, 
2000). With this I concur (see 1.4.3). However, this is not enough to reject the 
sensitivity-argument. This is the case since it may be concluded from the 
arguments against genetic information being especially se nsitive that this only 
shows that other kinds of information also are personal and sensitive enough 
to found rights.45 Of course, this conclusion denies that genetic information is 
more pro foundly personal and sensitive than other kinds of information, but it 
may still be thought to be personal and sensitive enough to found a righ t to it. 
However, even if this is granted, the sensitivity-argument is still 
problematic. Even though genetic information is profoundly personal and 
sensitive, it is also essentially about others, namely about those with whom one 
share one's genes. Consider the following example. The young man John 
knows that his grandfather had Huntington's disease. John takes a t est in order 
to find out whether he is a carrier of the gene. The test, alas, turns out to be 
positive. Due to the nature of the heredity of this disease, John's father must be 
2000, p 96-97). However, since the quotation captures the thought I am interested in concisely, I 
use it. 
45 As we shall see, a consequential could claim that genetic information should be treated as if it is 
especially personal and sensitive, since it is considered to be so (this claim may be doubted, 
however). See VII.4.1. 
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a carrier of the gene.46 John is familiar with this and reaches the valid 
conclusion that his father is a carrier. This example is not atypical, but 
concerns the vary nature of genes often emphasised — they are hereditary. 
Thus, gaining knowledge about (a part of) the genetic constitution of one 
person is sometimes to gain knowledge about (a part of the) the genetic 
constitution of another (given the proper background knowledge). 
Now, according to the sensitivity-argument, certain rights are based on the 
(alleged) fact that genetic information is personal and sensitive (if not uniquely 
or especially so, then at least very personal and sensitive). More specifically, the 
right to gain access to and receive information about one's own genes is 
founded in this way. However, it does not seem to be implausible to claim that 
if a certain piece of information is very personal and sensitive, then one has a 
right to control this information from the access of others.47 Anyway, why 
claim that the sensitive nature of the information is the foundation of the first 
right but not the second? That is, if the foundation of the basic right to have 
the information is that it is very personal and sensitive, it is hard to see why it 
cannot also be the foundation of the right to protect the information from 
spreading to others. 
But if this holds, we have a collision of rights due to the hereditary nature 
of genes. Let us assume that John's father does not want anyone else (including 
his son) to find out whether or not he is the carrier of the gene for 
Huntington's disease. If John then exercises his right to find out about his 
genetic susceptibility he is violating his father's right to prevent others from 
finding out whether or not he is a carrier, since John will know that his father 
is a carrier if he finds out that he himself is a carrier. In effect, the exercise of 
one right will lead to the violation of another. And a foundation that supports 
conflicting rights must be flawed, it may be argued. 
This may not be a problem, if one grants that these rights, although basic, 
are only prima facie, that is, they may be overridden. Then one could claim 
46 I am here disregarding the very remote possibility that John's father is n ot a carrier and the 
exact same mutation that the grandfather has recurs in John due to a random mutation. 
47 This is how the sensitivity-argument of genetic privacy goes and it is a common way to argue in 
favour of the right to keep some things from others, e.g. information about one's sexual 
orientation from one's employer (see VII.4.1). 
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that one right overrides another.48 But it is not clear at all, on ly on the basis of 
genetic information being very personal and sensitive, which right should 
override which. The problem is a general one for the sensidvity-argument: it is 
not obvious what the fact that some piece of information can be considered to 
be very sensitive in relation to one individual entails, since it may be equally 
sensitive in relation to another individual. The implications of the argument 
are thus unclear, to say the least. In itself, it is not obvious what practical moral 
implications it supports, if any. Since there are no other arguments to support 
a basic negative right to gain access to or receiving genetic information (at least 
that I know of), the claim t hat there is such a basic right seems to be a dead end 
(at least until someone comes up with another argument). 
Let me clarify what this argument against the sensitivity-argument says. It 
does not say that any rights are implied by genetic information (allegedly) 
being especially sensitive. Rather, it points to the vagueness of the argument by 
saying that it is very unclear which rights, if any, the argument supports. As we 
will see, it might as well be used to argue in favour of privacy-rights (see 
VII.4.1), which, then, would come into conflict with the right to know for the 
reasons stated. Why, then, one might ask somewhat rhetorically, think that it 
supports one of these rights over the other? Since the argument does not give 
any clue to an answer to this question, it remains true that if the argument 
founds rights, it founds conflicting rights (or the argument itself present no 
reasons to the contrary, at least). 
Furthermore, even if one grants a basic right to genetic information about 
oneself, founded on the sensitivity of genetic information, it is not clear what 
kind of right is supported by this foundation and, thus, that it rules out 
regulation of commercial genetic home testing. For what the sensitivity-
argument may found is a r ight to gain access to and learn about one's genetic 
constitution, not a right to gain access to and learn about one's genetic 
constitution in any w ay o ne pleases. For instance, all reasonable accounts of rights 
would agree that it would be wrong of a person to learn about her genetic 
information by threatening a geneticist with a gun into performing a test, and 
that such a threat may legitimately be prevented.49 Thus, the alleged right does 
48 One might daim that one right always overrides the other, or that they have different weights, 
depending on the situation, so that sometimes one override the other and other times it is t he 
other way around. See IV. 1.1.2. 
49 Extreme and fanciful situations, e.g. if lives could be saved, may of course be exceptions. 
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not necessarily rule out surrounding regulation designed to protect the 
interests of others, of society or even of oneself. 
One way of respecting a general unspecified "right to know" is to offer 
genetic testing in the public health care setting. Another is to allow people to 
use commercial genetic testing, given that they are also offered genetic 
counselling. If both these rights are granted, a wide range of rights of 
individuals is, in effect, granted: the negative right not to be prevented from 
getting genetic testing from public health care, for instance, and the positive 
right of tested individuals to have access to counselling whenever tested. Yet 
another way to respect an unspecified right to know is, of course, to allow 
people to purchase genetic testing under whatever terms they see fit. But it 
does not follow from the sensitivity-argument that it is this right to know that 
should be respected. And that is what is required of the sensitivity-argument to 
support the Radical Libertarian. 
2.2 Rights derived from basic rights 
2.2.1 Ubertarianism 
One could resort to arguing in favour of a r ight to gain access to and receive 
genetic information about oneself on the ground that these rights can be 
derived from other basic rights. One general and principled way of doing this 
is to defend the Radical Libertarian's position regarding genetic testing with 
reference to Ubertarianism in general. I will present the basic tenets of 
libertarianism closer when discussing justice (see VTL5.2.2).50 However, for 
now it is enough to be acquainted with the core of libertarianism: that normal 
adult persons whose capacity and competence to make decisions is not in any 
serious way diminished, should be allowed to (i.e. should not be prevented 
from) consent to whatever arrangements they themselves want and act 
accordingly, at least as long as they do not violate the rights of others. 
Applied to the question of home testing, the reasoning that tries to take us 
from general libertarianism to the Radical Libertarian's position may be 
adumbrated as follows. Voluntary, i.e. mutually consented, transactions on the 
market should not be prevented. For instance, P may not legitimately be 
interfered with if P voluntarily establishes a c ontract that gives P a genetic test 
in exchange for economic compensation and another person (or a group of 
voluntarily cooperating people in a company) may not legitimately be 
50 We are here primarily concerned with Nozick's brand of libertarianism. 
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interfered with if they offer P this test, given the terms of the contract she and 
they voluntarily consent to. To by force or threat of force (or other sanctions 
that are not the result of normal market competition) interfere with P is to 
violate P's right to engage in voluntary transactions. This is wrong, according to 
libertarianism. Thus, the state should allow the selling and buying of genetic 
testing, and the marketing of these tests. Furthermore, given libertarian 
premises, it seems illegitimate for the state to limit this right to establish 
contracts, e.g. by demanding that the contracts have a certain content (for 
instance, by requiring genetic counselling). It also seems illegitimate to 
interfere with companies advertising about these services. 
If one accepts this line of reasoning, it seems as though one has to accept 
that it is wrong (at least of the state) to prevent people from gaining access to 
genetic testing, since it is wrong to prevent them from gaining knowledge of 
the procedure to obtain genetic information by banning advertisement for 
genetic testing. It also seems as though one has to accept that it is wrong to 
prevent people from receiving genetic information, since it is wrong to 
prevent people from buying genetic tests in any way they seem fit and it is 
equally wrong to prevent companies from selling them in any way they seem 
fit (at least as long as no rights are violated). That is, there is no direct basic right 
to gain access to and receive genetic information about oneself, but it is 
generally wrong of the state to prevent transactions resulting in the gaining and 
receiving of genetic information. So libertarian grounds seem to support 
derived negative rights to genetic information in the way advocated by Radical 
Libertarianism. 
The basic tenet of libertarianism is, then, that normal adult persons whose 
capacity and competence to make decisions is not in any serious way 
diminished, should be allowed to (i.e. s hould not be prevented from) consent 
to whatever they themselves want, at least as long as they do not violate the 
rights of others. As we will we see later, libertarianism can be criticised on 
moral grounds (see VH.5.2.2). Furthermore, it is doubtful whether the 
conclusions about free markets can be inferred from the moral premises of 
(Nozick's brand of) libertarianism (see VIL5.2.2). However, regardless of this, 
there are problems with the argument from libertarianism to the Radical 
Libertarian's position. Surprisingly enough, the latter position is perhaps not a 
self-evident implication of the former. This is due to the vagueness of the 
term "consent". Let me elaborate this point. 
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According to libertarianism, in order for any transaction to be legitimate, i.e. 
in order for the justice of the situation before the transaction to be preserved 
to the situation after the transaction, the parties of the transaction must consent 
to the transaction. This is a basis for libertarianism and one of the 
characteristics of it that gives it some of its intuitive appeal ("what can be 
wrong with whatever consenting adults voluntarily agree to do?"). However, in 
order for a person, P, to truly consent to X (whatever X is), P has to know 
what X is about. Otherwise, mutual consent could be the case even though 
one of the parties was gravely deceiving the other — something that evidently 
runs counter to the basic tenet of libertarianism. More specifically, there are 
two ways in which the condition of consent may fail to be fulfilled: 1) If P 
thinks that what she has expressed consent to is something else than it actually 
is, 2) If P has no or not enough knowledge about what she has expressed 
consent to in order to be able to comprehend what it is. S o expressed con sent is 
not sufficient for actual or valid c onsent. This is why the widely accepted 
requirement in biomedical ethics is not consent but informed consent 
(Wilkinson, 2003, p 76-77). 
One exception to 1) and 2) may be if one consents to X "whatever X is". 
But even this may be doubted. Let us take an example. Jill asks Jack if he wants 
to participate in a game of mensur. Mensur is a ki nd of fencing game, the aim 
of which is to scar the opponent's face. Let us assume that Jack says: "Yes, that 
will be fun!" Can we thus conclude that Jack has consented to playing the 
game? It seems that we cannot if, for instance, Jack thinks that mensur is the 
same thing as a friendly game of poker. Whatever one feels about Jack having a 
reason to enter the game given what he has expressed, we cannot conclude that 
he has consented to pl aying men sur. What he really has consented to is a friendly 
game of poker and nothing else. The situation is similar if Jack has no idea 
about what mensur is or if he only has very vague ideas about it, in which case 
he has consented to nothing in particular or to something equally 
indeterminate, as are his ideas about mensur. Once again, this means that 
consent has to be informed in order to be valid consent at all. 
The question of consent has bearing upon the question of deceit and 
manipulation. If Jill knows that Jack thinks that mensur is the same thing as a 
friendly game of poker, she is taking advantage of this fact to get "consent" for 
something that Jack really is not consenting to at all (let us, plausibly, assume 
that Jack would not consent to mensur if he really knew what it was). This is, at 
least, manipulation and maybe also deceit. According to libertarianism, 
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transactions based on deceit are illegitimate, and plausibly so. The problem is 
that the notion of deceit, like consent, is rather vague. Let us assume that Jack 
has a crush on Jill and would express consent to almost anything she 
proposed. Let us furthermore assume that 2) is the case, i.e. Jack has (almost) no 
idea about what mensur is. Is this deceit, manipulation or what? Is the consent 
illegitimate or are there good reasons that Jill may scar his face without him 
explicitly saying that he is willing to risk such an outcome? 
We may, of course, argue that Jack should not really have expressed his 
consent without proper knowledge about what he was consenting to. We may, 
furthermore, argue that once he did, he is forced to face the consequence that 
Jill is morally permitted to disfigure his face. But it is doubtful, to say the least, 
whether Jack has consented to mensur. And if consent is the basis of the morality 
we are appealing to, it is doubtful if there is any reason why Jill may slice his 
face up. And it is neither obvious that someone saying "propose any 
transaction, I am consenting to it whatever it is" makes the proposed 
transaction legitimate. One may think that this leaves too much moral 
manoeuvre to exploit emotionally or otherwise dependant persons. 
The lingering question, that is the reason for the vagueness of the notion of 
consent, is how much knowledge about a transaction is required in order for 
the transaction to be legitimate. One proposal is "all the knowledge the 
potentially consenting parties have (or easily can find out) that would affect the 
other party's decision of whether or not to consent to the transaction". This 
proposal has the advantage of usefulness when it comes to defining 
manipulation. To manipulate is to withhold information that the other party 
would consider relevant in order to decide whether or not to engage in the 
transaction. Furthermore, it is hard to see how any more limited demand on 
consent would preserve the intuitive appeal of the basic moral tenet of 
libertarianism. 
However, this demand makes the duties of commercial enterprises that are 
selling genetic tests rather far-reaching. The discussion is thus about the scope 
and strength of commercial enterprises duty to offer "accurate" (Takala, 2000, 
p 97) or "adequate" (Hoedemaekers and ten Have, 1998, p 217) genetic testing 
and information. How much information should the seller provide to the 
buyer? 
If the moral basis of the practice is to be found in libertarianism, the seller 
should provide enough information in order to meet the demands of valid 
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consent. That is, then, all information that the seller has (or easily can find out) 
that is of relevance to the buyer. What does this mean, besides the obvious 
consequence that the seller must not lie or communicate the information in an 
outright deceitful way? 
Well, different buyers will want different information and different 
amounts of information, and they may need yet other pieces of information in 
order to decide what use to make of the test result. As a consequence, the 
seller must find out what the buyer wants to know about the product and what 
they need to know in light of what they are striving for. In the case of such a 
complicated product as genetic testing this will likely require genetic 
counselling. The general point is that sellers must anticipate what buyers may 
want and need to know, in order to be able to provide for that information.51 
This leads to the rather surprising conclusion that even libertarians may have 
to welcome certain regulations (over and above the regulations accepted by the 
Radical Libertarian). The minimal state has an obligation to preserve the justice 
of transactions and to compensate for the violations of just transactions. In 
order to safeguard consent (which is the basis of just transactions) the state 
would have to supervise the quality of tests and the truthfulness and 
completeness of the information provided by the companies. Maybe they have 
to legislate in order to guarantee that counselling is provided whenever genetic 
testing is done, if this particular good is of such a complex kind that careful 
disclosing of information is required in order to guarantee proper consent. 
Given the complexity of the results of many genetic tests this may very well be 
the case. 
However, this may seem to run counter to the spirit of liberty of 
libertarianism. Should not the individual herself be able to determine how 
much information she wants? Should she really be forced to receive 
"accurate" knowledge?52 That would seem plausible only if she is obliged to 
have such knowledge — and that seems implausible indeed. 
This way of putting it is to misconceive the basis of the regulations, 
however. The question is not one about individuals' obligation to know, but 
about individuals' right to the information she considers relevant for deciding 
51 Hoedemaekers and ten Have, 1998, p 223, makes a related poin t: "Free choice requires adequate 
information about the product." 
52 Takala makes these points (2000, p 97). 
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on whether or not to engage in a transaction. In order to see to it that she gets 
that information, regulation of the party providing the information (the 
commercial enterprise selling genetic testing) is necessary. The regulation is 
necessary, not in order to ensure that the buyer knows this-and-that, but in 
order to ensure that the seller provides the information that is relevant to the 
buyer. This may, for instance, be information about the uncertainty of the test 
(that it only gives an indication of a h igher probability of some condition and 
not a prediction and what this means), about the possibility of false positives 
and negatives and so on. The commercial enterprise cannot presuppose that 
this information is irrelevant. Either they ask if the person wants it, or they 
presuppose (on the basis of normal psychology) that this is the kind of 
information that probably is r elevant for the buyer and inform her. In order to 
try to ensure that rights are respected, the minimal state should implement 
regulations to this effect.53 The most obvious candidate is maybe a 
governmental board inspecting the quality of the marketing of genetic testing 
and the tests that actually are offered. But if that is too preventive for the 
libertarian spirit, at the very least, rights to retroactive compensation in cases 
where the requirement of informed consent have not been met must be 
enforced by society. 
To conclude, it is not obvious that libertarianism implies the position of 
the Radical Libertarian. Rather, if libertarianism takes seriously its own basic 
commitments to consent, some Moderate Liberal position seems to be 
warranted. 
2.2.2 Kantian autonomy 
Another foundation for a general defence of Radical Libertarianism may be 
sought in a Kantian notion of autonomy. In the debate about the right to know, 
there is a widespread understanding of this notion, according to which one 
can argue from autonomy to a duty to make rational choices and from this to a 
duty to know, e.g. about genetic information (Harris & Keywood, 2001; Laurie, 
1999, Rhodes 1998).54 
Takala (2000, p 98) suggests that this line of reasoning may be thought to 
support some kind of regulation of commercial genetic testing, since rational 
53 Or at least see to it that those whose rights are not respected are duly compensated. It is 
unclear, on libertarian premises, whether the role of the state is to prevent rights from being 
violated or just help those whose rights has been violated with receiving compensation. 
54 I will question both this interpretation of Kant and this line of reasoning (see V.3.1). 
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decision-making requires accurate information, and this may be promoted by 
regulation (e.g. an official board that controls the adequacy of the tests that are 
being marketed). However, Takala questions this line of reasoning. Her main 
complaint is (hat the Kantian argument in favour of a duty to know, even if 
valid, is irrelevant to the question of regulation. This is the case since "Kant's 
philosophy deals primarily with the morality of individuals" rather than "the 
legitimacy of the social regulation of people's lives" (Takala, 2000, p 98). 
Questions of regulation should rather be settled by a Millian account of 
autonom? "which maintains that we are allowed to make uninformed and even 
self-destructive choices as long as we do not significantly harm others by 
doing so." (Ibid) 
These remarks can be questioned on several accounts. Firstly, it is based on 
a misinterpretation of Kant, who quite explicitiy defended that his account of 
morals (testing on his concept of autonomy) should be the basis of laws — 
namely legal perfect duties.55 Secondly, it is highly controversial whether or 
not the potential harm presented by commercial genetic testing is significant 
enough to warrant regulation. I will return to this latter question (see IV.2.3.2). 
However, Takala invokes further considerations of Kantian autonomy 
against prohibition and regulation of commercial home testing: 
If indviduals have a duty to make their own decisions, then they must 
not b; legally forced into acting in accordance with the opinions of 
others... Rational, autonomous individuals can have a moral duty to seek 
the btst possible information concerning their health status. But they 
must decide for themselves where and how to find this information, 
otherwise they would be acting 'heteronomously' — following 
somebody else's law. (Takala, 2000, p 99) 
This coud be interpreted as st ating that the Kantian conception of autonomy 
is incompatible with regulating duties by law. However, as a lready mentioned, 
this is no: the case. What Kant claims is that acting out of duty (out of reverence 
for the noral law or autonomously) cannot be legislated, and that a person 
who acts i n accordance w ith the moral law only because she wants to avoid 
55 See e.g. Eant, 1797 Part I, Chapter II, Section I about property rights. See Nell, 1975, p 44-51 for 
an expositwn of legal rights based on the Categorical Imperative. It may of course be questioned 
whether th: duty to have knowledge of one's genetic constitution is a legal perfect duty. 
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punishment, is acting heteronomously. That is, legislation cannot guarantee that 
people will act with the proper motives. This is not to say that (Kantian) 
autonomy cannot and should not be the basis of regulation and legislation of 
external behaviour (including, perhaps, genetic data-collecting behaviour). 
According to Kant, autonomy could and should. What Takala would need to 
claim is that a Kantian cannot validly infer from the fact that something is a 
duty that it should also be enforced by regulation. But in order to demonstrate 
that, she needs to provide further arguments. 
However, Takala's argument can be reformulated, so that it may be thought to 
support the Radical Libertarian. One way of conceiving of autonomy inspired 
by Kant is that we (normal, decision competent adults) should be treated as 
autonomous or, to put it differently, should have our autonomy respected. 
This can be understood in different ways. A Millian way to understand it is 
that we should be allowed to make whatever decisions we want to and to be 
allowed to act on these decisions, at least as long as we do not (seriously) harm 
others. A more Kantian version of this is that we should be allowed to make 
our own decisions and act on them, since this is a way of others to treat us as 
worthy. Let me elaborate this last point. 
If a benevolent person, P, is coercing or manipulating another individual, Q, 
into making a decision this must be due to the fact that P does not think that Q 
realises that this is the decision he ought to reach (according to P:s opinion). 
This is equivalent to P saying to Q: "You are unable to deal with this issue in 
an appropriate manner, in contrast to me, who therefore should handle this". 
This is to treat Q as non-autonomous - as u nable to govern herself duly. This 
is to treat Q in a c ondescending or patronizing way, as if she were no better 
than a ch ild we have to take care of in order for her not to get herself or 
others into trouble.56 This may reasonably be said to be not to respect Q, or to 
treat Q as unworthy. 
It is perhaps something like this that Takala is expressing in the last 
sentence of the quote. Not to trust the individual herself to decide if and how 
she should gain genetic knowledge is to treat her non-autonomously or 
without respect for her autonomy. To forbid the individual from gaining 
access to genetic information about herself is to say t o the individual that she 
cannot deal with this information as she sees fit herself. Why? Presumably 
56 This is Kantian in spirit: see Kant 1797, Part II, Duties of Virtues to Others, Section II, §§37-41. 
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because the individual is not considered to be able to handle this appropriately 
herself. For instance, to make it compulsory for the individual to take genetic 
counselling in order to be tested is to say that the individual is not capable of 
deciding herself whether or not she should take the counselling - this society 
must order her to do so for her own sake. 
Some Moderate Liberals seem to be able to answer this line of reasoning. 
They can once again make the point made above concerning libertarianism: 
regulation does not have to enforce an (alleged) obli gation on the individual to 
get certain information (in a c ertain way). Some regulation is directed towards 
companies to enforce their duty to provide accurate information or adequate 
testing if that is what is sought after. However, this can be used only to argue 
in favour of some regulation, e.g. governmental control of the quality of tests 
and/or information about them and advertising for them, and maybe even 
regulated demand for genetic counselling when performing genetic testing 
(with the proviso that individuals should be free to decline such counselling). 
It cannot be used to argue in favour of total prohibition, or even partial 
prohibition of genetic testing. It can neither be used to argue in favour of 
banning individuals from getting unsupervised information, if that is what they 
want. 
But there is a more general weakness with this Kantian argument of treating 
persons as autonomous. The problem is that it always applies. Whatever 
regulation of whatever line of conduct is saying: "this is not up to you to 
decide — it is forbidden to do this and this". And it is not hard at all to think of 
situations where individual's right to be treated as autonomous seems to be 
overridden by other ethical concerns. For one, we have the right to be 
protected from harm. In a falling scale, legislation of murder, fraud, false 
marketing, smoking, and wearing a seatbelt when driving have been considered 
to be justified in order to avoid harm to others (and, sometimes, to the 
individual herself). If one considers this and other ethical factors as relevant 
for justifying regulations, it is thus not enough to state that a certain regulations 
fails to treat some individuals as autonomous in some respects. 
Furthermore, the Kantian conception of autonomy is far from 
unambiguous (see e.g. V.3.1). It may, and indeed has, been interpreted in other 
ways, so as to form the basis of a defence of regulation (Hoedemaekers and ten 
Have, 1988, p 222-223). The interpretation I have in mind takes the second 
formula of Kant's Categorical Imperative as its point of departure, namely the 
Formula of Humanity: "Act in such a way that you always treat humanity, 
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whether in your own person or in the person of any other, never simply as a 
means, but always at the same time as an end." (Kant, 1785, p 429)57 If emphasis 
is put on the formula's parts about the treatment of others, the following 
reading does not seem to be farfetched: "[T]his means especially to respect the 
capacity of other people to act freely, to respect other people as beings with 
their own life-projects, interests and values, and as people who can engage in 
purposeful action to achieve their various ends." (Hoedemaekers and ten Have, 
1988, p 222) 
Hoedemaekers and ten Have do not flesh out in any detail how this reading 
of Kant can form the basis of any regulation, but I think that their line of 
reasoning is something along the following lines (Hoedemaekers and ten Have, 
1988, p 222-223). If commercial enterprises provide information about their 
testing that is false, o ne-sided, biased or plays on the anxiety of the consumer 
in order to get her to purchase genetic testing, the consumer is not making that 
decision in a manner she would have if she had not been thus influenced. 
This, it may be argued, damages the autonomy of the individual (see IV.2.3.1). 
Another more direct interpretation is that when commercial agents try to sell 
genetic testing to buyers without disclosing relevant information, they are 
treating them as a means only for their financial aims, i.e. f or reasons of making 
a buck, they omit to providing relevant information. In order to try to ensure 
that this will not happen, an independent body supervising the quality of 
advertising is needed. This is, of course, a k ind of regulation more intrusive 
than the one the Radical Libertarian would concur to. 
2.3 Rights derived from values 
2.3.1 Consequences of autonomy 
One can try to derive negative rights to genetic information from 
considerations of autonomy, not by claiming that such a rights can be derived 
from a basic right to have one's autonomy respected, but on the basis that the 
recognition of such rights are conducive to autonomy conceived of as a value 
to promote. This idea can be formulated in different ways and the aspects of 
autonomy emphasised may vary. In the discussion of the negative right to 
home testing, Takala, 2000, refers to "the freedom of commercial testing" 
57 According to Kant there is a very close link between autonomy and morally praiseworthy 
behaviour (see also V.3.1.2): the formula of autonomy is said to be derived from the Categorical 
Imperative (Kant, 1789, p 431-434). 
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(Takala, 2000, p 99), and claims that a defence of regulations in this area is a 
defence of "policies which would curtail the freedom of choice of the [...] 
clientele" (Takala, 2000, p 100).58 She is thus emphasising the importance of not 
being prevented from trying to obtain genetic information about oneself in 
the way one seems fit, on the grounds that this would reduce something that is 
to be cherished: the "freedom of choice". This can be interpreted in Une with 
the idea discussed above of cherishing a right to home tests from the negative 
right to have one's autonomy respected. However, it may as well be interpreted 
as the idea that a negative right to home tests would promote the autonomy of 
people. Since the former idea has already been rejected, the latter 
interpretation is the more charitable one. 
However, considerations of autonomy as a value to promote are ambiguous 
regarding the question of regulation of commercial genetic home testing. It has 
been claimed that the practice of unregulated commercial genetic testing may 
reduce the autonomy of some parties in some regards (Hoedemaekers & ten 
Have, 1998). 
The question, then, is what system of negative rights, and thus what system 
of regulation, that such considerations of autonomy speak in favour of. Let us 
start by looking into the negative right to gain access to genetic information, in 
the sense of getting to know about a method for obtaining the information. 
Various ways of regulating the possibility of advertising about genetic testing 
are examples of circumscriptions of this right. We will then move on to 
investigate the question of the relevance of autonomy to the idea of a negative 
right to receive genetic information. 
The right to gain access 
Would a system of uncontrolled advertising for commercial genetic home 
testing pose a threat to individuals' autonomy? And is this threat serious 
enough to warrant regulation? Both those who are inclined to defend and 
oppose unregulated commercial genetic testing seem to agree that the answer 
to the first question is yes. Uncontrolled advertisement for commercial genetic 
home testing may do this by being "manipulative" (Hoedemaekers & ten Have, 
58 The last quote is picked from a line of reasoning about the responsibilities of medical 
professionals towards their clientele. According to Takala, such a responsibility may justify 
warnings from the professionals against commercial genetic testing, but not regulations of it ( p 99-
100). 
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1998, p 222; Takala, 2000, p 91) or "deceptive" (Hoedemaekers & ten Have, 1998, 
p 223). 
When is advertising deceptive? Hoedemaekers and ten Have use the 
following definition of deception (regarding advertising): "deception occurs 
when a false belief, which an advertisement either creates or takes advantage of, 
substantially interferes with the ability of people to make rational consumer 
choices" (1998, p 223).59 It should be added that the advertiser must believe that 
the belief she is trying to convey is false and intend to convey the belief in 
order for it to be deception. As previously argued, consent is incompatible 
with deception. Therefore, even a libertarian should agree that transactions 
based on deception are illegitimate. And rightly so: to be deceived into 
choosing something X, is not to choose X freely, since the thing that one 
would choose is not the thing that one gets. Thus, even the Radical Libertarian 
should accept minimal regulation against deceptive advertising. The question is 
if one should go further. Should we also regulate advertising that, although not 
outright deceptive, may be seen as manipulative? 
When is advertising manipulative? Hoedemaekers and ten Have suggest that 
this is the case when it "impair[s] people's capacity for critical evaluation of 
arguments offered" (1998, p 223).60 For instance, this is the case when 
advertisement "exploit[s] consumers' emotions or anxieties" (Ibid).61 Even 
though the definition leaves room for reasonable disagreement on its scope of 
application (e.g. due to the vagueness of "critical evaluation"), I think that the 
following example would qualify as manipulative. 
An image of the future. As the news is about to start on TV, there is a 
commercial and you get out of the sofa to make some coffee. Half-way 
there, your attention is caught by a deep, confident, and trustworthy 
voice: "Each person carries 8 to 10 genetic predispositions for serious 
and lethal genetic disease. Research has shown that many cases of cancer 
and cardiac diseases are inherited". The speaker — a white haired, stately 
man in a white coat with wise and calm eyes — wanders through 
impressive laboratories. The image fades to colourful, animated DNA-
59 Hoedemaekers and ten Have, 1998, p223, are quoting this definition from Boatright. 
60 It could be claimed that a definition of manipulation should also include the intention of the 
sender to impair the receiver's capacity in this way. I will disregard this component, however, since 
it will be of no consequence for the argument to follow. 
61 See Takala, 2000, p 91, for a similar account of manipulation. 
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models and then to dark interiors of ordinary homes, where people 
with hollow eyes gaze through rainy windows. The children by their 
side all have the same concerned expressions in their faces when 
looking at the adults. A new voice enters: " To put one's worries to rest. 
To secure the future of oneself and the loved ones. It is now possible 
for you too! BioKit 3000 is easy to use and gives you knowledge within 
a few minutes. BioKit 3000 is sold at your local pharmacy and 
supermarket. BioKit 3000. Your future in jour hands!" In the meanwhile, 
the image shift to bright summer's scenes in beautiful, affluent 
surroundings. Happy, well-dressed people turn their attention towards a 
colourful plastic box, holding it in their hands. In the final scene, a 
happy family with the children in the middle is gathered around the 
little box, glowing with joy. T he camera is closing in until you see that 
the box has a little glass window, where the picture of cheerful face is 
shown next to the word "H~F.AT.THY" an d "BioKit 3000™". (Munthe, 
1998, p 11-12. My translation) 
Naturally, whether the commercial in this example is manipulative according 
to the definition of manipulation mentioned above will be relative to an 
individual. Some people's capacity to critically evaluate the commodity in 
question may not be affected, since they know very much about genetic testing 
beforehand and are not easily worried. However, this imagined commercial 
gives the impression that a person's health is positively affected by genetic 
testing. This is not so. It may be the case that some health risks can be reduced 
to some extent. So the commercial is not lying. But someone unfamiliar with 
genetics may easily get the wrong impression of the potential of the test. 
Furthermore, the commercial suggests that untested people lead an insecure 
life, worried and scared of their future. However, people who have taken 
presymptomatic genetic testing may become more worried about the future 
than those who have not (see EL2.2.2). In order to cut a long story short, this 
commercial is probably manipulative, since it would give the impression that 
the benefits of genetic testing are bigger than they are and that they pose no 
risk of harm. 
Does manipulative advertising impair the autonomy of individuals? It may 
very well do so, in several respects. First, manipulative advertising may have a 
negative impact on the authenticity of a person. As we have seen, manipulation 
is typically th e kind of cause of a desire that would make a person be inclined 
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to disapprove of having the desire if she knew that she had been manipulated 
(see Ü.2.2.3). For instance, if one were to find out that one desires to take a 
genetic test only because a TV-commercial had played on an unfounded fear 
one has, one probably would be inclined to disapprove of that desire. Second, 
manipulation may make it more difficult to reach a decision if i t plays on one's 
anxieties and fears (see Et.2.3.2 and IH.2.3.2). And third, the advertisement may 
have a negative impact on the extent to which one lives the life that one wants 
to live. It is not implausible to assume that manipulative advertisement will 
make some persons purchase tests that they would not have purchased if they 
had known more about the test. That is, they will purchase tests on poor 
grounds and without proper knowledge about how to interpret the test. This 
may, for instance, lead to misinterpretation of the tests, leading to unnecessary 
anxiety and depression. And a troubled mind will generally have a h arder time 
to realise her basic desires (see e.g. II.2.3.2). 
However, this may not warrant regulation. Generally, in Western societies, 
advertisements that play on people's anxieties (e.g. for their physical 
appearance) are allowed, as ar e advertisement that are one-sided and biased in 
omitting to announce information about the product that most people would 
consider relevant for purchasing it.62 
What it boils down to is a conflict between two sorts of freedom (or 
autonomy): the freedom to act on a market without interference through 
societal regulation and the freedom of individuals to live a nd to be able to live 
the lives they want without being manipulated. It is far from self-evident 
which freedom is most important. 
However, it is obvious that both kinds of freedoms are granted some 
importance in our society. Generally, the more important a kind of choice is 
considered to be in our society for people's possibility to live the lives that 
they want to live, the more inclined we are to regulate in order to avoid 
manipulation. For instance, housing is considered so important that only 
regulated and authorised house brokers are allowed to inform private persons 
about the standard of the housing. And similarly, the more potential a 
commodity has to harm people's possibility to live the lives that they want to 
live, the more inclined we are to regulate in order to avoid manipulation. For 
62 As we have seen, it is not obvious whether a libertarian should agree to allow this, since 
manipulation also seems to undermine legitimate consent. 
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instance, many countries have regulation surrounding the marketing and 
selling of alcohol or pharmaceuticals. On the other hand, advertising for soaps, 
golf equipment and napkins is not that regulated. 
Generally, the relevance of some genetic testing to important life-choices is 
high. For instance, testing for Huntington's disease or BRCA1 often is a life-
changing experience with drastic consequences for the person's life (Marteau 
& Richards, 1996, p 4-38). These kinds of tests (for very serious late onset 
disorders) also have the potentiality of creating much incapacitating 
psychological harm (see II.2.2.2). Other tests probably are less important for life 
choices and probably have less potential to cause harm. For instance, the test 
mentioned at the outset of this section, which reveals a certain sensitivity for 
certain diets might be an example. 
To conclude, in order to determine whether or not certain regulations 
should be implemented with reference to autonomy or "freedom" as a value 
to promote, it is not sufficient to establish that the regulation prevents some 
acting parties from doing certain things on a market. One also has to determine 
whether the freedom of others and freedom in other normatively important 
senses are affected. Freedom is never freedom, period. Freedom is the 
freedom to something in relation to somebody else (in this regard freedom is 
like rights and, indeed, correlative to them). Also free (in one sense) 
commercial acting parties can circumscribe the freedom of others, e.g. by 
manipulation. If this circumscription is serious enough, regulation may be 
warranted. And, as we have seen, at least some cases of advertising for 
commercial genetic testing seem to fall in this category. 
The right to receive 
Even if considerations of autonomy as a value to promote do not support a 
negative right to gain access to genetic information unequivocally, it may 
support a right to receive such knowledge. However, this has been questioned: 
Hoedemaekers and ten Have, 1998, have claimed that unregulated commercial 
genetic testing may have negative consequences in terms of positive liberty or 
autonomy. These authors emphasise two ways in which this may happen: by 
giving rise to social pressure to use genetic testing and by allowing the 
advertisement of testing that has not been the subject of quality control. We 
discussed the last question above, and will now turn to the first. 
Hoedemaekers and ten Have expresses concern for the social pressure 
commercial genetic testing may give rise to: 
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Individual autonomous decision-making may be compromised if 
widespread availability of commercial genetic tests leads to forms of 
social pressure to also use them. If genetic tests are easy available the 
tendency to make individuals accountable for not using them may 
become stronger. Commercialisation can also intensify another, circular 
process: marketing of tests increases their use, increased use may lead to 
enhanced social pressure, enhanced social pressure may lead to further 
creation of demand and this to a further increase in sales. 
(Hoedemaekers and ten Have, 1998, p 219) 
Naturally, it is an empirical question as to how likely this scenario is. Some 
studies may nonetheless be taken to show that it is not unlikely (Hoedemaekers 
& ten Have, 1998, p 219). Furthermore, there are analogous examples in society. 
For instance, commerce has reinforced a social pressure to have cellular 
phones and e-mail and people are held accountable for not always being 
available b y these means. 
The remaining question is how and to what extent this compromises the 
autonomy of people. Even if there will be a so cial pressure on people to use 
various genetic tests, individuals can still refrain from doing so.63 However, 
Hoedemaekers and ten Have are not claiming that autonomous choices are 
made impossible by social pressure, only that "autonomous decision-making 
may be compromised". 
Hoedemaekers and Ten Have do not flesh out this idea, but here is an 
attempt. If there is social pressure to do something, it may be psychologically 
difficult to refrain from doing it (for most people), for instance because most 
people do not want to risk alienation from the community and because most 
people have a tendency to internalise social norms and patterns of behaviour. 
The case is then somewhat similar to the case of coercion by threat. A threat 
always leav es room for choice (you choose your life over your money), but 
still make it difficult for you to choose what you want the most. The 
difference is o nly that, in the case of social pressure, one is not threatened by 
someone in particular, but by one's social circumstances. So even if it is 
possible for any single individual to refrain from genetic testing it may be 
63 This is a minimal sense of autonomy - it is t rue that if o ne chooses to do so, one can refrain 
from doing so. 
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difficult for her to do so, even if she wants to. This can reasonably be 
considered to be a compromising of the autonomy of the individual, 
especially according to the ideal of self-realization presented earlier (see 
m.2.4.2). 
However, it is far from obvious that this mechanism is undesirable, all 
things considered. Whether or not social pressure is something bad must 
depend on what kind of norms and patterns of behaviour it is pressing for. 
The social pressures not to resort to physical violence or to go to work despite 
that you do not feel like it are presumably desirable. So the fact that a practice 
gives rise to a social pressure working for its own maintenance (as maybe 
commercial genetic testing does for genetic testing) can not in itself be a 
sufficient ground for deeming the practice undesirable. Furthermore, I would 
guess that few people would be prepared to defend that the fact that 
commercial genetic testing creates a social pressure to use genetic tests (if that 
is a fact) is, in itself, a r eason to forbid or regulate it (compare with cellular 
phones). What may make people hold such a view would rather be 
considerations of well-being — the fact that social pressure to conduct genetic 
testing pressures the individual to do something that is potentially harmful 
(especially if she would most have preferred to refrain from testing). 
So, on reflection, the fact that unregulated home tests can threaten the 
autonomy of individuals can be an argument in favour of regulating the 
marketing o f the commodity, even if one might be reluctant to forbid it. If a 
widespread use of genetic testing is of questionable value, the pressure to use 
it that may be the result of unregulated commercial testing is certainly 
questionable too. And in the next subsection, I will try to show why one can 
reasonably question the value of unregulated commercial genetic testing. 
2.3.2 Consequences of well-be ing 
One way to argue in favour of a c ertain right is to refer to the consequences in 
terms of well-being of respecting such a r ight. This can be done by arguing 
that respecting the right always is likely to lead to better consequences than not 
doing so. However, in general this move is unlikely to succeed, since one can 
almost always think of a situation when not respecting the right in question 
would have better consequences. A more promising way is thus to argue that 
the societal recognition of a r ight, i.e. by implementing it as a legal right, is 
conducive to general well-being. That is, one can argue that a certain 
institutional setting has better consequences than alternative institutional 
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settings. If such an argument is successful, one has argued in favour of a 
derived legal right from consequentialist premises. This kind of arguments will 
be scrutinized in this section. 
So, are there consequentialist arguments in favour of recognizing some 
negative rights to gain access to and receive genetic information about oneself? 
As we will see, some such arguments have been proposed. The Radical 
Libertarian defends the most extensive system of negative rights, by claiming 
that any interference in the marketing and selling of genetic testing is 
unjustified. First, I will discuss and reject some consequentialist arguments in 
favour of the Radical Libertarian position. I will then argue that the benefits of 
genetic testing are more likely to be realised to a greater extent given certain 
regulations. However, this does not speak in favour of prohibiting commercial 
genetic testing altogether, i.e. the Total Prohibitionist's position. Rather, it 
speaks in favour of some Moderate Liberal position. However, in some cases 
of genetic testing, arguments may support a more prohibitionist position. The 
arguments are of a general kind, both relevant to the right to gain access to and 
receive genetic information through genetic home testing. 
What consequentialist arguments might there be in favour of the Radical 
Libertarian position? Takala, 2000, has a few suggestions of this kind that can be 
used to argue in favour of the "free production and distribution of genetic 
services to the members of the general public" (Takala, 2000, p 89), i.e., 
unregulated selling and marketing of genetic testing, i.e. the Radical 
Libertarian's position. 
"The commercialisation of genetic testing can make the tests accessible to 
larger groups of people." (Takala, 2000, p 89) Of course, commercial genetic 
testing can m ake genetic tests accessible to more people, but this can also be 
accomplished in other ways. One obvious candidate besides commercial 
enterprises is public health care. So, even if it is a good thing that genetic tests 
are accessible to a greater number, this in itself does not speak in favour of 
commertial genetic testing. 
However, to this it may be replied that more tests will be performed if 
commercial enterprises are allowed to offer genetic home testing. Public 
health care may deny testing, e.g. if they think that there are no reasons to 
suspect that a person is a carrier of the gene tested for. These people may then 
resort to home testing if that is available. 
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However, this argument, if sound (which must be an empirical question), is 
at most incompatible with banning genetic testing, not with regulating them, 
e.g. by quality controls. Furthermore, it may be questioned whether these extra 
tests really are a good thing. In order for the line of reasoning to support the 
Radical Libertarian on consequentialistic grounds, one has to argue that these 
extra tests outside public health care increases total welfare. If we confine 
ourselves to the index-persons, it is highly unlikely that this will be the case 
when it comes to serious monogenetic diseases, like Hundngton's disease. If 
there are no suspicions in the form of family history or symptoms, the risk of 
being a carrier of these genes is negligible. On the other hand, there is 
potential harm in the form of false positives, unnecessary anxiety while waiting 
for the result, misinterpretation of the results leading to more anxiety, etc (see 
e.g. II.2.4). A related point can be made regarding testing for multifactorial 
diseases, in which case testing will have low predictive value, which is 
problematic from the point of view of well-being and autonomy (H.2.2.2 and 
n.2.3.2). 
Of course, one might feel that the individual should be free to expose 
herself to these potential harms if they choose to do so. But then the basis is 
not in consequentialistic terms of welfare, but rather in terms of liberty. And, 
as we have seen, it is not clear that considerations of liberty speak 
unequivocally against certain regulation (TV.2.3.1). 
"Commercial genetic testing can increase well-being, reduce suffering, and 
enhance individual freedom and autonomy." (Takala, 2000, p 89) Of course, 
genetic testing can, given the pro per circumstances realise these values for the index-
person (see chapter H, passim). However, this goes for genetic testing in 
general and not for commercial g enetic testing in particular. On the contrary, 
there are good reasons to believe that the circumstances favourable for these 
values to be realised are not present given unregulated home testing. The 
proper understanding that promotes autonomy and well-being is promoted by 
genetic counselling. Unregulated home testing does not have to provide this. 
The reliability of tests that is necessary for proper medical treatment or 
palliation (if there is any) is not guaranteed if there is no official body ensuring 
the quality of the test. To the contrary, much unnecessary suffering in the 
form of anxiety and other psychological damage may follow upon unregulated 
home testing. From this it does not follow that commercial genetic testing 
should be banned. However, it does indicate that the alleged advantages of 
testing may require some monitoring. 
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Takala also refers to the potential economic benefits that unrestricted 
commercial genetic testing may produce: "the production and marketing of 
genetic tests... generate profit and create employment" (2000, p 89) First, this 
may only be a weak form of ceteris paribus argument - other types of 
commodities are heavy regulated or even forbidden, despite their potential of 
huge economic profits.64 Second, different types of regulation probably will 
have different effects on the profitability of commercial genetic testing. For 
instance, there is likely to be very different market effects between total 
prohibition and quality controls of some testing. As always, potential harms 
and benefits of different regulations have to be weighed against each other. 
Third, there may be economic disadvantages with commercial genetic testing, 
especially for public health care (see this subsection below). Finally, profit and 
employment may also be generated by other means than the production, 
marketing and selling of home tests — means that do not pose any of the risks 
produced by genetic tests. 
So much for the consequentialist arguments in favour of the Radical 
Libertarian. However, further arguments can be added in favour of restricting 
the negative right to gain access to and receive genetic information from home 
testing. There are adverse consequences of home testing to first parties (the 
index-person), second parties (genetic and other relatives) and third parties (e.g. 
other commercial enterprises, such as insurance companies). 
The tested individual may suffer the following adverse consequences of 
genetic testing. First, there are concerns of errors in the results of the tests, 
primarily false positives and false negatives (Andrews et al., 1994; 
Hoedemaekers and ten Have, 1998, p 219). As already discussed (see H2.2.1), 
such erroneous results are of course problematic from the point of view of 
the index-person, since they may lead to unnecessary anxiety and unnecessary 
but risky medical interventions (in the case of false positives) or omission of 
needed treatment (in the case of false negatives). 
However, this problem is a general one for genetic and other medical 
testing. In general genetic testing should be reliable (that is, avoid false results) 
in order to avoid harm. In the case of commercial genetic testing the problem 
64 Most obviously, examples are drugs, weapons and such, but also cars, housing and food are 
regulated and controlled in various, probably profit-reducing, ways in most Western societies (e.g. 
the limits on the environmental impact of cars). 
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may be particularly pressing, since commercial interests in profit maximising 
may encourage marketing of less reliable tests. There may be profitability 
without reliability. I f it is generally a good idea to offer only reliable tests, this 
should also hold for commercial tests. Of course, this does not speak in 
favour of banning home testing. But it does speak in favour of controlling 
their reliability. Since it cannot be ensured that the commercial enterprises 
selling the tests have sufficient interest in guaranteeing the reliability of the 
tests, regulations ensuring the reliability should be implemented. 
Second, even if a test is correct, it may be misinterpreted. As frequently 
stated, results of genetic testing are, as a rule, cast in probability estimations (e.g. 
the risk of breast cancer caused by BRCA1). These may be over- or 
underestimated, also leading to the same type of detrimental consequences as 
false positives and negatives. It may also be hard for the individual to see the 
relevance of a s tatement about the relative frequency of disease in a population 
to her own situation (see II.2.3.2). 
Furthermore, some test results can be so vague as to defy any useful 
interpretation. What, for instance, of a test that says that you have an increased 
probability of 10-20% of contracting diabetes within the next 20 years? How 
can this result be the basis of decision and the feeling of certainty often 
sought after when testing? This goes to show that the predictive value of a test 
can be negatively affected by several factors: low risk number, non-definite 
risk number, high probability of being false, or by being about diseases with 
very varying penetrance and expressivity (1.4.1). In all these cases, the value of 
the test for the individual is highly dubious. 
These problems of misinterpretation are intimately connected to 
commercial home testing. Home tests can be performed without any contact 
w:th health care professionals that can aid the person in interpreting the tests. 
Commercial enterprises have no direct interest in giving this aid. In fact, in the 
cases of marketed genetic testing, there have been varied interests from the 
commercial firms to provide information about the tests (Hoedemaekers and 
ten Have, 1998, p 219), so there are empirical indications to this effect. 
Once again, this does not in itself speak in favour of banning commercial 
home testing. But it does speak in favour of regulating the practice in order to 
avoid these negative consequences. One proposed way is to demand that also 
ccmmercial firms selling genetic testing offer genetic counselling whenever 
testing is performed (Hoedemaekers and ten Have, 1998, p 223). 
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There are further positive arguments in terms of positive consequences of 
requiring counselling. There are well-founded worries about the psychological 
damage of genetic testing (Hoedemaekers and ten Have, 1998, p 222, see also 
Ü.2.2.2). Genetic counsellors are trained to give support and recommend 
further help in order to avoid this. Genetic counsellors can also give 
information about medical treatment and palliation, if available. This increases 
the possibility for the individual of getting the care she needs and to avoid or 
ameliorate disease, thus increasing welfare.65 
However, as mentioned, some tests give information that may be difficult 
to use (like the diabetes example above). It seems hard to defend that these 
tests can realise any value for the index-person (see also II.2.2.1 a nd II.23.2). 
Maybe these tests should be banned altogether then. 
If we grant that the onus probandi lies with the prohibitionist, obvious 
adverse effects of the test have to be demonstrated. As we just have seen, 
generally, the less predictive the test is, the less likely it is to realise any of the 
positive values and the more likely it is to realise negative values. Thus, a 
stricter prohibitionist stance seems reasonable regarding tests with very little 
predictive value. The case in favour of prohibition is strengthened if there are 
no preventive measures whatsoever against the condition tested for. 
Commercial genetic home testing may also harm relatives, especially if they do 
not want to have the test result. However, this is not a p articular problem for 
commercial tests, but a general problem of genetic testing (like the problem of 
reliability). Nevertheless, the risk of harm to relatives may be greater in relation 
to home testing than it is in relation to testing performed by health care. The 
reason is that the problems attached to not properly understanding the test in 
question are spread to relatives. As argued, the risk of erroneous or 
misinterpreted results is greater in the absence of safeguarding mechanisms of 
adequate information (as e.g. official quality controls of the tests and 
information about it and counselling about the test and its results). 
Furthermore, in the counselling situation, the index-person is given 
opportunity to reflect about the proper way to disclose the information to 
relatives with the support of a professional with insights in the possible 
65 This last point can also be used to argue that public health care should perform these tests. 
However, this is not necessary, if commercial firms are legally obliged to give the same information 
and the market develops so that all who can benefit from testing can also afford purchasing home 
tests. 
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adverse effects of disclosure. This will help the index-person to disclose the 
information in a manner that is not traumatising for the relatives and their 
relations. 
Once again, this is no argument in favour of banning home testing, but in 
favour of regulating it. There is, of course, no direct conclusion that can be 
drawn about the extent of the counselling that should be required. The matter 
must be settled in a piecemeal manner, looking at the expected adverse 
consequences of not having counselling. Different tests will probably require 
different amounts of counselling, depending e.g. on the seriousness of the 
disease, the predictive value of the test, and the presence or non-presence of 
preventive measures. In some cases, it may be enough to get a pamphlet with 
information; in other cases more extensive counselling may be required. 
Also third parties may suffer from adverse consequences of commercial 
genetic home testing. Insurance companies are sometimes mentioned 
(Hoedemaekers & ten Have, 1998, p 220; Takala, 2000, p 91). Insurance 
companies may suffer from the consequences of the fact that people know 
about their genetic constitution without having this on any record available to 
the insurance company. The problem becomes most acute if partial regulation 
concerning insurance companies' access to genetic information is 
implemented. Partial regulation means that insurance companies are allowed to 
gain access to genetic information that the individual herself has (at least under 
some circumstances), but not to demand that a p reviously untested individual 
should be tested.66 Home testing will make it hard for insurance companies to 
control that the individual does not withhold genetic risk information from 
them. Since they, given partial regulation, cannot demand that new tests be 
made, the individual may use the risk information to purchase more 
favourable insurance policies than the companies would have accepted, had 
they had access to the same information. However, this may be resolved by 
implementing a regulation, which says that commercial firms that perform 
genetic testing should send the result to the insurance company (or something 
like this).67 
Even if the adverse consequences for insurance companies may be 
sidestepped by regulation, other third parties may suffer significantly from 
66 I will present this type of regulation later (see VII. 1). 
67 If the test is actually performed at home, there can be law requiring the commercial enterprise 
to get the result and then to forward it to the insurance company. 
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commercial genetic home testing. I am primarily thinking of public health 
care. Unregulated supply of genetic home testing may lead to an excessive 
financial burden on public health care systems. If there are no impediments 
on the marketing or selling of home tests and public health care abstains from 
doing all the tests that can be done, an increase in demand of these tests will 
probably be the result. This tendency will be reinforced the more different 
kinds of genetic tests are available. This will mean that a lot of recently self-
tested and concerned people will turn to the national health services with 
questions about the result of the tests and demands for further physical 
investigation (Brower, 1997). 
Of course, public health care is not some self-sufficient abstract agent that 
carries this burden. Ultimately, the people of the society are the ones bearing 
the cost. So the potential adverse consequences of unregulated commercial 
consequences eventually affects all these individuals. If public health care is 
desirable,68 and if the public (i.e. the individuals of society) has decided to 
implement such a system, then they ought to be able to protect themselves 
from excessive financial burdens on such a system and, thus, ultimately 
themselves. 
Whether burdens will be excessive is partly an empirical question, 
depending on the extent to which the scenario of increased demands on 
public health care actually will be realised, given that unregulated home tests 
are allowed. The question is partly normative as well: "too much" is an 
implicature of "excessive" and the cost might, after all, be acceptable. For 
instance, some people that would not have discovered their susceptibility to 
preventable diseases might do so, and if they get in touch with public health 
care because of their home testing, this is, ceteris paribus, a good thing. 
However, given that very sparse quality controls are made on genetic home 
testing, there is a risk that many tests are unreliable. Then public health care 
may have to confirm the tests themselves. And given that no demands on 
genetic counselling are made, many needlessly worried people will burden 
public health care. Let us simply call these kinds of costs for the public health 
care systems for excessive costs. Then the following should hold: the more 
excessive costs unregulated genetic home testing results in, the more reason it 
is to regulate the practice in order to reduce the cost. Obviously, this cost has 
68 I will argu e later that are good reasons indeed in favour of a collectively financed system of 
health care insurance, primarily reasons of consequence and justice (see chapter VII). 
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to be compared with the benefits, but, as we have seen, there is little reason to 
believe that unregulated genetic testing will re sult in much benefit in terms of 
welfare. 
This argument in favour of regulation is quite general. It says that we have a 
reason to regulate those tests that will lead to excessive costs. However, the 
argument does not tell us which tests that will lead to excessive costs (this is an 
empirical question). Neither does the argument tell us how they should be 
regulated more precisely. Of course, "in a way as to most efficiently reduce or 
eliminate the excessive costs" is a good general answer. And I have been 
suggesting that quality controls and obligatory counselling (financed by the 
firm and, thus ultimately, the buyer) are two ways of reducing unnecessary 
costs. But prohibition may be needed in some cases. The cost to the public of 
allowing a certain test must then be compared with the benefits of it. It is not 
obvious that the moral calculation will fall out in favour of the Radical 
Libertarian. Probably it will not. 
2.4 Casuistic arguments 
As we have seen, it is far from obvious that normal adult people always should 
be allowed to establish contracts and engage in transactions in any way they see 
fit. Regulations, and thus circumscribing negative rights, may sometimes be 
justified. Nevertheless, freedom should be the rule and societal interference 
should be the exception, one might think. That is, everything that is not 
regulated should be allowed, and regulation must only be implemented if it is 
based on very good reasons. 
Of course, there is no unanimity on what constitutes good reasons for 
regulations. Some (like Locke and Nozick) thinks that only the violations of 
rights call for societal interference, while others (like Mill) seek their 
foundation in serious enough harm (or risk thereof) to others. These 
proposals may be combined and other ethical considerations may enter as well 
(like equality or autonomy). 
However, instead of scanning every possible, or even plausible, ethical 
consideration, the following strategy might help us to settle the question of 
regulation. Let us consider relevantly similar cases and see how they in fact are 
regulated. If there is no obvious reason to doubt that the regulation is flawed, 
we should apply the general standard to the case at hand. 
Takala also applies this strategy to the present question of home testing. 
Since she argues that "other... practices are not subject to constraints, although 
267 
their aim and features are similar to the aim and features of genetic testing" (p 
87), her conclusion comes close to the Radical Libertarian: "not many 
regulations seem justifiable in the context of genetic testing." (p 101) Of 
course, eventually this kind of defence can only be conditional on the 
justifiability of the actual regulation. In order to finally assess it, one has to 
evaluate whether or not the present regulation of the relevantly similar 
practices are, in fact, reasonable or justified (Takala, 2000, p 100). Nevertheless, 
our judgement may be informed by considering the regulations of relevantly 
similar cases. 
What are, then, the relevantly similar cases that speak in favour of very limited 
regulations, if any at all, in the area of commercial genetic testing? Takala puts 
forward the following four: 
Ann would like to be tested for her HIV status. Bob wants to get his 
head examined. Carol wishes to buy a pregnancy test kit. D avid wants an 
astrologer to tell him if the position of the celestial bodies is favourable 
to international peace negotiations. (2000, p 94) 
These cases are compared with Emma, who wants to purchase a genetic test in 
order to find whether or not she has an "increased inherited risk to develop 
breast cancer" (Takala, 2000, p 88). Let us assume that it is the test for BRCA1, 
which we are already familiar with (see 1.4.1) and which is in fact already being 
marketed. 
There are similarities between the cases. We can suppose that the reasons 
for these persons to find out the information in question, is best known to 
themselves (Takala, 2000, p 88). We can furthermore suppose that the 
information provided would affect future decision-making that may concern 
other people than the index-person.69 However, regarding regulations, there 
are differences. As Takala remarks, most countries have regulations demanding 
that the tests of Ann and Bob should be performed "only by qualified 
physicians" (Takala, 2000, p 95). This is different from Carol's pregnancy test, 
which "in many countries.. .can be purchased without any intervention from 
physicians, nurses or social workers" (Takala, 2000, p 101). And regarding 
astrologers, there are hardly any regulations at all. Th ey are "allowed to market 
69 Takala make these suppositions and I will, f or the sake of the argument, accept them. 
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their services in whichever way they wish, and there are no quality controls in 
their work." (Takala, 2000, p 100) 
Takala's aim of criticism seems to be the Moderate Liberal and the Total 
Prohibitionist. Why should Emma's case be like Ann's and Bob's and not 
Carol's (Takala, 2000, p 101)? That is, why should we demand that the test is 
performed by a professional and not at home? And why should not Emma's 
case be treated like David's (Takala, 2000, p 101)? That is, w hy demand quality 
controls and other sorts of interference at all? 
Let us start with comparing the cases of Ann and Bob with the case of 
Carol. There is a very strong reason for treating the case of Ann differently 
than the case of Carol. HIV regularly leads to an infectious and lethal disease, 
unlike pregnancy. Society ought to protect itself from the spreading of the 
disease, since successful prevention of the disease will save lives and avoid 
serious harm. If people are in contact with public health care when testing 
themselves for HIV, the public health care can provide proper care and 
information about how to prevent further spreading of the virus. Since the 
interest of third parties are so vital in this case, it may even be justified with 
quarantine if there is well-founded suspicion that the tested person will not 
comply to the measures necessary for prevention of further spreading. This 
interest is not present in the case of Carol. I will return to the question of what 
relevance this may have for the case of Emma after having considered Bob's 
case. 
In the case of Bob, the reason for treating this differently than the case of 
Carol is another one. In the case of Bob, a person needs much knowledge in 
order to properly perform a head examination. The signs may be hard to 
interpret and it takes training to avoid making the wrong diagnosis on the basis 
of the signs. Moreover, the question of the presence of signs of pathology is 
of tremendous relevance for Bob's life and health. On the other hand, a 
pregnancy test is easy to interpret and very reliable and, although being 
pregnant or not is an important issue for most people, it does not carry with it 
potential threats of the same kind and calibre as a head injury. 
That is the reason why we think that an officially qualified physician should 
perform the head examination — only such a person can do it properly and 
give proper guidance to the patient in light of its potential consequences. This 
does not mean that any individual lacks any r ight to take the "test" and find out 
the result. But in order to get accurate information, which presumably is what 
the patient is looking for, society has implemented regulations in order to 
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ensure the quality of the test. In most countries, the same is done for 
pregnancy test. Before they are permitted for marketing, their quality has to be 
approved by a governmental body. 
So in comparison, there is n othing about Emma's genetic testing for BRCA1 
that excludes official quality control. Furthermore, the geneüc test in question 
is much like the head examination. The test may easily be misunderstood, 
since we are dealing with complicated estimations of probability (see 11.2.3,2). 
As we have seen repeatedly, this may lead to over- or underestimation of the 
significance of the test, which may lead to serious harm (such as unnecessary 
anxiety or omission of well-needed treatment). So genetic testing of this kind 
seems more relevantly similar to Bob's case than Carol's. If demand for testing 
in a public setting is well founded in the case of Bob, it should thus be so in 
the case of Emma. To this it might be added that there is also relevant 
similarity between Emma's case and Ann's, which strengthens the case for 
regulation: since the potential harms threatening Emma may spread to her 
relatives, there is a third party interest to be protected also in this case. So far, 
then, comparisons with relevandy similar cases seem to support regulations 
that the Radical Libertarian would reject. 
But the case of David seems to be somewhat of an anomaly: 
Astrologers are allowed to market their services in whichever way they 
wish, and there are no quality controls in their work. This is puzzling in 
view of the fact that their predictions are even more ambiguous and 
more open to interpretation than genetic test results. Should it be 
inferred from this that even quality control and marketing regulation are 
excessive and illegitimate hindrances on acquiring information in 
western societies? Or should astrologers be required to submit their 
methods and predictions to an independent review board for 
inspection? (Takala, 2000, p 100-101) 
If one grants that the important commodity in all the cases is information, why 
regulate the exchange of some information but not others? Takala assumes that 
David is married to the president of a powerful nation and under this 
assumption we may, not implausibly, assume that the information that David 
will receive will influence important decisions that may affect the lives of 
many people, maybe in a harmful way (let us assume that the information he 
270 
gets makes his wife cancel the peace negotiations, with the result that a m essy 
war continues). We are still generally inclined to reject societal interference 
with regard to this example of free exchange of information. Why not apply 
the same reasoning to the case of Emma, indeed, to all of the cases mentioned 
above? If not, what difference is there between the case of David and the other 
cases that makes regulation illegitimate in this case but not the others? 
There is at least one important difference between the case David and the 
other cases that make regulation called f or in the last cases. There is a generally 
recognized need to protect public's trust in health care institutions. This is one 
(perhaps the most important) basis of the confidentiality between the doctor 
and the patient (Beauchamp & Childress, 2001, p 306-308). It can also be argued 
to be the basis of standard bans on the marketing and prescription of medical 
products that have not been carefully scrutinised. If medical products (like 
genetic testing) are being sold without being quality controlled, there is, of 
course some risk that their quality will be poor. This may contribute to an 
undermining of general trust in medical products and medicine in general. 
This, in turn, may cause widespread reluctance to turn to the institutions of 
medicine, with grave potential harm on general health and welfare as the result. 
All the steps of this line of reasoning are, of course, based on empirical 
hypotheses. But they are generally recognized; probably since the 
consequences of not taking them seriously may be so grave. However, there 
seem to be no parallel societal need to protect the credibility of and trust in 
the institution of astrology. 
In addition, there seem to be another crucial similarity between the cases of 
Ann, Bob and Emma: they are about maladies that can be ameliorated if the 
person is properly guided. This calls for an institutional setting around these 
cases not called for in the case of David. 
Finally, it is not obvious that David should not be prevented. If David's use 
of an astrologer's advice leads, or has a high risk of leading, to grave harm and 
death of other people, this seems to be a reasonable ground for interference. 
Maybe it is not the free exchange of "information" that should be prevented 
and maybe it should not, or cannot effectively, be prevented by regulation. But 
generally, if one grants that avoiding harm is ethically relevant, avoidance of 
serious enough harm is a l egitimate ground for prevention. Thus, if regulating 
home testing can prevent serious enough harm, it should be regulated. As we 
have seen, there are reasons to believe that this may very well be so. 
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2.5 Concluding remarks 
What should we make of all this? Well, first, it should be noted that the fact 
that a tes t is a genetic test is of little relevance in order to determine what kind 
of regulation is called for. A defence of some regulations on some genetic 
home testing does not have to and should not rest on the premise that there is 
something special or unique about genetic information. Rather, arguments for 
and against regulation should, as always, be cast in normatively relevant terms, 
e.g. terms of welfare, harm, rights, justice, and autonomy. 
Second, there seems to be some normatively relevant arguments in favour 
of some regulation (and maybe even prohibition in some cases), pace the 
Radical Libertarian. What kinds of tests that should be regulated and how they 
should be regulated have to be determined in a piecemeal manner, referring to 
the mentioned ethical considerations. 
More specifically, I have argued that the following features of genetic testing 
may make regulations of different kinds justified. Commercial genetic home 
testing should be permitted, given that (and to the extent that) 1) it does not 
undermine general trust in medicine and health care, 2) it does not excessively 
burden public health care financially, and 3) regulations that avoids harm and 
reducing of autonomy are implemented. Regarding 3), I have argued that harm 
and reduction of autonomy can be avoided (or at least ameliorated) by (i) 
controlling the quality of the tests, (ii) controlling the accuracy of the 
advertisement for them, (iii) demanding genetic counselling when testing is 
made, and (iv) prohibiting commercial genetic testing for some conditions 
altogether (maybe by allowing only public health care to make the tests). The 
kinds, degrees, and proper instances of regulation, again, have to be 
determined in a piecemeal manner. However, generally speaking, the more 
serious the disease tested for is, the more unreliable the test is, the more 
difficult it is to interpret the result of the test, the less the predictive value of 
the test, and the less preventive measures are available, the more reason to 
regulate the marketing and selling of the tests. 
The following should also be emphasised. To argue that commercial 
enterprises should be regulated in order to ensure a certain level of quality of 
information or testing is not to bluntly deny the individual's right to know (as 
Takala suggests, 2000, p 87), but foremost to impose certain duties on the 
commercial enterprise of home testing. To be sure, it is to restrict the negative 
right of some parties: commercial enterprises may not sell genetic tests in any 
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way they choose without being prevented, and this also limits the 
opportunities of the buyer. But in another way, some regulations increase the 
rights of individuals regarding genetic testing and information in some way — 
they do not only have a right to require this information, they also have a right 
to require adequate information presented in a useful way and support to deal 
with the consequences of this information when it is required. These are 
positive rights. One can ask what important rights of the individual have been 
lost in this process. 
How does the question of regulation relate to the general question of a 
negative right to know? Well, as already pointed out, some regulations do 
circumscribe such a right. Even if quality controls primarily interferes with 
commercial enterprises, to demand that counselling should be offered when 
buying genetic testing is to limit the way in which individuals can buy genetic 
testing: even if they are free to reject the offer, they cannot buy the testing 
without paying for the counselling. And to ban some testing on the ground 
that the quality of the testing is too poor in some way is obviously to 
circumscribe the individuals right to receive (inferior) genetic information. 
How does this discussion relate to the theoretical right-discussion? Well, 
we have settled some issues regarding the negative right to know. There is no 
such general right, since all re asonable justifications of a negative right to know 
support some system of regulations circumscribing this right. There is 
probably neither any basic negative right, since the arguments to this effect 
fails. If one accepts this, there is no absolute negative right to genetic 
knowledge.70 This is so, since rights derived from values can always be 
overridden by the ethical premises from which they are derived: if rights are 
based on autonomy as a value or well-being, enough autonomy and well-being 
gained by violating the right can justify the violation. The only way to reject 
this possibility is by arguing that respecting the right in question always leads 
to more value, and I have argued that more values probably will be realized by 
recognizing a less extensive system of negative rights to know than the one 
advocated by the Radical Libertarian. So, if one accepts my arguments, one will 
be inclined to accept that there are some derived, legal, special, and prima facie 
70 Even if one accepts libertarianism or any other way to found the basic right to know, I think 
one should reject an absolute right to gain access to or receive genetic knowledge about oneself. 
Does anyone really think that such rights are so important that no amount of suffering or 
autonomy-reduction (or whatever one takes to be valuable) can ever override the moral 
importance of respecting such rights? This seems highly counter-intuitive. 
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rights not to be prevented to gain access to and receive genetic information 
about oneself, but nothing further. However, the scope and strengths of these 
rights have to be settled in a piecemeal manner, referring ultimately to the 
values that is the basis of the rights in question. 
3. Positive rights 
As mentioned at the outset of this chapter, the right to genetic information is 
often claimed. For instance, in the WHO Guidelines on Ethical Issues in 
Medical Genetics and the Provision of Genetic Services (Wertz et al, 1995, 
Preface) states: "All individuals should have a right to know their genetic risks 
and risk to their potential offspring; to be educated about these risks". 
However, it is far from clear what kind of right, positive or negative, the 
authors have in mind, which is commonplace for statements regarding rights 
in this context.71 Nevertheless, the addition that there is a right "to be educated 
about these risks" could be interpreted as a claim that there is not only a right 
not to be prevented to know, but also a reason of someone else to educate the 
individual whether or not she is at genetic risk (of some medical condition), 
and thus assist her in learning genetic information about herself. That is, the 
quote could be interpreted as cl aiming that there is some positive right of the 
individual to genetic information about herself. 
Moreover, the WHO Proposed International Guidelines on Ethical Issues 
in Medical Genetics and Genetic Services (1998), partly based on Wertz et al 
(1995, Preface), states: "Presymptomatic testing should be available for adults at 
risk who want it, even in the absence of treatment, after proper counselling 
and informed consent..." (WHO, 1998, p 9) Even if this statement does not 
mention any rights explicitly, it expresses that a right to get presymptomatic 
genetic testing should be recognized, at least if there is some initial (suspicion 
of) risk (of genetic disorder). 
More explicitly, Häyry and Takala claim that there could b e such a right: 
In the context of genetics, the state could have a contractual duty to 
promote the health, and to protect the privacy, of its citizens. These 
duties, where they can be sanctioned, would then give rise to positive 
71 For references to other examples, see footnote 2, this chapter. 
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claim-rights both to knowledge and to ignorance. (Häyry & Takala, 2001, 
p 405)72 
It is clear from this quote that the authors have legal rights in mind, since they 
write about a sanctioned contractual duty of the state. This seems to 
presuppose some kind of moral basis to the legal rights, i.e. that there are some 
arguments for why these rights should be sanctioned by the state. Here 
promotion of health and privacy are mentioned as possible grounds for 
legislation. 
Moreover, the authors also mention a positive right to ignorance, i.e. a right 
not to know. I will return to this in the next chapter. Nonetheless, one may ask 
what the relationship between the right to know and not to know is. In 
modern liberal societies, it seems to be commonplace to assume that there is a 
right to know, as well as a right not to know, and that these rights are 
compatible. This may initially seem strange, since positive (and negative) rights 
correspond to reasons, and it would seem as though the positive right of P to 
know gives rise to a reason to see to it that P knows and a negative right of P 
not to know gives rise to a reason to see to it that P does not know. Since these 
reasons pull in the opposite direction,73 it seems that the rights gives rise to a 
moral conflict. But this conflict arises only if three conditions are met: the 
rights hold under the exact same circumstances, with the exact same strength 
and the exact same persons have the corresponding reasons to aid. And those 
who claim that there is a right to know and a right not to know would 
(probably) deny at least the first of these conditions. 
One obvious candidate for a circumstance necessary for the rights is the 
attitudes of (or the actions of, or consequences for) the individual about 
knowing: for the right to know to actually give rise to moral reasons, the 
individual must want (or ask for, or would want, or be benefited by) the 
genetic information in question, and for the right not to know to have the 
same moral bearing, the individual must want (or would want, etc) to avoid the 
information. This would give the person a right to know and a right not to 
know, but under different circumstances. Of course, the circumstances can be 
72 It seems as though Häyry and Takala presuppose that a positive right includes a negative one 
(Häyry & Takala, 2001, p 404). However, as we will see, this presumption seems justified only 
regarding basic rights (see rV.3.1). 
73 In the sense that they suggest two actions that cannot be jointly performed by one and the 
same acting party. 
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combined, and further items can be added to the list of circumstances that has 
to be in place in order for the right to give rise to actual moral reasons. 
However, the claim that there is a positive right to know that corresponds to 
everyone having a reason in all c ircumstances to see to it that one gets to know 
is in conflict with the claim that there is a positive right not to know that 
corresponds to everyone having a reason in all circumstances to see to it that 
one does not get to know. This means that if one is claiming that there is both 
a right to know and a right not to know, one has to specify the circumstances 
in which the respective rights hold. Another way to resolve the conflict is to 
claim that rights to know and not to know can be waived by the right-holder 
(TV.l.l.l). 
Perhaps surprisingly, a general positive right to know, i.e. a right to know 
that holds regardless of circumstances, does not imply an obligation to know. 
Even if everyone acted wrongly, if they failed to see to it that I know, it does 
not follow that I do anything wrong if I choose to remain ignorant. Compare 
with the case of a positive right to life. Even if everyone else acted wrongly 
were they to abstain from helping me to go on living, I may not do anything 
wrong by ending my life. This means that the question of a right to know 
should be kept separate from the question of duty to know, an issue to which I 
will return (see V.3). 
Despite the fact that a positive right to genetic information sometimes seems 
to be claimed, or at least presupposed or indicated, explicit argument in favour 
of such rights are hard to come by. This is so since the distinction between 
positive and negative rights are seldom made in this context. More often, 
possible arguments for more unspecified rights to know are presented 
(Chadwick, 1997, p 14; Hermerén, 1999, p 145-152).74 These arguments generally 
refer to advantages of knowing for the individual, that is, positive values 
actualised due to the possession of knowledge about one's own genetic 
constitution. If this is the correct basis for the individual's positive right to 
have genetic information about herself, which I will argue that it is, there are 
no basic or absolute positive rights to genetic information. However, this "if' 
obviously needs to be substantiated. After having thus rejected the idea of a 
74 Many such arguments concern the alleged right of relatives to be informed about genetic risk 
from the index-person (Hermerén, 1999, p 145-152). I will ignore these arguments here, since they 
will be discussed in chapter VI. 
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positive basic right to know (IV.3.1), or a right derived from such basic rights 
(TV.3.1.1), I will move on to the possibility of such right being derived from 
values, which will pr ove to be a more promising line of reasoning (IV.3.2). 
3.1 Bask rights 
Against the background of the previous section, it should come as no surprise 
that basic positive rights to have genetic information about oneself are hard to 
defend. And to argue that there are no such rights may be considered to be as 
much an attack on a straw-man as in the case of negative rights, since explicit 
arguments that there are such rights are hard to come by (in fact, I know of 
none). However, in order to see to it that the straw-man does not come to life, 
it can be worthwhile to try to show why there most likely are no basic positive 
rights to genetic information about oneself. 
There is a general argument to this effect, resting on two premises: 1) There 
are no basic negative rights to genetic information (about oneself). 2) If there is 
no basic negative right to something, X, there can be no basic positive right to 
X. 
The success of the argument is thus dependent on the validity of these 
premises. If my argument from the previous section, that there probably are 
no negative basic rights to genetic information, is accepted, one will have no 
problem of accepting premise 1). Premise 2) can be defended in the following 
way. Positive and negative rights are always rights towards someone else. 
Negative rights correspond to moral reasons for abstaining from doing some 
things (to the right-holder), while positive rights correspond to moral reasons 
for doing some specific things (to the right-holder). From this it seems natural 
to conclude that if there are no such reasons for abstaining from certain 
courses of action with regard to something, there certainly are no such reasons 
to undertake certain courses of action regarding this. Take the example of a 
basic right to life. If it can be argued that there is no such negative right, i.e., 
others have no reasons to abstain from taking my life that holds independently 
of other moral considerations, then it seems farfetched to claim that others 
have moral reasons of this kind to take active measures to keep me from dying. 
Note that this second premise only regards basic rights (and rights derived 
from them). This is so, since if a right is derived from the positive 
consequences of recognizing the right, then it depends on the consequences 
whether the right in question should be recognized or not. And it could very 
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well be that the consequences of recognizing a positive right to X will be 
good, but the consequences of recognizing a negative right to X will not. 
If one accepts premise 1) and 2) the case against positive basic rights to 
genetic information will be settled. But in order to convince those who do 
not, further elaboration may be needed. 
Recall the argument for a basic negative right to genetic information about 
oneself: the sensitivity-argument (see IV.2.1). This argument claims that (some) 
individuals have a basic negative right to genetic information about themselves 
due to the (alleged) fact that this information is very personal and sensitive. As 
demonstrated, the problem with the sensitivity-argument, besides resting on a 
highly doubtful premise that genetic information is necessarily very sensitive, 
is that the implications of the premise are so unclear that it can be used to 
argue in favour of conflicting rights. And an argument supporting conflicting 
rights must be flawed, unless it provides some way of solving the conflict, 
which it does not. This last line of reasoning holds regardless of whether the 
alleged rights supported by the sensitivity-argument are positive or negative. 
This is easily seen if one reformulates the argument to explicitly be about 
positive rights: just as the sensitive nature of genetic information can be 
thought to support some index-person's positive right to have genetic 
information about herself (and then a positive reason of someone else to help 
the index-person with this) it can be thought to support the positive right of 
others to prevent the index-person from acquiring genetic information about 
them. But then one sometimes can respect the rights of one of the right-
holders only by violating the rights of another (i.e. a co nflict of rights), since it 
is sometimes true that letting the index-person have genetic information about 
herself is to give this index-person genetic information about someone else. 
And since there is no independent reason to say t he (alleged) fact that genetic 
information is very sensitive supports one of the rights more than the other, 
the basis seems flawed. This problem is perhaps even more obvious regarding 
positive rights, since it is natural to think that it is the health care institutions 
that have the corresponding moral reasons, in which case a conflict of reasons 
follows as well. 
3.1.1 Rights derivedfrom basic rights 
There neither seems to be any good grounds for claiming that there are 
positive rights to genetic information (about oneself), which can be derived 
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from other basic rights. In fact, the basis for such rights seems to be even 
weaker than in the case of negative rights. Let us see why. First, one can refer 
to the basis of libertarianism. But libertarianism only acknowledges positive 
rights if they are the result of a voluntary agreement, for instance a contract 
(Wolff, 1991, p 19-20).75 That is, only if you consent to a voluntary agreement, 
the content of which is to give me some genetic information about myself, I 
have a positive right to this information. Thus, the scope of such a right would 
be very limited, holding only in cases where such binding agreements have 
been established. More extensive positive rights, as those mentioned by Häyry 
and Takala at the outset of this section and (probably) favoured by the WHO 
(see IV.3) would lack any foundation on a libertarian basis. 
Second, one can refer to the basis of Kantian autonomy that can be used to 
argue against (a s ort of) paternalism: preventing the individual from making her 
decision by making the decision for the individual in her best interest (see 
IV.2.2.2). Even if one accepts this basis,76 it cannot be used to found positive 
rights. This is so, since denying that anyone has a moral reason to help some 
individual to have genetic information about herself, and thus denying the 
positive right of the individual to have this information, is compatible with not 
preventing the individual from decision-making by making a decision for the 
individual. Of course, with some genetic information, a person could become 
more autonomous in various ways (see e.g. II.2.3.1), and this may give someone 
a reason to assist the individual in getting that information. But this is an 
argument referring to the beneficial consequences in terms of autonomy for 
the individual of having that information, not to refer to the basis of Kantian 
autonomy at stake here. That is, even if (the value of) autonomy can be used to 
argue in favour of a derived right (something we will r eturn to shortly, see 3.2), 
a basic negative right to have one's autonomy respected cannot be used to 
derive a positive right to genetic information about oneself. 
If there are no basic rights to genetic information, not even rights derived 
from such basic rights, which I have argued that there are not, the only 
possibility that remains to argue in favour of positive rights to genetic 
information is to argue in favour of such rights derived from the value 
realized by recognizing them. As argued in the previous section (see IV.2.5), if 
75 At least Nozick's brand of libertarianism, which we are concerned with here. 
76 I argued that this basis cannot be the only one of obligations and rights (see IV.2.2.2). It may be 
overruled e.g. by considerations of preventing harm. 
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there only are such derived rights to genetic knowledge, there are no absolute 
such rights, since derived rights can always be overridden by the ethical 
concerns from which they are derived. The only way to reject this possibility 
is by arguing that respecting the right in question always leads to more value, 
and we have already seen that giving someone genetic information about 
herself can lead to less value (see e.g. II.2 .4). So there are no basic or absolute 
positive rights to genetic information. 
3.2 Rights derived from values 
As already mentioned, most arguments for a right to know refer to advantages 
of knowing (see IV.3). Since there are few, or perhaps no, explicit arguments in 
favour of a basic positive right or such a right that may be derived from some 
other basic rights, it is natural to look for a defence of a p ositive right to have 
genetic information about oneself in the mentioned advantages. And since 
referring to the advantages of the individual of knowing is to refer to some 
value for the individual of knowing, such defence will, then, be defences in 
favour of rights to know that are derived from considerations of value. If one 
accepts my argument that the predominant values of genetic information are 
well-being and autonomy (see chapter II), the question becomes if these values 
for the individual can be used to argue in favour of positive rights to genetic 
information, and then which positive rights can be defended on this ground. 
The limited scope of this kind of argument must be kept in mind. Given 
that one accepts that it is not always valuable (in terms of well-being or 
autonomy) to have genetic information (about oneself), which certainly seems 
reasonable (see e.g. II.2. 2.2), there cannot be any general val ue-derived right to 
this information. Of course, one can argue that someone, P, has a moral reason 
to help another individual, Q, to gain such information, due to the value for Q 
of having such information, and the lack of reasons to the contrary (e.g. there 
are no negative values realized for Q or anybody else, P can do this without 
any significant sacrifice on his own part, etc). In the sense that it, for these 
reasons, may be wrong of P not to inform Q, Q can be said to have a right 
towards P to have the information in question. But this argument would, then, 
establish only this: that one particular person should see to it that another 
particular person has genetic information about herself. This right cannot 
automatically be extended to other persons, since the consequences in terms 
of value may then be different. 
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A more interesting way of arguing in favour of some derived positive right 
is to argue that the general recognition of a right, e.g. by im plementing it as a legal 
right, is conducive to general well-being and autonomy. That is, one can argue 
that a certain institutional setting, recognizing positive rights to genetic 
information, has better consequences than alternative institutional settings.77 
The most likely candidate to the obliged party that should execute such a right 
will, o f course, be health care, since this is the party that is primarily involved 
in performing genetic testing. 
However, also the limited scope of such an argument has to be 
acknowledged. If the basis of recognizing some rights is the promotion of 
some values for some individuals, the right can only be recognized to the 
extent and given the circumstances that these values are promoted for these 
individuals by recognizing the right. This means that positive rights to genetic 
information are special, s ince, as we have seen, the promotion of the values of 
genetic information generally most likely is dependent on the circumstances 
(see e.g. II.2.4 and II.3.5). 
So the question thus becomes, should health care recognize any, derived 
and special, positive rights to genetic information? As already mentioned, there 
are few, if any, explicit arguments in favour of positive rights to genetic 
information about oneself specifically (see IV.3). However, there are general 
arguments in favour of unspecified rights to know that can be construed as 
such specific arguments. One example is Chadwick, who states the following 
under the heading of "The right to know one's own genetic constitution"-. 
This claim I do not propose to discuss in any great detail, because it is 
the least different from other areas of medicine and raises similar issues 
to claims of right to knowledge about one's medical condition, based on 
principles of autonomy and self-determination. The knowledge may 
enable to seek appropriate therapy or to take preventive or ameliorative 
action. (Chadwick, 1997, p 14)78 
77 This is t he kind of argument that is indicated by Häyry and Takala in the quote at the outset of 
this section (TV. 3). 
78 She also mentions the right to make informed reproductive decisions as a special ground for 
the right to have ^««^information (Ibid). However, relevance for reproductive decisions is n ot 
unique to genetic information, since other medical information may be relevant for such 
decisions, i.e. about HIV (see 1.4.3). 
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What Chadwick seems to be saying is that there is no difference with regard to 
the right to find out about one's medical conditions in general and genetic 
information that may be relevant for such conditions. That is, a r ight to genetic 
information relevant to medical conditions should be recognized to the same 
extent that the right to medically relevant information in general is recognized. 
The reason to recognize such a right is the two traditional values of 
biomedical ethics: patient autonomy and (health-related) well-being.79 
Indeed, most western countries do recognize a positive right for all its 
citizens to have a proper diagnosis of their medical condition. The way in 
which this right is implemented is through a publicly funded health care 
system that is, or at least should be, equally accessible for all who needs it (with 
the striking exception of the USA). A nd the mentioned reasons of health-
related well-being and autonomy seem to be good reasons for recognizing 
such a right. 
However, these reasons can be irrelevant when it comes to presymptomatic 
genetic testing. To start with, one should that note such tests do not result in 
any diagnosis or information about one's medical condition, strictly speaking. 
They result in prediction of various probabilities of future medical 
conditions. But even so, the test may realize the mentioned values for the 
individual. However, health-related reasons are only relevant to the extent that 
there really are medical measures to take. A nd, as we have seen, finding out 
information from presymptomatic genetic testing can reduce autonomy (see 
n.2.3.2). Of course, there is genetic counselling, which aims at realizing 
autonomy and counteract consequences detrimental to this realization. 
However, if the basis of a certain genetic test, in the absence of health related 
reasons, is the promotion of autonomy (and psychological well-being), there 
cannot be any ground for providing these tests if it does not (or at least is very 
likely to) promote autonomy. This means that there can only be a positive right 
to the test if it is in the circumstances likely to be conducive to the value(s) 
that is the rationale of offering such presymptomatic genetic tests at all. T his, 
in turn, means that the right to have some genetic information of one's own 
genetic constitution is unlikely to be general. Under what circumstances, then, 
79 As we have seen, autonomy conceived of as a value that should be promoted is so mewhat of a 
novelty in biomedical ethics. However, it is un clear from Chadwick's quote whether "principles of 
autonomy" should be understood as including this novel idea of autonomy, or just the classic 
idea of respecting autonomy, which includes information giving necessary for informed consent 
(III.3.3). 
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does the positive right to have genetic information about oneself hold? I will 
divide this question according to the formerly introduced distinctions 
between having access to and receiving genetic information (IV. 1.2). 
3.2.1 The right to access 
Up to this point, the arguments for a positive right to know have been neutral 
regarding the distinction between having access to and receiving genetic 
information about oneself. To start with: should a positive derived right to 
gain access to genetic information be recognized and, if so, under what 
circumstances? 
The most interesting way to interpret access to genetic information in this 
context is "access" in the sense of knowledge about a method to receive 
genetic information. A positive right to access to genetic information would 
then mean a positive right to gain knowledge about how to get genetic 
information and, in this context, consequently a corresponding reason of 
health care to see to it that one gains this knowledge. That is, the question is if 
health care has any moral reason to inform anyone that there is genetic testing 
available.80 
This depends on how the moral reason is understood more specifically. In 
one sense, the right to be informed about health care performing certain 
genetic tests should be uncontroversial, namely in the sense that health care 
has a r eason, strong enough to ground an obligation, not to keep the availability 
of their services a secret. That is, if someone approaches health care with the 
question if they perform a certain test that they do perform, they should 
answer this question truthfully. It also seems rather uncontroversial to hold 
that health care has an obligation to tell someone who approaches health care 
herself with concerns of increased risk and who has indication of increased 
risk, for instance due to family history, a relative's test, or symptoms, that 
testing is available if it is. N ot to do so would be negligent. 
However, beyond that, the right to be informed that testing is available, a nd 
the corresponding reason of health care to inform, becomes more 
controversial. This is so, since informing about testing without the initiative 
from the individual herself and in the absence of indication of increased risk 
80 Of course, as previously stated, this right is o nly interesting if there also is a right to receive 
genetic information (see IV.1.2), which in this context would mean that genetic testing really is 
available. Let us grant that there is such right for now. 
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is problematic from the point of view of autonomy as well as well-being. 
Rather, such information could threaten autonomy, since "information" from 
public health care will o ften be thought of as r ecommendations (Clarke, 1998, 
p 401).81 This is due to the fact that health care is considered to be an authority 
in these questions. "Why would they contact me with information about 
testing if there is no reason for me to get tested?" is a n atural reaction to such 
an initiative from health care. Such information is also likely to increase 
general anxiety and worry, since the individual, who has no suspicion of 
increased risk and thus no worry to start with, may regard the offer as a r eason 
to think that there is something to be worried about. 
In fact, for health care to inform everyone (at least the competent adults) in 
a population that there is presymptomatic genetic testing for some specified 
medical conditions would, in a way, amount to genetic screening. Why this is 
so becomes clearer given a ch aracterisation of genetic screening. At least two 
things differ pure82 screening-programs from the kind of genetic testing 
discussed in this essay: 1) Health care, rather than the individual or the family, 
takes the initiative of testing. 2) There is no prior knowledge among those to 
whom the screening is directed of an increased risk common to all the 
individuals. Information directed to all adult citizens initiated by health care 
that there is genetic testing for some specified condition clearly fulfils both 
these conditions. 
Genetic screening is very problematic from the viewpoint of the values of 
autonomy and well-being, partly due to the reasons already mentioned, and the 
circumstances in which it should be implemented are rare indeed.83 I will not 
argue these points about genetic screening further, since this book is not about 
81 The threat to autonomy can be more or less gr ave, depending e.g. o n how active the patient 
has to be in order to avoid testing (if t he patient must actively resist testing and is n ot told about 
this possibility, the threat is more grave) and the existence of formal and informal sanctions. If the 
patient has to take active measures in order to avoid testing, testing can be called routine, and if 
there are sanctions, testing can be called obligatory (see Bennett, 2001, p 463-465). 
82 Screening-programs can be more or less p ure, depending on the level of individual initiative 
and prior knowledge of increased risk. For instance, screening of populations for which there are 
some indication of increased risk (al though low), e.g. screening-programs among Ashkenazi Jews 
for Tay-Sachs, is less pure than screening of populations for which there are no such indications, 
e.g. general screening for phenylketonuria. 
83 See Shickle, 1999, for a presentation and discussion of the widely used Wilson and Jungner 
principles of screening programs, which e.g. includes early and easy diagnosis and efficient and 
acceptable treatment. 
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genetic screening (1.2), a subject that would require a work of its own. Neither 
do I think I have to, since I think that this kind of argument has been made 
very convincingly elsewhere,84 and there is no need for me to repeat it 
Of course, there may be cases when such initiatives from public health 
care can be justified, for instance, if the testing is reliable and has high 
predictive value, if the condition in question is very serious and can be 
prevented efficiendy and without harm, and if there is no reason to think that 
the affected individuals have prior suspicion due to family history (in which 
case there is reason to believe that they would have contacted health care 
anyway). But genetic conditions of this sort are rare indeed.85 
So, there may be rights to be informed about the availability of 
presymptomatic genetic testing. But beyond the right to be informed of such 
testing when initiating contact with health care regarding this oneself or when 
there is prior indication of increased risk, any such right becomes 
controversial. In fact, due to potential damages in terms of well-being and 
autonomy, the obligation of public health care rather seems to be to abstain 
from directing the public towards presymptomatic genetic testing in almost all 
cases. 
3.2.2 The right to receive 
Is there a positive right to receive genetic information (from genetic testing) 
from health care, and then under what circumstances? If such a right is derived 
from the promotion of the values of well-being and autonomy of recognizing 
such a right, the general answer must be: to the extent that the recognition of 
such a right indeed promotes these values. As we have seen, these values are 
likely to be promoted only given certain circumstances (see e.g. II.2.4 and J3.3.5). 
Thus, there can be no such right if these circumstances are not in place. 
For genetic information to be likely to promote the values, the test has to 
have certain qualities: they must be reliable in the sense of not being likely to 
be false (either false positives or negatives), and the probability of the disease 
in case of a positive test must be unequivocal and rather high (see e.g. II.2.4). 
The last condition rules out most tests for multifactorial diseases, unless there 
84 See Munthe, 2002, and the anthology of Chadwick et al, 1999, and then especially Shickle's and 
Hoedemaekers' contributions. 
85 One example is p henylketonuria. 
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is some preventive measure to take in order to reduce the possibility of the 
disease in question. Furthermore, the patient must have a proper 
understanding of the genetic information and the consequences of testing, at 
least if autonomy and psychological well-being are likely to be promoted by 
testing (see e.g. H2.3.2). This means that genetic counselling, or something of 
the like, probably will be required (see e.g. H3.5), especially if there are no 
health-related advantages of testing. 
So if there is some positive derived right to know, it will be special. And 
if the rationale of these tests is well-being and autonomy, one has to argue that 
these values are sufficiently promoted compared to alternative ways of 
spending the resources of health care that also would promote these values. 
Since genetic counselling will be required in order to ensure the promotion 
of the values, the genetic testing procedure can become expensive. This 
increases the possibility that there are alternative ways of spending recourses 
much more conducive to these values, which may make the circumstances in 
which legal p ositive rights to presymptomatic genetic testing are justified rare. 
4. Conclusions 
This chapter has dealt with the question of the individual's right to genetic 
information about herself from presymptomatic genetic testing: how this right 
can be understood and justified. Regarding the question about how the right 
can be understood, I demonstrated that there are at least 120 interpretations of 
'T has a right to genetic information about herself', depending on what it 
means to have a right to something in general and what it means to have a r ight 
to genetic information more specifically. Generally, claiming that someone has 
a right to something can be taken to imply a positive or a negative right, an 
absolute or a prima facie right, a ba sic or derived right, a special or a general 
right, and, specifically, claiming that someone has a right to genetic 
information can be taken to imply having a right to gain access to, receive or 
use genetic information. This analysis, which draws on traditional theory of 
rights, will hopefully be useful for making right-claims in this area more clear 
and precise. 
I then discussed whether there indeed is any right to know, i.e. which such 
rights, if any, that can be justified. In this chapter I have focused on (thin) 
negative rights, which correspond to reasons for others not to prevent the 
right-holder in question from gaining access to and receiving genetic 
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information, and positive rights, which correspond to reasons for others to 
help the person to gain access to and receive genetic information about 
herself. 
Regarding negative rights, the most extensive system of such rights 
defended (or, at least, indicated) is the Radical Libertarian position, which says 
that marketing and selling genetic testing direcdy to the index-person should 
be allowed and that this practice should only be regulated as to prohibit 
coercion and deceit. I used this position to develop an argument in favour of 
some regulation of commercial genetic home testing. This argument, then, 
tries to argue in favour of restricting negative rights to genetic information in 
various ways. However, some negative rights in this area are plausible. 
More specifically, a negative right to genetic information through 
purchasing home tests should be recognized, given that (and to the extent that) 
1) it does not undermine general trust in medicine and health care, 2) it does 
not excessively burden public health care financially, and 3) regulations that 
avoids harm and reducing of autonomy are implemented. Regarding 3), I have 
argued that harm and reduction of autonomy can be avoided (or at least 
ameliorated) by (i) controlling the quality of the tests, (ii) controlling the 
accuracy of the advertisement for them, (iii) demanding genetic counselling 
when testing is made, and (iv) p rohibiting commercial genetic testing for some 
conditions altogether (maybe by allowing only public health care to perform 
the tests). The kinds, degrees, and proper instance of regulation, again, have to 
be determined in a piecemeal manner. However, generally speaking, the more 
serious the disease tested for is, the more unreliable the test is, the more 
difficult it is to interpret the result of the test, the less the predictive value of 
the test, and the less preventive measures are available, the more reason to 
regulate the marketing and selling of the tests. 
Regarding positive rights, a right to be assisted with gaining access to and 
receiving genetic information from health care is plausible, given that 
circumstances are in place to promote the values of well-being and autonomy. 
I have argued that such circumstances are more likely to be in place if the 
individual herself initiates contact with health care and there is prior indication 
for or worry about the condition in question. Furthermore, for genetic 
information to be likely to promote the values, the test in question has to have 
certain qualities: it should be reliable and have high predictability. Moreover, 
genetic testing should be accompanied by genetic counselling, especially if 
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there is no preventive measure to take in order to reduce the possibility of the 
disease in question. 
Generally, I have tried to argue that the proper basis for any right to genedc 
information, both positive and negative, is the values that can be promoted as a 
result of societal recognition of these rights. The values I have in mind are the 
values I argued provide the possible justification for presymptomatic genetic 
testing in the first place, namely well-being and autonomy. If this is correct, 
which I have argued that it is, the moral landscape of presymptomatic genetic 
testing becomes much easier to survey, since the rights in this area ultimately 
boils down to considerations of the values in it. As mentioned, I have also 
argued that given this basis, the recognition of some rights of the individual 
seems reasonable. However, these rights will be special (holding under the 
circumstances in which the values that are the basis for the rights really are 
promoted), derived (from these values), and prima facie (since they may be 
overridden by the values they are based on). 
However, to take us from reasons in terms of values promoted by 
recognizing rights on the basis of these values, one has to seriously ponder the 
question of priority: are these values sufficiently promoted by some particular 
presymptomatic genetic testing compared to alternative ways of spending the 
resources of health care, which also would promote these values, for the 
implementation of the presymptomatic genetic testing in question to be 
justified? Rather than answering this question, I point it out, which, once again, 
shows that there is more work to be done. 
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Chapter V 
The Individual's Right to Ignorance 
1. Introduction 
Just like the individual's right to know genetic information about her own 
genetic constitution is a recurring theme in the ethical debate on genetic 
testing (see chapter IV), so is the right not to know, or the right to ignorance 
regarding one's own genetic constitution. However, this right is to a greater 
extent explicitly defended in more specific terms.1 This is probably due to the 
fact that the idea of a r ight to ignorance has been the subject of much more 
criticism than has the idea of a right to know. The main claim of this criticism 
is that ignorance is incompatible with moral ideals formulated in terms of 
autonomy (Harris & Keywood, 2001). Rather, autonomy has been claimed to be 
the foundation of a duty or obligation to know, and this duty has been claimed 
to be incompatible with a right not to know (Ost, 1984; Rhodes, 1998). In this 
chapter I will address both the defence of a right not to know and the 
criticism thereof. 
The defence of a r ight not to know will be discussed rather briefly (section 
V.2). One reason for this is that some such legal right not to know is, and should 
be, rather uncontroversial.2 Another is t hat negative (and positive) rights not to 
know correspond to moral reasons of others not to inform (or see to it that 
the right-holder does not get informed), and such reasons are discussed 
elsewhere in this book (see e.g. VI.3). However, I will present the most 
common arguments in favour of such rights and make some distinctions and 
clarifications, so that it becomes sufficiently clear what scope and strength 
such rights can be argued to have without becoming controversial. 
Instead, the main part of this chapter will address the criticism of the idea 
of a right not to know, based on the (alleged) d uty to know (section V.3). I will 
argue that there is no such general duty to be based on autonomy or Kantian 
1 See e.g. Takala, 2000 and 2001, and Laurie, 1999. 
2 This has been, I think, successfully argued elsewhere. See Laurie, 1999, Häyry & Takala, 2000, 
Häyry & Takala, 2001. 
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ethics, contrary to what has been claimed.3 There may be such duties, 
however, on very rare occasions, where knowledge is a prerequisite for 
avoiding (significant risk of) serious harm to others. However, this only shows 
that there is sometimes no right to know in the sense of there being an option, 
1.e. it can be morally wrong to choose to remain ignorant about one's genetic 
constitution. No claims regarding rights of others to interfere in such choices, 
e.g. in terms of legally enforced rights or duties or institutional frameworks, 
follow direcdy from this, however. 
2. Are there any rights not to know? 
A common manoeuvre when defending rights not to know is to refer to the 
possible negative consequences for the individual of knowing. Accordingly, in 
the context of defending or discussing rights not to know, references have 
been made to unwanted changes in self-image,4 the possibility of having one's 
autonomy reduced,5 feelings of anxiety or depression,6 or stigmatisation and 
discrimination7, all of which can be the result of learning that one is (or is not) 
at ri sk of genetic disease. That is, the negative effects in terms of well-being 
and autonomy that were discussed in chapter 13, which can be the result of 
genetic testing, are being used to argue in favour of some right not to know. If 
such an argument were successful, it would establish some derived right not 
to know. Moreover, the scope and strength of this right would be determined 
by the actual presence of these very reasons in particular cases. The right 
would then, presumably, be prima facie rather than absolute. 
3 Most elaborately by Rhodes, 1998. 
4 See e.g. Widmer, 1994, p 184, and Laurie, 1999, who relies on the notion of psychological spatial 
privacy, an "aspect of spatial privacy [that] protects one's own sense of the self." (p 119) She 
argues that this privacy can be invaded by getting genetic information about oneself, and that we 
thus should recognize a right not to know. This defence is elaborated in Laurie, 2002. 
5 See, e.g. Chadwick, 1997, p 19, Husted, 1997, p 61-64, and Takala, 2001, who writes: "Maybe those 
who want to uphold the right not to be informed simply know themselves well enough not to 
seek possibly disastrous knowledge. Being in control of one's life can then require some degree of 
self-chosen ignorance." (p 487) 
6 See e.g. Laurie, 1999, who writes: "the fear of future ill-health may very well ruin what turns out 
to be an otherwise healthy existence." (p 122) 
7 See e.g. Chadwick, 1997, who writes: "genetic knowledge may have serious social consequences 
for the individual in terms of stigmatisation and discrimination." (p 18) Of course, this type of 
consequences can only be the indirect result of learning that one is at risk, namely if this also leads 
to others learning about one's risk. 
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Besides this kind of defence, the most recurring defence of a right not to 
know refers, in one way or another, to privacy and privacy-rights.8 However, 
privacy-rights are not self-evident but must be justified,9 and this is usually 
done with reference to values like well-being and autonomy (V1.2.2). So, also 
defences based on privacy are likely to establish only derived rights not to 
know. 
However, even if one grants that all these negative values can be realized by 
acquiring knowledge of some piece of genetic information about oneself, the 
question of which rights more specifically that can be derived from these 
values remains. Let us look at the three main elements of rights distinguished 
in the previous chapter: options, negative and positive rights. 
So, first, can these values found a right not to know in the sense of an option 
not to know, at least for some persons in some situations? That is, is there ever 
a right to remain in ignorance regarding some piece of genetic information, in 
the sense that some persons in some situations do not do anything wrong by 
remaining ignorant of this information (about their own genetic constitution)? 
It should be clear that there can be such a right, perhaps most obviously when 
the individual stands to loose in terms of the values by getting to know some 
piece of genetic information, while at the same time not gaining much and no 
one else is affected negatively by her ignorance. In fact, as we shall see, the 
situations where it can reasonably be held that there is a duty to know, and 
thus no option not to know, are rare indeed (see section V.3).10 Even so, there 
seem to be such situations, notably when there is significant risk of serious 
harm to others due to the ignorance of some genetic information about 
oneself. However, since I will discu ss the question of a duty to know, and thus 
the corresponding criticism of an option to know, in the next section, I will 
leave it for now. 
8 See e.g. Hermerén, 1999, p 147-149, Laurie, 1999 and 2002, and Häyry & Takala, 2001, p 405-407. 
9 This is s o, at least in the moral context (to see why, see VI.2.2). To claim this is not to deny 
Laurie's thesis (see 1999 and 2002) that privacy might be the most appropriate concept when 
defining and defending various legal rights (not) to know. 
10 One reason for the fact that these situations are rare is t hat even if there may be a moral duty 
to help others (most notably, blood relatives) by giving them access to one's genetic information, 
this does not imply a duty to learn about this information with regard to oneself (even if one 
perhaps is likely t o find out anyway if one discloses to relatives). See Takala, 2001, p 486. 
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2.1 Negative and positive rights 
Is there a negative right not to know? In one sense of negative rights, namely in 
the sense of some derived legal or institutional rights, the right to remain 
ignorant should be uncontroversial. What I am thinking of is the right not to 
be forced to have genetic testing. There are good reasons indeed for this. In a 
liberal society, when some kind of intervention can be both beneficial and 
burdensome to an individual, we normally leave it up to her to make the 
decision whether or not to accept this intervention (at least when the 
individual is a competent adult and making such decisions does not impose 
serious harm or risk of harm to others). This is in line with Mill's idea that 
people normally are the best judges of what is beneficial or burdensome for 
them and thus should be allowed to make decisions of this kind themselves. 
This is, of course, nothing but Mill's famous argument in favour of anti-
paternalism: that others, and especially societal institutions, should not be 
allowed to force one into something only for the sake of one's own good 
(Mill, 1859).11 Thus, forcing genetic testing upon someone may not only be 
damaging for her autonomy and well-being, but amounts to imposing medical 
intervention upon someone without her consent, i.e. coercive care. This is 
contrary to the principle of respecting autonomy (ffl.3.3). If one accepts the 
standard view in biomedical ethics that this is a basic right, i.e. a right that 
should be respected even if consequences would be better by not respecting 
the right (Beauchamp & Childress, 2001, p 176-177),12 there is even a basic right 
not to be forced to genetic testing by public health care and other societal 
institutions. I will not take a stand on whether there is a basic right to have 
one's autonomy respected, but rest content with pointing out that if one thinks 
there is, which many seems to do, some rights not to know have a firmer basis 
than any right to know, since all those rights are derived (or so I have argued in 
chapter IV). 
Furthermore, one can use this line of argument to go further and claim that 
it is wrong to disclose genetic information to someone without her consent. 
As emphasised repeatedly, it is primarily not testing itself, but the information 
that is the result of such testing that can be beneficial or burdensome for the 
individual (even if being coerced into testing can be unpleasant enough, 
11 This kind of argument in favour of a right not to know is used by Häyry & Takala, 2000. See 
also Häyry & Takala, 2001, p 410-412. 
12 This is q uite compatible with the right being prima facie, i.e. overridable in circumstances where 
sufficient moral reasons not to respect the right is at stake. 
292 
regardless of the result). So why focus just on coercive tests, in the sense of 
testing without consent, and not also disclosure of genetic information 
without consent? If the former should be prohibited or, at least, severely 
restricted, it seems natural to conclude that the latter should be so too. 
What is more, the claim that there is a right to ignorance in this sense not 
only should be uncontroversial, but also seems to be considered to be so. To 
my knowledge, no one has ever seriously claimed that institutions such as 
health care should be legally allowed to force presymptomatic genetic testing 
or genetic information upon the individual. Not even the most outspoken 
advocates of a duty to have genetic information about oneself have ever 
claimed this, and sometimes explicitly denied that this is what they argue in 
favour of.13 
Even though this argument in favour of a legal negative right to ignorance 
seems to be both valid and sound, the scope of the right should be delimited 
clearly. For one thing, it is unclear if the standard rule of informed consent 
applies in all cases. I am thinking about the type of cases where one cannot ask 
for consent to disclose some information without at the same time disclosing 
that very information one is a sking for consent to disclose. This is typically the 
case where some relative(s) of a person, P, has tested positively and P has no 
prior suspicion whatsoever that she might have an increased risk of the genetic 
disease tested for. In cases such as these, the relative probably cannot ask if P 
wants to find out whether P is a t increased risk of having the genetic disease in 
question without P understanding that she has such an increased risk. That is, 
just by asking: "Do you want to find out whether or not you are at increased 
risk of being a c arrier of some gene(s) that increases the risk of a particular 
disease?" P will normally understand that she has such an increased risk, if P 
also knows that the reason the question is asked is that a relative has been 
tested. So, in cases such as this, one (most likely) cannot ask whether someone 
wants to find some information about genetic risk out without revealing that 
information. 
How should one handle situations such as this? I will argue that there are 
circumstances, even though rare, where consent of a person, P, to know that P 
13 See Rhodes, 1998, p 27: "Prescribing social policy and policy for the professions is b eyond the 
scope of this paper." and "There may certainly be excellent policy considerations and personal 
reasons for not imposing information on someone who does not want it." 
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might be a carrier of some gene(s) that increases the risk of a particular disease 
can be presumed. In these cases, it might even be argued that P should be 
informed without the consent of the relatives (see VI.3.1.2). In these rare cases, 
there should be no legally protected right not to know that one might be a carrier 
and, in even rarer cases where the testing of a re lative shows that P is a carrier 
for sure, that one is in fact a ca rrier. Since I will discuss this later, however, I 
leave it for know. 
This kind of situation should be carefully distinguished from situations 
where the individual has some prior knowledge or suspicion of being a carrier 
of some gene(s) that increases risk of disease. Then it is certainly reasonable to 
demand of societal institutions, including health care that they ask whether or 
not the person wants to find out whether she ac tually is at risk, i.e. is a carrier of 
the gene in question. However, this should not, and probably is not, very 
controversial. 
Is there also a negative moral right, in the sense that there are reasons against 
others informing a person that she has a certain risk of a genetic disease 
without her prior consent? Again, on the basis of the (negative) values in 
question, i.e. w ell-being and autonomy, there clearly can be such reasons. This 
is so, since the person may become significantly worse off in terms of both 
well-being and autonomy by gaining this knowledge (II.2.4) w ithout anyone 
else being better off. 
However, it can also be the case that there are reasons, perhaps even reasons 
strong enough to override reasons pulling in the opposite direction, for 
someone, P, to inform someone else, Q, of her risk of genetic disease on the 
basis of the very same values. It is reasonable to claim that an obligation to 
inform based on this is prima facie and holds to the degree that Q will be 
better off (or less worse off) by receiving the information in question.14 In that 
case, one obviously has no absolute negative right not to know of this risk, 
since it is not necessarily wrong of others to inform one about it. 
Nonetheless, since it is hard to know whether or not receiving the 
information in question will actually benefit a certain person, guesses about 
this should not be the basis of policy or regulation of the institutions that 
produce and handle genetic information. Given the Millian assumption that 
the individual, as a rule, knows better than anyone else what will benefit her, it 
14 I will argue in favour of both these claims in section VI.3. 
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seems plausible to leave the decision whether to know or not up to the 
individual herself. So the institutional right not to know is not undermined by 
the fact that receiving genetic information can benefit some individuals and 
that others, by virtue of this, may have moral reasons to provide this 
information to these individuals regardless of whether or not they have 
consented to this. 
However, the claim that society should abstain from coercive interventions 
does not imply that society should protect the individual from getting the 
information against their wishes in all circumstances. For instance, no 
defender of a right not to know has ever claimed that relatives who inform a 
person that she has (or is likely to have) a certain genetic constitution should 
be punished or made to pay compensation. This means that it should be 
uncontroversial that some positive legal rights to be protected from knowing 
should not be recognized. However, there can be reasons indeed to enforce 
sanctions on some third parties, such as researchers, in the case of unsolicited 
disclosure of genetic information they have about a person to that person (or 
anyone else, for that matter), namely on partly the same grounds that legal 
negative rights not to know ought to be enforced. So some legal positive rights, 
in the sense of regulating against third parties to protect the ignorance of first 
parties, most likely should be recognized too. 
3. A duty to know 
It has been claimed that we have a general duty to know about our own genetic 
constitution (Ost, 1984; Rhodes, 1998),15 at least if such knowledge is relevant 
for important decisions.16 What is being claimed is, then, that there are strong 
reasons for knowing one's genetic constitution in such cases. These reasons 
may be seen as conclusive, in which case the duty is absolute. However, the 
duty may also be prima facie, i.e., strong enough reasons to the contrary may 
override the reasons to know. In the following, I will assume that the 
15 These authors both have a salient line of reasoning that I will ignore in the following. It has the 
following structure: X (autonomy) cannot be the ground for Y (the right not to know), since X is 
the ground for not-Y (the (mandatory) right to know (Ost, 1984, p 302-303; Rhodes, 1998, p 17)). 
This "argument" obviously presupposes what must be demonstrated, namely that autonomy is 
the ground for a duty to know but not a right not to know. 
16 Of course, the terms "relevant" and "important" are unclear and a more precise interpretation 
of them may be crucial to the credibility of the duty to know. I will return to this below. 
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supporters of a duty to know claim the reasons to know to be quite strong; if 
not absolute, the duty is still n ot easily ov erridden. 
The most conspicuous argument in favour of this duty is that a person's 
right to remain in ignorance about her genetic constitution is incompatible 
with her autonomy.17 In this section I will address this and other arguments in 
favour of the duty to know.18 My own conclusion is that there probably can be 
such a d uty in certain situations. However, the basis o f this duty is not the one 
the defenders of the duty to know have argued that it is. More importantly, 
they have not established, and probably cannot establish, a general or absolute 
duty to know. However, this does not imply a general right to remain in 
ignorance, contrary to what seems to have been the received opinion. This is 
so, since it may be morally permitted to remain in ignorance, and at the same 
time morally permitted for others to see to it that one knows. That is, not 
knowing may be an option without any negative right. 
A point of departure for the arguments to follow is that a duty to have 
genetic information about oneself is incompatible with the right not to know 
about this information: "if someone has an obligation to pursue genetic 
knowledge, she has no right to preserve her genetic ignorance" (Rhodes, 1998, 
p 15).19 This is true in one sense of rights, but false in another. If one talks 
about rights in the sense of options, the right not to know is equivalent to it 
being morally permissible not to know, i.e. a person does not do anything 
wrong if she does not know. In this sense of right, the duty to know is 
incompatible with the right not to know, since the duty to know claims that it 
is wrong not to no, which the claim that it is an option not to know denies. 
However, the duty to know is not incompatible with rights not to know in the 
17 See e.g. Harris & Keywood, 2001, p 421, when discussing the right to ignorance of genetic 
information: "Ignorance of crucial information is inimical to autonomy in a way that other 
autonomy-limiting choices are not. For where the individual is i gnorant of information that bears 
upon rational life choices she is n ot in a position to be self-governing." See Laurie, 1999, p 127, 
Ost, 1984, p 302-303, and Rhodes, 1998, p 17 for similar statements. 
18 In the following, "the duty to know" will be shorthand for "a person's duty to know about her 
genetic constitution, at least if that knowledge is relevant to important decisions". This, of 
course, does not imply that a person has to know everything there is t o know about her genetic 
constitution, but only the relevant facts. "To have genetic information" is in this context taken as 
equivalent to "to know about one's genetic constitution". 
19 See Ost, 1984, p 37, and Häyry and Takala, 2001, p 404, for similar remarks. This is quite 
compatible with the claim that an absence of that duty does not imply a right not to know, as we 
just saw. 
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sense of positive and negative rights. This is s o since it may be wrong not to 
know, and sill wrong of others to see to it that one knows (there are moral 
reasons that others should not prevent one from being ignorant, i.e. a negative 
right) o r wrong of others not to help one to remain ignorant (i.e. a positive 
right). This is so, even if it may strike one as odd that one does something 
wrong if one gives so meone else know ledge that this someone else is obliged 
to have. So, a duty for P to know about genetic information about herself does 
not imply a duty, or even a right, for someone else to give P that information. 
There may be good moral reasons not to disclose such information to a party 
who nevertheless is obliged to have that information (see V.3.2). So in order 
for the argument in favour of a duty to know from denying the right not to 
know to be successful, rights must be interpreted as options. That is, what has 
to be argued is that it is wrong not to know or, at least, strong moral reasons 
for this being the case. 
On the other hand, it may seem reasonable to claim that the right not to 
know genetic information about oneself implies that other persons do not 
have a right to disclose su ch information to the person (Rhodes, 1998, p 15).20  
However, once again, this is so only given a certain interpretation of the right 
not to know, namely as a negative right. Only then is it wrong of someone else 
to disclose the information to the person in question (and they thus have no 
right to do so), at least in the absence of overriding reasons to the contrary. If 
the right not to know is only an option, there are no implications of the rights 
of others. These remarks o n the relationship between duties and rights should 
suffice for the following discussion to get of the ground. 
First, a brief reminder. This discussion is essentially about "duty" and 
"right" understood morally, and not legally. Th ere may be all sorts of reasons 
to regulate the practice of genetic testing in various ways, including rules of 
thumb that do not necessarily guarantee that the moral rights or duties of 
people are upheld. However, I will not enter such a debate. As mentioned 
earlier, I assume that a succes sful argument in favour of negative an d positive 
rights makes a strong case for various regulations. However, the same 
assumption seems less reasonable when it comes to options, which then is the 
20 Rhodes writes: "When someone has a right to genetic ignorance, others have a responsibility to 
allow her that ignorance and to respect her choice not to know." (Rhodes, 1998, p 15) However, 
this is only so if the right not to know is a negative right. So here Rhodes, confusingly enough, 
changes the interpretation of a right not to know from an option to a negative right without 
explicidy stating this. 
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object of concern in this section, since it seems more difficult to argue that 
society should implement regulations preventing people from every type of 
moral wrongdoing. 
3.1 Kantian arguments of autonomy 
There are, in fact, a number of different Kantian argument/ for the duty to 
know. Nevertheless, they have sufficiently much in common to deserve 
treatment under the same heading. They are all, in one way or another, 
founded on the Kantian idea of a d uty to be autonomous — a duty to govern 
oneself (Kant, 1785, p 14-20). Of course, generally put like this, the idea is open 
to several, mutually incompatible, interpretations. 
The interpretation that probably is most congenial to the intentions of Kant 
himself is that we have a duty to act out of reverence for the moral law. That 
is, we should act out of "pure" (morally praiseworthy) motives. The idea might 
seem obsolete, but it has been suggested (Rhodes, 2000, p 114).21 This 
interpretation will therefore be addressed in due course (see V.3.1.2). I will 
concentrate on two authors that have explicitly defended the duty to know 
from Kantian ideas of autonomy, namely Ost and Rhodes.22 However, I will 
also address authors that refer to the argument that choosing not to know is 
incompatible with one's autonomy (Harris & Keywood, 2001). I will argue that 
this is a mistake. 
As mentioned earlier, the duty to know is assumed to hold only when the 
information is "relevant" to some decision (Rhodes, 1998, p 18). This is 
certainly unclear, but let us for now take it to mean that relevant information is 
information that would make the decision maker change or at least reconsider 
her decision.23 If one takes "relevant" information for decision-making as 
information that should infl uence decision makers to change or reconsider the 
decision (see Rhodes, 1998, p 18; Ost, 1984, p 306 about reasoning referring to 
what the rational person would want to know), the claim becomes close to 
being tautological: we should have (have a d uty to have) the information that 
21 Rhodes writes: "To summarize my position, the Kantian concept of autonomy expresses the 
core content of an individual's moral obligation, the duty to determine one's own action by the 
moral law." (Rhodes, 2000, p 114) 
22 It should be noted that both these authors emphasise that this is compatible with a policy that 
does not enforce unwanted information upon patients and clients. 
23 See also, Rhodes, 2000, p 115, where Rhodes instead uses the term "serious information" as 
information that is " likely to make a significant difference in decision". 
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we should have. No one is denying that. Indeed, the very question at stake is 
what information we do have a du ty to attain. 
The mentioned authors can be interpreted differently, but they do share 
one basic line of thought. Somewhat coarsely, it could be put as follows. Each 
one of us has a duty to be autonomous. In order to be autonomous (in a 
situation) one has to be a rational decision maker (in that situation). In order to 
be a rational decision maker one has to have or obtain information that is 
relevant for the decision. Genetic information may be relevant for a decision. 
If the situation of decision is such that genetic information is relevant to the 
decision, one is irrational if one refuses to take part of that information. One 
therefore fails to be autonomous and hence does not fulfil one's duty to be 
so. Thus, autonomy is the basis or foundation for the duty to know and can 
therefore not be used to establish a right not to know (in the sense of an 
option, an addition I will implicitly assume from now on). 
In order to establish this Une of reasoning as p lausible, several things must 
be clarified. To start with, it has to be explicated what kind of duty we are 
dealing with in this context. Is the duty to be autonomous a duty towards 
others or a duty towards oneself? The general line of reasoning can be 
interpreted in both ways. In fact, Ost is quite explicit about defending the 
"duty towards oneself'-interpretation (Ost, 1984, p 307-309),24 while Rhodes, if 
not as explicitly, is most naturally interpreted as taking the "duty towards 
other"-stance. Let us begin with the former. 
3.1.1 A duty towards oneself 
Omitting to receive genetic information relevant to a d ecision is, then, argued 
to be an omission to fulfil a duty one has towards oneself. How should this be 
understood? Ost seems to argue in the following way. We have rights and 
duties25 by virtue of being autonomous. In other words, autonomy is the 
foundation of rights and duties.26 In order to make an autonomous decision, 
one has to be rational. To refuse to receive information relevant to decision is 
to be irrational. One is therefore not autonomous (autonomy requires 
24 See e.g. "that there is a duty to oneself... seems on its face, implausible at best. I hope to make 
it more plausible." (Ost, 1984, p 307) 
25 Or are the "bearers" of rights and duties (Ost, 1984, p 303). 
26 
"[W]e use the concept of autonomy to designate a moral status which justifies the predication 
of rights and duties." (Ost, 1984, p 309) 
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rationality) and can therefore not have rights (rights requires autonomy), 
including the right not to receive the information (Ost, 1984, p 309).27 
This all sounds very strange. To begin with, if autonomy is the foundation 
for rights and d uties, and failure to be autonomous destroys rights, failure to 
be autonomous should also destroy duties (including the duty to know). To 
this the answer probably would be the following. If one can be autonomous, 
one should be (has a duty to be) autonomous. If one fails to be autonomous 
when one can be so, one has forfeited one's rights. The general duty to be 
autonomous cannot, however, be forfeited. 
But even if one accept this, many of the premises are unclear and, upon 
closer examination, not very credible. Of course, it is very controversial 
whether or not it is by virtue of being autonomous that we have rights and 
duties.28 In order to determine the plausibility of that statement, we firstly 
have to have an analysis of autonomy. There is one interpretation of autonomy 
that makes the idea that we have moral obligations (or duties) only if we are 
autonomous plausible, namely if we take "autonomy" to mean the same as 
"able to make intentional decisions". If an individual cannot make an 
intentional decision in a situation she can hardly be praise- or blameworthy for 
the action. She cannot be said to be acting at all, in fact. However, this cannot 
be how autonomy should be interpreted in this context. This is the case, since 
we cannot have a duty to be autonomous, unless we have the ability to make 
intentional decisions.29 
More importantly, it is by no means self-evident that only autonomous 
individuals have rights. No matter how generous an interpretation of 
autonomy one makes (being able to decide intentionally being at the most 
generous end), there are plenty of sensible moral theories that ascribes rights 
to beings who are not autonomous in this sense (at least derived rights). Even 
if one finds it hard to accept the claims of environmental philosophers, who 
claim that species or ecosystems have moral status and therefore rights, or 
animal-rights spokesmen, there is hedonism, according to which all sentient 
beings (whether they are autonomous or not) have moral status. If it is possible 
27 
"If autonomy includes rationality, then one's efforts to act irrationally are violations of one's 
autonomy. If one's refusal of information is irrational, then this refusal is a violation of the 
mandatory character of autonomy... Thus, we can say that... receiving information about one's 
diagnosis, alternative treatments, etc., is both a right and a duty." (Ost, 1984, p 309) 
28 To this we get no argument from Ost, but only a reference to Kant (Ost, 1984, p 303). 
29 It is also obvious that Ost's discussion is about people with this ability. 
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to derive norms from values (which many philosophers of a consequentialist 
bent of mind tend to think it is) it is not implausible for a hedonistic utilitarian 
to ascribe non-autonomous but sentient animals, e.g., the right not to be 
arbitrarily tormented. It takes substantial moral arguments in order to establish 
that all theories that ascribe rights to some non-autonomous being(s) are 
implausible. To my knowledge, this has not been done yet. 
Another way o f defending that only autonomous beings have rights is to 
interpret "right" in an unusual (and unusually narrow) way, making it a ma tter 
of definition that only autonomous beings have rights. However, linguistic 
usage does not warrant any no rmative conclusions, since this move leaves it 
completely open for strong moral reasons that are not based on rights. For 
example, we may have a strong reason not to torment sentient beings, although 
they are not right-holders in the peculiar sens e just stipulated. 
Until someone has established that all theories that grant rights to (some) non-
autonomous beings ar e implausible, let us leave the idea that autonomy is the 
only foundation of rights and duties. Let us instead rephrase the argument to 
render it more (at least prima facie) plausible. Most normal adults have the 
ability to act autonomously. In order to be autonomous, or make an 
autonomous decision, in a certain situation, o ne has to make a rational decision 
(in that situation). In order to make a rational decision in a situation one needs 
information relevant to the decision. To refuse to receive such relevant 
information is to choose to be irrational and, thus, not autonomous. It is 
wrong (towards oneself) to choose not to be autonomous. Therefore, no one 
has the right not to receive the relevant information. Therefore, everyone has a 
duty to receive t he relevant information. 
Perhaps a general note on relevant information is appropriate in this 
context. There can hardly be a general duty to try to get all inf ormation 
relevant to a decisio n before acting. This duty would make acting downright 
impossible, since we can always search for more information relevant to a 
decision. So the claim must be that one has a general duty not to refuse to 
receive knowledge one knows is relevant. Th is can be a general duty, and the 
examples I will discuss will not presume that the claim of a general duty to 
know presumes anything more. However, I will argue that even this can be 
compatible with Kantian ethics and/or autonomy. 
The crucial conce pts in this line of reasoning are, of course, autonomy and 
rationality. W e still need an account of these concepts in order to assess the 
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validity of the argument. Since the defenders of the duty to know take Kant as 
their point of departure, the most natural way of doing justice to them seems 
to be to go to Kant's use of these concepts. 
If we want a full account for these concepts, we would have to take the 
totality of the philosophy of Kant into account. That would take (at least) a 
book of its own and that book is not this one. Fortunately enough, we do not 
have to do this. It is enough with a rudimentary understanding of the concepts 
of autonomy and rationality of Kant in order to see that they cannot be used in 
any straightforward manner as a foundation of the duty to know. 
As we already have seen, morally praiseworthy action and autonomous 
action is intimately connected in the ethics of Kant (see IH.2.2.1). F urthermore, 
practical rationality30 is intimately connected with autonomy (they can even be 
said to be identical). According to Kant, to act rationally is to act with the moral 
law as an end, or out of reverence for the moral law, that is to act on the 
maxim through which you can at the same time will that it should become a 
universal law (Kant, 1785, p 52). In other words, to act rationally is to act 
autonomously, and to act autonomously is to act morally praiseworthy. Let us 
for a m oment forget the earlier scepticism towards the connection between 
moral praiseworthiness and autonomous action (see III.2.2.1). There may still be 
more particular duties (towards oneself) that are defensible on the basis Kant's 
ideas, such as the duty to know. 
Ethical duty of commission? 
According to Kant, we have a duty to strive towards our own perfection. This 
is a duty of commission (or an imperfect duty) that we owe to ourselves. That 
is, it is a duty to ourselves that we do not have to act on in every situation. 
Furthermore, it is a duty of virtue or an ethical duty. That is, it is a duty to have 
a certain end, not a duty to do certain (types of) actions, even if the duty to 
have an end can sometimes imply the duty to act in some specific ways.31 
The duty to promote one's own perfection is the duty to develop one's 
talents. Kant tries to show that it is a contradiction in the will not to have this 
end (and therefore it is a duty to have it). For this argument, he uses two 
30 Kant makes a distinction between pure and practical rationality. In order to cut a very long 
sto r y  v e r y  s h o r t :  p r a c t i c a l  r a t i o n a l i t y ,  a s  o p p o s e d  t o  p u r e  r a t i o n a l i t y ,  i s  a b o u t  d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g  a n d  
action. 
31 See Kant, 1797, 6:379-6:413 for the classification of duties and 6:444-6:447 for the duty to 
increase one's natural perfection. 
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assumptions: (i) people have ends, (ii) if people have ends, they must want 
some necessary and sufficient mean to accomplish this end (if they are 
rational). The argument, then, is that in order to accomplish one's ends 
(whatever they may be) one needs abilities and talents. Since this is a n ecessary 
means, one must want to develop such abilities and talents. Otherwise, one has 
contradictory wants (given the assumptions).32 
This argument can of course be questioned on several grounds.33 
However, let us assume that it is valid. Does it then follow that we have a duty 
to know genetic information about ourselves when such information is 
relevant to decision-making? 
No, it does not. First, the argument only shows that we should have certain 
abilities and talents in general (those we need to accomplish our ends), not that 
we are obliged to have certain information in certain situations. Second, and 
more importantly, the argument rests on the assumption that we should have 
(or want) the necessary means to accomplish the ends we actually have. The 
rationality in question then becomes nothing but classic instrumental 
rationality: to be rational is to act as to (try to) realize the goals one has in an 
efficient manner. In that case, it depends on the situation whether increased 
knowledge generally, or genetic knowledge about oneself particularly, leads to 
the effective realization of one's goal. More specifically, it depends on what 
goal one has and on the means required to reach it. As we have seen (e.g. i n 
II.2.3.2), it is far from obvious that acquiring genetic information about oneself 
would always be conducive to the realization of one's desires. 
Ethical duty of omission? 
My line of reasoning might lead to the following complaint. I triggered the 
argument against the possibility of arguing for a duty to know by supposing 
that the duty to know is an ethical duty of commission. As mentioned, such an 
ethical duty is the duty to have certain ends.34 According to Kant, it is in the 
nature of these duties that you cannot, or at least should not try to fulfil them 
32 This is a recapitulation of Nell's treatment of the argument. See Nell, 1975, p 88-90. 
33 One obvious way is to question assumption (ii) on the basis of Humean psychology. 
34 Except for the duty to oneself, to strive towards one's own perfection, Kant emphasises one 
more ethical duty: the duty t o strive for the happiness of others (Kant, 1797, 6:398). 
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in every situation.35 The duty is to internalise these ends as personal policies. How 
and when we should (try to) act o n them is not derivable from the duties 
themselves.36 It is therefore futile to use the notion of ethical duties of 
commission in order to found or derive more particular duties, such as the 
duty to know. 
Instead, one should concentrate on ethical duties of omission. These are 
particular actions that follow from (or are necessary means to fulfil) our 
obligatory ends (Nell, 1975, p 54, 92). For instance, Kant argued that the 
prohibition against suicide is an ethical duty, since suicide would destroy the 
necessary material precondition for striving towards one's own perfection and 
the happiness of others. He also argued that drunkenness, gluttony and several 
other "classical" sins are prohibited by being ethical duties of omission (Kant, 
1797, 6:421-6:428). Maybe a similar prohibition against refusing to seek out 
genetic information relevant to a decision can be argued to be an ethical duty 
of omission as well? 
Unfortunately, this will not do either. Despite Kant's own alleged 
conclusions, it is hard to derive specific duties of action from the obligatory 
ends. It is an empirical matter which acts are needed in order to be able to 
strive towards (and accomplish) these ends (Nell, 1975, p 92). Of course, if you 
are drunk all the time, it will be difficult to strive towards your own 
perfection (develop your talents). So, maybe it is reasonable to argue for a duty 
to avoid becoming a d runkard on the basis of this obligatory end. But since 
the ethical duties of omission are grounded on the ethical duties of 
commission and the ethical duties of commission cut us some slack regarding 
their demands, it is not clear how and when we should abstain from drinking. 
Getting drunk every once in a while does not seem to be incompatible with 
adopting the general policy to strive towards one's own perfection and the 
happiness of others. 
The same goes for the duty to know. Of course, if you never have any 
relevant information regarding decisions you make, you are highly unlikely to 
accomplish anything you strive for. But maintaining some degree of ignorance 
seems perfectly compatible with striving towards both your own ends and 
your own perfection. As we shall see soon, relevant information could even 
35 One reason for this is that they may conflict with each other (such as the to duties mentioned 
in the previous footnote). Another reason is t hat they might conflict with duties of justice or legal 
duties (such as the duty not to lie, which, of course, may conflict with the duty to help others). 
36 To some extent sometime is the minimum, of course. 
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work against accomplishing your ends. So there cannot be a general duty 
towards yourself to know, based on Kant's ethics. 
Against this, one may hold that the most important duty according to Kant 
is to be worthy or act morally praiseworthy (out of pure motives). As we have 
seen, Kant equates moral praiseworthiness with autonomy. As has been 
claimed above (HL2.2.Î), and as will be further elaborated below (see V.3.1.2), 
there are reasons to doubt the fruitfulness and plausibility of that equation. But 
even if one believes in this equation, it is difficult to see the duty to act out of 
pure motives as a duty one has to oneself. If it is a duty, it is a duty, period. Let 
us therefore leave the equation of worthiness and autonomy for now. 
Against a duty towards oneself: Two examples 
Let us instead elaborate further on the Kantian idea of the duty to strive 
towards one's own perfection. One purpose with such striving, as we saw, is 
that it is a means to accomplish our ends. In this regard, this duty (according to 
Kant, derived from the moral law and thus our autonomy) is very much alike 
the conception of autonomy presented and defended in chapter HI above. In 
order to accomplish what you want you need capacities. You need the 
competence to make decisions and the means to realize your goals through 
acting on these decisions. Genetic information may be and may not be 
favourable for the development and upholding of these capacities. A few 
examples will d emonstrate these points. 
Jolene?1 Jolene is a writer. Several of Jolene's female relatives on her mother's 
side, including her mother, have contracted breast cancer in their adult years. 
Therefore Jolene's sister took part in a genetic study, which established that 
she was a carrier of the mutation BRCA1 (see 1.4.1). As a re sult, Jolene's sister 
decided to go through with a prophylactic operation, removing her breast 
tissue. The operation was successful and Jolene's sister seems satisfied with her 
life. When the study was done, Jolene was asked to test herself. Jolene 
declined. Seeing her sister being satisfied with her situation, she knows that if 
she were to test herself and the test showed she was a ca rrier too, she would 
also go through with the operation. However, she knows that she has a 
predisposition for depression. She became deeply depressed in her 
adolescence, when her mother fell sick with breast cancer. She then became 
37 This example was also discussed in II.2.3.2. 
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unable to live an active life for several years. She therefore considers herself to 
have good grounds for believing that a test that would show her to be a carrier 
of the gene would make her equally, if not more, depressed. She is on the 
verge of finishing her great novel. This project she considers to be her most 
important life project. She therefore declines the test in order to be able to 
realize one of her basic aims in life. Does she still have a duty (to herself) to 
know about her genetic susceptibility to breast cancer? 
John. John is part of a family that is plagued by Huntington's disease. Many of 
John's relatives have tested themselves presymptomatically. Some of the tests 
were positive (indicating the tested to be a carrier) and some were negative. He 
is a stern bachelor and does not intend to have any children. However, he is 
facing an important crossroad in his life. He is ambivalent. On the one hand, 
he can stay on his present unqualified job, which he enjoys well enough, and 
spend more time on his hobby as an ornithologist. On the other hand, he can 
enter a lengthy education that hopefully will end in a job as a business lawyer. 
He knows that if he were to test himself for Huntington's and the result came 
out positive, he would not bother to invest time in lengthy education, since he 
could only practice the job for a few years to follow. However, he has decided 
not to take the test. He just does not want to know what the future holds for 
him regarding his health. Does he still have a duty to know about having or not 
having a genetic susceptibility to Huntington's disease? 
In both these examples, genetic information is relevant in the sense that it 
would influence the decision-making of the persons. Also, in both examples 
the interests of others are supposed to be irrelevant. One difference between 
the two cases is that the avoidance of the genetic information is motivated 
differently. In the case of Jolene, the motivation is that genetic information 
would (probably) be an obstacle in the realization of the end she finds most 
important. In the case of John, the motivation is the avoidance of genetic 
information. 
There are thus two ways in which genetic information relevant to a 
person's decision-making can decrease that person's autonomy. Firstly, genetic 
information can get in the way of realizing one's other ends. Secondly, 
avoiding genetic information can be an end. In both these types of situations, 
the acquisition of genetic information would decrease the degree to which the 
person leads her life according to her own basic desires. 
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In the case of Jolene, she could of course be mistaken about her own 
reaction. A positive result might not cause a depression. She might be as 
content as her sister. But then again, she might not. I do not wish to claim that 
we are the greatest experts on ourselves as individuals. But we tend to have 
some idea on how we will react to various circumstances, especially if we have 
experienced them before. And just as things might not be as bad as she thinks, 
they may be worse. She might be paralysed also by a negative result, feeling 
"survivor's guilt" towards her mother. Of course, she might also become sick 
before finishing the book and unable to fulfil her dream because of that. She 
has no guarantees, whatever she does. But she has good enough reasons to 
believe (we may assume) that she will be able to finish the book before 
symptoms emerge and that she would become too depressed to finish it if she 
were to know that she was a carrier. 
How can she then have a duty to herself to know? It would (probably) 
decrease her autonomy. It would (probably) make her miserable. Even if we 
cannot infer from this that she has a right not to know, there does not seem to 
be anything that speaks in favour of saying that she has a duty to know.38 
In the case of John, he could of course come to realize his other plans to a 
lesser degree because of his ignorance. He might opt for the education and 
find that the symptoms of Huntington's starts to emerge before he completes 
it. Then it might be true that he would have lived a more autonomous life in 
the sense of self-realization (see III.3.1.1) if he had taken the test and stayed on 
his old job. In other words, there are reasons of autonomy that speak in favour 
of testing. On the other hand, there are reasons of autonomy that speak against 
testing. He does not want to test himself. He wants to stay ignorant about his 
future health status. In order to find out what he ought to do, focusing on 
autonomy only, it boils down to what he wants the most and which of his 
desires are most authentic. It may very well be the case that the balance tips in 
favour of not knowing. Then it would be strange to say that autonomy is the 
foundation for his alleged duty to know. 
For both Jolene and John, genetic knowledge can be a valuable instrument. 
It may help them to lead more autonomous lives and increase their respective 
capacity for doing this. But, then again, it might not. This is why Rhodes is 
38 To this Rhodes may agree, since the information cannot "be obtained at a reasonable cost", 
2000, p 115 (which seems to be a prerequisite for the duty). However, this reservation will m ake the 
thesis of the duty to know either trivial (if it means that the duty only holds when the moral 
benefits of getting the information outweighs the moral costs) or in need of further defence. 
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wrong to conclude that autonomy always is a basis for the right to know and 
never to a right not to know (1998, p 17-18). She is right to insist that autonomy 
is the basis for informed consent, since informadon about e.g. treatment may 
be relevant to the individual's assessment of the treatment and the information 
thus "allows others to make choices according to their own light" (1998, p 17). 
She is wrong, however, to conclude from this that more relevant information 
always increases a person's ability to make choices and live according to her 
own lights, i.e. always increases the autonomy of the person. As the examples 
shows, even obviously relevant information can decrease the person's 
possibilities to live her life according to her own standards. 
The same point can also be used to refute the claim that "absence of crucial 
information is inimical to self government, to the ability to control one's 
destiny, and hence inimical to autonomy." (Harris & Keywood, 2001, p 421) 
These writers makes a distinction between "autonomously chosen restrictions 
on autonomy which are consistent with autonomy understood as an ethical 
principle and such choices which are inconsistent with autonomy" (Harris & 
Keywood, 2001, p 419) calling choices of the second kind choices that are 
inimical to autonomy (Harris & Keywood, 2001, p 418).39 They are thus 
claiming that choosing to decline crucial information40 is incompatible with 
autonomy. They elaborate this claim: 
If I lack information, for example about how long my life is likely to 
continue I cannot make rational plans for the rest of my life. If I do not 
know that my life is only likely to last five more years, rather than say 
twenty five more, many of my priorities will be inappropriate and some 
will be self-defeating. Of course it is not necessarily irrational not to 
want to know one's probable life expectancy and many would prepared 
to forego autonomy rather than face the knowledge of a looming 
premature death. However they cannot defend the wish to remain ignorant of a fact 
like that in the name of autono my. (Harris & Keywood, 2001, p 421. My 
italics) 
39 For instance, according to Harris & Keywood, 2001, the choice to sell oneself as a slave is 
inimical, whereas the autonomous choice to commit suicide is not (p 420). 
40 With which they mean relevant information in the sense defined above (V.3.1), see Harris & 
Keywood, 2001, p 421-422. 
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However, the conclusion (in italics) of this line of reasoning is surely flawed,41 
especially given their own characterisation of autonomy (which is very similar 
to mine): "[Ajutonomy... [is] the ability and the freedom to make the choices 
that shape our lives in accordance with our own conceptions of what that 
shape should be." (Harris & Keywood, 2001, p 420) Obviously, this makes 
autonomy a matter of degree: one more or less has the ability and freedom to 
thus shape one's life. Then it should be equally obvious that genetic 
information, even such information that is crucial for decision-making, can 
both promote and damage autonomy, depending on the person and situation. I 
have just adumbrated two cases in which it is plausible to assume that crucial 
genetic information about the persons in question can damage their autonomy. 
And as we have seen in previous chapters, there is no guarantee that (genetic) 
information is conducive to autonomy; in fact, it might be the other way 
around (see e.g. IL2.3.2).42 However tempting it might be to say that certain 
kinds of choices always promotes or damages one's autonomy, one should 
resist the urge to give in to such simplifications, in the light of the multitude 
of factors that can influence the autonomy of a person. 
3.1.2 A duty to do one's ( Kantian) duty 
The equation of autonomy and worthiness 
We have touched upon the Kantian idea of autonomy as worthy (or 
meritorious or morally praiseworthy) action several times (see e.g. EI.2.2.1). 
This "orthodox" reading of Kant lurks in the background of some arguments 
for a duty to know. In fact, Rhodes has been quite explicit about it: "the 
Kantian conception of autonomy expresses the core content of an individual's 
moral obligation, the duty to determine one's own actions by the moral law" 
(2000, p 114). Let us call this id ea the equation of autonomy and worthiness. 
In Kant's writings, this idea rests heavily on his dualistic metaphysics. It also 
concerns the "free wilT'-debate. This is also the source of the problem with 
the equation of autonomy and worthiness: it makes the notion of "free" and 
41 As is the first premise (at least on most standard accounts on rational plans), since I can make 
rational plans despite ignorance of my length of life, by assigning probabilities and values to each 
possibility and acting accordingly. 
42 Takala, probably has this point in mind when writing: "Maybe those who want to uphold the 
right not to be informed simply know themselves well enough not to seek possibly disastrous 
knowledge. Being in control of one's life can then require some degree of self-chosen ignorance." 
(Takala, 2001, p 487) This point is validated by examples such as Jolene's. 
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"right" collapse into each other.43 An idea with that implication ought to be 
abandoned, or so I will argue. Therefore, no argument resting on the equation 
of autonomy and worthiness can be successful, whatever it tries to establish 
(including the duty to know). 
Before I argue this last point, let me recapitulate "the Kantian conception of 
autonomy" referred to by Rhodes. According to Kant, we are all part of the 
"natural" or phenomenal world. The laws of nature, which we are unable to 
change or break, govern this world. Everything that happens in the natural 
world is the necessary effect of the previous state in the world in conjunction 
with the laws of nature. That is, everything that happens in the natural world is 
causally determined, that is, Kant defends determinism regarding the natural 
world. A consequence of this is that to the extent that our actions are a result 
of what happens in the natural world (of which we are a part) they are 
determined. That is, given what has happened previously (which is given in the 
natural world) we could not have done anything else than what we in fact 
did.44 
Since Kant formulated and believed in the dictum "'ought' implies 'can'", 
he believed that if we always are determined, that is, i t is always true that we 
could not have done anything else than we actually did, then it cannot be true 
that we ought to do anything else than what we in fact do. But our moral 
discourse seems to presuppose that we could have acted differentiy than we in 
fact do. Otherwise blame and merit are pointless, Kant argues. That is, morality 
presupposes something that is incompatible with determinism. 
Moreover, Kant realizes that indeterminism will not save "free will". To act 
freely is instead to act autonomously - to legislate oneself as opposed to being 
ruled by "external" and non-controlled internal factors. It is only in virtue of 
having the ability to reason that we have the ability to legislate ourselves. The 
dualism of Kant now rises to the surface. There is a world of phenomenon 
and a noumenal world that, so to speak, lies behind the world of phenomenon. 
We come into contact with this noumenal world through our reason. There 
are thus two kinds of motives behind our actions, the "empirical" motives 
43 This formulation might be misleading, since Kant is ca reful to distinguish between the theory 
of right (to act in accordance with the moral law, regardless of motive) and a theory of worth (to 
act out of (reverence for) the moral law). 
44 This last inference can, of course, can be questioned. See, for instance, Tännsjö, 1998b, chap. 
10. 
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(wishes that are the effects of causes) and the "pure" motives (principled 
motives according to the moral law). W hen we act according to an empirical 
motive, we are part of the phenomenal world and, thus, determined. Thereby, 
we are only autonomous (free) when we act according to reason and legislate 
ourselves in accordance with the law of practical reason — the categorical 
imperative.45 
To state the same reasoning in a more modern language: there is only one 
way to not be determined by previous causes — to govern ones' actions with 
reasons. This is the only way to acquire the capacity to choose among 
alternatives. In order for the reasons to really be reasons, and not just 
rationalizations of causes, they must be reasonable (or in accordance with the 
laws of reason). Conclusion: only when we are governed by reason, we are 
autonomous, and only when we are governed by reason we act morally. The 
law of freedom is thus identical to the moral law: the categorical imperative. It 
is important to emphasize that it is not enough to act in accordance with 
reason to be autonomous. We must act out of our reason(s) (out of "reverence 
for the law"), since it is our motive and not the behaviour itself that 
determines whether we are free or not. 
Now we have a fuller understanding of Kant's equation of autonomy and 
worthiness. Therefore, we also are in a better position to see its shortcomings. 
If we equate autonomy and worthiness, we cannot autonomously act in a non-
worthy or unworthy way.46 That is, if autonomous, we cannot ever be 
blameworthy. The view that evil men are not acting out of free will is very 
humanistic. But it is very hard to believe in. Why should the very possibility of 
principled evil, i.e. autonomous action out of blameworthy motives, be 
excluded? Intuitively, it seems perfectly possible to legislate oneself according 
to morally abhorrent principles, such as sadistic, revengeful or mean ones (see 
ni.2.2.1). An idea that excludes this possibility certainly carries a h eavy burden 
of proof. And to refer to the foundation on a dualistic world-view of a 
noumenal and a phenomenal world as a further defence will not convince 
modern readers. 
The following could be retorted. Kant surely recognized principled evil. 
Of course, our empirical motives are (by definition) determined. We do not 
45 I take it to be so that what I have said so far about Kant in this subsection is a fairly 
uncontroversial reading of the third part of Kant, 1785. 
46 However, Kant did not seem to think that this was so. See Nell, 1975, p 56. 
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choose them. But we choose whether or not we should act in accordance with 
them. We are not determined to act either in compliance with the preceding 
causes or with reason (then we would be determined nevertheless). Rather, we 
can sometimes overcome our natural inclinations and choose according to 
what we (think we) should do. When we can d o that and do not, in fact, do 
that, we are blameworthy. We choose to not govern ourselves in accordance 
with the moral law. 
However, if this is how we should understand Kant, the equation of 
autonomy and worthiness no longer holds. Autonomy is then not a 
prerequisite for choosing the worthy, but rather about the ability to choose 
either to do the worthy thing or to follow one's inclinations: there is a choice 
between what motives to act from, empirical or "pure" ones. We can, then, 
freely (autonomously) choose to act on our empirical motives or act on the 
morally praiseworthy ones. To be sure, if one accepts the ethics of I<ant, i t 
would be wrong not to act on the morally praiseworthy motives. But this 
conception of moral praiseworthiness is no longer identical to the conception 
of autonomy (although it still presupposes the possibility of choosing, since 
'ought' still implies 'can"). So the problem with being ignorant cannot directly 
be that it is in compatible with remaining autonomous. Instead, one would have 
to argue that intentionally chosen ignorance on genetic information when this 
information is r elevant to a d ecision is immora l. Given a Kantian basis of such a 
claim, one then would have to argue that such ignorance is in conflict with the 
categorical imperative. 
The categorical imperative 
Is it or is it not, then, in accordance with the categorical imperative to choose 
not to find out genetic information relevant to a d ecision? This question can 
be discussed at some length, not least since there is an enormous debate on 
how the categorical imperative should be understood. I will dodge some of 
these questions. As a point of departure, I will use the first and most famous 
formulation, the Formula of Universal Law (FUL): "Act only on that maxim 
through which you can at the same time will t hat it should become a universal 
law." (Kant, 1785, p 52)47 
47 Since this is the principle bidding for all rational beings regardless of goals or intentions, other 
formulations of the principles are just reformulations that put emphasis on other aspects on the 
categorical imperative (like t he Formula of an End in Itself, p 66-67, and the Formula of the 
Kingdom of Ends, p 76) or derivations (like t he Formula of the Law of Nature, p 52, or the 
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FUL is, then, a way of testing maxims. If the maxim is universalizable, to act 
on it is morally permissible. If, at the same time, a maxim prescribing the 
omission of this a ct is n ot universalizable, the action is obligato ry (or a duty): i t 
is not permissible to abstain from that action. If the maxim is not 
universalizable, to act on it is f orbidden.48 What, then, is a maxim? Kant defines 
it as a "subjective principle of action" (1785, p 51), that is, the actual principle, 
intention, or motive of the action.49 It is a pr inciple in the sense that it can be 
acted upon repeatedly, in different concrete ways, and in different 
circumstances (like the maxim "go to the store around the corner to buy some 
milk"). It is subjective in the way that it is the actual motive or principle of the 
agent acting on it. A maxim is also practical, that is, saying something about 
what actions to perform. A maxim thus is a practical principle an agent has (acts 
on) at a certain time, and can act on several times. 
Which maxims, then, ought to be subjected to the test of the categorical 
imperative? "All maxims", seems to be the only answer if one should stay true 
to Kant's own formulations. But this is not obviously so. There are two 
schools here, with different ideas. O n the one hand, we have the idea that the 
maxims are specific intentions regarding specific decisions in concrete 
situations. T his is the narrow view. On the other hand, we have the idea that 
maxims are general principles a pe rson is committed to, that is, the basis for 
her more specific intentions.50 This is th e broad view. 
Fortunately enough, the subject matter we are currently investigating helps 
to limit the number of interpretation we need to deal with. The discussion is 
about something so specific as the duty to know about genetic information 
about oneself. Broad theories cannot help us here, since the purpose of these 
Formula of Autonomy, p 70), Kant argues. This is, o f course, controversial, but not something I 
will que stion here. 
48 This is Nell's interpretation (Nell, 1975, p 73-74), which I will f ollow to a large extent. According 
to Nell, if a maxim and its omission both cannot be universalised (like e.g. "to sell t omatoes but 
not buy them"), the action(s) is (are) permissible (p 75-77). 
49 This is also Nell's interpretation of Kant. It has the advantage of presenting a solution of the 
problem of relevant act descriptions (which description should be universalised): the actual 
intention of the individual is the maxim that should be universalizable. See Nell, 1975, chap. 2-3. 
50 Brännmark, 2002, p 198-208, argues that the latter interpretation is the proper one if the 
purpose is to defend a reasonable version of Kantian ethics. To this question, I am neutral. 
However, I have used his terminology of "narrow" and "broad" maxims. 
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is to supply a moral framework (Brännmark, 2002, p 97).51 Within these frames 
one has to use one's judgement in order to solve more particular issues (like 
the question of whether one should test oneself genetically or not). In order to 
acquire direct guidance on the duty to know, we thus have to turn to the 
narrow interpretation of maxims: i t is the specific intention to do a specific act 
that must be universalizable if that act is to be morally permissible. 
How should one universalise, according to the categorical imperative? Well, 
the important thing is t hat the maxim can be consistendy universalizable at all, 
not whether we would want it to be universalised. This is what Kant means 
when he says th at we are legislators — a person should be able to consistently 
hold the maxim she acts on, were it a universal law (of nature). Can the law be 
upheld? Is the action of the maxim possible if the law is a universal law? This 
is the question we should ask ourselves when applying the categorical 
imperative. 
In order to determine whether a maxim is consistently universalizable, we 
must formulate a universalization of the maxim. This can be done by 
formulating the universalised typified c ounterpart (UTC) of the maxim in question. If 
a maxim schematically can be formulated as this: "To — if ..." (where "—" 
denotes some action and denotes some circumstances), the UTC will be 
"Everybody to — if ...". For instance, the maxim "to he if I think I can get 
away with it" has "Everybody lies if they think they can get away with it" as it s 
UTC (Nell, 1975, p 61-63). 
In order to get a contradiction when universalising a maxim in this manner, 
we need some background assumptions (Nell, 1975, p 70-74). For instance, we 
need certain empirical assumptions. Take Kant's classical example of breaking 
promises in order to avoid a financial predicament. Kantians who are 
sympathetic to Kant's attempt to show that this maxim cannot be consistently 
universalised has roughly argued along the following lines. If it became a 
universal law of nature to break promises when one is in a financial 
predicament, no one would trust promises made out in such situations. A 
presupposition for a p romise to be possible (as a p romise) is that the person 
you make the promise to takes the promise as a promise.52 If it is a law of 
51 Even if o ne can argue that such a framework can generate certain constraints, e.g. against 
murdering and harming someone else (Brännmark, 2002, p 202). 
52 Let us take this conceptual c laim for granted. 
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nature that everybody in a financial predicament who promises something 
breaks this promise, it is thus not possible to act on this maxim (you cannot 
make the promise). The maxim is therefore not consistently universalizable.53 
However, this conclusion is too hasty. In order to reach this conclusion, we 
have to presuppose many facts about the world and us. One crucial empirical 
supposition is that people know that no one is honest when they make a 
promise in this kind of situation. This, furthermore, presupposes that people 
learn from their mistakes (Nell, 1975, p 66, 74). These suppositions may seem 
reasonable, but the categorical imperative is silent upon which empirical 
assumptions we are allowed to make. And a contradiction can be derived from 
any maxim whatsoever given the appropriate empirical assumptions. Given the 
empirical assumption that anyone who visits her old mother goes nuts with 
her nagging and kills her , one can derive a c ontradiction from the maxim "Go 
to visit your old mother every Sunday". This would be impossible, since there 
soon would be no old mothers to visit.54 
The solution lies in the same spirit as the solution to the problem of 
relevant act description, where it is the intention that the agent in fact has that 
should be universalised. A maxim or an intention can only be formulated 
against the background of some empirical assumptions. I cannot intend to rob 
a b ank if I do not at the same time have a lot of beliefs, e.g. th at there are banks, 
that they can be robbed, and other intentions, e.g. the intention to take out my 
pistol, the intention to get away with it. That is, when I formulate a maxim, I do 
it from some empirically necessary assumptions and I also presuppose some 
normal and foreseeable consequences. These are, then, part of my maxim and 
demarcate the empirical assumptions that make the derivation of the 
contradiction possible. For instance, a normal and foreseeable consequence of 
the UTC of "To rob a bank", that is, "Everybody robs a bank", is that there will 
very soon be no more banks. It is impossible to rob a bank if there are none, 
so the UTC of "to rob a bank" is contradictory. 
What makes a consequence "normal and foreseeable"? The agent must 
realize that the consequence is a part of the maxim. The agent is an agent of 
53 Or, rather, the action of promising becomes impossible. This reveals an ambiguity in the test. Is 
it the maxim or the action that should be impossible? For simplicity, I will presuppose that if a ny 
one them becomes impossible, the contradiction is e stablished. 
54 Further empirical assumptions, like that there are a finite numbers of old mothers, that no one 
could have an intention to do something they know to be impossible, and so on, would of course 
be needed. 
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this actual world, who assumes the ways of this actual world. Probably no one 
who intends to steal thinks that a copy of the stolen object will materialize 
itself direcdy after the theft, since she knows that it is not the way this world 
works. This is, then, an actual presupposition of the maxim and thereby a part 
of the system of intentions and beliefs we are allowed to refer to when 
determining whether the maxim is consistently universalizable. 
This makes the moral status of an action extremely dependable on the 
presuppositions that are built into its maxim, and therefore the psyche, of the 
actor (Brännmark, 2002, p 185). And maxims in general are probably very 
sensitive to the specific situation of the agent, since agents are sensitive to the 
situations they are in. This is important to keep in mind in the following. If 
one believes are utterly strange and unusual, the maxims one acts upon may be 
universalizable, even if the action is considered deeply immoral by most 
people.55 However, my point here is not to call into question the plausibility 
of the theory, but to see whether it can be used to found a duty to know. 
Is it, then, in accordance with the categorical imperative to avoid finding out 
genetic information relevant to a decision? Well, as we just saw, that depends 
on the maxim of the agent. Let us try the maxim "To avoid finding out genetic 
information (about risk of future disease) relevant to a decision".56 The UTC 
of this maxim is, then, "Everybody avoids finding out genetic information 
relevant to a decision." Is this consistent? Is it possible to act on the maxim if 
everyone were to do this? It is hard to see why that would not be possible. 
To this, both Rhodes and Ost probably would object that their point was 
more general. I am including genetic information in the maxim. Is this really part 
of the maxim? In order to know whether a belief is part of a maxim one has to 
ask oneself if the maxim is dependent on the belief. Take the maxim "To steal 
a car if I am born in Stockholm, dark-haired, six feet tall, plays the clarinet and 
is named Juth." This maxim is universalizable. Obviously, it is so in virtue of 
being so specific. If it were a natural law that anyone with these characteristics 
stole cars, this would not pose any threat to the existence of cars in particular 
or a well ordered society in general. But is this really my maxim? Someone 
who claims to have maxims of this sort probably would not be believed to be 
55 Take the maxim "To torment an atheist in order to save th e human race from extinction due 
to the wrath of god". This maxim seems to be universalizable. 
56 I take it for granted that the maxim-holder thinks that genetic information may be relevant to at 
least one of her decisions, since she would otherwise be very unlikely to have such a maxim. 
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honest. This since the maxim does not seem to be dependent on the 
characteristics: "Would you really re frain from stealing the car if you had dyed 
your hair green the same morning?" If one cannot truthfully answer yes to that 
question, the colour of the hair is probably not part of the maxim after all 
(Nell, 1975, p 71-72). Rather, it is a rationalization in order to render the maxim 
universalizable. 
This line of reasoning may be thought applicable to the "genetic"-part of 
the maxim. Is it really essential to the maxim that the information is gen etic? If it 
is not, the maxim rather is "To avoid finding out information relevant to a 
decision." The UTC to this is "Everyone avoids finding out information 
relevant to a decision." This looks far more difficult to universalise 
consistently. Any person needs information relevant to a d ecision in order to 
make one. Otherwise, it could be claimed, like flipping a coin, one leaves it up 
to chance what one does and this is not decision-making at all. 
However, this i s not convincing at all. From the fact that one does not find 
out or refuses to accept information relevant for a decision it cannot be 
derived that one has no information relevant to the decision-making. To be 
sure, any person at least has to believe some things in order to make a decision in 
a certain circumstance (see III.2.3.1). For instance, it is necessary to believe that 
there are alternatives of action one decides among. But it does not take very 
much information (if information is conceived as true believes, it actually takes 
none) in order for it to be possible to make a decision (remember the test of 
universalizability). I can make a d ecision on what to have for lunch (let us say 
that there is only two possibilities I take into account) without knowing 
anything about what I choose between (besides that they are different options 
of lunch) by flipping a coin and decide to go for whatever the coin shows 
(like heads for meal 1 and tails for meal 2).57 If I make decisions in this manner, 
I will probably not be very successful in realizing my aims, but this is 
something else. There is a distinction between decision-making (and the 
capacity to make a decision) and efficient decision-making (and the capacity to 
realize one's aims through one's decisions and actions). 
More importantly, it is highly unlikely that anyone acts on a maxim as 
coarse as "To avoid any information relevant to a decision". Most people 
already have information relevant to their decisions. The question is whether 
57 I will not pursue the terminological objection that this is not really a decision. Why would it not 
be? 
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or not they should find out more. Jolene (TV.3.1.1) is already aware of the 
nature of the disease the test is about. She also knows (or considers herself to 
have good reasons to believe) that she will be depressed if the test reveals that 
she is a carrier of BRCA1. John also is familiar with the disease he is testing 
himself for. John knows that a test result would not interfere with any 
reproductive plans he has (since he has none). And so on. 
The typical situation of decision looks like Jolene's and John's; it is 
characterised by partial ignorance. Therefore, maxims will not typically be of 
the type "To not have any information of relevance to the decision". Since 
maxims are sensitive to the persons (due to the fact that they are different 
persons and that they are in different situations) the maxims will rather be of 
the following character "To avoid further information that is relevant to this 
and that decision in this and that way". These kinds of maxims are 
universalizable, since they are more specific. (Try some for yourself!) 
Furthermore, since maxims are sensitive to differences in situations, it may 
be of relevance to them that the information is g enetic. Of course, this may be 
due to the fact that one holds unrealistic beliefs about the nature of genetic 
information (see 1.4.1 about genetic essentialism). But it may also be due to the 
fact that the genetic nature of the information is of significance to the reaction 
of oneself and others. One may become depressed as a result of a positive 
result. Then the maxim is something like: "Avoid to find out information if it 
most likely makes me depressed". Of course, this maxim is not about genetic 
information perse. But it is about genetic information in the situation when 
such information is the very information that most Likely will make one 
depressed if acquired. Or one may have good reasons to believe that one will 
be isolated in a family where most of the living relatives are carrier if a test 
reveals that one is not a carrier. Then the maxim might be something like: 
"Avoid to find out genetic information about oneself if it may stigmatise me 
in the eyes of my family". 
Examples such as these, of course, can be multiplied. But the point should 
be clear already at this stage. Since maxims may vary, there can be no general 
duty to know based on the categorical imperative, even if there may be 
situations where a maxim that contains the intention not to know is not 
universalizable. It depends on the maxim. And maxims depend on situations 
and persons. 
So Kantian ethics, on a more careful reading of it, most likely cannot be 
used to argue in favour of a general obligation to know. The general lesson for 
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moral philosophy is that duties and worthiness in a K antian setting are not so 
"square" as has been presupposed. Differences in situations may allow for 
exceptions to general rules, such as "Do not lie". However, if one wants ethics 
to be sensitive to the particulars of a situation, which has seemed reasonable to 
many, this should only be good news for Kantian ethics. Furthermore, it 
shows that very "principled" moral theories do not have to be insensitive to 
particulars of situations. And this is good news for moral theory in general. 
3.2 Duties towards others: Arguments of non-harm 
There are of course other ways of arguing for the duty to know. One obvious 
way is to claim that it is a d uty towards others and, more precisely, a duty not 
to harm others. Such a duty may, of course, have a Kantian foundation 
(Brännmark, 20002, p 205). But principles of non-harm are not particularly 
Kantian. They may also be justified in a more consequentialistic framework. 
The duty not to harm is usually separated from the duty to benefit others 
(Beauchamp and Childress, 2001, p 114), even if the limit between non-harm 
and beneficence is unclear. However, the duty not to harm is usually 
considered to consist in or found duties of omission, while the duty to 
benefit consists in or founds duties of commission (Beauchamp and 
Childress, 2001, p 115). One reason that the limit between non-harm and 
benefit is unclear is that this related distinction between actions and omissions 
is unclear and ethically controversial. 
However, even if we were to overlook this problem, to use a p rinciple of 
non-harm that founds duties of omission in order to justify a duty to know 
would be problematic, to say the least. This is so since finding out information 
about one's genetic constitution (or anything else) is certainly not an omission 
on any version of the acts/omissions distinction. Because of this, and since it 
is hard to draw a line between actions and omissions, I will understand the 
principle of non-harm in a way that may be considered unorthodox in 
biomedical ethics. To harm someone is to cause adverse consequences for 
someone through ones actions or omissions to do something that one could 
have done. "Adverse consequences" may also be what we normally would call 
absence of benefits. Furthermore, in this context, adverse consequences 
should be interpreted in terms of subjective well-being, i.e. i n accordance with 
hedonistic and preferentialistic theories of value (see II.4.1.4). This means that 
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"harm" in this context will not include harming the autonomy of someone 
else.58 
All this may give the impression that "non-harm" is to be equivaent to 
traditional utilitarianism. This is not so, however (see III.4.2). I wish to intlude a 
broader range of ideas, including such that attaches greater moral weght to 
inflicting harms than to producing benefits and theories that includes risks and 
possibilities in their ideas of right-making characteristics. 
A prerequisite for any argument for a duty to know is that the harm thit is to 
justify th e duty is of a sufficient magnitude. How great the magnitude should 
be in order to be "sufficient" is, of course, far from clear. However, very 
marginal harm cannot be enough. You cannot claim a duty of someone else to 
refrain from harming you from the prick of a smal l injection if that inection 
is necessary for you to become immune from a very dangerois and 
contagious disease. The harm to you has to be bigger than that in oder to 
justify a duty. 
Can the duty not to harm someone else be used to argue for a duty to kiow? I 
think only a brief moment of thought is enough to see that a gen eral tuty to 
know in all (or most) circumstances cannot be grounded on a duty not to 
harm (or any reasonable non-harm principle, for that matter). A few eximples 
should be enough to make this clear. The examples show that a persrn can 
harm someone else by acquiring genetic information rather than retaining 
from this.59 
An obvious example of this is the case of purchasing life insurane after 
having gone through with a genetic test. The result of this test may rencer you 
uninsurable. Say th at you are planning to buy a house for your family aid you 
need a life insurance in order to get a mortgage for the house.60 Then taking 
the test may make you uninsurable and therefore rob you of your chaices of 
58 I have already discussed harming autonomy, and then argued that harm of autommy can 
result from finding out genetic information (see e.g. V.3.1.1). And what holds for the divalue of 
the person tested holds for other persons as well, as we will see (chapter VI). So the nove of 
referring to harm in terms of autonomy is not open for anyone who wants to argue foia general 
duty to know. Besides, the points I will make about consequences in terms of well-beirg in this 
subsection can be reformulated to be about consequences in terms of autonomy. 
55 This book contains lot of such examples. See e.g. chapter II, passim. 
60 As has been the case in UK for some time (Sandberg, 1995, 1554). 
320 
buying the house.61 This, in effect, does not only harm you, but also your 
family. Avoiding the information could thus have had less damaging effects.62 
Another, perhaps more mundane, example is the following. Let us imagine 
woman who has Huntington's disease in her family. Let us assume that she 
herself is a carrier of the gene for Huntington's disease. If she were to test 
herself, she would find this out. She would then not be able to keep this from 
her husband. However, if he were to find this out, he would become 
depressed and thus unable to lead an active and enjoyable life. Instead, he 
would, with agonizing fear, wait for the day of the outbreak of disease. If she 
does not find out this informadon beforehand, he will be able to cope with 
the situation when she starts to show symptoms. It is waiting for a catastrophe 
he cannot manage. Thus, for the woman not to get the information at all 
would have less damaging effects with regard to her husband. 
Of course, examples such as these can be multiplied. However, these two 
should be enough to establish that there is no general duty to know to be had 
from the duty not to harm people. Not only is it conceivable that not getting 
genetic information would not harm anyone, it is also conceivable, not to 
mention likely, that getting information may be more harmful to others than 
not getting it in certain situations. Therefore, the idea of a duty to know has to 
be modified. 
One modification that would be true to the idea of non-harm would be to 
say that we have a duty to know when the omission to know would harm 
someone else. Of course, the duty would then not be a duty to know, but a 
duty not to harm. But if this duty can be shown to imply a duty to know in 
many and/or important cases, there may still be some warrant for sometimes 
talking of "a duty to know". 
Despite her Kantianism, Rhodes has provided a string of examples where 
omissions to know are characterised by their potentially adverse consequences 
to others (1998, p 12-14). Furthermore, she claims that one only has a duty to 
know "when the information can be obtained at a reasonable cost" (2000, p 
115). These are reasons that all fit s consequentialism like a glove! 
Since Rhodes continues by arguing for a duty to know (at least partially) in 
virtue of standing in certain relations to others (which makes the argument 
61 This is s o at least if no or partial regulation is i mplemented (see VII. 1), given certain other 
prerequisites (such as not having or having to renew your insurance and so on). 
62 This case is n ot only conceivable but also actually quite common. The fault may of course be 
with the system of insurance, but that is another question, to which we will r eturn in chapter VII. 
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more Aristotelian than consequentialist),63 Takala and Häyry, have outlined an 
explicidy consequentialistic way of dealing with the duty to know in a 
response to Rhodes' argument. Let us therefore extrapolate this argument and 
see how far it takes us. Let us furthermore start with Rhodes' own cases. They 
are neatly summed up by Takala and Häyry: 
Professor Rhodes' examples are the cases of Tom, Dick, Harry and 
Harriette (1998, pp. 12-14). Tom has to decide whether to participate in a 
population study which would provide scientists with a m ore accurate 
picture of Huntington's disease. Dick has been asked to take part in a 
linkage study to find out what his cousin Martha's chances are for having 
a child who does not suffer from Marphan syndrome. Harry, who has a 
strong family history of Huntington's disease, faces the choice of 
genetic testing because he is planning on marrying Sally and starting a 
family with her, although he may die young and pass on the disease to 
their children. And Harriette and her husband have decided not to find 
out if they are recessive carriers of the Tay-Sachs gene and to have a 
child despite the fact that the child's life can be short and full of agony. 
(Takala and Häyry, 2000, p 109)64 
Let us begin with Tom. As Takala and Häyry points out, the duty for Tom to 
know does not follow from his alleged duty to participate in the study, since 
"the accumulation of scientific data does not require that he himself be 
informed" (2000, p 111). As will be argued later (VH.6.2), under some very 
special circumstances, Tom has a duty to participate. However, he has no duty 
to know. The same goes for Dick, who can participate in the linkage study 
without finding out what the result was regarding himself. 
Let us move on to Harry. "Harry, who has a strong family history of 
Huntington's disease, faces the choice of genetic testing because he is planning 
on marrying Sally a nd starting a family with her, although he may die young 
and pass on the disease to their children." (Takala and Häyry, 2000, p 109) Does 
Harry have a duty to know? 
63 See VI.3.2.2 for a discussion of this idea. 
64 For a description of Huntington's disease, Marfan syndrome and Tay-Sachs, see 1.1.4. 
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From Rhodes' example, it is clear that Harry knows that his father died of 
Huntington's disease and he has also understood that he has a 50% risk of 
carrying the gene (Rhodes, 1998, p 13-14). So it is really not a q uestion of not 
having a clue to whether he is a carrier or not. As is common in situations 
such as this, there is a suspicion based on familiarity with the disease through 
personal experience. But he does not know for sure whether he is a ca rrier or 
not. Does Harry have an obligation to find this out? 
As Takala and Häyry points out, in a consequentialist framework, Harry has 
an array of obligation, depending on what he does more specifically (2000, p 
109-110). The example is under-described if we are to determine whether he 
has a duty to know. Will he harm others by his ignorance of his genetic status? 
As already mentioned, that depends. 
Sally perhaps has no idea about the history of the disease in Harry's family 
or at least not about the genetic nature of it. Then the allegation of fraud is not 
farfetched: Harry knows something of great importance to their future and 
their potential children without telling her about it. The potential harm of this 
fraud is of course immense. If he is a carrier and starts to develop symptoms, 
she will probably find out about his disease and become devastated with his 
secrecy. "I ought to have been told before we had a child", she would 
probably say. B ut deceiving his spouse in this way is not in itself a result of his 
ignorance of whether he is a carrier for sure. He could find this out and still 
deceive Sally. Th us, the deception is a wrongdoing and something he should 
refrain from, regardless of any alleged duty to know. 
More likely, however, she does know about the fact that Harry is a p otential 
carrier, the nature of the disease and that he might be disabled in various ways 
at a relatively young age from it. D o they, then, have a duty to find out about for 
sure whether he is a carrier or not? 
If the duty is to be based on any non-harm idea, this duty probably is not 
towards themselves. They both know that Harry may suffer from Huntington's 
disease, regardless of his knowledge of carrier status. They probably have 
agreed on not finding out. If ignorance caused anxiety to them, they probably 
would have decided to find out anyway. Alternatively, Harry has decided to 
remain ignorant against Sally's wish. This, of course, can reasonably be 
described as harming Sally (ce rtainly according to preferentialism and probably 
according to hedonism). But then she probably will r econsider having a family 
with this man, who disregards her wishes on such important questions. i/~Sally 
wants him to find out, he harms her. He then, at least, has a moral reason to 
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find out. In order to find out if he ought to act on this reason based on non-
harm, he has to consider whom he would harm by finding out his carrier 
status, including himself,65 and ponder what course of action would effect the 
least serious harm all things considered. 
However, as the example stands, the duty to know most likely is a duty he has 
towards his future offspring. This is the person(s) he risks harming, by 
transmitting the disease. Can Harry's and Sally's ignorance harm their future 
offspring? 
It is important to keep in mind that Harry and Sally are only planning to 
have children at this point. So they do not harm any existing person by their 
ignorance. The alleged victim of the harm is a future possible person — a person 
that might or might not come to exist. Is i t possible to harm an individual that 
does not yet exist? 
Before tackling this question, it is important to keep in mind that the 
potential harm is independent of the information. The potential harm lies in 
passing on the gene for Huntington's disease, not in doing this knowingly or 
unknowingly. The reasoning that can lead to a duty to know then has to rest on 
some further idea of risk of harm: by not knowing about one's carrier status 
one risks passing on the (gene for the) disease.66 It may be claimed that this is 
an illegitimate risk to impose on someone else, at least if one has not done 
one's best to clarify the facts of the case (by finding out one's carrier status). So 
in order to establish that Harry has a duty to know, it is not enough to show 
that passing on Huntington's disease harms the person it is passed on to. One 
also has to show that if the risk is high enough to pass it on if ignorant, one has 
to avoid ignorance. However, in order to be successful, the argument also has 
to establish that passing on Huntington's disease is to harm the person it is 
65 This general idea is c ompatible with weighing probabilities, and weighing his harm lower than 
Sally's. However, no non-harm principle totally disregards the harm of anyone in particular. 
66 The idea of irresponsibility is qu ite salient in Rhodes' argument. The idea is then that not only 
actually harming someone is a moral reason against doing something, but also inflicting risk of 
harm can constitute such a reason, at least if the harm is grav e, and the probability of it is gr eat, 
enough. This idea explains her use of the parallel to "the driving blindfolded"-example (Rhodes, 
1998, p 16). We have a duty to keep our eyes of the road because of the serious risk o f harm we 
otherwise would inflict on others. Certain kinds of activities (such as driving or family founding) 
create certain kinds of obligations (e.g. of a non-harm kind) it would be irresponsible not to live 
up to, or so the idea goes. 
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passed on to. Since this is not an actual person, but a possible future one, the 
question thus becomes: can being brought into existence harm a person? 
This relates to the non-identity problem and the problem of future 
generations. Therefore, this discussion will to a great extent draw on Parfit's 
(1984) seminal discussion of these topics. The non-identity problem is about 
the fact that our decisions will not only affect existing people, but also will 
affect which people will exist. This is obviously so with regard to 
reproductive decisions. 
So, once again, is Harry harming the future child if he passes on the gene 
for Huntington's disease? Well, either a therapy to cure the disease has been 
developed or it has not. If such a therapy has been developed, the child can 
find out if (s)he has the disease for himself when (s)he is old enough. Then 
Harry has no duty against the child to find out if he is a carrier now.67 Or no 
therapy has been developed. In that case, the only way to guarantee avoidance 
of giving birth to child that could contract Huntington's disease is through 
testing the embryo in utero or in vitro. In the first case, abortion can be 
implemented if the foetus is found to be a c arrier. In the other case, one can 
go through with a PGD and discard the embryos that are carriers. However, 
without therapy, we are not avoiding the harm to the child with the gene for 
Huntington's disease, we are avoiding the ch ild with the gene for Huntington's 
disease.68 
This is, of course, nothing but the non-identity problem. The only way to 
use the knowledge of carrier status (in reproductive decisions without 
therapies) is to choose a c hild who is not a c arrier. Granted that being a c arrier 
of the gene for Huntington's is better than not existing at all, that is, that one 
still ha s a life worth living even if one will contract Huntington's sometime in 
the middle-ages, one cannot claim to have been harmed by being born with 
the gene. If Harry refuses to find out whether he is a c arrier or not, it turns out 
that he is and he passes on the gene to his child, the child cannot complain: 
"You passed on this disease to me that you could have avoided passing on. 
You have harmed me." To this Harry's reply obviously is: "If I had avoided the 
67 Even if he probably has a duty to tell the child that he is a potential carrier when the child is 
old enough. 
68 I am here, of course, resting on the premise that if one makes an abortion or discards an 
embryo, the very same child cannot in fact be born through later pregnancy or grow from 
another embryo. Although not self-evident, this assumption should be uncontroversial (especially 
regarding abortion). See Parfit, 1984, p 351-356. 
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disease I would have avoided you. You would never have existed. Have I 
harmed you by bringing you into this world? Would it have been better if you 
had never existed?" 
One cannot resort to the person-affecting view either in order to claim that 
there is a duty to know. The person-affecting view says that we cannot act 
wrongly unless we act wrongly towards some (timelessly) existing person 
(Tännsjö, 1998b, p 162). However, this idea can only be used to argue in favour 
of a duty to know if ignorance leads to the birth of a child whose life is not 
worth living, which we assumed was not the case with the life of someone 
with Huntington's disease. This is so, since we cannot be said to wrong 
someone by making her exist, if her life is worth living and there is no way we 
can better her life and still preserve her identity (as is the case here). (Of 
course, things become much different regarding other diseases, which can be 
argued to make the person's life not worth living, as we soon will see). 
In fact, the only way to argue in terms of harm and benefits in favour of a 
duty to know in the case of Harry is to refer to some version of the total 
version of utilitarianism (see II.4.2), acc ording to which we should act as to 
make the world as good as possible.69 This argument can be made, for instance, 
if one assumes that the alternative for Harry of not finding out whether he is a 
carrier will lead to the birth of child that is a carrier and the alternative of 
finding out whether he is a carrier will lead him to find out that he is, and lead 
to reproductive measures that results in the birth of a child that is not a carrier. 
Furthermore, one has to assume that the life of the child who is not a carrier 
is, on the whole, better than the life of the child who is not. Given the truth of 
all these assumptions, Harry should find out whether he is a carrier. 
Obviously, all these assumptions are practically useless or highly 
controversial. To rely on some total version of utilitarianism is in itself highly 
controversial, and is not something that Rhodes does.70 The assumption of the 
consequences of the alternatives can, of course, be done. However, such 
assumption will hardly be helpful in a p ractical situation of choice, since one 
does not know beforehand whether Harry actually is a carrier, which the 
assumptions just take for granted. Furthermore, in an practical situation of 
69 In fact, in this case, referring to the average version of utilitarianism (see II.4.2) would also do, 
but this need not bother us here. 
70 This is obviously so, since Rhodes refers to the irresponsibility of posing others to certain risks 
(see this section above), and irresponsibility and risk does not enter the moral picture of total 
views, which only claims that we should make the world as good as possible in actual terms. 
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choice, there is always room to doubt the assumption that the person without 
Huntington's disease will lead a better life than the one without. Even if the 
assumption is correct, it will be difficult to find out, given the difficulties of 
interpersonal comparisons of well-being, and impossible to find out 
beforehand, since so many factors can influence the quality of someone's life 
(Gren, 2004). 
But even if one accepts the controversial theory of total utilitarianism and 
ignores the problem of the knowledge required for practical action-guidance, 
it is still unclear whether the theory implies a duty to know. This is due to 
further theoretical complications regarding what set of actions the utilitarian 
reasoning should really be applied to — a problem often discussed under the 
heading of future mistakes. Let me illustrate. 
Let us assume that Harry is a carrier of the gene for Huntington's disease, 
but is not yet aware of this, since he has not yet gone through with genetic 
testing. Now, he and Sally plan on having a child, something they can carry out 
regardless of whether he goes through with testing or not. So they are really 
facing two decisions: one of testing and one of having a child. Let us assume 
that if they have a child without testing, the child will also be a c arrier of the 
gene for Huntington's disease. On the other hand, if he goes through with 
testing, he can take measures to ensure that the he has child will not be a 
carrier (e.g. by PGD). However, if he finds out that he is a carrier, he will not, 
in fact, choose to have a child, even if i t remains true that he could do so (Sally 
would still be prepared to go through with PGD and pregnancy, we may 
assume). Let us assume that the child who would exist if Harry chooses not to 
test himself, i.e. the child who is a carrier of the gene for Huntington's disease, 
would lead a life worth living. This would be better than no child at all, since, 
we can assume, no side-effects of having or not having any child will make any 
difference.71 Let us furthermore assume that having the child that is not a 
carrier of the gene for Huntington's disease is clearly better than having the 
child who is. The situation can be illustrated in the following tree. 
71 According to total versions of utilitarianism, the comparison between no child and some child 
is viable, since it is a comparison between the values of two possible histories of the world. This 
explains why utilitarianism can be used in order to establish a duty to know. 
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time 
Let a be the alternative of "performing a test for the Huntington's disease' 
gene" and x the alternative of "not performing a test for the Huntington's 
disease' gene". Furthermore, let b be the alternative of "having a child (who is a 
non-carrier)", £ "not having a child", andj "having a c hild (who is a c arrier)". 
A., B, and C are the compound alternatives consisting of the respective 
alternatives that may follow each other (a+b, a+%, x+j), which we can call 
projects. 
Now, what should Harry do? Given that no other consequences will be 
relevant, according to the total view that one should make the world as good as 
possible, Harry should go through with project A. But in order to do this, he 
must perform a, w hich he should not do, since it would lead to z being 
performed and thus effect project C to be carried out. So, it seems as though 
A as well as a should and should not be performed. Obviously, such a 
conclusion must be avoided (at least for the theory to found a duty to know), 
so utilitarianism has a problem. 
The general theoretical problem is that actions can be subdivided into 
more specific actions. So the question becomes which set of alternatives we 
should choose from: which is the relevant alternative set?72 There are 
numerous ways of trying to solve this problem.73 However, there is still 
controversy on which solution, if any, is the correct one. So even on a 
theoretical level, it is unclear whether there is an answer to the question of 
what duties are implied by total utilitarianism. And this i s bad news for anyone 
that tries to argue in favour of such a duty in the case of Harry (and relevantly 
similar ones), since no other consequentialist or Kantian theories can be used 
to argue in favour of such a general duty in this kind of case, as we have seen. 
72 Bergström, 1966, was the first to present this problem. 
73 See Carlson, 1995, Feldman, 1975, and Tännsjö, 1998b, to mention a few. 
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Things are different if we finally turn to cases such as Harriette's and her 
husband, who "have decided not to find out if they are recessive carriers of 
the Tay-Sachs gene and to have a child despite the fact that the child's life can 
be short and full of agony" (Takala and Häyry, 2000, p 109). In this case, it can 
be argued that their potential child will not have a life worth living if the child 
is unfortunate enough to inherit the gene from both her parents.74 It might be 
that we sometimes are prejudicial against handicaps, deeming such lives not 
worth living when they really are worth living (Vehmas, 2001, p 475). However, 
this does not rule out that there can be cases where disease is so serious as to 
render it not worth living for the person experiencing it. For instance, this 
might be the case with Tay-Sachs, where "the child's life can be short and full 
of agony". Then it seems reasonable to claim that the child is harmed by being 
brought into existence, and that this harm is serious enough to make the act of 
bringing it to existence wrong.75 If this is so and one knows beforehand that 
one runs a high enough risk to produce such a child, it does not seem 
unreasonable to say that one has an obligation to take measures to see to it that 
this does not happen, including finding out relevant genetic information about 
oneself. However, once again, this merely shows that in some types of rare76 
circumstances, we may have good reasons to know our genetic constitution. 
From this, we cannot infer that these reasons motivate enforcing the duties 
based on them. We need independent arguments to get from lack of options 
to enforcement privileges (TV. 1.1.1). 
4. Conclusions 
This chapter may come through as quite "negative", since much of it consists 
of criticism of suggestions made by others. One such suggestion is that 
Kantian ethics favours a general duty to know. A more careful analysis of 
Kantian ethics reveals this suggestion to be implausible, or so I have argued. In 
74 That the child can have a life no worth living is maybe even more obvious in cases regarding 
Lesch-Nyhan and Krabbe's (1.4.1). 
75 What one should say is thus not that it is better for the child not to exist, but that it is b etter, 
on the whole, if the child never exists, and if the child is brought into existence, the child is 
harmed. 
76 Even though the risk to contract a disease at some point in life due to a single gene disorder is 
2-4% (Wahlström, 2002b, p 24), few of these diseases can unambiguously be claimed to make the 
affected person's life not worth living, and there is seldom initial suspicion that would make it an 
alternative for the parents to seek the genetic information in question. 
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connection to this, I have also argued that to knowingly abstain from genetic 
information relevant to a decision need not be incompatible with one's 
autonomy, contrary to what has been claimed. Moreover, I have levelled 
criticism against arguments of non-harm in favour of a general duty to know. 
This criticism is valid even if these considerations are given a non-Kantian 
consequentialistic basis, or so I have argued. 
However, hopefully, the critical stance of some discussions does not hide 
the fact that much of the criticism has been used to argue in favour of quite a 
few positive conclusions. For instance, it should be clear from my criticism 
that Kantian ethics, autonomy, and consequentialism, in some cases, can 
provide reasons to know, perhaps even reasons strong enough to imply a duty 
to know, at least in rare cases. However, in spite of this, my criticism indicates a 
rather extensive right not to know in the sense of an option. That is, as a rule, 
those who choose to remain in ignorance do not make a choice that is morally 
impermissible. 
Furthermore, I have argued that, even if there at times may be a m oral duty 
to know, this is in no way incompatible with negative, or even positive, rights 
to ignorance. At least, the legal right not to be forced to genetic testing or to be 
informed about one's genetic constitution without one's consent should be 
recognized. This should hardly come through as very controversial. Although 
such a right has its limitations, e.g. due to the fact that it seems unreasonable to 
enforce sanctions on relatives who choose to reveal such facts and that, at 
times, consent cannot be obtained without revealing some information one is 
asking for consent to reveal,77 the legal right to ignorance should be rather 
extensive as well. Besides Millian arguments of a consequentialist kind to this 
effect, such a right can even be argued to be basic, since not to respect it 
amounts to not respecting autonomy conceived of as a right. So, indeed, there 
seems to be some rights to ignorance. 
77 I will return to the question of when one should inform relatives of their risk, when consent can 
be presumed, and what to do in practice when relatives should be informed in the next chapter. 
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Chapter VI 
The Relatives' Value of and Right to 
Genetic Information 
1. Introduction 
Genetic information, by its very nature, is i nformative of others. This truism is 
repeated so often in debates on genetic testing as to give the impression that 
this fact alone settles important normative issues. However, the knowledge of 
one person's genes does not provide knowledge of another person's genes, 
unless one has proper background knowledge (about genetics, for instance). 
The fact, nonetheless, remains that, due to the hereditary nature of genes (they 
provide the very mechanism of biological heredity), we sometimes can infer 
quite precise things about whether or not a c ertain relative to a person has a 
gene (or at least about the probability thereof) from the fact that the person has 
this gene. 
In this chapter I will discuss the questions of the relatives' value of and 
right to genetic information, and then mainly the latter 'right-question'. 
Helative' is a vague conception indeed, and its meaning is certainly dependent 
on culture and time. In order to avoid discussions about the scope of the 
question I will therefore state what kind of relatives I am primarily interested 
in. I am interested in close blood relatives and other family members. With 
close blood relatives I mean others with whom one can reasonably expect to 
share the gene or genes tested for. This is the group of people that clinical 
geneticists are interested in when constructing a family tree or pedigree of the 
index-person (Harper, 2001, p 5-7), and I will not presuppose any wider 
definition. When I am talking about other family members, I mean other 
members of the modern Western nuclear family, and then primarily the 
spouse. Due to the hereditary nature of genes, I will take more interest in close 
blood relatives (which henceforth will be called relatives for short) and less 
with other family members.1 
1 I had some things to say about the rights of the spouse in V.3.2. 
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More precisely, this chapter will deal with the question of the relative's 
value of and right to receive informadon from the genetic testing of t he index-person. 
As a matter of fact, the index-person is not always one person: often a fa mily 
and/or a group of relatives together contacts health care in order to find out 
about their genetic propensity for some disease. I will disregard this 
complication.2 My focus will be upon the question of relatives that have not 
themselves initiated genetic testing. 
The question about whether and when a relative should receive 
information about the genetic testing of the index-person is foremost a 
question that is brought to stand in the clinical context, i.e., it arises in the 
health care setting run by health care professionals. The reason for this is that 
genetic testing is primarily made in this setting. The exception is, of course, 
home tests done by the index-person herself (TV.2). This kind of situation is 
rarely discussed regarding relatives right to be informed, however, and 
although some of what follows has relevance for this situation, I will disregard 
this complication too. 
The focus of the current debate is whether the result of genetic testing should 
be disclosed to relatives. This will also be the focus of my discussion. In order 
to answer this question, we will have to look into the question about the 
relatives' value of and right to genetic information. However, I will give the 
'value-question' considerably less attention and the reason is the following. To 
the extent that genetic information about the index-person is telling about the 
relative, the information may realize the same values for the relative as for the 
index-person. That is, if P's having genetic information about P can increase, 
e.g., the autonomy and well-being of P, this will hold regardless of who P is 
(whether P is the index-person or a relative to the index-person). The same 
goes for the avoidance of harm or any other negative value that can be 
prevented by having some genetic information. And the other way around, the 
negative values potentially realized by receiving genetic information can affect 
the relative as well as the index-person. Generally speaking, it seems reasonable 
to claim that the more positive values that can be realized and the more 
negative values that can be avoided by disclosure to the relative, the stronger 
2 The complication gives rise to some additional interesting questions, such as: W hen there is a 
conflict of interest between index-persons, who should decide? Who is the index-person to 
whom the health care professional is prima rily obligated? See Parker & Lucassen, 2003, p 72, for a 
presentation of a case where these questions becomes relevant. 
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the obligation to disclose (see VI.3.1). A nd, again, the other way around: the 
more negative value that can be realized by disclosure to the relative, the 
stronger the obligation not to disclose. The magnitude of the likelihood of 
realizing such values will, of course, also be taken into account when 
considering disclosure. However, the general point remains: as far as values 
goes, the same ethical considerations will be relevant regarding relatives as 
regarding the index-person. So there is no reason to ask separately, what values 
genetic testing will realize for the relative, since this would only be to repeat 
the previous value-discussion (see chapter H). T hus, values will be discussed 
only to the extent that they are relevant to the right-question, and the 
corresponding question of reasons for an obligation to disclose genetic 
information to relatives. 
When it comes to relatives' right to genetic information, the most common 
way to discuss such a r ight is to discuss a c orresponding duty or obligation to 
disclose.3 This is often presupposed to be an obligation to see to it that 
relatives actually gets informed, not only to abstain from preventing relatives to 
acquire the information in question, which then corresponds to a positive, 
rather than a negative right of the relatives in question to be informed. Often, 
the obligation is primarily ascribed to the index-person. If there is an 
obligation of the index-person to inform the relative about the result of 
genetic testing, there is a r ight of the relative to receive this information (see 
IV.1.1.1). As we will see, it has been argued that this obligation holds, at least 
partly, because the index-person is a relative or because genetic information 
about the index-person (sometimes) is also genetic information about the 
relative (see VI.3.2). The idea, then, is that we have special moral reasons 
towards certain other parties in virtue of them standing in certain relations to 
us (e.g. th e relation of family or blood relative). 
A further question that is often discussed in relation to this question is 
whether health care professionals should inform the relatives if the index-
person refuses to do so, or if they should inform the relatives rather than the 
index-person altogether. In connection to this question, one can also ask the 
general question who has the most reason to inform the relative (given that the 
3 As we saw in IV.1.1.1, rights, strictly speaking, correspond to reasons rather than obligations, 
even if the reasons in questions can give rise to obligations. However, the discussion regarding 
relatives' rights has been cast in terms of corresponding obligations rather than reasons (see e.g. 
Rhodes, 1998), so I will at times follow this way of talking. However, it should be kept in mind that 
the obligations may be overridable ones. 
333 
relative has a right to the information). Questions like these, in turn, give rise 
to questions about how the practice of presymptomatic genetic testing should 
be regulated and institutionalised. Particularly, the institution of genetic 
counselling and its ideal of non-directiveness have been questioned, due to 
potential conflicts between this ideal and the interests of relatives. 
Having provided a picture of the subject at hand, we can now consider the 
more particular questions that I want to discuss. These may be divided into 
questions arising before a nd questions arising after testing. Questions arising 
before testing are the following: 
(1) Given that a genetic test can reveal genetic information about a relative, 
should the relative have to consent to the testing as a prerequisite? 
Given what circumstances (if any) should such consent be required? 
(2) Should the relative be informed about the fact that a test will be 
performed or not? Given what circumstances (if any)? 
(3) Who should provide this information? The index-person or some 
health care professional? Given what circumstances? 
I will focus on question (1), which will be discussed in section VT.2. I f the 
answer to this question is "no", the other questions will be of marginal 
interest. The reason is the following. Obviously, the relative can have an 
interest in receiving the result from a genetic test of the index-person, an 
interest that can be met only after testing. The only interest independent of 
this a relative can have in knowing that the index-person is planning to go 
through with testing, i.e. before test ing, is that such knowledge allows the relative 
to (try to) prevent the testing, since the relative can have an interest in the 
index-person not receiving information that reveals facts about her genetic 
constitution. And, as I will argue when discussing (1), relatives should not be 
allowed to prevent testing. So question (2) (and, consequently, question (3)) will 
become uninteresting if my argument regarding question (1) is successful. 
Questions arising after testing are the following: 
(4) Do the relative(s) have a right to the information that a test has been 
performed and/or the results of the test and does somebody else, 
334 
thus, have a reason to inform the relative thereof (perhaps a reason 
strong enough to make it an obligation)? Given what circumstances?4 
(5) Who should provide this information? The index-person or some 
health care professional? Given what circumstances? 
(6) Should health care professionals try to persuade the index-person to 
disclose the information if the index-person is reluctant to do so? To 
what extent and given what circumstances (if any)? 
(7) If the index-person still refuses to disclose, are there reasons for the 
health care professionals to inform the relative anyway (against the 
wishes of the index-person)? Given what circumstances (if any)? 
(8) Does the relative have a r ight not to receive the information that a test 
has been performed and/or the results of the test and does everybody 
else, thus, have a reason to abstain from informing the relative thereof 
(perhaps a reason strong enough to make it an obligation)? 
Although I will have something to say about each of these questions, I will not 
tackle them to the same extent. In general, the questions that have actually been 
up for debate will receive more attention, as will the questions I think are 
more interesting. The question that will receive most attention is (4) and the 
other questions will be addressed when discussing that question. Question (8) 
can be answered on the same theoretical basis as (4), or so I will suggest (see 
VI.3.1.1). Questions (5)-(7) will be discussed as more practical concerns against 
the background of the general answer to question (4). I will no t reach a definite 
answer to these practical questions, but only make some suggestions relevant to 
answering them (see VI.3.1.2). Regarding question (5), an overlooked distinction 
between the ones who are obliged to see to it that relatives are informed and 
the ones that should do the actual informing is made. 
Furthermore, there are questions relating to the institutional setting of 
disclosure to relatives and family. For instance, let us grant that there is a r ight 
of a relative to receive some information about a genetic test, should this right 
be codified and/or enforced somehow? How should it be codified or 
enforced more particularly? Should there, e.g., be a code of conduct for 
genetic counsellors including this type of item? If yes, should there be 
4 It may be so that the reasons for informing fail to found a right to the information, but 
nonetheless makes it allowed for somebody else (the index-person and/or the health care 
professional) to disclose the information (i.e. fo unds an option for the party that can inform the 
relative). I will almost entirely ignore this possibility. 
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measures taken against breaching of the code or should the code just function 
as non-enforced rules of thumb? These questions are, of course, interesting, 
and some of what I will have to say about the reasons to disclose will have 
relevance for these questions (see VI.3.1.2). However, they will be treated more 
ephemerally. 
It is obvious that the questions are legio also in this context. I will not 
motivate the focus of every question, so I am relying on the beneficence of 
the reader. Having said this, let us turn to the questions, starting from the top. 
2. Requiring the consent of relatives 
Should there be a requirement that relatives consent to the genetic testing of 
an index-person? This question becomes pressing when the test of an index-
person is highly predictive of some relative(s). As many types of genetic testing 
are presently conducted, the testing presupposes a preliminary genetic analysis 
of some blood relatives, which indicates whether or not to suspect hereditary 
disease and establishes what genetic mutation to look for in the case of testing. 
In some cases, familiar heredity can be established but no mutation can be 
identified (either due to lack of material or to lack of knowledge of the 
particular mutation at work). In such cases, no testing is possible. However, also 
when testing is possible, this has been established through a genetic analysis o f 
family history. To the extent that this analysis has made use of medical records, 
contact with a family physician, or contact with the relatives themselves, 
informed consent will have to be obtained from the relatives in question. If 
consent is denied, the analysis o f the family will never get off the ground and 
there will thus be no testing. Thus, the question of whether or not the 
informed consent of relatives should be required may seem like a non-starter. 
This is true as long as p resymptomatic genetic testing presupposes additional 
genetic family analysis. 
However, it is more and more common to skip the initial step of family 
analysis, since people in affected families often know what mutation is at stake 
(through the testing of someone else) and specialists often know what to look 
for anyway. In the near future, this can be expected to become increasingly the 
standard, due to the development of knowledge about genetic mutations and 
technology for simultaneous testing of a large number of genes. Consider the 
following case, which illustrates how this trend makes the question of whether 
or not to require the relatives' consent a live issue: 
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A woman, Rachel, comes for an appointment at a clinical genetics unit 
following a referral by her family doctor. Rachel was referred to the 
Unit because she had requested a ' breast cancer gene test' and was aware 
of a very strong family history of the disease. Six close relatives had 
been diagnosed with this cancer at an early age. H er only living affected 
reladve was her grandmother, who had herself been a patient at the 
genetics unit and had tested positive for one of the BRCA1 mutations. 
The case was made more complicated when Rachel revealed that her 
mother, the grandmother's daughter, was as far as Rachel knew 
unaffected and had no contact with the genetic service. Rachel said that 
she no longer got on with her mother and would not want her to know 
that she had been tested. This presented a problem for her family 
doctor and for the geneticist. If a test were provided to Rachel and the 
result turned out to be positive, her mother would also be positive for 
the mutation. To carry out a test on the daughter would be to test the 
mother without her knowledge and to do so in the context of a family 
which relationship were already strained. (Lucassen, 1999, p 323)5 
Cases like this are not uncommon (Parker, 2001, p 453). The motives for the 
index-person not to inform her relatives vary. Sometimes it is due to family 
conflict (as th e example above suggests) and sometimes the index-person feels 
that she wants to protect others from "bad news" (Adelswärd & Sachs, 2002, p 
81-86). Regardless of motive, one may wonder if the index-person should be 
tested at all without the consent of close blood relatives in cases like Rachel's, 
since the test, if it is positive, will reveal that the mother is a carrier for sure. 
The question of the requirement of relative's consent is ambiguous. It can 
be about the moral reason for obtaining consent or about the desirability of 
regulations of genetic testing requiring consent. From now on, I will focus on 
the question whether consent should b e required and presuppose that if the 
answer is yes, this provides a powerful argument in favour of implementing 
this requirement in the practice of genetic testing. I will, however, leave the 
question of how the requirement should be implemented open for now. 
In general, there are two types of argument with regard to the question of 
requiring the consent of relatives. First there are arguments that refer to 
general norms within health care, such as informed consent, confidentiality, 
5 This case is also quoted in Parker, 2001, p 451-452. 
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and privacy. Then there are arguments that refer directly to the basis or 
foundation of these norms, and then primarily ideas about respecting 
autonomy and consequentialist arguments. I will argue that arguments of the 
first kind will not settle the issue, but that considerations of consequence 
weighs in favour of not requiring the consent of relatives. Such requirements 
would also face problems of moral arbitrariness. 
2.11nformed consent 
Should the consent of relatives be obtained, then? The following line of 
reasoning indicates that it should. 
Genetic testing is predictive, interpersonal, and identifying. It is 
generally agreed that genetic testing should only be carried out with the 
informed consent of the patient. To test one person can in some cases 
be to carry out a highly predictive test on someone else. If we are 
serious about informed consent in genetic testing should we not apply 
the same standard in both cases? (Parker & Lucassen, 2003, p 72) 
This argument suggests that the generally accepted norm in bioethics of 
informed consent to medical interventions speaks in favour of obtaining 
informed consent also from relatives, if the testing of the index-person is 
"highly predictive on someone else".6 In order to assess the validity of this 
argument one has to determine what informed consent is and whether 
requiring informed consent from the index-person also speaks in favour of 
requiring informed consent from the relative. 
There are different conceptions of informed consent (Beauchamp & 
Childress, 2001, p 77-98). A minimal conception requires health care 
professionals to disclose medical information about the intervention 
according to the "professional community's customary practices" (Beauchamp 
& Childress, 2001, p 81) and then obtain consent in the form of expressed 
consent. It has been claimed that this form of consent is insufficient, since the 
basis of informed consent is some principle of the respect for the patient's 
autonomy and this minimal consent is compatible with the autonomy of the 
6 I will p resume this condition is clear enough for the rest of this section, until the last subsection, 
where it will b e discussed (see IV.2.5). 
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patient not being respected (Beauchamp & Childress, 2001, p 81-83).7  
Therefore, it has been argued that informed consent should involve the 
patient's actual understanding of the medical intervention and that the health 
care professional should find out what information the patient regards as 
relevant (Beauchamp & Childress, 2001, p 83, 88-93). 
I concur with this criticism of the minimal conception of informed 
consent and have argued that the conditions of understanding and relevance (at 
least) should be included if the aim is patient autonomy (see IL3.3.5). However, 
this point is less important in this context. The question is if the same sort of 
informed consent should be obtained from the relative as from the index-
person, regardless of the kind of informed consent one favours. That is, the 
argument states that informed consent (whatever idea one has on the 
conditions for informed consent) should be obtained from the index-person 
and the relative. However, if an important point of informed consent is to 
protect autonomy, and a certain conception of informed consent does not 
achieve this, the conception should be rejected. Nonetheless, I will not 
presuppose that even the minimal conception is an unreasonable conception, 
since nothing I will have to say regarding the question at hand will hinge on 
this. Just choose your own favourite conception of informed consent. 
Now, should the consent of the relative be obtained, when the test of the 
index-person is "highly predictive" about the relative? The most reasonable 
way to interpret Parker is presumably the following. Consider the case of 
Rachel. It may not seem too farfetched to claim a positive test on Rachel is, in 
effect, a positive test on Rachel's mother. It can thus seem reasonable to claim 
that whatever speaks in favour of obtaining the consent of Rachel, also speak in 
favour of obtaining the consent of Rachel's mother.8 Thus, if the consent of 
the daughter should be obtained (which we assume it should), then the 
consent of Rachel's mother should. In order to see whether this conclusion is 
warranted, we have to investigate what speaks in favour of obtaining consent 
from the daughter and investigate whether this really speaks in favour of 
obtaining informed consent from the mother. As previously mentioned, the 
most important (or at least the most usual) argument in favour of informed 
7 This is obviously so, since the professional community's customary practice need not be 
respectful of autonomy at all. 
8 This will be questioned later (VI.2.4 and VI.2.5). 
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consent is that it is necessary in order to respect the autonomy of the patient. 
So, we have to investigate whether not obtaining the consent from the mother 
is in someway disrespectful of her autonomy. I will execute this investigation 
below (see VI.2.3). 
However, another possibility is to understand the argument as ap pealing to 
some implicit norm of justice. Consider again the case of Rachel. It could be 
claimed to be unjust that Rachel gets to know something about her mother if 
the mother does not get to know this herself or gets some corresponding 
information about Rachel. However, as a general principle of justice, it seems 
unreasonable to claim that whenever someone, P, gets to know something 
about Q, it is unjust that Q does not also receive that information, and even 
more unreasonable to claim that it is unjust that Q does not get a 
corresponding piece of information about P (then it would be very hard 
indeed to hold just interviews). Furthermore, even if one were to argue in 
favour of such a principle of justice, it would only support that Rachel should 
inform her mother in case of a positive result of testing, and not that the 
consent of the mother has to be obtained before testing.9 I will investigate the 
argument for informing the relatives of the result of genetic testing in section 
VI.3. 
2.2 Confidentiality and privacy 
Respecting the confidentiality of patients and relatives (or "third parties" as 
they are sometimes called) can be considered to be relevant to the issue of 
requiring the consent of the relatives. Parker, when discussing Rachel's case, 
writes: 
Insistence on the confidentiality of the index patient would mean that 
the confidentiality of third parties, such as Rachel's mother, who had 
genetic diseases, or susceptibilities of such diseases would routinely be 
breached. To carry out a test on Rachel would at the same time be to 
carry out a test on her mother and this highlights why informed consent 
9 I take it for granted that the argument should not be interpreted as the question-begging one 
that since genetic testing on a person requires i nformed consent, and this testing can be highly 
predictive of someone else, the informed consent of this someone else s hould also be obtained. 
To fall back on the claim that testing without obtaining the consent of relatives is unjust is only to 
repeat the question-begging claim while adding "and this is unjust". As an independent argument, 
this is insufficient. 
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is also an issue in such cases. R especting the confidentiality of the index 
patient would mean that third parties would be tested without their 
knowledge or consent.... (Parker, 2001, p 452) 
What is being indicated in this passage is that testing Rachel without neither 
requiring the consent of her mother nor letting her know about the testing (or 
the result thereof) is to breach the mother's confidentiality while respecting 
the daughter's. That is, there is a conflict of confidentiality: "confidentiality 
pulls in several directions at once and it is not immediately clear what would 
be involved in 'respecting confidentiality'." (Ibid) There are two issues at stake 
here: (i) w hether testing Rachel without informing her mother of the testing 
(or the result thereof) is at odds with respecting her mother's confidentiality, 
and (ii) w hether testing without requiring that her mother consents is at odds 
with respecting the mother's confidentiality. In this section, question (ii) is the 
one up for discussion: Is t esting without first requiring that the mother consents 
to the testing to breach the m other's confidentiality? Furthermore, in light of the 
alleged conflict of confidentiality, one can ask: Is requiring the mother's consent 
to breach Rachel's confidentiality ? 
In order to answer these questions, we will hav e to take a closer look into what 
confidentiality is, and what the respecting of and breaching of confidentiality 
consists of. The idea of confidentiality is much like the idea of secrecy, i.e., t o 
avoid further disclosure of something someone else have told you (often 
about herself). For someone, P, to preserve or respect the confidentiality of 
somebody else, Q, is to protect or abstain from forwarding information that Q 
has disclosed to P. To breach the confidentiality of someone else is thus either 
to fail to protect or to forward this information, at least if it is done without 
the consent of P. If P has a right to confidentiality, it is a violation of this right 
to breach it without the consent of P. Generally, some kinds of relationships 
are considered to give rise to such rights and, thus, corresponding obligations 
of the party that has been informed not to "redisclose" this information to a 
third party. The relationships between a priest and a member of the 
congregation in the situation of confession or the one between a lawyer and 
the client are familiar examples. Another is, of course, the relationship 
between the doctor (or other health care professional) and the patient. 
The principle of confidentiality (i.e. the right to have one's confidence 
preserved) is a central tenet in medical ethics and an ancient one at that (to be 
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found already in the Hippocratic Oath). When it is questioned, it is not so 
much the principle itself as the weight and scope of it. Certainly, the feasibility 
of the principle has been questioned, on grounds of being impossible to 
realize in modern health care where patient's information is shared between a 
great numbers of professionals (Beauchamp & Childress, 2001, p 304-305). But 
this has only been taken to imply that the principle cannot be fully realized, 
but only approximated. 
The reason for this relatively unquestioned position of confidentiality is 
that the basis for respecting patient's confidentiality is rather firm. First, to 
respect patient's confidentiality seems to be a part of respecting patient's 
autonomy. The simple reason is that confidentiality includes, by definition, 
that redisclosure of patient's information demands the consent of the patient. 
Thus, confidentiality is about respecting the wishes of the patient (regarding 
the spreading of information) and respecting the wishes of the patient is, in a 
sense, to respect the autonomy of the patient (see III.3.3). 
Second, for the doctor and other health care professionals to preserve the 
confidentiality of the patient is crucial for the patient's trust in the doctor in 
particular and the health care system in general. If the patient cannot trust the 
doctor not to forward information about her, she may be reluctant to share 
information or even to contact health care at all. T his, in turn, would decrease 
the possibility of the health care professional to make the proper diagnosis 
and, thus, recommend the proper treatment. If people's trust in health care is 
damaged to the extent that they are reluctant to make contact at all, this will a lso 
lead to omissions to prevent, palliate or treat diseases. That is, without 
confidentiality, no trust, and without trust, less well needed health care. To this 
it might be added the uneasiness one might feel if one cannot feel confident 
that the information one discloses is protected accordingly. So there are good 
consequentialist grounds for confidentiality as well. 
The fact that the basis f or confidentiality is strong in general makes the breach 
of confidentiality problematic (even if justified on occasion). So if requiring 
the consent of relatives for testing (or disclosure of result of testing) were a 
breach of the index-person's confidentiality, this would make a strong case 
against such a requirement. And similarly, if not requiring the consent of 
relatives for testing (or disclosure of result of testing) were a b reach of these 
relatives' confidentiality, this would make a strong case in favour of such a 
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requirement. But is requiring or not requiring consent a breach of anyone's 
confidentiality? 
In order to answer that question, let us once again turn to the case of 
Rachel. Is testing while requiring the mother's consent to breach Rachel's 
confidentiality? No, it is not. When requiring consent, the doctor is saying that 
testing will not be performed unless the patient accepts that consent from 
relatives is obtained. To issue such a condition for testing is not to breach any 
confidentiality, since it is not a case of redisclosure of any information to 
anyone else about the patient. Nor is it a failure to protect some informadon. It 
is just saying that in order for a test to be made at all, the consent of someone 
else has to be obtained. 
It is perhaps easier to see why this demand is not a breach of 
confidentiality if we consider some examples of what would in fact have been 
such breaches. It is clear that Rachel does not want her mother to find out 
about her testing and, presumably, about her plans of having a test.10 If the 
doctor reveals Rachel's plans to the mother, he will betray her confidence. 
This would, then, constitute a breach of confidentiality. And to contact the 
mother after testing is done, informing her that testing has been performed (or 
the result thereof), would also be to breach the confidentiality of the daughter. 
But to require that consent should be obtained, as a prerequisite of testing is, 
in itself, no breach of confidentiality. This can be done without the mother's 
knowing of Rachel's plan and, thus, without any redisclosure and breach of 
confidentiality whatsoever. If Rachel refuses to accept the requirement, no 
testing will be done and, hence, no information about the test can be disclosed 
to the mother. If Rachel accepts the requirement, she has consented to the 
mother being informed about her testing. In neither of these cases there is a 
breach of confidentiality. 
Is testing Rachel without demanding the mother's consent to breach the 
mother's confidentiality? No, it is not, for the simple reason that the situation 
does not involve any «disclosure of any information that the mother has given 
to the doctor. Even if the doctor knew that the mother is a c arrier beforehand, 
Rachel's receiving a positive result of the test is not disclosing that 
information, but giving Rachel information of herself that allows her to infer 
that the mother is a carrier. 
10 It is not clear from the case whether Rachel actually has performed the test or just has 
contacted the doctor to have a test performed. 
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Of course, it might be argued that these simple answers just miss the point. 
One could argue that the daughter has a right to test herself without obtaining 
the consent of the mother, and if she decides to do this, neither this decision 
nor the result of the test should be redisclosed to the mother. Or one might 
claim that the daughter should not be allowed to have a testing that can lead 
her to realise that the mother has some susceptibility to some disease without 
the consent of the mother. But neither of these arguments can be based on a 
reference to confidentiality alone, as we just saw. So it is not the case that 
"confidentiality pulls in several directions", at least not when it comes to the 
question of whether the consent of relatives should be required. In fact, 
regarding this question, confidentiality pulls in no direction whatsoever.11 
However, it might still be claimed that some information about a person 
should not be available to anyone else, unless the person herself voluntarily 
releases it. That is, it might be claimed that person has a right to control the 
access of others to information about oneself. This idea is commonly cast in 
terms of privacy}2 Privacy is a state of limited access of others to aspects of the 
person, and a right to privacy is a right to control this ac cess. Such a right, then, 
creates a protected zone or personal sphere around the person where the 
individual is especially entided to non-interference of others as well as control 
over what is happening. In this case, the question regards the right to 
informational privacy, i.e., th e right to control who has access to information 
about oneself. Of course, respecting confidentiality is one way to respect 
someone's privacy, but confined to cases of redisclosure13 of information of a 
person given or obtained from that person. Thus, there may be ways to respect 
informational privacy that do not involve confidentiality. Can any such claims 
of privacy be used to argue for or against the requirement to obtain the 
consent of relatives? 
I think claims of privacy can be used to argue both in favour and against 
this requirement, depending on how the right to privacy is understood more 
11 Parker would, I guess, concur with this conclusion. The reason that he talks about 
confidentiality in this context is t hat he also discusses the question of redisclosure of test result, 
which is a question of confidentiality, and the basis of such rights, i.e. autonomy and trust (Parker, 
2001, p 452-453). 
12 I will return to this (see section VII.4). 
13 The redisclosure can be both active and passive by failure to prevent such redisclosure, e.g. by 
not properly protecting the journals of a patient. 
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precisely. If one emphasises the access-part of the right, it could be claimed 
that the right to informational privacy does not only contain the idea that one 
has control of the access of others to the information, but that one also should 
have the right to control one's own access to the informadon in question. That 
is, one claims that the right to privacy contains or entails a right of the 
individual to know of her own genedc informadon without this being 
conditioned on the consent of someone else. If the relative's consent must be 
obtained in some cases in order to be tested, they can veto the tesdng by not 
consendng.14 This, of course, limits the individual's access to her genetic 
informadon, and can thus be claimed to be an illegitimate limitation of her 
right to privacy. 
Perhaps even more obviously, the mother in the case of Rachel can use 
considerations of privacy to argue in favour of the requirement to obtain her 
consent. If testing can be done without her consent, Rachel can get 
information of her being a carrier of BRCA1. This would mean that she does 
not fully control who else has access to that information, which is a l imitation 
of her informational privacy. 
However, rights to privacy must be justified somehow. It is not necessarily 
so that an action being a breach of privacy is a reason against performing this 
action. For instance, we do not recognize a full right to informational privacy, 
i.e. all forms of access to all aspects of the person should not and cannot be in 
full control of the person herself. This is so, even regarding information that 
in one sense or another can be considered to be very personal, for instance a 
person's sex, occupation, hobbies, parents, and so forth. We all need and share 
information about each other all the time, and sometimes a piece of 
information is just plain obvious (e.g. about a person's sex or occupation). 
Extensive rights to privacy are therefore impossible to protect, and often not 
desirable. Thus, one has to provide justification of what kind of privacy that 
should be protected. 
To simplify, there are two common ways of justifying rights to privacy: 
with reference to the instrumental value of recognizing such rights, or with 
14 The right to gain access to one's own genetic information without the consent of relatives can 
thus be described as a negative right, since the requirement of consent allows the relative to prevent 
the index-person from receiving that information. However, it can also be described as a positive 
right, since gaining access to genetic information most likely involves help from others (e.g. 
geneticists). This highlights the difficulty of drawing a precise line between negative and positive 
rights (see IV. 1.1.1). 
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reference to the principle of respecting autonomy (Beauchamp & Childress, 
2001, p 295-297).15 Let us suppose that these ways of justifying rights to privacy 
are the only one's there are. We can then see that confidentiality and privacy 
are basically justified in the same way.16 Since privacy can be used both to 
claim that there should and should not be a requirement of the consent of 
relatives, reference to privacy alone cannot solve the issue of whether there 
should be such a requirement. Rather, we should turn directly to the 
justification or basis of the claims to privacy and confidentiality, and see 
whether this can solve the issue. 
First, just a brief reminder of why justifying rights of privacy on the basis 
of the personal and sensitive nature of genetic information will not do the 
trick of settling the issue of whether we should or should not demand the 
consent of relatives. Take the case of Rachel again. The mother could claim 
that since genetic information is especially personal and sensitive, she should 
have a right to control this information. Therefore, she should be able to 
prevent the daughter from obtaining this information by vetoing her genetic 
test. The daughter, on the other hand, could claim that since genetic 
information is especially personal and sensitive, she should have a right to 
control this information. Therefore, she should have access to it herself 
without being prevented by the vetoing of others. That is, from the same 
premise, two conflicting conclusions can be claimed to follow. In lack of 
reasons to the effect that one person's argument is flawed while the other is 
not, this shows the insufficiency of just referring to the (alleged) fact that 
genetic information is especially personal and sensitive in order to settle 
normative issues. Considerations of privacy, unlike considerations of 
confidentiality, thus seem to pull in opposite directions. 
The justification of privacy, as well as co nfidentiality, can then refer to the 
principle of respecting autonomy or to consequentialist claims regarding the 
instrumental value of privacy and confidentiality. The latter type of reason will 
be the subject of subsection VI.2.4 be low. Before that, I will consider the 
former line of reasoning. 
15 There are other ways, like Thomson's attempt to derive them from basic or fundamental rights, 
but this attempt has serious drawbacks (Beauchamp & Childress, 2001, p 296). 
16 Because of this, and because of the fact that confidentiality is a subclass of privacy, they are 
easily conflated. 
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2.3 Respecting autonomy 
As previously mentioned, the most important (or at least the most usual) 
argument in favour of informed consent is that it is necessary in order to 
respect the autonomy of the patient. It has been claimed that arguments of 
respecting autonomy (as well as arguments of a c onsequentialistic kind) speak 
both in favour of demanding the consent of relatives and against such a 
demand: "respect for patient autonomy and the demand to avoid causing harm 
each appear to call both for testing without consent [from relatives], and 
testing only with consent." (Parker, 2001, p 451)17 In light of this alleged 
conflict, there are, once again, tw o questions: Is testing without first requiring 
that the mother consents to the testing to violate the mother's autonomy? And: 
Is testing Rachel only with requiring the mother's consent to violate Rachel's 
autonomy? 
In order to answer these questions, we have to take a closer look at the 
principle of respect for autonomy once again. Why is this idea thought to 
support the obtaining of informed consent from anyone, be it an index-
person or a relative, in the first place? The idea can be fleshed out as f ollows. 
In health care, the decisions of the adult and competent individual ought to be 
respected (at least if this does not mean inflicting serious harm to someone 
else). This means that individuals should be allowed make their own decisions 
according to their own wants without being coerced or manipulated. To 
perform a medical intervention (treatment or testing) without obtaining or 
regarding the consent of the individual is to ignore the want of that individual 
and, thus, to coerce the individual into the intervention. This is a failure to 
respect the autonomy of the individual. To knowingly abstain from disclosing 
information that is relevant to the decision of the individual about the medical 
intervention in order to have the individual making a certain decision (perhaps 
one that the individual would not have made if she had that information) is to 
manipulate the individual. This is s o, since the decision is not the result of the 
want of the individual (even if she thinks it is), but the result of the health care 
professional's wants. This is also a failure to respect the autonomy of the 
individual. So, the purpose of informed consent is to avoid coercion and 
17 See also the following statements: "testing third parties without their consent [would] fail to 
respect their autonomy" (Parker, 2001, p 452) and "This [requiring the consent of relatives] would 
mean that patients would only be able to gain access to genetic testing with the agreement and 
permission of others; surely in itself a failure to respect patient autonomy?" (Parker, 2001, p 453) 
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manipulation, since those are incompatible with respecting the autonomy of 
the patient (see also III.3.3). 
If the purpose of consent is to avoid coercion and manipuladon (and 
thereby respecting the patient's autonomy), then the first question is if Rachel's 
mother is coerced or manipulated through Rachel having the test without her 
mother's consent. 
The following line of reasoning suggests that Rachel's mother is neither 
coerced nor manipulated through Rachel's testing. The only thing that would 
constitute coercion or manipulation of Rachel's mother to test herself would 
be if she were coerced or manipulated to have a ge netic test herself. But she is 
having no genetic test at all: Rach el is. How can she be manipulated or coerced 
into doing something she is not even doing? 
However, this line of reasoning gets the argument for demanding Rachel's 
mother's consent all wrong, it might be claimed. The core of the argument for 
requiring her consent was that, even if she has not had the genetic test herself, 
she is, in fact, tested if the result of the test is positive, i.e. others would know 
that she is a carrier of BRCA1. The testing in itself is not the object of concern, 
but the result of test is. A positive result for Rachel's test would, in effect, be a 
positive result for the mother since, at least, Rachel and some health care 
professional would have the information that Rachel's mother is a c arrier. The 
idea, then, is that testing Rachel would, in effect, also be to test her mother. 
And if we demand consent in the first instance, we should do so in the 
second. 
However, this is questionable. A presupposition for the test on Rachel 
giving information or knowledge about her mother being a carrier of the gene 
is that the test is positive. If the test on Rachel, on the other hand, is negative, it 
is as uncertain as it was before testing whether Rachel's mother is a carrier 
(there is still a 50% risk, since it is established that Rachel's grandmother was a 
carrier). So the test is a test on Rachel that could have implications for the 
knowledge of whether the mother is a carrier of BRCA1 (given proper 
background knowledge), not a test on the mother.18 The question of whether 
the fact that the result of the test can reveal something about the mother means 
that her consent should be obtained too is the very question at stake, and 
cannot be settled by just referring to that fact again. 
18 Pace th e rhetorical formulation of Lucassen that this is so (Lucassen, 1999, p 323). 
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Neither would Rachel be coerced or manipulated by a requirement of 
relatives' consent. She is certainly not manipulated by openly being presented 
this condition for testing, s ince it is only to tell he r what she has to agree to in 
order to get tested. She is obviously not coerced into testing either. It might be 
claimed that such a demand is coercing her into not testing herself. But she is 
only coerced in a weak sense: there is a condition of testing that she might 
find so unacceptable as to choose not to test herself. That is, she cannot have it 
her way all the way: she cannot, e.g., both avoid telling her mother about her 
plans of testing and have the test performed. And this is not how coercion is 
normally conceived of when talking about coercion in health care. As we saw 
above, traditionally, coercion into having some type of care has been the kind 
of coercion that respect for autonomy is supposed to protect the individual 
from (Tännsjö, 1999, p 17-18). So, it cannot be in the traditional sense 
respecting autonomy, i.e. avoiding coercion or manipulation, that someone's 
autonomy is violated by testing with, or without, the requirement of the 
relatives' consent. 
Rather, it is some weaker idea of respecting autonomy one must have in mind 
when claiming that (not) requiring the consent of relatives is to violate 
someone's autonomy, namely 'respecting autonomy' in the sense of 'respecting 
wishes', i.e., do ing something in accordance with someone's wishes. Surely, a 
lot of things may happen as a result of testing, without the mother's consent, 
which is contrary to her wishes. In this sense, then, the mother's autonomy 
could be violated. To start with, the mother may not want the daughter to test 
herself. Without a requirement that the mother's consent is obtained, the 
daughter can test herself against the wishes of the mother (she will perhaps 
never know about it, but it could still b e against her wishes). But this cannot be 
a part of reasonable ideal of respecting autonomy, since any reasonable 
principle of respecting autonomy has to be based on the idea of personal 
autonomy (see HL3.3), w hich means that the right to have one's autonomy 
respected cannot include matters that regard others. In this case it means that 
my a utonomy is not violated by the mere fact that I do not want you to get 
tested and you do. It has to be demonstrated that this decision somehow 
regards me. 
However, this seems to be a straightforward task in the discussion at hand, 
since the test can reveal information about a relative (it will if it is positive); 
information that, then, in some sense regards her. And the mother may not 
349 
want the daughter to find out that she (the mother) is a carrier of BRCA1, 
which the daughter will do if the test is positive. And for you to find 
something out about me surely regards me (or so we may assume). 
Furthermore, the mother may not want to find this information out herself, 
but if the daughter has a positive test, this may happen. So in the sense of 
'respecting wishes (regarding information about myself)' the mother's wishes 
may be violated by Rachel's testing (if s he has any of these wishes and the test 
is positive). A right to veto such testing with a d emand to informed consent of 
relatives will protect autonomy in this sense. 
In the same sense of "respecting autonomy", requiring the consent of 
relatives in order to get tested may lead to the index-person's autonomy being 
violated. This is so if the index-person wants to get tested without telling the 
relatives and/or if the index-person wants to make the decision of testing 
herself. If there is a r equirement that she obtains the consent from the relatives 
in order to get tested, the index-person cannot have it her way regarding these 
decisions. So, in this sense, there really is a conflict of autonomy. This is not a 
very surprising result: if some piece of information is potentially about several 
individuals, and some of these individuals, P, want to have the information 
while others do not want P to have that information, some in this group of 
individuals that the information is about is bound to have their preference 
frustrated. So reference to what different people want cannot settle the issue. 
However, it is doubtful whether this conflict should be cast in terms of 
respecting autonomy, since to interpret 'respecting autonomy' just as 'r especting 
wishes' is to interpret the idea of respecting autonomy more weakly than what 
is common in biomedical ethics. Rather, it should be cast in terms of a 
conflict of the value of autonomy: granted that the individuals' wishes are basic 
and authentic (enough), they all c ould lead less autonomous lives (less of the 
lives they want to live), which is bad according to the ideal of self-realization, 
due to there being or not being a r equirement for the consent of relatives. In 
the case of Rachel, the mother would do so, if Rachel then finds out that she 
is a carrier of BRCA1 (which she can do if there is no requirement for the 
consent of relatives and given that the mother does not want Rachel to know 
that she is a carrier of BRCA1). Rachel would, on the other hand, do so if her 
mother finds out about her plans of testing and refuses to go through with 
testing (which she can do if there is a requirement for the consent of relatives 
and given that Rachel does not want her mother to find out about her testing-
plans and wants to go through with testing). Construed as a c onflict in term of 
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the value of autonomy, Parker is right to insist that reference to autonomy can 
be used to support both testing without consent from relatives and testing 
only with consent. Then the issue will be difficult to settle indeed only with 
reference to autonomy. However, the conflict should not be construed as a 
conflict of respecting autonomy. Otherwise, there will be great difficulties in 
resisting demands of patients, since understanding respect for autonomy as 
respect for wishes implies that patients can claim that their autonomy is 
violated every time they do not get what they want. Rather, the conflict should 
be understood as being about which of two competing values or interests is 
most important to actualise, i.e. in consequentialist terms. 
2.4 Consequentialist arguments 
This takes us to the instrumental reasons for confidentiality and privacy. Recall 
the consequentialistic line of reasoning supporting confidentiality: that certain 
information from a patient is not forwarded or is duly protected, is a 
prerequisite for the patient's trust in the doctor and the health care system in 
general, a trust without which the patient will be reluctant to share information 
(which will lead to worse care), o r even reluctant to contact health care at all 
(which will lead to no care). A similar line of reasoning can be presented 
regarding privacy: if information about a patient considered to be especially 
personal (like, maybe , genetic) is disclosed without the consent of the patient, 
this can damage the patient's trust in health care and if done routinely a ge neral 
distrust in health care institutions may result. 
Does any argument of this kind speak in favour of or against demanding 
the consent of relatives? Parker claims that also arguments of this kind pull in 
both directions (Parker, 2001, p 452-453), so there is a conflict of consequences 
as well as one of autonomy. The point above about how to analyse the conflict 
of autonomy between Rachel and her mother may seem to point in the same 
direction. On closer inspection, however, I would say that the claim of a 
conflict of consequences is more doubtful, since the pull in the one direction 
seems to be stronger than the pull in the other. 
Let us first turn to the consequentialistic argument against requiring the 
consent of relatives: "Would people come for genetic testing if they knew that 
this information would be shared with relatives? In many cases, o ne suspects 
not." (Parker, 2001, p 453) This argument does not really mention trust at all. 
And this is as it should be, since trust is primarily an issue when it comes to 
breaching confidentiality and, as we saw, requiring the consent of relatives is 
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not really about breaching confidentiality at all: requiring the consent of 
relatives is not to reveal something to someone else about the paient, but to 
require that the patient reveals something to someone else in order to get a 
service. It is not clear why openly making such a condition for the access to a 
service would undermine any trust or confidence at all. 
What the argument does is to skip the "trust-step" of the standard argument 
of confidentiality and move directly to a detrimental effect of requiring 
consent, which may also be effectuated by d istrust: less testing. The thought is 
the following. Requiring the consent of relatives may discourage or deter 
people from genetic testing, since they may be reluctant to let relatives know 
that they are testing themselves or reluctant to place the final decision of 
testing in the hands of relatives. And since testing may realize values (and avoid 
negative values) to persons tested, if people are discouraged or deterred, less 
value (or more negative value) may be realized. 
Even though it is far from self-evident that more testing will realize more 
value, as seen in chapter H, let us grant that values are regularly realized by 
testing, so that less te sting will have detrimental consequences. Does, then, the 
requirement that relatives should consent to testing lead to less testing? This 
question is empirical, but, as Parker says, the answer is probably yes. The 
development of molecular testing that can be done individually has been 
presented as an improvement compared to old testing procedures that 
required the cooperation of the whole family, just because reluctant family 
members could, and sometimes did, veto the testing of one individual (Harper, 
1996, p 55).19 So persons from families with strained relations or persons who 
for various reasons know that their relatives do not want to know may very 
well abstain from testing due to requirements of relatives' consent. 
Against this it might be held that if testing is important enough, for 
instance, if it is a question of life and death, most people will opt for testing 
despite the requirement of the consent of relatives. This obviously is the case 
when there is a fatal hereditary condition for which there are efficient medical 
measures. But in these cases, it certainly seems unreasonable for relatives to be 
able to veto testing, since the values that can be realized from testing are so 
great as compared to the disastrous consequences that could result from 
19 Harper, 1996, p 55, writes: "The advantage of newer specific genetic testing approaches that no 
longer make it essential to sample the whole family is strikingly illustrated here; the different family 
attitudes to information and testing may remain frustrating, but at least they no longer need to 
prevent the member who does wish to know her risk from attaining this." 
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abstaining from testing (see 11.2.1). However, in cases such as these, there 
certainly is a strong case for informing relatives if the test shows that they may 
be at risk, also against the wishes of the patient. But this is another (although 
related) question to which I will return (see VT.3.1). Rat her, generally speaking, 
if one is reluctant to do a t est due to the fac t that one is concerned that relatives 
might find this out, it is unlikely that a requirement to obtain the consent of 
relatives (and thus a r equirement to let them know that you are planning to test 
yourself) will lead one to become less reluctant. 
Is there a similar argument to be evoked in favour of requiring the consent of 
relatives? Parker seems to think there is: 
[TJesting third parties without their consent... would also be likely to 
lead to harms comparable to those associated with breaching the 
confidentiality of the index patient. Would confidence in the genetic 
service not be undermined by the realisation that people were being 
routinely tested for inherited conditions without being informed of the 
results? Would it not be further undermined by the knowledge that 
such information was at the same time being made freely available to 
their relatives? (Parker, 2001, 452-453) 
From this passage, it is unclear what is being claimed to undermine the 
confidence in genetic services. Is it not informing relatives of results from 
testing the index-person when the result has implications for the genetic 
constitution of the relatives in question, or is it not obtaining consent from the 
relatives in order to test the index-person when the result of such testing 
could have such implications, or both? Since both consent and informing 
relatives are mentioned, probably both (or whichever one of them), but as we 
are concerned exclusively with the second question here, I will leave the first 
one for now. 
Will, then, not requiring the consent of relatives for the testing of a 
patient lead to an undermining of the trust, or confidence, in genetic services 
(a part of health care)? Maybe, but not necessarily in the way "likely to lead to 
harms comparable to those associated with breaching the confidentiality of the 
index patient." (Ibid.) 
Recall once again the consequentialistic argument for confidentiality. This 
argument says that undermining trust is bad because it can lead to people 
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abstaining from informing health care professionals properly or abstaining 
from health care altogether. So distrust is b ad because it leads to worse or less 
health care. But it is hard to see why this should apply in this case, that is, i t is 
hard to see why worse or less health care would be a consequence of not 
requiring the consent of relatives in genetic testing. Why should anyone think 
it relevant to anyone's decision of genetic testing that a relative already has or 
may have information that may result from such testing? 
Of course, "confidence" may be undermined by not requiring the consent 
of relatives in another sense of confidence: relatives (and people in general) 
may be upset about or resent the fact that someone else can get this 
information about them without their consent. But this is not undermining 
confidence in the way relevant to the standard argument for confidentiality. 
So, in the argument against demanding the consent of relatives, we have the 
second step of the consequentialistic argument for confidentiality (it will lead 
to less testing), but not the first (it will lead to less trust). And in the argument 
for demanding the consent we have a ver sion of the first step (it will, in a sense, 
lead to less trust), but not the second (it will lead to less testing). 
Comparing these negative consequences, I think the scale tips in favour of 
not requiring the consent of relatives. It seems worse that some people are 
deterred from genetic testing altogether than that some people are upset about 
the possible access of others to genetic information about them. Ultimately, 
this depends on the degree of deterrence and the consequences of people 
being deterred as compared to the degree of resentment and consequences of 
people being upset. Of course, it is always hard to determine this kind of 
consequences and naturally, it can only be settled empirically. For instance, it 
may be so that people will be so upset with the fact that relatives can get 
information in this way that they withdraw support from society offering 
genetic testing at all, le ading to a public outcry for not providing, or even 
forbidding, such testing. This may surely lead to less, perhaps no, testing. But 
this is an empirical speculation lacking any substantial support, as compared to 
the already existing empirical indications of deterrence from testing when 
requiring the consent of relatives. 
2.5 The problem of arbitrariness 
As we have seen, arguments have been put forward both for and against the 
requirement of relatives' consent. I have argued that arguments referring to the 
general norms within health care cannot settle the issue. The norm of 
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informed consent is the one being at stake, and thus cannot be used in a way 
that is not question-begging. The norm of confidentiality does not apply, and 
the norm of privacy can be used in either way. There are two kinds of 
justificatory principles of health care one can resort to: autonomy and 
consequentialistic arguments. The principle of respecting autonomy as 
traditionally conceived of in biomedical ethics, i.e. avoiding coercion and 
manipulation, does not apply and autonomy in a weaker sense does not settle 
the issue. However, consequentialist concerns seem to weigh in favour of not 
requiring the consent of relatives as a condition for testing. In this passage, I 
would like to argue the case against requiring relatives' consent further. 
As we have seen, the issue of requiring the consent of relatives only 
becomes pressing when the test of the index-person is (highly) predictive of 
some relative. Otherwise, relatives have no interest in having a say about 
testing. At least, they have no interest of the same kind as the index-person, 
relating to the genetic information and the possible values of getting such 
information. This is why the question of the relatives' consent is only 
discussed in relation to genetic testing that is (highly) predictive of someone 
else, an assumption taken for granted also in my own discussion above. 
However, the actual predictability of genetic tests with regard to relatives 
may vary considerably (1.4.1). This means that anyone who tries to make a c ase 
for requiring the consent of relatives on the basis of such predictability faces a 
question: how predictive should the testing be in order for it to be reasonable 
to require the consent of relatives? In order to answer this, we will have to say 
something about how to determine the degree to which a t est is predictive of 
someone else. Let us once again return to the case of Rachel. As previously 
noted, a prerequisite for the test on Rachel giving information about her 
mother is that the test is positive. If the test on Rachel is negative, it is as 
uncertain as it was before testing whether Rachel's mother is a c arrier (there is 
still a 50% risk, since it is established that Rachel's grandmother was a c arrier). 
What we know before the test, when the question of the mother's consent is 
relevant, is that Rachel has a 25% risk of being a carrier. In the light of this fact, 
what are we to say: tha t the test means a 25% risk of testing the mother and 
thus that the predictability of the test is 25%? Let us grant this for now. Is this 
risk of testing her mother sufficient to warrant requiring the mother's consent? 
If so, how about cousins on the mother's side? How about second cousins? At 
what point on a sliding scale would the predictability become too low to 
warrant requiring the consent of a relative? 
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Moreover, it does not seem unreasonable to claim that not only the 
predictability for the relatives b ut also for the index-person herself is relevant 
for the plausibility of requiring relatives' consent. Suppose that a gene that 
increases risk f or diabetes with 15-30% before the age of 50 in comparison to 
the population in general is found, and suppose there is a test determining 
whether or not one is a carrier of that gene. It seems reasonable, at least prima 
facie, to say that the (alleged) reason to obtain the consent from relatives in 
order to do this testing is weaker than the reason for doing so for e.g. 
Huntington's disease, where a carrier is sure to get the disease eventually (if she 
does not die first). So how predictive, in this sense, should a genetic test be in 
order for us to demand the consent of relatives? 
As these questions indicate, the general problem is the following. To 
require the consent of relatives before testing presupposes that we settle the 
issue of which degree of predictability that is high enough in order for the 
requirement to "kick in". Besides difficulties in determining the degree of 
predictability regarding the relative and determining whether and how the 
degree of predictability o f the test itself should be relevant, there seems to be 
no answer to this question that is not morally arbitrary.20 Say that you answer 
"25%". Then it can be asked: "Why not 30%? Or 20%?" If we do not know for 
sure that testing will reveal something about the genetic constitution of the 
relatives i n question, any way of specifying the likelihood of such possible 
revelation required for an obligation to obtain the consent of relatives to kick 
in seems arbitrary. 
Furthermore, it should be noted that many medical tests in health care besides 
genetic tests might be revealing of someone else, which makes the moral 
arbitrariness of requiring the consent of relatives for genetic tests e ven more 
obvious. Tests for sexually transmitted disease is one example. If Jill, who has 
been sexually faithful to Jack her whole life, tests herself for gonorrhoea and 
the test turns out to be positive, she will know that Jack is a carrier of the 
bacteria of the disease. Should we thus demand that the consent of Jack is to 
be obtained in order for the test to be performed? 
20 The only non-arbitrary line to draw is when testing one person is revealing of someone else for 
sure. But this is very rare. One example is genetically identical twins and another is ge netic carrier 
detection for the gene for fragile X on the father. If the test is p ositive, any son must be carrier 
too, and the same goes for negative testing. But then they are very likely to be symptomatic, 
which makes the question of presymptomatic testing irrelevant. 
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I think that we should not. And the simple reason for this is that Jack could 
then veto the testing of Jill. This veto could lead to Jill being seriously harmed, 
harm that Jill has contacted the health care system to avoid. In this regard, the 
situation is exactly analogous to that of Rachel and Rachel's mother: to demand 
that Rachel's mother's consent should be obtained in order for Rachel to test 
herself is to leave the decision of Rachel's testing to Rachel's mother; only if 
Rachel's mother consents, Rachel can have the test. 
Of course, there are differences between the gonorrhoea test and the 
BRCA1 test. They are different kinds of tests for different kinds of things. 
One difference may be said to be that the latter test is more "directly" 
revealing than the first, since the first test requires background knowledge of 
Jill in order to be revealing of Jack (e.g. ab out her sexual faithfulness to him). 
Thus it might be claimed that the family doctor of Rachel (let us assume that 
she is also the doctor of Rachel's mother) would know about Rachel's mothers 
status as carrier the very same moment she would find out that Rachel is a 
carrier (if that is what he would find out). On the other hand, the family 
doctor of Jack and Jill would have to know that Jill had no other sexual 
relations in order to conclude that Jack is also infected. 
However, this alleged difference is, at best, merely a d ifference in degrees. 
Genetic information in general also requires background information in order 
to be revealing, e.g. about the mechanism of heredity and about the familial 
relations between the concerned parties. Moreover, Jill's family doctor may 
know Jill well enough to be very confident in her assurance about her 
faithfulness to Jack. Then it is hard to say that this test is not equally revealing. 
The fact that the degree to which a medical test is revealing of someone else is 
due to background knowledge holds with regard to medical testing in general, 
genetic or not. Furthermore, it may be claimed that the gonorrhoea test is 
more directly revealing than a test for BRCA1 in another sense, since it reveals 
actual presence of a disease and not just the propensity thereof. 
The problem of drawing a non-arbitrary line of predictability and comparisons 
with other medical tests strengthens the case against requiring the consent of 
relatives. Together with the consequentialist arguments and the absence of 
considerations to the contrary we are certainly warranted to reject the idea of 
requiring such consent. 
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3. Disclosure to relatives 
In the introduction of this chapter, a distinction was made between informing 
relatives before testing (that testing will occ ur) and after testing (that testing has 
occurred, or the result thereof). The main reason to inform relatives before 
testing is, naturally, that doing so gives relatives the possibility of affecting 
whether testing is done when test results can reveal information about the 
genetic constitution of the relatives in question. I argued that there are reasons 
to deny them that possibility. However, maybe the relatives' possible interest in 
being informed about the result of such testing should be recognized 
nevertheless. That is, the question of whether, and, if so, when, how, and by 
whom, relatives should be informed about the genetic testing of the index-
person^) remains unanswered, even if one concurs that the consent of the 
relative(s) should not be required in order for testing to be performed. 
However, as mentioned above (VI.2), contact is often made with relatives 
before testing, since constructing a pedigree often is an essential component 
of the testing procedure. In order to construct a pedigree, estranged or 
unsuspecting relatives may have to be contacted. Contact is then made for the 
sake of the index-person rather than the relatives. Of course, one could then 
ask whether these relatives should be contacted. However, to abstain from 
testing only because one thinks that one should not contact certain relatives is, 
in effect, to let them veto testing, which I have argued that they should not be 
allowed to. This, of course, does not exclude the possibility that the index-
person does the right thing when abstaining from genetic testing in order not 
to upset some relatives. Neither does it exclude the right of the relatives to 
abstain from participating in the pedigree (for instance by denying access to 
their medical records). Nonetheless, the relative should not be allowed to stop 
the genetic test (even if the predictive value of the test may be undermined by 
some relative's refusal to reveal facts relevant for the pedigree). 
Because of this, the main question to address is whether (and, if so, when, 
how, and by whom) test results, i.e. af ter testing, that have implications for the 
genetic constitution of relatives should be disclosed to them. I will d iscuss this 
question by investigating arguments for and against claims to the effect that 
different parties have reasons to do this. Some of these arguments are about 
the general claim that there are reasons for informing relatives, but does not 
address the question of who has this reason (see VI.3.1.1). But some arguments 
are about the question of the more exact party that has the alleged reason in 
question (see VI.3.2). Perhaps surprisingly, some of these arguments are not 
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really about who should inform, but rather about who has reason to see to it 
that relatives do get informed, irrespective of whether they do the actual 
informing themselves. For instance, even if the index-person has special 
obligations towards her relatives, it does not follow that the index-person 
should do the actual informing. It could be that health care professionals 
should do that instead (see VI.3.1.2). 
This leaves us with three questions: should relatives be informed of the 
result of genetic testing (and, if so, when and how)? If they should, who has 
the most reason to see to it that they are informed? And who should perform 
the act of informing them? In relation to addressing these questions, I will also 
address the question of whether it should be allowed or forbidden to inform 
relatives. 
It should be kept in mind that these questions arise only in certain 
circumstances. The index-person(s) seeking genetic testing has prior 
knowledge, or at least suspicion, of being at risk for genetic disease. If the 
index-person knows that her relatives has the same knowledge or suspicion, 
she may very well leave the decision to seek genetic testing to these relatives. 
The question of disclosing the result of genetic testing to relatives thus arises 
primarily when there is reason for the index-person to believe that there are 
relatives at risk that are unaware of themselves being at risk. Furthermore, 
disclosure is important primarily when the result of the test is positive, since 
only positive results increases the initial risk of the relatives. 
3.1 Well-being and autonomy 
As we will see in this subsection, reasons to inform relatives are sometimes 
cast in terms of well-being and autonomy, or can at least be reformulated in 
this way. This is helpful, since it allows us to use previous findings in 
formulating a general theoretical answer to the question of whether and, if so, 
when relatives should be informed. However, this answer leaves many 
practical questions of when to act on these reasons unanswered, since we will 
not always know when the reasons are present. I will discuss some merits and 
flaws of suggestions on how to answer the practical questions after addressing 
the theoretical question. 
3.1.1 Theoretical solution 
Consider the following statement: 
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Genetic testing of one person can produce information that will make 
predictive testing available to other family relatives that would not 
otherwise have been possible. This information may enable them to 
make more informed reproductive choices, to make choices about 
surveillance, or to avoid unnecessary treatment. If this information is not 
made available relatives may die or suffer serious harms as a result. 
(Parker & Lucassen, 2003, p 73) 
What this argument says is that relatives can be better or, rather, (much) less 
worse off by receiving genetic information from the index-person, than they 
would have been if this information had not been disclosed to them. More 
precisely, well-being (or avoidance of "ill-being" or harm) may be realized for 
the relatives, for instance by giving genetic information that makes the relatives 
"avoid unnecessary treatment", or the autonomy of the relatives may be 
increased, for instance by giving them genetic information that "enable them 
to make more informed reproductive choices". That is, very much the same 
values that can be realized for the index-person by receiving genetic 
information (II.2.4) may also be realized for the relatives. 
However, this last claim needs to be modified somewhat. Some of the 
values that can be realized for the index-person are unlikely to be realized for 
the relative. Perhaps most obviously, the psychological well-being of removing 
the anxiety of uncertainty may not be an advantage of disclosing genetic 
information to relatives, since they may not have any prior suspicion and 
hence no uncertainty to remove. Rather, one may give rise to anxiety by 
informing of previously unsuspected genetic risk. It is well known from 
genetic counselling that some index-persons are reluctant to contact relatives 
just b ecause they do not want to cause anxiety and distress (Adelswärd & Sachs, 
2002, p 83; Clarke, 2003, p 80). This is probably the reason why Parker and 
Lucassen mention health-related advantages and promotions of autonomy as 
examples of the potential benefit of disclosure to relatives. The reason to 
disclose results from genetic testing when there are no health-related 
advantages thus seems weaker in the case of relatives.21 
21 Although there may be psychological advantages for relatives, e.g. strengthened emotional 
bonds within family and time for psychological adjustment to cope with the (more or less 
probable) disease (see II .2.2.1). 
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Nonetheless, the fact that well-being and autonomy may be realized for 
relatives provides reasons for disclosing the information to the relatives, just as 
the realization of such values for the index-person provides reasons for testing 
her. This is not to say that anyone in particular has such reasons, only that at 
least someone does. If the reasons are strong enough and if there are no 
reasons strong enough to the contrary, someone thus has an obligation to 
disclose the information. 
Now, generally, the following principle seems to be somewhat reasonable: 
when obligations are based on values (realization of positive or prevention of 
negative values), the more value that can be realized and negative value that can 
be prevented, the stronger the obligation. For instance, if one can prevent 
someone's death by disclosing some information, the obligation to disclose 
the information is stronger than if one can prevent some minor 
inconvenience by disclosing the information.22 That is, it seems reasonable to 
claim that the more benefited the relative would be by receiving the 
information, the stronger the obligation to disclose it, ceteris paribus. 
Moreover, the converse seems to hold equally: the more harm the relative 
would suffer as a result of receiving some (genetic) information, the stronger 
the obligation not to disclose it. And, as we have seen, receiving genetic 
information may also produce negative values or harm (see e.g. II.2.4). This 
means that the argument above does not support a general obligation to 
disclose to relatives, but only an obligation to disclose when and to the extent 
that the relatives in question actually would be benefited by the information. 
Indeed, when and to the extent that they would be harmed by the information, 
there is an obligation of corresponding strength not to disclose it. 
This indicates a theoretical solution to the problem of disclosure to 
relatives: there is a moral reason to disclose if, and to the extent that, relatives 
would be benefited by disclosure and a moral reason not to disclose if, and to 
the extent that, relatives would be harmed by disclosure. In those cases where 
there are reasons pulling in both directions (i.e. where both benefits and 
harms would result), the overall strength of the reason to disclose or not 
comes down to the relative strength of these reasons (in turn determined by 
the magnitude of the harms and benefits in question). As already indicated, 
22 Given the usually correct assumption that the negative value of death is greater than the 
negative value of some minor inconvenience. 
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benefit should be understood broadly, both in terms of well-being and 
autonomy (as a grad ual value) and also as to include avoidance of harm. This 
general solution could be interpreted more precisely in numerous ways. For 
instance, it is compatible with the common sense-view of morality that it is 
(much) more important to prevent harm than to improve the situation of 
someone already well off (i.e. the idea of an elevated weight of evil). H owever, 
I think few would be inclined to abandon the view that if an action benefits 
someone already well off, this gives the person who can perform the action at 
least some reason to perform it, even if the reason is easily overridden 
(perhaps a desire not to perform it would be enough in some circumstances). 
So even if the details of the solution can be fleshed out in different ways 
depending on the ethical theory one favours, the general character of the 
solution seems sound on a theoretical level. 
3.1.2 Practical solutions 
However, a practical problem remains, since it may be hard to know before 
disclosure whether or not the relatives would actually be benefited or not by 
the information. The only certain way of finding that out is to disclose the 
information, but then the question of whether one should do so or not is no 
longer open. One way to tackle this is to say that information should be 
disclosed to those relatives who want the information in question, 
presupposing that the fact that they want it is a s trong indication that they will 
be benefited by it. However, this will only push the problem a step further. 
Remember that the question of disclosure arises primarily when there is 
reason to believe that the relatives do not have any prior suspicion of 
increased genetic risk. I f one knows that they have prior suspicion and yet have 
abstained from genetic testing, this constitutes a reason to believe that they do 
not want to have the result of the test. However, without prior suspicion, the 
only way to find out if they want some information about increased genetic 
risk for disease is to let them know that there is such information. And this 
may very well be something they do not want to know about. To put it more 
concisely: the only way to find out whether or not they want to know is to let 
them know. So by finding out who wants to know, one will fail to respect the 
wishes of those who do not want to know. So even if there is a theoretical 
answer to the question of when genetic information should be disclosed to 
relatives ("only when they would be sufficiently benefited by it"), the practical 
problem of how to d ecide when to disclose this information remains. I will now 
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address some possible suggestions regarding how this practical problem 
should be solved. 
The index-person's decision. One practical solution is to leave the decision to the 
index-person herself.23 This solution has some advantages. Firsdy, it protects 
the confidentiality of the index-person: if she does not want to reveal genetic 
information about herself to relatives, she does not have to (I will return to 
this below). Secondly, one can expect that most people are more acquainted 
with the situation of their relatives than are e.g. health care professionals, 
which makes them good candidates for determining whether or not the 
relatives would be sufficiently benefited by the information. One can also 
expect that most people are benevolent towards their relatives,24 and therefore 
willing to decide according to their best interest. 
However, even if index-persons often are acquainted with and benevolent 
towards their relatives, it is well known from genetic counselling that this is 
not always so . Index-persons may be in conflict or have no contact at all w ith 
their relatives. Thus, genetic information "could also become a tool of revenge 
in dysfunctional families" (Knoppers, 2002, p 85), for instance by non­
disclosure when relatives would be benefited by the information or by 
disclosure to relatives in order to upset them. 
The health care professional's decision. In the light of these problems, one may 
propose that health care professionals (and then primarily the geneticist 
and/or the genetic counsellor) should make the decision, at least in some 
circumstances. The obvious drawback with this proposal is that it threatens the 
confidentiality of the index-person. Relatives are likely to learn that the reason 
that they are being contacted about genetic risk is the positive test of the index-
person, in which case they will receive genetic information about her. If i t is 
up to the health care professional to contact the relatives, this can be done 
23 This strategy is implemented in, for instance, the UK (Hallowell et al, 2003, p 74-75) and 
Sweden. 
24 Some empirical findings seem to support this, for instance Hallowell et al, 2003, who performed 
interviews on women who were diagnosed with breast and ovarian cancer and who tested for 
BRCA1/2. A large majority of these women stated that their primary motive for testing was the 
good of their relatives in some way or another, e.g. in terms of their autonomy and/or well-being 
(see primarily Ibid, p 75-77). 
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without the consent of the index-person, which clearly makes it a breach of 
confidentiality. 
Another problem of letting health care professionals make the decision of 
whether or not to disclose is that health care professionals may be more eager 
to disclose than relatives.25 T his may lead to disclosure even in cases where the 
relative is not benefited and even harmed by receiving the genetic information 
in question. 
In order to avoid these problems, one could confine allowance for health 
care professionals to decide whether or not to disclose to situations where it 
seems obvious that relatives would suffer serious harm if they were not 
informed. In such circumstances it may seem reasonable to presume consent 
to being informed on part of the relatives. This strategy would limit the cases 
of breaches of confidentiality, and is in line with general norms of biomedical 
ethics. It is also a strategy that is gaining in popularity (Knoppers, 2002, p 86). 
However, this leaves us with specifying the conditions that have to be fulfilled 
in order for breaches of confidentiality to be allowed. Here is a suggestion: 
In the situation of repeated refusal by the patient, four conditions must 
be met before it is seen as ethically permissible for the physician to 
breach medical confidentiality: (1) the condition in question must be 
serious with (2) a h igh probability of occurrence, (3) in an identifiable 
blood relative(s) and (4) prevention or treatment must be available. 
(Knoppers, 2002, p 86) 
To this it should be added that the prevention or treatment available must be 
efficient and not too burdensome, since the value of the prevention or 
treatment can be questioned if it can be experienced as b eing as burdensome 
as th e condition it is a p revention or treatment for (see H3.4.2). Even if these 
conditions are vague (like "serious" and "high probability"), they will most 
likely make the situations where health care professionals are allowed to take 
over the decision to disclose from the index-person rare indeed. As we have 
seen, there are no efficient and non-burdensome preventions or treatments 
for almost all monogenetic diseases. And multifactorial diseases probably will 
not have a h igh probability enough for condition (2) to be fulfilled (see 1.4.1). 
25 There seems to be some indication that they are, perhaps partly because they often also have 
the role of the researcher interested in collecting data (Adelswärd & Sachs, 2002, p 84-86). 
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Nevertheless, since the basis of respecting confidentiality in health care as a 
general rule seems firm enough (VI.2.2), and the value of relatives' knowledge 
can be questioned unless there are obvious benefits of knowing, conditions 
like the ones above seem plausible. 
Contractual solutions. However, this still leaves health care professionals with 
some room to breach confidentiality. One could try to sidestep this problem 
in the following way. Whenever the index-person asks for genetic testing and 
the above conditions are fulfilled, she is told that relatives will be informed if 
the result indicates that they are at risk. This can be made in the form of a 
contract.26 Then, whenever the index-person consents to testing she also 
consents to relatives at risk being subsequently informed. Thus, it is not a 
breach of confidentiality.27 It is neither to require the consent of relatives in 
order for testing to be done, since the consent of the relatives does not have 
to be obtained. No other person than the index-person has to consent to 
testing in order for testing to be done. 
However, even if such a contract preserves the confidentiality of the index-
person in a formal sense, it could be argued that the same argument that 
justifies confidentiality could be directed against this proposal: one could 
claim that a contractual term stating that relatives will be contacted if they are at 
risk may deter the index-person from going through with testing, just like a 
threat of breach of confidentiality may do so. And then the relatives who 
could have been benefited will not get the information anyway, since the 
index-person will not test herself in the first place. 
The index-person's decision and persuasion. In the light of all of these problems, one 
could once again resort to the position that the index-person should always 
have the ultimate decision. One could also add that "informal encouragement 
of family discussion" (Parker & Lucassen, 2003, p 72) or "seeking to persuade 
them [the index-persons] to pass on relevant information to others" (Clarke, 
2003, p 81) may be recommendable in some circumstances. But once again, 
this would still leave us with the problems of relatives not being informed 
26 Doukas & Berg, 2001, have made a similar proposal. 
27 However, it is a restriction of the index-person's privacy, since it circumscribes the control she 
has over her genetic information: she cannot get the testing without agreeing to the terms, which 
could lead to the spreading of the information. 
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when the index-person persists in her refusal, or relatives being informed by 
the index-person in an adverse manner. 
This only goes to show that there may not be a n eat solution to the practical 
problem of deciding when to inform relatives. When it comes to values like 
well-being and autonomy, there can always be conflicts, and difficulties 
predicting and controlling outcomes. If the basis of some solution is to be 
sought by reference to these values, one will have to know quite a lot about 
what would happen if different strategies were implemented. That is, some 
empirical questions need to be answered, for instance the following: If we 
allow the overriding of the decision of the index-person on some occasion, 
how great would the threat to trust in genetic services and the negative effects 
of non-occurrence of testing be? If we set up contracts stating that the result 
will be disclosed to relatives if they are at risk, how great would the negative 
effects of non-occurrence of testing be in that case? I f we allow index-persons 
to make the decision all by themselves, how many relatives that could have 
been benefited by being informed if we adopted some of the other solutions 
will not be thus benefited? How many will receive information that is in fact 
harmful to them? 
Without pretending to have an answer to these questions, I would say that 
experiences from the practice of genetic counselling provide some clues on 
how to solve the practical problem. One lesson from genetic counselling 
seems to be that one should not underestimate the importance of respecting 
confidentiality. Not doing so can be counterproductive from the point of 
view of the relatives, since doubts about the confidentiality being protected 
can lead to defection from genetic testing by the index-person, in which case 
the relatives will remain uninformed anyway. Angus Clarke, one of the 
pioneers of modern genetic counselling, writes: "Any sense of, "You had 
better tell her [the blood relative in question] now because otherwise we will", 
would be damaging and likely to lead to further blocks in family 
communication." (Clarke, 2003, p 80) Furthermore, to have weaker 
requirements of confidentiality in genetics than in health care in general runs 
the risk of starting "down the slippery slope towards "paternalistic" medicine 
in which other family m embers and health care professionals would be able to 
decide what is b est for the patient." (Parker & Lucassen, 2003, p 73) 
Moreover, since the day of Hippocrates, the primary concern of the health 
care professional has been the person in front of her looking for help, i.e. the 
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patient (see II.2). This has many reasons. One is pragmatic: the needs and wants 
of the patient in front of you stands in a c lear light, while the needs and wants 
of potentially concerned third parties normally will be a subject of more or 
less qu alified guesswork. Another reason is that primary attention to the patient 
is crucial for patient's trust in health care professionals. This does not mean 
that health care professionals can totally disregard the interest of third parties. 
If the goal of health care is to promote well-being and (perhaps) autonomy, the 
well-being and autonomy of third parties cannot be totally irrelevant (see 
III.3.2.3). But as a rule, the interest of patients should be the primary concern of 
the health care professional. 
This means that if confidentiality is to be breached, there should be very 
good reasons indeed for doing so. Other possibilities, like persuasion, must be 
tried first. A contractual solution may seem somewhat more attractive in the 
light of the importance of confidentiality. Even if such a solution may lead to 
defection too, it is more likely to preserve trust, since the terms of disclosure 
are out in the open to start with. However, if the level of defection were to be 
larger than the number of relatives that would not have been contacted if there 
were no contract, this solution looses its rationale. And whether this is so, 
seems hard to find out. 
Another lesson from genetic counselling is that genetic counselling can 
solve much of the practical problems (Clarke, 2003). Discussions between 
counsellor and counselee may very well make the counselee abandon her 
reluctance to inform relatives in those cases where there are reasons to believe 
such disclosure to be in the relatives' interest. This may be considered to be 
persuasion a type that is incompatible with the norm of non-directiveness, but 
many forms of "persuasion" can in fact be quite compatible with this norm 
(n.3.3.5).28 For instance, if the persuasion consists in encouragement of family 
communication prior to testing by informing that the consequences of not 
informing relatives of genetic information they reasonably can be expected to 
want may be devastating also for the index-person herself (e.g. s omething like 
"if there were any hope of reconciliation it will almost certainly be lost by 
such an omission"). Pointing out such psychosocial consequences of genetic 
testing is increasingly becoming an integral part of genetic counselling and is 
28 Pace C larke, who writes that "seeking to persuade them to pass on relevant information to 
others... will often entail a radical departure from strict adherence to the ethos of non-
directiveness" (Clarke, 2003, p 81). 
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done for the sake of the index-person herself. It is thus well in line with the 
concern for her autonomy and well-being, the ultimate rationale against which 
any standard of non-directiveness should be assessed (see H3.3.5). Of course, 
other forms of persuasion, such as outright moral blame directed at the index-
person, are harder to reconcile with the ideal of non-directiveness. However, 
if the harm of the relative(s) of not knowing is great enough, such persuasion 
may be preferable to any alternative. The interest of relatives can therefore 
justify deviation from non-directiveness, and this may be better than blunt 
breaches of confidentiality. 
Finally, the fact that there sometimes is an obligation to inform relatives 
leaves the question of who has this obligation. In the next section, we will 
address arguments that claim that it is the index-person who primarily has such 
an obligation, due to the special relation she has to her relatives. However, 
even if one concurs with such an argument, it does not follow that the index-
person herself should do the actual informing of the relatives. The obligation, 
if there is any, is to see to it that relatives are informed. There may be good 
reasons to let the index-person delegate the actual informing to some health 
care professional.29 One such a reason is that misunderstandings of the 
information are less likely to spread among the relatives if a trained 
professional does the actual informing. Another is that it may be difficult for 
the index-person to contact relatives: it may be hard to be the messenger when 
you are bringing bad news (Adelswärd & Sachs, 2002, p 71-86). If the genetic 
counsellor or some other professional offers to do the informing, some 
reluctance to inform may fade. If nonetheless the index-person does the 
informing, the counsellor must try to ensure that she has understood the 
information properly and is willing to take on the task. 
3.2 Special obligations due to special relations 
As we have seen, there are arguments in favour of disclosing genetic 
information to relatives, referring to more or less traditional health care 
considerations in terms of well-being and autonomy. However, it has also been 
claimed that one has special obligations to see to it that relatives and family 
members are informed, by virtue of them being relatives and/or family 
29 This shows that what Hermerén, 1999, p 154-155, calls the messenger approach (that the index-
person informs) and the clinical approach (that the health care professionals inform) can be 
combined. 
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members. The underlying rationale is well known in moral philosophy: that 
some relationships between individuals give rise to special moral reasons or 
obligations (Kagan, 1998, p 125-137).30 
3.2.1 Special obligations due to genetic bonds 
Do we have special obligations towards our blood relatives,31 only due to the 
fact that they are our blood relatives? In order to answer this question, one has 
to demarcate it from other related questions. The question is not about 
whether or not most of us think that we have such an obligation. I think many 
do. But I am taking it for granted that the view that many people considering 
something to be morally relevant in itself makes it morally relevant is 
implausible (see also 1.3). So the (alleged) fact that many (or perhaps most) 
people believes that we have special obligations towards our blood relatives is 
not the object of discussion here. The question is rather whether or not there 
are any reasons for believing that we indeed do have such obligations. 
The question is neither about whether certain social bonds gives rise to 
obligations (see VI.3.2.2), nor about whether some general obligations like "do 
not harm" can generate obligations towards one's relatives. The question is 
whether the fact that one is a blood relative to someone else in itself gives rise 
to certain moral reasons, perhaps strong enough to imply obligations, to that 
relative, and, then, particularly the obligation to disclose genetic information to 
that relative. So the question is: does blood relatedness as such carry any moral 
weight, or to put it differently, is blood relatedness morally relevant? 
Although the view that blood relatedness is morally relevant in this sense is 
often indicated, not least in the saying that "blood is thicker than water", it is 
rarely explicitly claimed and even more rarely defended. However, Rhodes 
seems to hold that view: "moral responsibility depends on a variety of factors 
including blood ties" (Rhodes, 1998, p 25). Rhodes grants that social bonds 
"typically" are more important in justifying moral claims than "blood ties": 
"Blood alone does not tell the story of our moral responsibility to one 
30 Proponents of this idea often draw on Aristotle's writings, and then especially Nicomacean Ethics. 
31 As I sa id earlier, with blood relatives I mean the group of people that clinical geneticists are 
interested in when constructing a family tree of the index-person. This is n ormally those who I 
inherited my genes directly from (mother and father), those who inherited their genes directly 
from me (my children) and relatives with common ancestors close enough to have a high 
probability of sharing certain genes (usually siblings and maybe parents siblings and cousins, but 
seldom further). 
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another. The bonds that have moral weight and give us thick responsibilities to 
one another typically include a social component." (Rhodes, 1998, p 21) But to 
say t hat blood does not tell the story of moral responsibility alone is still to 
claim that blood has something to say in that story.32 Is there anything to this 
claim? 
The first thing one has to ask oneself is what is meant by "blood ties". The 
interpretation that seems to be the most natural when it comes to the 
obligation of disclosing genetic information is in terms of similarity or 
commonality of DNA between two persons. Rhodes also favours this 
interpretation: "Commonality of DNA seems to be and important component 
of blood ties..." (Ibid.) However, "blood ties" cannot mean "genetic 
communality", at least if interpreted as "genetic similarity".33 This is so since 
genetic similarity cannot be the morally relevant relation, at least not in order 
to ground an obligation to disclose genetic information to relatives. The 
reason for this is that it is possible tha t my genetic constitution is more similar to 
someone else's who is a complete stranger who share no ancestors with me 
for the last 1.000 years, than it is like any of my close relatives, like my siblings, 
parents, or children. In fact, it is even possible (although unlikely) that there is 
a complete genetic match between such a perfect stranger and me. But 
disclosing some genetic information about myself to this person is not 
informative of this person's genetic constitution, unless we know about our 
genetic identity to start with. Our genetic match thus provides no reason for 
inferring facts about the genetic constitution of that other person from facts 
about my genetic constitution. So mere similarity of DNA is of no relevance in 
itself to the obligation to inform relatives of one's genetic constitution. Rather, 
it must be to stand in certain (genetic) relations of heredity, like father-, 
mother-, or brotherhood, that can be of moral relevance, since only then 
knowledge of my genetic constitution can be telling of their genetic 
constitution. Therefore "genetic relatedness" rather than "genetic similarity" is 
the only reasonable interpretation of "blood relatives" to whom one may have 
obligations. 
32 See also the quotation below about the case of Dick, where she clearly states a responsibility 
due to "biological ties". 
33 Which is Rhodes interpretation (Ibid). 
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Does genetic relatedness give rise to an obligation, at least of a prima facie 
kind,34 to see to it that genetic information is disclosed to relatives? Rhodes 
brings the case of Dick to the stand in order to argue in favour of such 
obligation (Rhodes, 1998, p 23-24). Dick can participate in a family linkage 
study, and his participation is important, maybe crucial, in order for his cousin 
Martha to find out whether or not she is a carrier of the gene for Marfan 
syndrome:35 
Dick's case is particularly interesting because it is only his blood ties that 
give him an obligation to participate in the linkage study. No one else 
can do it for her and no one else could take his place. Dick's case make 
the point that we have some of our responsibilities because of our 
unique ability to help, others only because of our biological ties. So 
morality is not entirely constructed out of socially created links. 
(Rhodes, 1998, p 24) 
Here Rhodes makes an important point that threatens to undermine the whole 
idea of genetic relatedness giving rise to special obligations. Sure, we can grant 
that Dick has a moral reason to participate in the linkage study: he is the only 
one that can help Martha (or so we can assume). Surely, if you can do someone 
else some good, or help her to avoid or alleviate something bad, this is a 
reason to do so. But then we do not have to refer to genetic relatedness, but 
only to (rather) uncontroversial ethical concerns of a consequentialist kind: to 
do good and to do no harm. Of course, it is the fact that Dick and Martha are 
blood relatives that makes it true that Dick has a unique ability to help Martha. 
Analogously, the fact that I am the only one driving by you when you are 
bleeding to death on the side of the road (to take a well-known example) 
makes me the only person that can help you. But in neither of these cases, one 
need not resort to the incidental facts about blood relatedness or geographical 
location in order to argue in favour of a prima facie obligation (i.e. a moral 
reason) to help, but only to principles like "do good" and/or "do not harm". 
If someone else, who were not a blood relative to Martha was the only one 
34 Rhodes mentions "prima fade duties that must be taken into account in moral deliberation." 
(Rhodes, 1998, p 23) With prima facie duties (or obligations) I take her to mean always existing but 
overridable moral reasons, i.e. what Kagan calls pro tanto reasons (Kagan, 1989, p 16-17). 
35 One can discuss whether this is d isclosing genetic information, but one could easily change the 
case so that it is obviously about disclosure. See 1.4.1 for a short description of Marfan syndrome. 
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who could do her good, this person would have the reason to do so and no 
one else. 
Of course, one could claim that genetic relatedness has some moral 
relevance, since "it would be more terrible to ignore her [Martha's] need than 
it would be to ignore a stranger's." (Rhodes, 1998, p 24) In order to continue 
the analogy, probably many would intuitively think it even worse to drive by 
one's sister bleeding to death on the side of the road than a complete stranger 
(or that the person driving is even more blameworthy or cruel or something 
of the like). However, this intuition probably draws on our normal conception 
of sibling relations as being a strong emotional and social bond. Probably, 
most people picture their own sister, who they love and care about, on the 
side of the road. If you remove that, little of the intuition may remain. Ignoring 
a perfect stranger to whom you are not genetically related seems as bad as 
ignoring some perfect stranger in the side of the road, to whom you happen 
to be genetically related (perhaps without your knowledge). 
In fact, the impression that genetic relatedness is morally relevant may fade 
if one considers that many people you think you are related to biologically in 
certain ways are, in fact, not related to you in this way. In order to take an 
extreme, but nonetheless realistic, example: it might be that a mistake in the 
hospital in which you were born led to a swap of babies, so none of the 
people you think are your blood relatives are actually so. Were one to find this 
out, I suspect that in most cases (at least if no conscious deception has taken 
place from any of the involved parties) this would not lessen the emotional 
bonds and sense of obligation we would feel towards our "social" relatives. 
This only goes to show that we care much more about social bonds than 
genetic ones, something that Rhodes concurs with when discussing what 
reasons we give for having certain responsibilities: "More likely reasons [than 
genetic] would be related to the intimacy and dependency of our previous 
relationship, or the strength of our feelings, or the history of our interactions" 
(Rhodes, 1998, p 21), i.e. social bonds. 
Since the alleged moral relevance of genetic relatedness really rests on 
other concerns, like doing good, avoiding harms, or special obligations due to 
social bonds, there seems to be little intuitive appeal in granting genetic 
relatedness independent moral relevance. Rhodes gives no reasons why we 
should do so. And such a reason seems hard to come up with, since there are 
reasons against granting genes or genetic information in general moral 
relevance in itself (see 1.4.3). Of course, letting a relative know that she has a 
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susceptibility for an avoidable genetic disease can be a good thing to do (at 
least instrumentally), and even an obligation, but to think that this obligation is 
even partly due to us sharing some molecules due to hereditary links seems 
odd, to say the least. Relations may give rise to obligations, but it is hard to see 
why genes in themselves give rise to obliging relations. 
3.2.2 Special obligations due to social bonds 
Do (some of) our social relationships give rise to special obligations towards 
those we have these relationships with? It is a classical idea in moral 
philosophy that they do, and perhaps the most classic work invoked when 
formulating or defending this idea is Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics. Rhodes also 
invokes this work when claiming that some such relationships give rise to 
"prima facie d uties that must be taken into account in moral deliberation." 
(Rhodes, 1998, p 23) More precisely, she demonstrates that Aristotle argues that 
"(1) Family relationships count. (2) Social relationships count. (3) The history 
of a relationship counts. (4) The particulars of the relationship and situation 
count." (Ibid.) 
Because of this, we may have special obligations to disclose genetic 
information to e.g. cousins (Rhodes, 1998, p 24), partners (Ibid.), and siblings 
(Rhodes, 1998, p 25).36 As Rhodes herself notes, there may be all sorts of ways 
to found special obligations to others whom we stand in special relationships 
to (Rhodes, 1998, p 22). One way to found such special obligations is to argue 
that there is something in the nature of the relationship from which the 
obligations follow. I have already claimed that this attempt fails regarding 
genetic relatedness. This leaves us with the present question of whether social 
bonds give rise to special obligations. 
One way to found some special obligations towards some family members 
and relatives is to argue that some such relationships are based on contracts th e 
breaching of which we have strong moral reasons to avoid. One such 
argument could refer to promises (Kagan, 1998, p 140): some family 
relationships seem to presuppose or entail that one promises to take on 
various responsibilities. For instance, in our society, the obligation of fidelity 
36 The context of Rhodes' discussion is really an argument against a right not to know, because of 
a duty to know (see V.3), but she seems to presuppose that the obligation to share genetic 
information with others entails that one knows about it. But a duty to inform someone else is 
something different than a duty to know about this information oneself (which is ind icated by 
Häyry & Takala, 2000, p 111). 
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seems to be presupposed in the relationships to spouses (even if this 
obligation can be waived by explicit agreement). The idea that relationships 
implies promises is most plausible when it comes to (partly) voluntary 
relationships, such as relationships to spouses and one's children, since 
involuntary promises do not seem to be (morally binding) promises at all. 
Thus, this kind of argument cannot found a duty to disclose to most blood 
relatives, like parents, siblings, and cousins, since these relationships are not 
voluntarily chosen. 
Other possible ways of founding special obligations towards others can be 
by referral to considerations of consequence,37 fair play (Kagan, 1998, p 138-
143), or more metaethical considerations, e.g. communitarian one's (see VII.5.3). 
This is not the place to evaluate all these possible foundations to special 
obligations towards relatives and family. For all I know, we might have such 
special obligations. But one has to be very careful in order to determine what 
particular obligations that special obligations towards relatives and family entail. 
The subject of discussion here is the obligation to disclose genetic 
information to relatives. As we have seen, such disclosure may be beneficial to 
the relative(s) in question, but we have also seen that it may not be. Whatever 
the basis one proposes to the special obligations towards relatives and family, 
the idea must be that one may have a duty to act beneficially towar ds them (or to 
act in their interest or something of the kind). This means that whatever special 
obligations towards relatives and family one has, it does not entail a general 
obligation to disclose genetic information, but only an obligation to do so 
when they would be sufficiently benefited by it. To do so when they are 
harmed by it must be contrary to whatever special obligations one has towards 
them. If there are special obligations towards relatives, it cannot very well be 
obligations to harm them. This means that special obligations towards relatives 
cannot be an independent argument fo r the disclosure of genetic information. It 
can only strengthen already existing moral reasons to disclose, or not to disclose, such 
information. 
Furthermore, it has been claimed that special obligations to relatives and family 
is not the kind of obligation that should be regulated: 
37 Anyway, considerations of consequences can argue in favour of recognising some obligations as 
part of some relationships, since relying on people fulfilling their socially assigned obligations can 
be an efficient way of achieving good consequences through coordination and division of labour. 
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If the postulated duties are founded on the Aristotelian remarks 
concerning friendship and family ties, then they need not, and cannot, 
be reasonably enforced by legal regulations or professional codes. It 
would presumably be alien to Aristode's thinking to insist that 
physicians or public health authorities should direct or coerce us into 
doing good to our family members or friends. (Häyry & Takala, 2000, p 
110) 
In the rights-parlance presented earlier (see IV.1.1.1), th is amounts to the claim 
that even if relatives have a moral right to genetic information, and relatives 
have a corresponding moral reason to see to it that they are informed, we 
should not institutionalise this right into regulation, i.e. make it a le gal right. At 
least this is so if the special obligations are founded on "Aristotelian remarks". 
Since I share, what I take to be, Rhodes view that Aristode was not entirely 
clear on how the special obligations due to some relationships should be 
founded or justified (Rhodes, 1998, p 22), I am not sure that this argument is 
valid. I suppose it depends on the kind of justification given for the special 
obligations. For instance, if it is based on some conservative idea of family 
values, Häyry and Takala might be right. But if it is built on some contractual 
idea of promises or fair play, it is not obvious that the obligations should not 
be enforced by regulation (or other institutional pressure). 
However, personally, I have no idea what basis, if any, for the idea that 
social bonds gives rise to special obligations is correct. If one shares Häyry's 
and Takala's interpretation of Aristotle and agrees to the substantial point that 
these kinds of special obligations to relatives and family should not be in any 
way institutionalised, the practical implications of the argument from special 
duties will be of minor consequence. Of course, if one agrees that one has 
special obligations towards family and relatives due to (and then only if there 
are) social bonds between them, it would be more problematic to withhold 
from them information that would be sufficiently beneficial for them to 
receive, than it would be to withhold such information from a complete 
stranger. However, given that one accepts Häyry's and Takala's line of 
reasoning, this in itself does not imply any right or obligation to affect the 
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obliged party. And I personally know of no reason not to accept their line of 
reasoning.38 
4. Conclusions 
This chapter poses the question about the relatives' value of and right to 
genetic information. I h ave focused on blood relatives, since it is information 
about their genetic constitution that can be revealed by testing the index-
person. Regarding the value that may be realized for relatives, they are the same 
as for the index-person, i.e., primarily and basically, well-being and autonomy. 
Regarding the rights of relatives, I first discussed the pre-test question of 
whether or not there should be a requirement that relatives consent to the 
genetic testing of an index-person. I investigated some arguments for and 
against this and argued that confidentiality and respecting autonomy pulls in 
neither direction regarding this question, while privacy and consequentialist 
considerations pull in both. However, I argued that consequentialist 
considerations probably pull more towards not requiring the consent of 
relatives. Together with the problem of determining a limit of predictability 
for tests on relatives, and a morally non-arbitrary one in particular, and 
arguments of comparisons to other medical testing, reasons weigh heavily in 
favour of not requiring the consent of relatives. Or so I have argued. 
I then discussed the question of whether (and, if so, when, how, and by 
whom) relatives should be informed about the result of genetic testing of the 
index-person. As the possible values of receiving such results are the same for 
the relatives in question as for the index-person, I argued that there certainly 
are reasons to inform relatives if, and to the extent that, the same values would 
be realized for them as for the index-person. 
However, since it may be very hard to know what benefits that would in 
fact be realized by disclosure and that these benefits would sufficiently 
outweigh the potential harms, one should be very careful to infer an 
obligation to disclose, even if there can be such an obligation. This 
corroborates the findings in the previous chapter regarding an alleged duty to 
know. However, it leaves us with the practical problem of how to decide when to 
disclose the information in question. I argued that in rare cases, the possible 
benefits are so obvious that relatives' consent to being informed can be 
38 Evidently, this uncertainty is a result of my uncertainty of whether there are special obligations 
due to special relationships and what the basis of such obligations is. 
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presumed: for instance when the disease is very serious and very likely given 
genetic disorder, and there is efficient and not too burdensome preventive 
measures to take. However, even then, it is not obvious that the confidentiality 
of the index-person should be breached. I presented several models on how 
to solve this practical problem, and concluded that they all have downsides. 
Nonetheless, I indicated that the problem of deterrence from testing due to 
threat of redisclosure should not be taken lightly, no least since such threats 
may be counterproductive from the point of view of the relatives. However, I 
indicated that proper counselling can solve some of the practical problems, 
and that persuasion may be preferable to binding contracts and breaches of 
confidentiality. 
I then argued that these conclusions are not affected in any radical way by 
ideas of special obligations due to special relations. The idea of special 
obligations due to genetic bonds was argued to be implausible. The idea of 
special obligations due to social bonds was not questioned, but was found to 
be, so to speak, symmetrical with the obligations to promote well-being and 
autonomy already discussed. That is, such alleged obligations cannot be used 
to argue in favour of any separate obligations to reveal genetic information, but 
only to strengthen reasons to benefit and avoid harm already present. 
So, should we be our brother's keepers? We certainly should, but not by 
revealing genetic information about them whenever we can and not 
necessarily because they are our brothers. 
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Chapter VII 
Third Parties' Right to Genetic 
Information: Insurance Companies 
1. Introduction1 
Besides individual people and their close ones, the possibility to predict the 
onset of disease and premature death (or at least to determine the risk thereof) 
through presymptomatic genetic testing is of interest also to other parties. 
Employers, business associates and insurance companies have obvious 
economic reasons for knowing about an individual's susceptibility to disease; 
there is a risk of economic loss if you establish a long time contract with or 
hire someone who probably will contract a disease. Researchers are interested 
in mapping the frequencies of various genetic deviations in order to establish 
family p atterns and develop cures. Health institutions have similar motivations, 
and also an interest of using genetic information to foresee coming 
expenditures, an interest they share with society at large. And so on. 
In this chapter, I will address the right to genetic information with regard to 
these kinds of parties.2 However, taken literary, this task would be enormous, 
because of the many parties involved. Therefore I will concentrate the main 
part of the investigation to insurance companies: to what extent, if any, should 
insurance companies have access to genetic information? One of many reasons 
to chose this particular focus is that the question of insurance companies 
access to genetic information is the most thoroughly discussed question of 
third parties' right to genetic information. Because of this, many issues of 
relevance to other third parties have been dealt with in this context. Another 
reason is that many ideas of autonomy, privacy and justice will be brought to a 
head in this context, which will be clear in the following discussion. Despite 
the strong focus on insurance companies, I will then use the results of that 
1 Sections 1-5 of this chapter draw heavily on two previous publications: Radetzki, Radetzki and 
Juth, 2003, chapter 7, and Juth, 2003. 
2 I will ignore the value-question, since the value for these parties obviously coincide with the 
interest they have in genetic information. So, for instance, the value for insurance companies is 
that genetic information allows them to protect themselves from economic risks. 
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discussion as a basis for some remarks regarding a couple of other third 
parties' right to genetic information (section VII.6). 
Another limitation of the discussion in this chapter is that I will mainly be 
concerned with insurance companies' legal righ t to genetic information (see 
IV.1.1.2). That is; should insurance companies have access to genetic 
information or should this be regulated in any way? Because of this limitation, 
I will not deal with the question of any putative moral duty to reveal such 
information to insurance companies. The reason for this limitation is that the 
question of insurance companies right to genetic information has, almost 
without exception, been discussed as a question of regulation. The practical 
importance of settling this issue also makes the discussion more interesting. 
The question of insurance companies access to genetic information can be 
subdivided into two questions, (i) Sho uld insurance companies be allowed to 
demand that people applying for insurance are to be tested before the 
establishment of the insurance contract? (ii) Should insurance companies have 
the right to information from tests already performed?3 If the answer to the 
first question is a ffirmative, it will obv iously be so for the other as well. There 
is no point in insurance companies asking for new tests if they are not granted 
access to the information from them. The reverse is, however, a possible and 
also defended position: insurance companies should be allowed to ask for the 
results from already performed tests, but not to demand new ones.4 
The reason to emphasise the distinction between these two kinds of 
regulation issues is that they correspond to two types of regulation of 
insurance companies' access to genetic information that has played a central 
role both in debate and actual policy making. A further reason for upholding 
this distinction is that there are important differences between the two forms 
of regulation with regard to autonomy, privacy, and economic consequences, 
as will be evident in the following. 
The position that insurance companies should be allowed to ask for the 
results of tests already performed as well as d emand that the individual must 
3 A distinction between access to and use of genetic information has been made (Mayer et al, 
1999, p 42). In this discussion the distinction will be ignored. It is t aken for granted that the right 
to access to genetic information implies a right to use that information to differentiate premiums. 
4 For instance Sandberg, 1995, has defended this position, at least if t he insured amount is above a 
certain specified amount. Below this amount they should not have access to already made tests 
either. 
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undergo testing in order to be insured will in the following be called absence of 
regulation. The middle position is that insurance companies should be allowed 
to ask for the results from tests already performed, but not to demand new 
ones. This position will be called partial re gulation. The position that insurance 
companies should not be granted access to genetic information whatsoever (at 
least not from genetic testing) will be called total reg ulation. E ach of these ideal-
types of regulation can, of course, vary in different dimensions and degrees. In 
Sweden, for instance, access to results from tests already performed is 
permitted only when the insured amount exceeds a pre-specified amount of 
what is currently about 50.000€ (see VII.1.1). 
A few more preliminary remarks are required. Regulation should be 
understood broadly, so that it not only includes laws, but also moratoriums 
and other kinds of binding agreements between insurance companies and the 
state (or other relevant regulating societal institutions). Some countries in 
Europe (e.g. Sweden and France) have, at least temporarily, chosen the last 
mentioned method of regulating insurance companies access to genetic 
information. Other countries (e.g. Denmark and Belgium) have chosen to 
regulate insurance companies access to genetic information by law (Radetzki, 
Radetzki and Juth, 2003, p 30-37).5 
The relevant type of insurance in this context is personal insurance, that is, 
insurance against loss of income or for health care in case of disease (health 
insurance), insurance to compensate for loss of income in case of the 
premature death of family providers (life insurance) and insurance to secure 
income in old age (pension insurance). The focus will be on health insurance 
and life insurance. This focus is chosen due to the conflict of interest 
between the insurance seeker and the insurance company when it comes to 
these forms of insurance. This conflict of interest arises when the insurance 
seeker is a genetic high-risk person,6 since she then has an interest of not 
disclosing the information, while the insurance companies have an interest of 
disclosure. Therefore, this situation will give rise to ethical dilemmas: whose 
interest should yield? This is not the case with pension policies, since both the 
genetic high-risk person and the insurance companies have an interest in 
disclosure of genetic information in that case. The reason to focus the 
5 In the case of Sweden, legislation that establishes the former agreement as a law is pending. 
6 A genetic high-risk person, or a high-risk, is a person who has a higher probability of having a 
certain genetic disease than the population at large. 
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attention to genetic high-risk rather than low-risk persons are that they stand to 
lose the most from insurance companies' access to genetic information. 
Sometimes life and health insurance will be discussed as a lump, and 
sometimes it will be necessary to emphasise the difference between them. 
We have already seen that the values that genetic tests can realize give rise to 
various interpersonal conflicts of interest (see e.g. chapter VI). This will 
become even more evident in the following. How these conflicts should be 
solved is a question of justice (who should, under what circumstances, receive 
which benefits and burdens). Therefore considerations of justice will be the 
most important ethical consideration of this chapter. However, there are also 
other ethical concerns that arise in this context. Therefore, a classification of 
different ethical considerations is necessary. The most recurring and important 
ethical reasons or arguments for and against insurance companies access to 
genetic information will be placed in one of the following categories: (i) 
arguments of consequences in terms of well-being; (ii) arguments of 
autonomy; (iii) arguments of privacy; and (iv) arguments of justice. These 
arguments will be discussed in the mentioned order. 
Already at this point, it is important to emphasise that different ethical 
considerations can support different conclusions. Considerations of privacy, 
seems to speak straightforwardly in favour of total regulation (see section 
VII.4), while some considerations of consequence seems to speak in favour of 
partial or even absence of regulation (see section VH2). It might seem, 
therefore, that in order to be able to answer the question of what sort of 
regulation there should be, one has to take a stand on the question of the 
relative weight of these different ethical considerations. Appearance is 
deceptive, however. In the following, I will argue that several plausible ethical 
theories, in spite of their theoretical differences, seem to point in the same 
direction when it comes to the more general conclusions. 
Furthermore, it is hardly possible to defend a full-blown ethical theory in 
this limited context. That would require something much more than this 
inquiry can contain. Nevertheless, I hope to show that we can learn something 
about ethical theory in general by applying different ethical theories to more 
concrete questions such as this one. For instance, I will argue that this 
particular discussion shows that questions of privacy are secondary to other 
ethical concerns, and that some ideas of justice are dubious (Walzer's) or 
altogether unacceptable (Nozick's). Apart from this, no stance will be taken on 
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questions about the relative weight of consequences of well-being versus 
justice, or justice versus autonomy, or consequences of well-being versus 
autonomy. Each of these ethical considerations is supposed to carry some 
moral weight. 
7. 1 Empirical suppositions 
As will be seen below, the issue of insurance companies' and other third 
parties' access to genetic information puts the ethics of genetic testing in an 
even more complicated context. To make the discussion more manageable, it 
is therefore expedient to assume some fairly plausible empirical hypotheses as 
valid. In the following, I will make two such assumptions. The first is that the 
use of presymptomatic genetic testing will become more widespread, and that 
more diseases will be detectable before onset through genetic testing. As we 
have seen, the extent to which meaningful presymptomatic genetic testing will 
be developed for more diseases is controversial (1.4.2). Most of the people 
initiated seem to hold that this will happen to some extent, however. This 
supposition is, then, not very controversial. 
The second assumption is that the systems of publicly funded social 
insurance in the welfare states around the North Atlantic are, since the 1990's, 
the subject of a partial and ongoing dismantling. In the following discussion, I 
will follow the general debate and concentrate on these countries (members 
of the EU) and the USA. The conclusions, however, will be valid for any 
developed country. Publicly funded social insurance, built up during the first 
half of the 20th century, is collective and mandatory, and one important goal 
for its establishment has been to insure against the cost of treatment in the 
event of illness, loss of income due to illness, premature death, or during old 
age. Some main reasons for the dismantling of these systems are the fast 
expansion of public financial obligations and a d esire to make the provision of 
the insurance services more economically efficient. The reforms of the 1990s 
have comprised (a) partial individualization and commercialisation of public 
arrangements; (b) lesser generosity towards those publicly insured; and (c) 
active encouragement to seek private supplements to the remaining public 
arrangements. The supply of personal insurance by private insurance 
companies operating in competitive markets has been strongly stimulated by 
these reforms (Radetzki, Radetzki and Juth, 2003, p 2). Unlike collectively 
financed social insurance, private insurance companies have a d esire, as far as 
possible, to adjust the premiums charged to their customers to the risk 
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represented by each individual engagement. That is why they are interested in 
genetic information, just as they seek and obtain other informadon of 
relevance for individual risk assessment. 
Because of ethical considerations, use of and access to the results of 
genetic testing, and genetic information in general, has been regulated in 
various ways in the countries mentioned above. In some cases, the choice has 
been something close to total regulation (Norway and some states in USA). 
Many European countries have chosen a middle position between total and 
partial regulation, where insurers are allowed to ask for the results of tests 
already performed when the insurance fall out above a certain specified 
amount (in Sweden about 50.000C), but never to demand new tests to be 
performed. The question is then, if these forms of regulation are defensible 
from an ethical point of view, or if there are good reasons to abandon or 
strengthen them. In other words, which forms of regulation are defensible 
under which circumstances? 
1.3 Things to come 
The following discussion will unfortunately not lead to any neat and 
straightforward solutions. Suggestions will be given, but no definite answers. 
One important conclusion is that the questions must be answered against the 
background of how the basic institutions of society are constructed more 
generally. Another important conclusion is that emergence and continued 
evolvement of genetic testing provides a reason for society to reverse the 
trend of dismantling collective social insurance systems. This is not, of course, 
a direct answer to the question of how insurance companies' access to genetic 
information should be regulated. However, it is an interesting result in its own 
right that suggests that the question of regulation may be of secondary 
importance, provided that the basic institutions of society are arranged in a 
certain way. However, regardless of this, ethical arguments in conjunction with 
reasonable empirical hypotheses seem to argue against both complete absence 
of regulation as well as against total regulation. The result then seems to be that 
the solution to the problems that arise as a result of the growing importance of 
private insurance, in conjunction with the increasing possibility of 
determining risk on the basis of genetic information, is a resurrection of 
collective financed insurance combined with some sort of partial regulation. 
This is not to categorically to say that such a resurrection should take place. 
There may well be other important reasons to not do so, e.g. reasons of 
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economic efficiency that in the end can affect people's welfare considerably. 
But the developments in genetics present additional arguments for a welfare 
state in the classical sense of the word. After the discussion of insurance 
companies, I will us e the findings of that discussion in order to say something 
very brief about two other parties' (alleged) right to genetic information: 
employers and researchers. 
2. Consequentialism 
Consequentialism is the position that the moral status of actions is determined 
solely by the value of their consequences compared to available alternatives 
(n.4.2). I will here focus exclusively on the value of subjective well-being 
(HA 1.4) or as I will sometimes call it below, welfare. Consequentialist 
considerations could, of course, also be applied to societal institutions and 
laws, that is, o ne can hold that a reason to implement certain institutions and 
laws is that such an implementation is conducive to general well-being. As 
already stated, I will assume that consequentialist considerations carry some 
moral weight, that is, the consequences in terms of the well-being of people 
have some relevance for evaluating whether or not a c ertain regulation should 
be implemented. 
In this context, a more disturbing problem with consequentialism is 
nevertheless actualised: the problem of knowing what consequences a c ertain 
regulation will have . I will sidestep rather than tackle this obvious problem by 
concentrating on the mostly discussed consequences of well-being of 
different forms of regulation, which almost exclusively concern negative 
consequences. These consequences are so salient that a consequentialist cannot 
ignore them. Moreover, the fact that we cannot say everything should not 
prevent us from saying something, especially given the obvious importance to 
people's well-being that the discussed consequences could have.7 
2.1 Negative consequences of absence of regulation: uninsured population 
An obvious negative consequence in terms of welfare that probably will result 
from absence of regulation is that people with high enough risk of contracting 
genetic disease will become uninsurable. Presymptomatic genetic testing 
7 Furthermore, the problem of having enough knowledge to make the ethical theory action-
guiding is not a unique one for consequentialism (see VII.3.2 and VII.5.2.2). See Gren, 2004, p 137-
144, for a fu ller argument of this regarding several ethical theories. 
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makes it possible to differentiate individuals at high risk of developing 
conditions that will re sult in illness or death. Insurance companies will want to 
charge higher premiums from these people in order to compensate for the 
higher risk of paying the compensation, or maybe deny them insurance 
altogether if the risk is considered too great. Whether these people are denied 
insurance altogether or just charged very high premiums will in many cases 
amount to the same result (since many people cannot afford the high 
premiums): an uninsured high-risk population. 
This need not be a great problem if private insurance is not vital for 
people's welfare (e.g. their access to health care, or their possibility to 
guarantee provision for their children in case of death). However, if the above 
described dismantling of the social insurance systems keeps going, private 
insurance will eventually become vital to most people's welfare. This, I have 
claimed, is what is in fact happening. A way to avoid the problem of an 
uninsured high-risk population, then, is to regulate insurance companies' 
access to genetic information, so that it cannot be used to identify the high-risk 
population. Total regulation thus may look as a swift solution to the problem 
at hand. As always, however, things are more complicated. 
2.2 Negative consequences of total regulation: adverse selection 
The problem of adverse selection is one of the most discussed in relation to 
the question of insurance companies' access to genetic information. It is often 
considered to be the strongest argument in favour of insurance companies' 
right to genetic information and, thereby, against total regulation (Sandberg, 
1995, p 1555). To explain what the argument of adverse selection amounts to, 
we have to move further into the issue of what kind of entity insurance is. 
A private insurance is a contract between an insurer and an insured, which 
says that the insurer in exchange for a premium from the insured will pay a 
benefit or compensation to the insured given the occurrence of a specified 
event that is more or less probable. The events relevant in this context are, 
then, health problems or premature death. The size of the premium is 
calculated on the basis of a r isk assessment regarding the occurrence of this 
event and the size of the compensation. Higher risks and compensations mean 
higher premiums, since the insurance would otherwise be a b ad deal for the 
insurer. Even given a considerable size of the compensation, if the risk is low, 
the premiums might still not be very high. However, if the risk is higher, the 
insurer needs to raise the premiums proportionally. And at some magnitude of 
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elevated risk, i t becomes a bad deal altogether to grant insurance at all. T o be 
able to set the size of the premium, or to decide whether or not to establish a 
contract at all, i t is therefore essential for the insurer to estimate the probability 
of the event; that is, how great the risk is that the insurer will in fact have to 
pay the compensadon. 
This risk assessment is made on the basis of particular information about 
the applicant and general statistical information about the health-significance of 
various factors. In the standard case of health and life insurance the assessment 
is d one on the basis of the applicant's age, health status and other information 
considered material. Information is material "if it would influence the judgement of a 
prudent insurer in fixing the premium; or in determining whether she/ he mil take the risk." 
(Chadwick & Ngwena, 1995, p 120) This may include information about the 
applicant's sex, choice of life style (e.g. s moking or not smoking) etc. Clearly, 
genetic information of the type produced by presymptomatic tests for 
Huntington's disease or cancer is material in this sense and is also considered 
so by insurance companies. 
The international standard is a legal obligation of the applicant to reveal 
material information to the insurer, if the applicant knows about it.8 Typically, 
this is implemented through a right of insurers to effect a reduction or 
elimination of compensation in the event of incomplete or erroneous 
information. However, it is in the interest of the insured to be able to 
withhold this kind of information from the insurer without the threat of 
sanctions. If an individual knows about her genetic predisposition for disease 
and is allowed to withhold this information (as w ould be the case if total 
regulation was to be implemented), it is possible for her to purchase insurance 
with a very high benefit without the premium reflecting her inflated chance 
of receiving the compensation. There is no reason in general to believe that 
people with genetic predispositions to disease are more altruistically inclined 
than others. Should this be an open course of action we can therefore assume 
that many of those who suspect themselves to be so disposed would take tests 
and, in the case of a positive result, buy insurances because they know that the 
benefit (probably) will befall them. 
Since the insurance company cannot raise the premium especially for this 
group (they cannot be identified), the premium must be raised for everyone in 
8 Ibid. This is sometimes called the applicants informational duty, and is r egulated through law in 
Sweden (Försäkringsavtalslagen 1927:77). 
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order to cover for the increased expenses for these benefits. But generally 
raised premiums will le ad to a reduction of customers, especially among those 
who know themselves to be low-risk. 
The fear of the insurance companies is, then, that the increased 
opportunities of individuals to attain knowledge about their genetic risks 
without a corresponding legal duty to reveal this knowledge will lead to adverse 
selection, i.e. that high-risk people become more likely to seek insurance, while 
low-risk people become less so inclined. In a worst case scenario from the 
insurance companies' point of view, this process may eventually make it 
altogether unprofitable to run insurance business in the areas of health and 
life. This, then, is why insurance companies argue that there should be a duty 
to reveal this kind of informadon. 
It is important to keep in mind that the obligation is to reveal the 
information if had by the applicant, since only this can give rise to adverse 
selection. The problem then arises when there is asymmetric infor mation, that is, 
when one part has information relevant to the value of a transaction that the 
other part is lacking. 
How likely is this scenario? What reasons are there to expect that the absence 
of a right to genetic information will lead to an adverse selection so severe that 
it will threaten the existence of personal private insurance? 
The answer to this question is dependent on at least three other factors, 
assuming that total regulation is implemented: (i) t he extent to which persons 
at high risk of genetic disease will use information about this to purchase 
insurances with high benefits without revealing the risk (that is, if the 
phenomenon of adverse selection really is a phenomenon); (ii) how many of 
this sort of persons there are, and (iii) to what extent raised premiums for 
other insurance customers will make them take their business elsewhere or 
altogether refrain from insurance. Let us discuss these factors one at the time. 
As concerns the first factor, I have already remarked that there are no 
reasons in general to think that people who know themselves to be at high risk 
of developing some genetic disease would be reluctant to engage in profitable 
transactions. General remarks of this kind do not settle the matter, however. 
The question is an empirical one and must therefore be settled by empirical 
means. Unfortunately, data about the phenomenon of adverse selection are 
difficult to interpret and, in the case of genetic diseases, scarce. 
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If we allow generaÜ2ation from other diseases than genetic ones, perhaps 
some weaker conclusions can be supported. There seems to be certain 
evidence indicating that HIV has led to adverse selection (Oppenheimer & 
Padgug, 1991). However, this discounts for the problems of providing any 
evidence at all for the putative fact of adverse selection (Brown, 1992). 
Nevertheless, there are known cases of persons positively tested for 
Huntington's disease who have applied for life insurance with very high 
benefits, and this may be taken as being proof enough (Geller et al, 1996, p 82). 
However, research on females tested positive for BRCA1 shows very weak 
support for a correlation between positive tests and number of life insurance 
policies.9 To conclude, empirical evidence seems inconclusive. 
As concerns the second factor, it is dependent on the actual scope of 
presymptomatic genetic testing: how many conditions can be tested for, how 
common are they and how many people potentially at risk of such conditions 
will choose to test themselves? These matters are obviously empirical too. It 
depends partly on which of the two scenarios adumbrated in 1.4.2 are realized: 
the cautious or the bold. If the bold scenario is realized, there will be genetic 
testing for more disorders, including reliable and informative testing for 
multifactorial diseases. Then, naturally, there will b e many more persons aware 
of their genetic susceptibility for diseases than today and, consequently, the 
problem of adverse selection will be much more accentuated. However, even 
if the cautious scenario turns out to be the real one, the economic viability of 
insurance business can be threatened, given total regulation.10 It is enough that 
sufficiently many high-risk persons are tested.11 And I have made the, not too 
controversial, empirical supposition that more genetic high-risk people than 
today will be identified. 
As concerns the third factor, and I am afraid I am starting to be repetitive, 
the matter is again empirical and far from settled. Whether or not low risk 
people will take their business elsewhere or not engage in them at all will 
9 Smith et al, 1999. They conclude that they "view with some scepticism the insurance industry's 
contention that denial of access to genetic test results... will th reaten the industry's economic 
viability" (p 68). However, the authors themselves have reservations concerning this conclusion, 
e.g.: "the reason we observe little evidence of adverse selection could be because our follow-up 
period of four months is too short" (p 68). 
10 For more specific evidence to this e ffect, see Radetzki, Radetzki and Juth, 2003, p 76-77. 
11 Approximately 3% identified high-risk persons of the total population seem to be enough, at 
least if the argumentation below about offshore companies is c orrect (Ibid). 
388 
depend on several, to some degree, correlated variables. These include, for 
instance, the size of the premium raise (which is dependent on the already 
mentioned factors), the access of lower cost premiums (which is dependent 
on the presence or absence of monopolies and cartels, among other things) 
and to what extent public insurance is available. 
There are, however, powers at work that give us good reasons to believe 
that adverse selection can become a problem in the long run.12 The economic 
integration of the world has increased strongly during the post-war era, and the 
pace at which this is happening seems to be increasing. This is obvious if one 
examines the increasing flow of goods, capital and informadon across national 
borders, and the growing strength and significance of multinational 
corporations. Single nations' attempts to reverse this trend through legislation 
have often been futile. This also means existing and increasing possibilities to 
obtain private insurance in another country than your own. 
It is very likely that some countries will not regulate insurance companies' 
access to and use of genetic information. This paves the way for insurance 
companies to establish themselves in these countries offshore. F rom this base of 
operation they may offer lower premiums to genetic low-risk individuals all 
over the world. Since use of genetic information to differentiate premiums is 
an efficient tool in market competition, establishment offshore is likely to take 
place for insurance companies in countries implementing total regulation. 
The possibility of buying insurance offshore to a lower premium if you 
are an identified low-risk person, will force domestic insurance companies to 
raise premiums to cover increased expenditures that will result from a smaller 
portion of low-risk persons. This will give people more motivation to find out 
if they are low-risk, and use that information to buy cheaper insurance 
offshore, which will further raise the domestic premiums etc. This reasoning 
indicates a dynamic process that constantly makes the situation worse for 
insurance companies that are under total regulation. The prospect of getting 
run out of business suddenly seems more probable. Even on relatively 
cautious premises regarding the actual use of presymptomatic genetic testing 
and willingness to buy insurance offshore, personal insurance will be made 
unprofitable in countries with total regulation. 
12 The following is a s ummary of the argumentation in Radetzki, Radetzki and Juth, 2003, chapter 
5. 
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There are some important reasons to believe, then, that adverse selection can 
become a serious problem for insurance companies in countries where total 
regulation is implemented. But, one may ask, w hy bother? Let them scorch 
under the regulation fire. There are too important values, such as privacy, at 
stake to give in to the business interest of insurance companies, one reaction 
to this scenario may be. 
Unfortunately, there are more interests at stake than the profit of a few 
insurance companies. Insurance companies contribute to the economy of the 
society and, therefore, indirectly to the welfare of the society. Moreover, and 
more important, insurance is a service in demand, and all those demanding it 
will be without matching supply if insurance companies are run out of 
business. This may not be a serious problem if the demand is a d emand for a 
luxury good one can do well without. The problem here is that the scenario 
just adumbrated can be expected to be combined with a dismantling of the 
social insurance system. If so, these two processes taken together will leave the 
same people uninsured as i n the scenario of absence of regulation. A dilemma 
is r ising to the surface. 
The dilemma is that regardless of whether insurance companies are 
allowed or forbidden to use genetic information the result may be an 
uninsured high-risk population — a "genetic proletariat" (Billings et al, 1992). In 
the case of absence of regulation, it is because of insurance companies' 
possibility to differentiate premiums to the detriment of genetic high-risk 
persons. In the case of prohibition, it is because insurance companies are 
unable to differentiate premiums, which can make it bad business. This 
dilemma has been called "the Genetic Catch-22" and is concisely summarized 
with these words: "If insurers act, or are forced to act, generously by not using 
genetic testing, then they produce disastrous consequences; if they act selfishly 
and exclude clients on the basis of testing, then again, they produce disastrous 
consequences." (Hedgecoe, 1996, p 76-77) 
A swift way out of this dilemma is to implement partial regulation, that is, 
to allow insurance companies to ask f or the results of already made tests, but 
not to demand new ones. That would limit the uninsured population to those 
who have already taken genetic tests that show increased risk of disease. In 
order to avoid that fate, individuals only need to abstain from taking such tests. 
And it would prevent adverse selection, since it would make it illegal for the 
insurance seeker to withhold relevant genetic information if the insurance 
company asks for it (failure to disclose such information would make the 
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contract invalid and leave the insurance company without obligation to pay its 
due) and thus undermine the problem of asymmetric information necessary 
for adverse selection. 
2.3 Negative consequences ofpartial regulation: deterrence 
Partial regulation, alas, p robably will have adverse consequences too, namely 
for those with reason to perform genetic testing but who have not done so 
yet. We have already discussed the many reasons there can be to go through 
genetic testing (chapter II). In some cases, it may make the difference between 
life a nd death for the individual who take the test. 
However, some may prefer to remain ignorant concerning their genetic 
constitution, even if such knowledge is of vital importance to their health and 
life, due to the possibility of being denied insurance (or forced to pay 
premiums one cannot afford) if the test reveals risk for disease. This 
deterrence to testing is a negative consequence, of course, for those 
individuals who would benefit from genetic testing themselves in terms of 
well-being and/or autonomy (II.2.4). 
What is the extent of this problem of deterrence? This, obviously, is an 
empirical matter. No systematic scientific investigations have been made. Some 
anecdotal evidence for the occurrence of the phenomenon seems to be at 
hand, however. A reasonable conjecture is that the severity of the deterrence 
problem is dependent on the extent and generosity of public social insurance 
systems. The more generous the public system is, the less people will have to 
rely on private insurance to guard against misfortunes. In such a society, private 
personal insurances will be an expendable form of luxury commodity, with 
limited impact on general welfare. But where social insurance systems are not 
so generous (as in the USA), and where access to private insurance is a 
necessary means for access to other vital goods, such as health care, reluctance 
to gather genetic information that can leave you uninsured is probably greater. 
In other words, the more important private insurance is to the well-being of 
people, the greater the problem of deterrence will be. And how important 
private insurance is to people's well-being is heavily dependent upon the 
presence of social insurance systems.13 
13 Not even generous social insurance systems, such as the Swedish, seems to avoid the deterrence 
problem altogether, however. So the problem is n ot to be underestimated. Genetic counsellors 
have claimed that genetic testing has been aborted on several occasions, because of fears 
concerning lack of private personal insurance (personal information from Christian Munthe who 
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To avoid the problem of deterrence, then, two different institutional 
arrangements are possible: to implement (or resurrect or sustain) generous 
social insurance systems or to implement total regulation, that is, ban the access 
to genetic information altogether. The first possibility runs counter to what 
seems to be the trend in western countries (the second empirical supposition, 
see VII.1.1). That will lead to increasing problems with the second solution: the 
more people that depend upon private insurance, the more acute the problem 
of adverse selection will be if total regulation is applied. But still, a 
combination of dismantling collective social insurance systems and stern 
regulation is the policy many of these countries have chosen. We have seen 
the problems in terms of well-being this may lead to. 
It might be argued that the compromise between partial and total regulation 
chosen by countries like Sweden and the Netherlands might solve the 
problem of adverse selection and deterrence simultaneously. As I have already 
mentioned (see 1.1), this system allows a person to keep genetic information to 
herself if the insurance benefit is below a pre-specified amount and insurance 
companies are never allowed to demand new tests. The problem is that this 
solution also creates a dilemma. The higher the pre-specified amount, the less 
the problem of deterrence, but the greater the problem of adverse selection. 
The lower the pre-specified amount, the less the problem of adverse selection, 
but the greater the problem of deterrence. If the pre-specified amount is not 
high enough, the compensation may not be high enough to cover the costs of 
health care and the loss of income of the sick person. All this, again, given the 
ongoing dismantling of collective insurance. To make this solution into a 
sustainable policy in the light of the dismantling of collective social security 
systems is therefore trickier than might be thought at Erst glance. 
2.4 Consequentialist arguments: Summary 
To summarize: there are reasons to believe that all types of regulation will lead 
to severe adverse consequences for high-risk persons. The form of regulation 
that seems to avoid the problem of an uninsured high-risk population more 
than any alternative regulation is partial regulation (that both avoids adverse 
selection and allows non-tested high-risk persons to buy insurance at a normal 
is cu rrently investigating the matter). In the USA there are even stronger evidence that fears for 
lack of insurance protection makes people reluctant to take genetic testing, which supports the 
argumentation above ("Bush Administration Backs Genetic Discrimination Ban". PM from US 
government administration 2002-02-13). 
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premium). However, partial regulation may lead to deterrence to perform 
genetic testing, which can be a great loss. Moreover, it can still lead to certain 
people being unable to insure themselves. A public social security system that 
is generous enough to make access to private insurance superfluous to basic 
welfare will, h owever, lessen these negative consequences of partial regulation. 
3. Autonomy 
Autonomy has already been thoroughly discussed in this book. A conception 
of autonomy was developed that can be used to formulate various conflicting 
ideals of autonomy, ascribing differing normative significance to facts of 
autonomy (e.g. if it is a restriction to what others may do to you, a va lue to be 
promoted or a duty to fulfil), d ifferent views on how "basic" it is (whether it 
is an intrinsic value of some sort - a positive to promote or a negative to 
respect - or an instrumental value), why it is a value, and so on (see chapter III). 
In the context of insurance companies' access to and value of genetic 
information, there is one recurring opinion of autonomy that is so widespread 
that it demands attention. It is the following: considerations of autonomy 
provides a s trong argument for the right to remain ignorant about ones genetic 
constitution, and this provides a strong case against insurance companies 
demanding genetic testing on previously untested persons as a term of insurance 
(Chadwick, 1997, p 17 ff; McGleenan, 1997, p 47; Sandberg, 1995, p 1555; Takala, 
2000, p 97). That is, autonomy at least speaks against absence of regulation. 
In chapter IV and V, we saw that autonomy has been referred to in order to 
defend both the right to know and the right not to know about ones genetic 
constitution (Husted, 1997, p 63), as well as the duty to know about it (Rhodes, 
1998, p 18). Since we limit ourselves to the question about regulation of 
insurance companies in this context, there is no need to repeat this discussion. 
Instead, I will fo cus upon two important ideals of autonomy that seem to lurk 
in the background of many arguments in this particular context. On this basis I 
will investigate to what extent they really support the alleged conclusion that 
autonomy provides a reason against absence of regulation (and thus indirectly 
supports partial regulation). 
3.1 Mill's ideal of autonomy 
Mill's famous ideal is that the autonomy of the individual should be respected, 
that is, she should not be prevented from acting according to her decisions 
and decide according to her wishes, at least as long as the actions do not harm 
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anyone else (Mill, 1859, p 68). For our autonomy to be violated according to 
this ideal someone thus actively has to prevent us from making the decisions 
we want or from acting as we have decided. Would a demand for genetic 
testing from insurance companies constitute such a violation? 
The following example suggests that it would not. Jack makes a voluntary 
decision to obtain a life insurance. This insurance is sold on a market in which 
every insurance company demand genetic testing from the applicant as a 
condition for establishing such an insurance contract. Jack, however, does not 
want to know about his genetic constitution. He has Huntington's disease in 
his family, and he believes for good reasons that if he was to learn that he is a 
carrier of that hereditary disease, he would not be able to complete the great 
novel he is writing (one of his most important projects), due to the emotional 
paralysis that this knowledge would bring on him. Does this mean that the 
insurance companies are violating Jack's autonomy in a Millian sense? 
The argumentation that suggests this not to be the case goes something like 
this. The right to have your decisions respected does not imply a right to get 
whatever you want on your own terms. The important point, according to this 
ideal of autonomy, is that you decide for yourself given the options you have. 
In the situation just mentioned, Jack can independently decide either t o obtain a 
life insurance, or to remain ignorant about his genetic constitution. Granted, he 
cannot decide to satisfy both these wishes. That, however, does not imply that 
the insurance companies violate his autonomy, according to this ideal. Jack is 
violated no more than Jill is violated, when she is prevented from getting all 
fishing tackle she wants, having already spent her money on those rare Beatles-
records she also wants. Considering market prices, Jill cannot get all she wants; 
yet this does not mean that the salesmen of the city have violated her 
autonomy. 
In analogy with Jill, Ja ck's autonomy is neither violated as a result of the 
obstacles he is subject to. To buy insurance is an economic transaction, where 
the buyer chooses to accept or reject the terms of the seller (Borna and Avila, 
1999, p 357). As long as these choices are respected, there is no violation of 
autonomy, according to Mill. It would be strange to claim that insurance 
companies actively prevent Jack from deciding what he wants and to do what 
he decides, just by providing terms Jack does not accept. Even if Jack then 
chooses not to obtain something he would have obtained if the terms had 
been more beneficial (that is, if insurance companies had not demanded 
genetic testing), we cannot say that insurance companies thereby actively harms 
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Jack (which could have motivated regulating insurance companies terms, 
according to Mill). Because of this, Mill's famous ideal of autonomy cannot be 
used as an argument against absence of regulation.14 
3.2 The ideal of self-realisation 
Mill's ideal of autonomy is not so much a question about degrees. Our 
autonomy is violated when someone actively prevents us from acting on our 
own decisions, although no harm to others results from us doing so. If we are 
not so prevented, our autonomy is respected. The purpose of this ideal is to 
stake out the limits of a private sphere, within which no one may interfere, 
which ideally gives us the possibility to realize our plans. 
However, this may seem insufficient. Most people are interested in real, 
and not just formal, opportunities to realize (from their point of view) 
important plans and wishes. For that to be true at least some people may need 
more than non-interference; they may need active help from someone else. If 
autonomy is of value, it therefore seems as though people, in such situations, 
have at least a prima facie claim on others to receive such help (if they so 
wish). This ideal of autonomy can of course come in many variations 
(depending on the status and weight assigned to the value of autonomy), but 
the basic idea is easy enough to state: to the extent the individual is leading her 
life according to her basic ideals and plans (or projects or goals), she is 
autonomous. In other words: to be autonomous is to live the life according to 
one's own standards. Therefore, we all have reasons, not only to abstain from 
"active" infringements of people's autonomy, but to actively promote the 
autonomy of people as well. That is, we have moral reasons to take active 
measures to ensure that people have real opportunities to live their lives 
according to their own standards (at least as long as living such a l ife does not 
prevent anyone else from doing the same). This amounts to the ideal of self-
realization, presented earlier (HL3.1.1). This ideal of course says something 
more than that a persons decisions should be respected (at least if they really 
track her wants and the realization does not actively harm anyone else) — it says 
that it is of value to be autonomous and that this value should be promoted by 
others than the individual himself (of course, only the individual herself can 
14 At least if Mill is in terpreted in this way, relying heavily on the distinction between action and 
omission (i.e. it is n ot harm not to help someone). If the reader finds this to be an unfavourable 
interpretation of Mill, she is free to change label on the position I am presenting to something she 
can accept. 
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ultimately decide to live autonomously, but others can help her to make that a 
real possibility). As we have seen earlier, this idea of autonomy is often 
discussed by medical ethicists (Glover, 1984, p 160; Harris, 1998, p 148; Munthe, 
1999, p 198) and we have also seen that the idea plays a crucial role when it 
comes to justifying the value of genetic testing (13.2.3). The ideal of 
self—realisation takes autonomy to be a quesdon of degrees to greater extent 
than Mill's ideal. We can be more or less autonomous depending on our 
competence to make our own decisions and our ability to implement them 
(see m.2.3 and ÜI.2.4). As we have seen, genetic information can enhance our 
capacity to lead more autonomous lives and, according to this ideal, then, this 
constitutes a reason for providing such testing (II.2.3). 
It is more reasonable to claim that insurance companies' demand on 
applicants to take genetic tests is detrimental to autonomy interpreted in 
accordance with the ideal of self-realization, than interpreted in accordance 
with Mill's ideal. Let us once more turn to the case of Jack in order to 
demonstrate that this is so. Although it still is reasonable to claim that 
insurance companies do not force Jack to take a genetic test by demanding this as 
a term of contract, this demand nevertheless limits Jack's possibilities of 
realizing his important plans. The gravity of the limitation depends on what 
Jack's plans are and the circumstances under which Jack makes his choice. If 
the circumstances are such that there is an asymmetry of power to Jack's 
disadvantage, the gravity increases. For example, if he needs the insurance 
more than the insurance company needs him as a customer (his position of 
bargaining is then weaker than that of the company), the demand that he has to 
perform a genetic test in order to be able to obtain insurance limits his ability 
to realize his own plans to a g reater extent than if the balance of power had 
been the opposite. This is more likely to be the case if there are very meagre 
collective social insurance systems. Let us picture a society where Jack's 
children are dependent on him obtaining life insurance to be able to continue 
school in the case of his premature death. If one of his most important plans 
are to provide for his children and finish the great novel, given such 
circumstances, his possibilities to live autonomously is severely limited by the 
insurance companies' demands. If private life insurance on the other hand is 
an expendable commodity, obtained merely to make his children rich in the 
case of premature death, then the severity of the limitation is much less. 
What is valid for Jack, is also valid on a general level: the extent to which 
insurance companies' demands for genetic testing limit people's autonomy, 
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depends on people's values and plans and the circumstances under which they 
choose. To what extent are the demands of the insurance companies 
incompatible with the plans of people in general? To be able to answer this, 
we must be familiar with society's basic social institutions, the values and 
projects most important and widespread among the population (which 
requires intimate knowledge about the culture), and so on. If it is shown that 
insurance companies' demand to use genetic information really limits 
individuals' possibilities to self-realization to a g reat extent, does this mean that 
they should be forbidden to demand such information? That depends on 
what value we ascribe to autonomy as se lf-realization; the greater value it has, 
the more reason do we have to restrict demands from insurance companies 
(or anyone else) that will impede the realization of this value. 
How great is the value of living your life according to your own basic 
values and wishes, then? I think no one would say that this is of no value 
whatsoever, but different ethical theories, of course, will provide different 
answers to how great this value is and what determines this magnitude. Classic 
forms of consequentialism that typically do not include autonomy as a value in 
itself, gives self-realization an instrumental value:15 the value of self-realization 
depends on the contribution of self-realization to well-being. For example, 
according to the hedonistic version of consequentialism, the value of self-
realization partly depends on how bad people would feel towards the 
prospect of not being able to live according to their own values and plans. In 
western societies, this agony is probably worse than in societies with less or 
other expectations on life. To cut a long story short, a consequentialist must 
know about all sorts of things in order to determine the value of self-
realisation. 
Another theory assigns intrinsic value to autonomy in the sense of self-
realization. Especially modern liberals seem to be inclined to do so.16 If self-
realization is of intrinsic value, it must be of value to all individuals that can 
achieve it. Due to this fact, the ideal provides reasons to contribute to other 
people's self-realization. Unlike Mill's ideal of autonomy, this ideal will thus 
naturally actualise typical questions of justice: who should contribute, how 
15 To some extent, the preferentialistic version of consequentialism (II.4.1.2) will be coextensive to 
this ideal of autonomy (to the extent that living according to your values and plans is sa tisfying 
your intrinsic preferences, namely). The difference between these two ideas is d iscussed in III.2.4. 
16 The most obvious example is R awls, 1972, but also Nozick, 1974, p 50, and Dworkin, 1985, 
chapters 8 and 9. 
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much, and to whom? I will return to these questions later in this chapter 
(section VTI.5). 
3.3 Autonomy: Summary 
Different ideals of autonomy support different conclusions concerning 
regulation of insurance companies' access to and use of genetic information. 
Mill's ideal of autonomy cannot be used to defend any kind of regulation.17 
Autonomy interpreted as an ideal of self-realization seems more promising as a 
basis for a defence of regulation. To use this ideal to support that conclusion, 
we need to know a great deal: we need to know about societal circumstances, 
people's plans and values, what kind and how great the value is. What kind o f 
regulation it speaks in favour of is therefore uncertain. The ideal speaks in 
favour of partial regulation to the extent that a r ight to demand genetic testing 
undermines individuals' possibilities to realize important plans and values. The 
argument could even be used in favour of total regulation, for instance, if the 
problem of deterrence becomes so severe that people's possibilities to live the 
lives they choose are gravely limited as a resu lt. I must once again stress the 
significance of societal circumstances to address this issue. If society is so 
arranged that people are not in need of private insurance in order to gain 
access to important goods, vital to possibilities in society (such as health care, 
education, etc.), then people will be able to realize important plans regardless 
of regulation on private insurance. 
4. Privacy 
The right to privacy refers to a protected zone around the individual — a 
private sphere where the individual is especially entitled to non-interference 
from others as well as co ntrol over what is happening (see also VI.2.2). T his 
sphere can be broad and general or just concern certain aspects of the 
individual (for instance the physical body), certain information or some kinds 
of decisions. The defence for such a private sphere has a lo ng tradition in the 
legislation of the western civilisation (McGleenan, 1997, p 43-44). For instance, 
it is common to refer to privacy to claim the right to control information 
about oneself (e.g. information about ones sexual orientation or genetic 
constitution), to avoid interference concerning certain decisions (e.g. about 
17 This does not imply that it supports absence of regulation. The correct conclusion is th at it 
does not directly support any kind of regulation, nothing more. 
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abortion), to avoid supervision (e.g. of public places), or to claim the right not 
to answer certain questions (e.g. to your employer about political opinions, 
recreational activities or reproductive plans). 
Privacy is not equivalent to autonomy; the right to sometimes be "left 
alone" does not in it self imply any right to self-determination. But the right to 
privacy can be justified with reference to autonomy: to be able to practice self-
determination it can be necessary to be left alone. Mill's ideal of autonomy can 
be seen as an attempt to defend privacy with reference to the value of 
autonomy (which in turn can be defended with reference to general welfare, 
according to Mill): to be autonomous in any interesting sense we must 
demarcate a sphere in which others in general, and society in particular, must 
not interfere. 
The question in this context is if genetic information should belong to 
such a protected sphere. Is there a genetic privacy? Is there anything special 
about genetic information about individuals that makes it especially worthy of 
protection? 
First let me say something more about privacy. How protected should 
some piece of information be to be counted as belonging to a persons 
privacy? When is your privacy protected? The common understanding of 
privacy seems to require a great deal of protection. I will join this received 
opinion and say that genetic privacy is protected when the person herself has 
full control over her genetic information, without the risk of adverse 
consequences to herself, whatever she chooses to do with it (at least as long as 
she does not use it to harm others). If she can be excluded from insurance 
because of negligence to disclose genetic information to insurance companies, 
her genetic privacy is not being fully respected, according to this 
understanding of privacy. A successful argumentation in favour of this strong 
kind of privacy thus speaks in favour of total regulation. 
4.1 Is there anything special about genetic information? 
We have already discussed this matter from various angles (see e.g. chapter 
1.4.3). The important question in this context is the following: is there 
something special about genetic information that makes it an object for special 
concern in legislation and regulation aimed at protecting privacy? This is to ask 
once again for the ethical significance of genetic information, but now given 
the assumption made about there being ethical reasons for laws and other 
formal societal rules. 
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Four main characteristics has been used to argue that genetic information is 
different from other (medical) information in morally relevant ways: Genetic 
information is: (i) predictive about disease before onset; (ii) transmittable to 
offspring; (iii) revealing about other persons than the one tested (namely the 
persons' blood relatives); and (iv) especially personal and intimate. 
The received wisdom in today's discussion is that none of these 
characteristics single out genetic information as deserving special treatment 
compared to other medical information, not even together (Holm, 1999; 
Launis, 2000; Sandberg, 1995, p 1550 ff). This is so, since other kinds of non-
genetic information are claimed to be relevantly similar (see 1.4.3 for an 
argument to this effect). This does not show that genetic information should 
not be protected in the name of privacy, but then so should other information 
relevantly similar too.18 
The most debated characteristic concerns the personal and intimate nature 
of genetic information. The argument should not rely on the very 
controversial idea that there is something very personal about genetic 
information as such, since this claim would draw on a form of genetic 
essentialism already refuted (1.4.1). However, no one should deny that genetic 
information is considered very personal and intimate in our culture, as is 
information about sexual preference, private relations and so on. However, 
what people consider being very personal and intimate, what they feel is of 
nobody else's business so to say, changes over time (think about discussing 
one's sexual orientation, for instance). Maybe genetic information will cease to 
be considered especially sensitive, when this information becomes more 
frequently used and widespread. 
The fact that genetic information is considered personal and intimate can 
be used to argue that it should be protected. Laws of integrity are often 
justified with reference to the value of respecting peoples' feelings that this 
information is of no other's business. These laws are then justified against a 
broader consequentialist background. People feel distressed and worried about 
the fact that others may gain access to information they think of as very 
personal and intimate. This is one explanation of the fact that many are 
reluctant to share genetic information to third parties (Borna and Avila, 1999; 
Mayer et al, 1999). Regulation of access to genetic information can thus be 
18 This is the motivation in Norwegian legislation to prohibit insurance companies from using all 
sorts of medical information. See Radetzki, Radetzki and Juth, 2003, p 37-38. 
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justified on the ground that it helps people to protect them from the distress 
they may experience if genetic information were not thus protected. To put 
things simpler: why genetic privacy? In order to avoid distress and worry. 
If there is nothing inherent in genetic information that makes it especially 
worthy of protection, and the reasons to protect genetic privacy are general 
consequentialist ones, then the question arises of how efficient a means to 
consequentialist ends regulation of insurance companies' access to genetic 
information is. Is regulation to protect genetic privacy an efficient instrument 
for handling peoples' distress? Some have claimed that such legislation can be 
counterproductive (McGleenan, 1997; Wolf, 1995). Regulation can contribute 
to the opinion that genetic information is a str ange and potentially dangerous 
substance that we better keep secret, and thus reinforce the false ideology of 
genetic essentialism. Furthermore, if genetic conditions get special treatment 
in regulation, we risk stigmatising those affected by them further. There is an 
analogy to restrictive policy on immigration. Such a policy can be motivated by 
a concern for the distress caused by facing foreign cultures. The result is 
fewer encounters with foreign cultures, which contributes to cultural 
prejudices, which increases distress caused by facing foreign cultures. 
There are other ways to take measures against the distress caused by third 
parties access to genetic information. One way is to make it more optional to 
reveal such information to third parties. In the case of insurance companies, 
this can be accomplished through public social security systems with a 
widened scope. With such a system, the individual can choose not to disclose 
the information, without the risk of loosing access to important basic goods, 
such as health care and economic compensation in case of disease. 
One important explanation for the great reluctance in many states in the 
USA to accept insurance companies' access to genetic information probably is 
the fear of being left without insurance vital for health care and other 
important goods. Regulation may not be an efficient means to solve this 
problem. First, there is a problem of defining genetic information and genetic 
testing in such a way that regulation prevents use of these (Rothstein, 1997, p 
457-459). Even if we focus on monogenetic diseases, which are genetic in a 
straightforward way, these may be tested for with other means than 
straightforward molecular genetic testing on DNA. For instance, cystic fibrosis 
(see 1.4.1) may be detected by a c hloride test on perspiration and many other 
monogenetic conditions may be tested for by biochemical analysis of proteins 
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or detected by access to family history. It may be difficult to formulate 
legislation as to include all the conditions one is interested in and exclude all 
the rest. 
Second, there are other properties than genetic ones that insurance 
companies can and do use to demarcate genetic high-risk populations.19 An 
illuminating analogy is the problem in the USA of using legislation to prevent 
discrimination by insurance companies of HIV-positives. When use of HtV-
tests was banned, other medical tests (of T-cells) were used instead. When this 
was prohibited, insurance companies used sexual orientation to identify the 
relevant high-risk population. When this was regulated against, insurance 
companies began to differentiate between occupations where homosexuals 
were over-represented. Insurance companies are not interested in causal 
relations, but in statistical correlations, and some features have to be singled 
out if private insurance is to be economically sustainable. The genetic case, o f 
course, is even more problematic to regulate, because of the numerous ways 
such regulation can be sidestepped due to the great variation of diseases that 
are genetic. 
However, the force of this last line of reasoning should not be 
overestimated. If true, there cannot be a se rious problem of adverse selection 
in general, since the thrust of the argument is that insurance companies always 
can find a way to sidestep regulation in order to identify high-risk persons.20 
Nonetheless, it does not matter which of these arguments that are most 
plausible in the end, since they both supports the same conclusions: that 
regulation may not be the most efficient way to protect the interest of 
insurance-holders. 
4.2 Privacy: Summary 
Genetic privacy can be protected by total regulation. The primary motivation 
to protect genetic information is to avoid the distress felt if it were not 
19 One way is to use ethnic groups, as in the much debated testing programs for sickle-cell 
anaemia among the black population of USA in the 1960s (Gostin, 1991, p 118). 
20 My own inclination is t o think that regulation can sometimes be effective, making the problem 
of adverse selection worse than the problem of impotence of regulation. However, this cannot be 
settled without more empirical investigations. It should perhaps also be noted that the argument 
of adverse selection and the argument of impotence of regulation corresponds to two classic 
conservative arguments: the argument of jeopardy and the argument of futility (Hirschman, 
1991). 
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protected, because genetic information is considered personal and intimate. 
There are, however, problems with using regulation as a means to protect 
genetic information. First, regulation may strengthen ill-informed fear of 
genetic information and consequently stigmatisation of people with genetic 
disorders. Second, regulation may be an inefficient means to eliminate distress 
due to fear of being left without insurance, since insurance companies can use 
other ways than genetic to single out genetic high-risk populations. Privacy can 
be protected to a certain extent by other means than regulation, however. 
There is the possibility to, through a social insurance system, guarantee access 
to vital goods without access to private insurance. The fact that one can avoid 
to reveal genetic information without loss of vital goods provides the 
protection of privacy in this system. Such system could also "play down" the 
importance of genetic information, and thus counteracting the belief in 
genetic essentialism, which would be a gain. 
5. Justice 
Justice is one of the basic concepts of ethics in general and political 
philosophy in particular. In the discussion about insurance companies' right to 
genetic information it is probably the most common consideration of a 
normative character brought to stand, and we have repeatedly seen that 
questions of justice a rise in the discussion of the value of and right to genetic 
information (see e.g. II.3.3.1, II.3.3.2, and VII.3.3). Like autonomy, the concept of 
justice has a controversial meaning, but is always p ositively valued. That is to 
say, everyone agrees that justice is a good thing, but there is fierce 
disagreement on what is just. 
Sometimes it has been claimed that there are various ideals of justice, but 
one basic concept of justice on which the various ideals agree. This has been 
stated in numerous ways, with small differences in substance.21 It is, however, 
hard to find anything that is both unique and common to different ideas of 
justice. It has been claimed that all ideas of justice are ideas of equality 
(Dworkin, 1977, p 179). This is true, on a very loose definition on equality, 
which says so mething like relevantly sim ilar c ases sho uld be tr eated similarly (th e so-
called formal principle of justice). That means, for instance, that if some 
21 See e.g. Hart, 1961, p 156, who claims justice has a core of meaning that is co nstant between 
different users; Rawls, 1972, p 5, who differs between a common concept of justice and different 
conceptions of justice; and Ohlsson, 1998, p 45 who differs between the formal principle of justice 
(relevantly similar cases should be treated similarly) and different substantial principles of justice. 
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dividable good is to be distributed between two persons, and there is no 
relevant difference between them from the point of view of justice, they 
should receive (or have) the same amount of the good.22 However, this is 
unsatisfactory as a unique characteristic of justice. First, the suggestion is close 
to empty as long as one has not defined "relevantly similar". Second, this claim 
may not differentiate principles of justice from other ethical principles: some 
would claim that this is nothing more than the principle of universalizability 
that all plausible ethical judgements have to satisfy (see e.g. Hare, 1981). 
Something more is thus required to differentiate questions of justice from 
other normative issues. One such proposed characteristic is that questions of 
justice are question of distribution of benefits and burdens.23 There is no 
unanimity on this point,24 but in this context it is a reasonable prerequisite. 
From the point of view of the insured, insurance policies can be considered 
as benefits or goods, and the premiums charged by insurance companies a 
burden. The situation is the other way around for insurance companies.25 The 
question of justice, then, is how these goods and burdens should be 
distributed. The question in no way implies anything about there being a 
distributor (for private insurance, the market does the distribution according 
to the principles of supply and demand) or about the method of distribution. 
To some theories of justice, the method of distribution is relevant for the 
justice of the distribution and these theories should not be excluded without a 
hearing. 
If we concentrate on goods (which is customary in discussions of justice), 
how are they to be distributed? The proposals on what kind of distributions 
that are just are legio and (often) incompatible: distribution should be 
according to desert (Rachels, 1991), according to need (Miller, 1976), such that 
22 To this both Nozick and utilitarian can agree, since "relevantly similar" in Nozick's terminology 
would mean "equal entitlement" and if t wo people have entidements to an equal amount of a 
dividable good, they should receive the same amount. A similar reasoning is applicable to 
utilitarianism, which would say that "relevantly similar" amounts to something like "has equal 
interest of' or "makes the first person as happy as the other". 
23 What are the relevant benefits and burdens to be distributed is a controversial question, but 
one we fortunately enough have to address in this context, since they are defined by the subject 
matter. 
24 See Young, 1990, p 13 ff. 
25 Stricdy speaking, insurance does not have to be a burden to insurance companies (it is the 
commodity they are selling and want to sell, since that gives them their profit). But paying 
compensation to the insured, of course, is a burden to the insurance companies. 
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situation of the worst off cannot be improved further (Rawls, 1972), such that 
the welfare is maximised (the total: Hare, 1991; the average: Harsanyi, 1977),26  
the result of an unforced trade on a f ree market (Nozick, 1974), or the result of 
negotiation between the involved parties (Gauthier, 1986). To further 
complicate matters, propositions have been made that different principles 
should be applied to different goods (Walzer, 1983). 
Considering this multitude of principles, can there be any hope of saying 
anything about what is just? In most cases it is difficult. In the case of personal 
insurance, however, a grouping of principles along two major Unes is feasible, 
as disagreement in theory does not necessarily preclude agreement in practice. 
This I will try to demonstrate in the following. On the on e hand there are the 
principle of desert and various principles in favour of a far-reaching equality 
in the distribution of the recourses of society; principles therefore called 
principles of equality (of which I will discuss three: the difference principle, 
the priority principle and the principle of need).27 These are sometimes used 
to argue against insurance companies right to genetic information, and in 
favour of total regulation. On the other hand there are principles that defends the 
right to keep things acquired through fair transactions and negotiations. These 
will be called principles of voluntariness. These are used to argue for 
insurance companies' right to ask for and use genetic information. 
I will also discuss a third type of theory of justice with relevance to this 
issue — theories that claim different principles of justice to be applicable in 
different circumstances. I will discuss the most elaborated version of such 
theories, namely Walzer's theory of "complex equality" (Walzer, 1983, p 17). 
This theory can be described as an attempted compromise between principles 
of equality and principles of voluntariness. 
These are the main conclusions I want to defend in the following: contrary 
to what has been claimed in the debate, the principle of desert and the 
principles of equality do not directly support total regulation. Rather, they 
support a more general conclusion, which is not committed to any particular 
view regarding more specific practical arrangements, namely the claim that no 
one should suffer excessive burdens because of her genetic constitution. 
Rather, genetic susceptibility to disease is a ground for compensation, 
26 These principles amounts to consequentialism, and will n ot be discussed as separate theories of 
justice. 
27 I will not address the form of egalitarianism, which states that equality is of intrinsic value. This 
would require a book of its own. See Temkin, 1993, for a thorough exposition of this position. 
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according to these views. This conclusion is neutral on the method through 
which this should be accomplished. Principles of voluntariness, on the other 
hand, are either implausible (which is shown for instance by the application to 
this case) o r do not support the libertarian conclusions they are claimed to 
support. The most reasonable application of Walzer's theory of justice will 
reach conclusions similar to the principles of equality, since private personal 
insurance increasingly is becoming a good necessary to security and welfare. 
Because of some assumptions made by the theory, this is unclear, however. 
This presents difficulties for the theory, I will argue. This application will 
therefore teach us something about the theory of justice, namely that the most 
reasonable theories are the theories of equality (and desert). Consequently, no 
one should be burdened only because of her genetic constitution. 
5.1 Desert and equality 
One argument that seems to tell against the justice of an arrangement where 
insurance companies are allowed to ask for genetic information is that no one 
should have to be exposed to additional burdens due to factors one reasonably 
cannot be held responsible for (Dworkin, 1985, p 207; Rawls, 1972, p 47-48; 
Roemer, 1995, p 4-5). On the basis of this principle of d esert the following can be 
argued (Holtug, 1999, p 284 ff). We can only be held responsible for that 
which we ourselves choose (or for foreseeable consequences of such 
choices). No one chooses her own genetic constitution. It is therefore not a 
just a rrangement that someone who has suffered bad luck in the natural lottery 
through inheriting an increased susceptibility to disease, because of this 
should suffer from the additional burden of limited access to or denial of 
other goods, such as insurance. On the contrary, such a person rather should 
be compensated for those burdens that are due to bad luck.28 If insurance 
companies are allowed access to genetic information, they will exclude from 
insurance people already burdened due to bad luck, and this precisely because 
of this bad luck (i.e. their increased susceptibility to disease). Therefore the 
companies should not have access to this information. It might seem, then, that 
the principle of desert speaks in favour of total regulation (Johnston, 1999, p 
80, 83-84). 
28 Holtug, 1999, however, argues that we need an extra premise (such as a principle of equality) to 
reach the conclusion that undeserved burdens should be compensated (p 287). He does not 
claim that the principle of desert implies that regulation should be implemented. 
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The principle of desert is often connected to the ideal of equal 
opportunities. The reasoning behind this ideal goes something along the 
following lines. In modern societies of the Western type, there is a 
competition for favoured positions — favoured in that they mean an 
advantageous allocation of basic goods, such as in come and social status. In 
order for this competition to be just, we must all have equal o pportunities to 
succeed in it; circumstances must not unfairly disfavour anyone. There are 
basically fou r different views on how equal circumstances has to be in order 
to make the opportunities equal: (a) absence of legal barriers for favoured 
positions (e.g. no nobles; formal equal opportunities. Nozick, 1974); (b) 
elimination of informal barriers based on sex, ethnicity, sexual o rientation and 
so on (Fishkin, 1987); (c) elimination of all social circumstances that have 
consequences for the competition, but that is not the result of the 
competitors' own choices, i.e., elimination of the social lottery (Goldman, 
1987); (d) elimination of all circumstances, natural and social, that have 
consequences for the competition, but that are not the result of the 
competitors' own choices (Roemer, 1995).29 
It has been claimed that we have fair equal opportunities only when we 
have reached step (d) (Rawl s, 1972, p 74; Roemer, 1995, p 2-3). Then people's 
positions are determined by their own choices, rather than circumstances they 
cannot do anything about. When we have eliminated the effects of such 
natural and social circumstances, what we have left is what the individual 
herself contributes with. This is what the person is entitled to, is justified to 
claim or deserves. I nterpreted in this way, the principle of desert leads to far-
reaching equality: no one should have to suffer detrimental consequences 
because of things they cannot do anything about themselves. However, this 
leaves o pen for interpretation, first, wha t should be counted as "detrimental 
consequences" (who are to be compensated), and, second, how this 
compensation should be accomplished in a society with scarce resources. 
Here, more substantial theor ies of equality come into play. O f such theories, I 
will in the following consider three main streaks: the difference principle, the 
priority principle and the principle of need. 
29 The three first steps can be found in Buchanan et al, 2000, p 65. Including the fourth step we 
have the view on equal opportunity they call the brute luck-view. 
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Rawls' difference principle is so widely discussed that a closer presentation 
than the following is superfluous: "social primary goods... are to be 
distributed equally unless an unequal distribution... is to the advantage of the 
least favoured." (1972, p 303) I will not account for the argumentation that leads 
to this principle or explicate the principle further, since that is not needed for 
my purposes. Only the application of Rawls' conception or ideal of justice to 
the question of insurance companies' right to genetic information is of 
primary interest here. This brings the focus on the basic moral intuition that 
this ideal of justice expresses: the claim that we have special obligation towards 
those worst or, at least, worse off. 
Rawls' theory of justice has many inherent problems that nevertheless 
should not be concealed. One problem is the difficulty of identifying the 
worst off group (is it comprised of a small destitute minority or everyone but 
the best off, or something in between?).30 Besides that, the privileged position 
that Rawls gives this group have troubling consequences, in that the least 
improvement to the worst off always outweigh an improvement of the second 
worst off group, no matter the size of the improvement of this group, the size 
of the groups and even if the difference between the groups is very small to 
start with (Holtug, 1999, p 288). These consequences are to some extent the 
result of Rawls' concentration on groups instead of individuals, but also his 
stern deontological reluctance to balance the interest of the worst off against 
the interest of those better off. 
The more general moral intuition reflected by Rawls' theory of justice 
does not have to solve that kind of technicalities, however. It is enough to 
claim that the worse off someone is, the stronger the obligation of others to 
help her. This general idea is summed up by the priority p rinciple-, " [bjenefiting 
people matters more [morally] the worse off these people are" (Parfit, 1997, p 
213). This principle can be used to argue against insurance companies' right to 
genetic information, since this right would often be used to the disadvantages 
of the already bad off individual (Holtug, 1999, p 290).31 People who already 
suffer from natural disadvantage (the increased risk of developing disease), is 
further burdened by reduced possibilities to insure themselves against the bad 
effects of this. That seems to be contrary to the priority principle. 
30 However, Rawls does have some, not very elaborated, suggestions on how this should be done 
(but not so very much about why it should be done in the way he proposes), 1972, p 98. 
31 To argue this point a minimal priority principle, stating that people who are worse off should 
not get their situation worsened to the benefit of those better of, is su fficient. 
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A similar line of reasoning seems applicable to the principle of need, goods 
should be allotted according to need. What need is, when someone is in need 
and what determines the extent of a need, is notoriously hard to define 
(Kymlicka, 1994, p 183-186). The spirit of the principle of need is, however, 
congenial to the priority principle; to be worse off is often to be needy in the 
way this word is commonly used. If insurance companies are allowed to access 
genetic information, those in most need of insurance will be the ones 
suffering the greatest difficulties of getting it. Any reasonable interpretation of 
the principle of need therefore might seem to favour the same conclusion as 
the priority principle: total regulation. 
In spite of the apparent force of these lines of reasoning, however, the 
conclusion is premature. Indeed, it does seem to follow that those suffering 
from misfortunes, such as genetic disease, should be compensated as far as is 
possible. The more fortunate have an obligation to give up some of their 
goods to help those worse off, even if this causes a decrease in the net balance of goods. 
All this speaks in favour of a redistribution to the benefit of these unfortunate 
individuals. But it does not tell us that insurance companies are the party 
obligated to perform this redistribution. Rather, it seems more congenial to 
the principles of equality to claim that all of those better off should 
contribute. 
Moreover, as w e have seen, the effect of forcing insurance companies to 
provide for genetically worse off by prohibiting insurance companies' use of 
genetic information may be the collapse of private personal insurance. Then 
the very problem that the regulation was intended to solve will resurface, and 
this as a result of this regulation. This is also problematic on the principles of 
equality, since it would further burden an already burdened group. 
There is a further problem with letting private insurance and regulation 
solve the problem of compensating the genetically worse off, namely the 
problem of overcompensation. You might purchase a health insurance to 
guarantee access to proper care in case of disease or injury. You may also 
purchase it to save money or to acquire wealth. The worry of insurance 
companies is that persons allowed to withhold genetic risk will enter 
insurance contracts with very high benefits, not to guarantee a decent level of 
welfare, but to strike exceedingly rich. The same thing goes for life insurance, 
maybe even to a greater extent (Chadwick & Ngwena, 1995, p 123). And 
constructing such special opportunities seems difficult to defend with 
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reference to considerations of justice. We may have an obligation to help 
people in need or to compensate for arbitrary inequalities, but we surely do 
not have any obligation to make persons with genetic disorders vastly richer 
than the average person. To this the consequentialist argument that such policy 
might also undermine solidarity with this group can be added. 
All of these problems speak in favour of another solution to the problem 
of achieving justice (according to the principle of desert and the principles of 
equality) for the genetic high-risk group. The solution favoured should be 
familiar by now: a generous collective social insurance system, which 
guarantees that no one stands helpless in case of disease. 
This does not mean that private insurers are without responsibilities. 
Private personal insurance is a highly valued commodity, and there are few of 
us who would feel comfortable to be shut out from this market because of 
our genes. To be unable to purchase the commodities you want, just because 
of your genetic constitution, is also an undeserved loss. To avoid this, and at 
the same time avoid adverse selection and overcompensation, a system of 
partial regulation similar to that in Sweden and the Netherlands can be 
implemented (see VII. 1.1). The level below which one can buy insurance 
without revealing genetic information, then has to be decided on several 
grounds: the severity of the problem of adverse selection is maybe the most 
important, since the solving of this problem is necessary for the existence of 
private personal insurance. However, if the existence of a social security 
system of the type proposed is a fact, then private personal insurance is 
somewhat of a luxury commodity, probably primarily of interest to the 
wealthier part of the population (if there is such a population in a just society). 
And there is something to the following claim: "there is nothing wrong with 
applying a libertarian view to the distribution of benefits between members of 
a privileged group in society" (Tamburrini, 2000, p 119) — at least if the 
privileged position of this group is not a result of unjust social arrangements. 
5.2 Voluntariness and rights 
5.2.1 Actuarialfairness 
Principles of justice also have been used as arguments in favour of insurance 
companies' right to genetic information. The most frequent argument refers to 
actuarial assessment of risk (Sandberg, 1995, p 1554; Wortham, 1986, p 361). The 
whole idea of private insurance is based on the assumption that people pay 
premiums in proportion to the risk of payment of the compensation taken by 
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the company. With access to genetic information, insurance companies can 
take the higher risk of those with damaged genes into consideration, and 
differentiate premiums accordingly. The idea of actuarial fairness is that, in 
correspondence with the spirit of private insurance, everyone should pay 
premiums according to her own risk, or to phrase it in negative terms, no one 
should have to pay higher premium than the risk she actually represents. 
Justice according to actuarial fairness rests on "the moral judgement that fair 
underwriting practices must reflect the division of people according to the 
actuarially a ccurate determination of their risks" (Daniels, 1990, p 500). 
The concept of actuarial risk is problematic, however. As far as I know, no 
one has explicitly defended that the calculations of risk undertaken by 
insurance companies aim at reflecting any kind of "objective" risk or 
probability. Since it is highly controversial if there are any objective 
probabilities (Resnik, 1987, p 61), a defence of actuarial fairness would 
therefore profit from not relying on any such assumption. A more promising 
interpretation of the concept of actuarial risk is to refer to the accurate 
calculation of risk, given the known factors relevant to the risk in question 
(Harper, 1993, s 224). 
However, insurance companies do not use all k nown factors relevant to the 
risk in question when they differentiate premiums. Calculation of risk and 
differentiation of premiums are based on a limited numbers of factors. To use 
all the factors known relevant for estimation of risk for disease and premature 
death, would simply make the investigation of potential customers too 
expensive to bear its own costs. The customary procedure is, therefore, to use 
some factors traditionally seen as highly relevant, for which statistics are 
already available. Because of this, all ri sk-assessments are more or less arbitrary 
in light of the actuarial ideal. The problem is not just that insurance companies 
defend a practice with reference to an ideal (actuarial fairness) that they do not 
reach. Worse than that, insurance companies do not even try to reach the ideal. 
They have other more important (economical) considerations that stand in the 
way. Therefore, if the actuarial ideal can be so outweighed by these sorts of 
considerations from the point of view of the insurance companies, reason 
dictates that claims from actuarial fairness can be similarly outweighed by all 
considerations of a similar kind. For example, it may be outweighed by 
economic factors on behalf of potential customers — such as the economic 
risk of revealing the results of genetic testing. 
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All of this is, of course, compatible with the claim that actuarial fairness can 
in fact not be outweighed in this way, and that insurance companies should 
sacrifice the economic gains of applying cheap and simple methods of risk-
assessment for the sake of actuarial fairness. However, such a suggestion 
presupposes the actuarial ideal to express a ba sic tenet of justice and actuarial 
fairness, seen as an independent principle of justice, has inherent problems. 
The ideal is namely based on a dubious moral principle: individuals should be 
able to gain from their natural advantages, even when others stand to loose 
because of this (we will later discuss libertarianism, which defends this). That 
is contrary to the principles of equality previously discussed, according to 
which natural disadvantages are grounds for compensation rather than further 
burdens. If one finds such principles of justice plausible, one cannot 
consequendy embrace actuarial fairness as a basic tenet of justice. 
Against this one may object that it is reasonable that we at least sometimes 
should be allowed to gain benefits because of our natural advantages. That 
seems to be necessary in a market economy of the Western type. To this 
theories of equality can agree, however: it may be the case that everybody in a 
society, including the worst or worse off, stands to loose from blocking 
incentives to talents. In this particular case, however, the question is not 
whether we should prevent talents to gain from their capacities. Instead, the 
question is if those who have suffered the bad luck of being genetically 
susceptible to disease should be further burdened through exclusion from 
other goods, such as health care. Since that is a consequence of actuarial 
fairness taken as a basic principle of justice, most people probably will be 
rcluctant to accept this as a reasonable principle. 
A perhaps more convincing argument in favour of actuarial fairness instead 
refers to the fact that allowing the withholding of genetic information to 
insurance companies will make low-risk individuals subsidize high-risk 
individuals, which is unjust towards low-risk individuals. This is not very 
convincing, however, since everybody will have to pay the higher premiums 
such an allowance would result in, including the high-risk individuals. Low-
risk individuals are therefore not discriminated against in this respect. 
To gain further support against regulation, one thus has to leave purely 
actuarial concerns and instead refer to more general intuitions of justice. Then 
one can claim that all th ose more fortunate and better off should carry the cost 
of compensation of genetic high-risk individuals, and not just those who have 
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chosen to invest in private personal insurance. This speaks in favour of 
generally subsidi2ed compensation from society, where people pay according 
to capacity and receive according to need. 
The line of reasoning above shows, perhaps not surprisingly, that the 
actuarial ideal is best seen as internal to the business of private insurance — not 
a general principle of justice. This suggestion is further strengthened by its 
actual use within insurance business: it is one consideration of many that can 
be balanced out in case of conflict with e.g. e conomic factors. Because of this, 
the actuarial ideal leaves plenty of room for people to abstain from genetic 
testing or the sharing of information from such tests in connection with 
applying for private insurance. 
If, instead, actuarial fairness is interpreted as a strict ideal that insurance 
companies should d o their best to comply to, the actual procedures of risk-
assessment of insurance companies would have to undergo rather far-reaching 
revisions. It seems rather difficult to predict what the result of such revisions 
would be for the business of private insurance, as well as society on the 
whole. Therefore, to describe what a strict ideal of actuarial fairness would 
have to say a bout genetic testing in connection with insurance is difficult, to 
say the least. 
5.2.2 Ubertarianism 
Even if ideals of actuarial fairness will not do the job, there are basic ideas of 
justice that appear to support the right of insurance companies both to ask for 
information from old tests and to demand new tests to be made; i.e. a bsence 
of regulation. These are the libertarian the ories of justice, of which the most 
famous is Robert Nozick's theory of entitlement.32 Libertarian theories are 
united by backing up a strong kind of free market system without taxation and 
(stricter) regulation. My criticism will partly extend to all these libertarian 
theories, when it comes to criticizing the libertarian conclusions they allegedly 
reach, but I will concentrate most of my criticism to Nozick's particular theory. 
The basic assumption of Nozick's theory is that we have certain absolute 
negative r ights, foremost to our body and acquired property. In virtue of this, 
no one may prevent the individual from using his body, psychological 
32 Although this will n ot be systematically demonstrated, other theories in this family support the 
same conclusions in this respect as Nozick's, e.g. Gauthier's theory of morals by agreement (see 
instead Gauthier, 1986; Kymlicka, 1990, p 132 ff; Holtug, 1999, p 288). 
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capacities and justly acquired property in the way she seem fit herself, as long 
as the individual does not violate the same rights of anyone else (I may destroy 
my justly acquired car if I want to do so, but not by crashing into your porch). 
If all property is justly acquired, every voluntary transaction that does not 
violate anyone's rights will result in a just distribution, no matter what the 
pattern of distribution looks like. "A distribution is just if it arises from 
another just distribution by legitimate means" (1974, P 151) is Nozick's concise 
statement of this idea. 
According to libertarianism, each one is free to choose the terms she 
herself wants when engaging in transaction with property she is entitled to, 
just as she is free to accept or reject the terms of the other party of the 
transaction. This implies that insurance companies may demand information 
about the insurance applicant's genetic constitution as a term of insurance 
contract, if they choose to do so. If the insured deliberately withholds such 
information, the insurance company has the right to be compensated by the 
insured, and the state has an obligation to force the insured to pay 
compensation. Justice on behalf of the insured is constituted by the fact that 
she could have rejected the contract and chosen not to engage in the 
transaction, if she had found the terms unacceptable. 
One basic problem facing anyone who tries to apply these assumptions to 
reality is that it is unclear, to say the least, to what extent people's material 
belongings are in fact justly acquired property (Nozick, 1974, p 231). This due 
to the vast amount of force, violence and robbery that can be found 
throughout human history - not least the history of Western affluence. I will 
sidestep this difficulty, assuming (implausibly) that people's belongings are in 
fact theirs in the moral sense of libertarianism. I will argue that there are still 
serious problems involved in supporting absence of regulation on libertarian 
grounds. 
The major problem with libertarianism is its normatively unacceptable 
consequences, which are clear in this case. According to libertarianism, taxation 
is a violation of the right to property,33 even if tax-money saves lives or 
33 This holds given the implausible assumption that the libertarian rights extend to our actual 
material belongings. I will question this assumption shortly. However, regardless of whether one 
rejects libertarianism due to its (alleged) moral implications or because it does not have these 
implications, the conclusion will be the same: that absence of regulation cannot be defended on 
libertarian grounds. 
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reduces extensive suffering (Kymlicka, 1990, p 96-97). People in dire 
conditions instead have to rely on the voluntary beneficence of others. If 
private personal insurance companies demand genetic information and use 
this to differentiate premiums, which they most certainly will if they are 
allowed to, those suffering from genetic disease may be left totally without 
means to provide for the most basic material necessities for survival. This 
consequence should be enough to make most people reject libertarianism. 
The basis of libertarianism seems sound, however. It is an appealing 
thought that each individual should be the sovereign ruler of what happens to 
her own body with its attributes and capacities, and that we should be allowed 
to use this as w e our selves choose, as long as we respect the corresponding 
rights of others. Perhaps, then, the consequences just mentioned is the price 
we have to pay in order to uphold this fine ideal of personal liberty. However, 
these consequences follow only if Nozick's further claim that "self-
ownership" implies the absolute right to justly acquired external property is 
accepted. Property, according to Nozick, can be justly acquired either through 
original acquisition of previously un-owned nature, or through voluntary 
transactions between autonomous individuals. We have the right to acquire 
parts of the external world, as long as they are not previously acquired, and we 
leave "enough and as good" parts to others (Nozick, 1974, p 202).34 This last 
condition on legitimate original acquisition has been called "Locke's proviso"35 
and has been the subject of much debate. The outcome of the debate shows 
that the basis of Nozick's theory does not imply the general resistance to 
taxation or regulation of the market as easily as he thought. 
Hillel Steiner, 1997, has argued that a re asonable interpretation of the basis 
of libertarianism leads to non-libertarian conclusions. According to Steiner, 
each individual, on the basis of each person's right to use her body and talents 
to achieve prosperity, has an original justified claim of access to an equal part of 
(the value of) natural resources. If natural resources already have been acquired 
by earlier generations, then these generations has a duty to share the (value of) 
natural resources with the new individuals. Steiner continues his argument by 
34 How the acquisition should be done in order to legitimate is unclear. Do I have to "mix labour" 
with that which I acquire (which seems to have been the position of Locke)? In that case what 
exactly do I acquire (if I use part of a tree to make a chair, do I acquire the whole tree, the parts I 
am using or just t he product)? Is it enough to fence a thing in or "call for" it in order to acquire it? 
I will ignore these difficulties. 
35 From Locke, who originally formulated this in Two Treatise of Government, 1689, 11:27. 
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claiming that if everyone has such an equal right to natural resources, then we 
also share an obligation to carry the costs for whims of nature. The genes of an 
individual are a result of such whims of nature.36 This seems to favour an 
obligation to compensate those who suffer adverse consequences as a result of 
their genes. It is an issue of appropriateness how this compensation should be 
implemented - through a regulation that limits insurance companies rights to 
use genetic information, or through a social insurance system. It is important 
to notice that the compensation cannot be left to voluntary beneficence, since 
there is a right to compensation if Steiner is right. 
Further arguments can be brought to bear on the idea that Nozick cannot 
deduce the conclusions he does. Nozick claims that Locke's proviso is 
compatible with individuals acquiring a larger part of natural resources than 
the part each one would have acquired through equal distribution. On the 
other hand, Nozick claims that an acquisition of a p art of natural resources that 
makes others worse off materially than they would have been had that part of 
nature never been acquired is illegitimate. This interpretation of Locke's 
proviso has been widely criticized. The background of the criticism is that 
Nozick defends the principle of self-ownership with reference to the ideal — 
vital to all f orms of liberal ideals - that each individuals right to live his life 
according to his own ideas of what is valuable should be respected (Nozick, 
1974, p 50). 
This raises the question of why Nozick emphasises making others worse 
off materially and not worse of in the ability to lead the life the individual 
herself finds valuable (Cohen, 1986). If the ability t o lead the life the individual 
herself finds valuable is the basic tenet underlying Nozick's theory, why is 
there according to him no obligation to support those who cannot do this 
without the help of others (Holtug, 1999, p 289)? Many of those suffering from 
genetic disease obviously belong to this group and this may imply far-reaching 
obligations of others to help these people. For instance, Kymlicka (1990, p 113) 
has shown that if libertarianism in this way is interpreted in line with its most 
basic moral tenet, the resulting demands on redistribution of resources may be 
extensive. 
36 To an increasing extent, this can be questioned. Preimplantation and prenatal genetic diagnosis 
make it possible to choose the genetic make-up of their children. The responsibility for the 
consequences of that make-up could then be claimed to belong to the parents, thus making them 
the party that should provide compensation, according to Steiner. 
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5.3 A compromise 
Even if libertarianism is hard to defend generally, it may be defensible 
partially. A dominating opinion in Western societies is that market transaction 
is an appropriate and efficient method of distribution of a wide variety of 
goods. Very few become morally indignant by the fact that e.g. golf-equipment 
and Beatles-records are distributed according to supply and demand. Most 
people lead good lives without the right to support for the purchase of such 
expendable commodities. On the contrary, most people think that a right to 
receive support is limited to some goods, of vital concern to welfare, such as 
health care, education and food. These vital goods should be accessible to all, 
and, if necessary, we are justified in implementing some mechanism of 
redistribution to provide these goods for those unable to purchase them on 
the market. 
Given the second empirical supposition of this chapter, private personal 
insurance is to an increasing extent becoming such a vital good. The social role 
of insurance companies is thereby changing. This has lead some to claim that 
insurance companies have other obligations than profit-maximising business in 
general — obligations of a social kind (Chadwick & Ngwena, 1995, p 122). The 
fact that access to private personal insurance is increasingly becoming 
necessary for the security and welfare of the individual makes it reasonable to 
apply stricter regulations on such insurance than on goods such as golf-
equipment and Beatles-records. Such, at least, is the general idea. 
This kind of argumentation of justice is of a c ommunitarian kind, and can be 
supported with reference to considerations of principle. The most obvious 
candidate is Michael Walzer and his primus opus on justice: Spheres of Justice 
(Waker, 1983). I will look closer into this in the following. 
Walzer's point of departure is that a society, or, more generally, a culture, 
has shared, important values and ways of seeing social relations. Different 
societies regard different things as goods, depending on these values (Walzer, 
1983, p 8-9). The term 'goods' have a wide meaning and should be understood 
as everything positively valued and distributed according to societal norms, 
including public offices and social relations. Whether some thing is a good or 
not is partially determined by the function this thing fulfils in people's 
relations, or its role. Money is an example: it is of value in our society because it 
functions as a means of exchanging commodities and services. Some things are 
valued in several cultures, but often to different degrees and for different 
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reasons. For instance, cattle are considered valuable due to its function as food 
in one culture, while another culture values cattle for its religious significance. 
These examples illustrate that different goods have different social meanings. 
This term refers to the common evaluation and understanding of a certain 
thing in a certain society. The following claim is crucial to understand Walzer's 
theory of justice: what principle of distribution that should be applied to a 
certain good is determined by or a part of the social meaning of this good 
(Walzer, 1983, p 20). For Western societies of the type that are of concern here, 
Walzer discern three basic principles of distribution (Walzer, 1983, p 21-26): 
the principle of desert, the principle of need (resembling the principles of 
equality discussed above) and free exchange (resembling libertarian principles 
discussed above). For instance, it is part of the social meaning of punishment 
in Western societies, that it should be distributed according to guilt (negative 
desert). The favoured positions, such as jobs, should befall the person with 
best merits (positive desert) and health care should be distributed according to 
need. Non-vital material commodities, however, are to be distributed on the 
basis of free exchange. That all this has a banal ring is because we have a 
common understanding of the social meanings of these goods, which also tells 
us how they should be distributed. 
Following this, a just society is a society of "complex equality" (Walzer, 
1983, p 17), as opposed to simple equality (where everyone has the same 
amount of every good). Complex equality means absence of dominance 
(Walzer, 1983, p 16-20), which means that we should not be allowed to use one 
type of good to acquire goods that have another social meaning. In our society, 
the commonly agreed injustice of being able to use money to avoid legal 
punishment is an obvious example. Walzer states this thought by saying that 
different goods demarcate different spheres, and that justice prevails when 
spheres do not impose on one another. 
With this theory of justice as our point of departure the question thus 
becomes: what is the social meaning of personal insurance? Attempts have 
been made to answer this question in the spirit of Walzer, but this has proved 
to be a rather difficult task (Lemmens, 1999). Partly, this difficulty is due to the 
fact that the social meaning of a good is to some extent determined by its 
relation to other goods. The task is further complicated by the dynamics of 
history, in which the social meaning of some goods gradually change. That is, a 
type of good which resides in one sphere and to which one type of 
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distributive ideal is applicable may, due to social change, move into the area of 
another sphere, thereby making other distributive ideals more appropriate 
regarding this type of good. This is, I claim, what seems to be happening with 
personal insurance. 
At least traditionally, private insurance has been considered a good among 
others to be exchanged on a free market according to supply and demand: they 
are bought to satisfy "private desires of certainty" (Lemmens, 1999, p 34). As 
mentioned, this role of private insurance is changing. Since we are in a 
situation where public social insurance systems are weakened, private 
insurance has a tendency of becoming more vital for basic welfare. Private 
insurance is developing into a necessary means of compensating for loss of 
income or providing for health care in case of disease and of compensating 
for loss of income in case of the premature death of family providers. 
Walzer argues that health care is a typical example of a good that should be 
distributed according to need. No one should have to be left without access to 
health care in our society. The principles of the market should therefore not 
interfere with the sphere of health care. This does not imply that private 
personal insurance should be banned. But if health care should be distributed 
according to need, it should be accessible for the individual regardless of her 
success in the competitive market. 
The obligations of insurance companies therefore must be judged with 
consideration taken to the rest of society. In the EU of today, the major part of 
health care is funded by t axes (Nys et al, 1993), and is distributed according to 
some vaguely formulated criterion of need (SOU 1995:5, p 22). There are 
reasons to believe that this si tuation is about to change (it is, I have claimed, in 
fact already changing). If health care should be distributed according to need, 
the following assertion seems reasonable from a "walzerian" point of view: 
insurance companies' obligations to make personal health insurance accessible 
for everyone is proportional to the absence of social insurance systems. 
Someone has to see to it that the needy get the care they are entitled to, and if 
the state does not provide for this redistribution, insurance companies must 
do this. For this to be accomplished, some sort of rather strict regulation is 
probably necessary. 
We have seen, however, that it is a risky business to leave this responsibility 
to private insurance, because of the problem of adverse selection. For Walzer, 
it makes no difference in itself how we regulate insurance companies use of 
genetic information. The important thing according to his theory in this 
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regard, is that no one is left without the goods that are part of the sphere of 
"Security and Welfare" (Walzer, 1983, p 64) that should be distributed 
according to need. Health care, education and commodities such as food and 
housing belong to this sphere (Walzer, 1983, p 64-94). If we are to allow private 
personal insurance, it must not threaten anyone's access to these goods. But 
such a threat is exactly what is posed by the problem of adverse selection. For 
this reason, the suggestion to force insurance companies to provide health 
insurance according to need does not seem as a stable solution. Remaining, 
then, is the solution of reversing the weakening of social security systems. The 
conclusion supported by Walzer's theory in this regard is similar to those 
supported by the principles of equality and the principle of desert, then. 
However, even if one is inclined to accept this conclusion (as I am), there are 
good reasons to avoid building it on Walzer's theory.37 This is so, since the 
theory has several serious problems of a general kind. One such problem is 
that it is unclear how the theory should deal with disagreements on or 
vagueness of the social meaning of a good. This is so, since the idea that goods 
should be distributed in accordance with their social meaning presupposes 
that each good has one such meaning,38 which rules out disagreement, and that 
the meaning is clear enough so as to yield an answer to what kind of 
distribution that is implied by it, which rules out vagueness (in this sense). 
However, from the debate of the proper distribution of insurance, it is 
obvious that there are disagreements on its just distribution. For instance, a 
libertarian would disagree to the claim that health insurance and, thus, health 
care should be distributed according to need (or something of the kind). Even 
if o ne thinks that the actual number of libertarians in a society is too small as 
to be able to determine the social meaning of goods, the problem of 
vagueness remains: it is not obvious that the distribution of health care 
according to need is a part of, or implied by, the meaning of health care (even if 
most people probably think that health care should be distributed according to 
need or something of the like). 
True, Walzer has a ge neral answer to solve problems like these: it is the 
task of the democratic political sphere to determine the borders of different 
37 Some of the points of this criticism can be found in Dworkin, 1985, p 214-220. 
38 Otherwise, the problem of which meaning that is the relevant one emerges. I will r eturn to this 
shortly. 
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spheres (Walzer, 1983, p 281-282). However, this solution seems to dodge 
rather than address the fundamental question of how social goods should be 
distributed. Democratic political procedures is a way of reaching a practical 
solution on what distribution to implement in the face of disagreements of 
how we should distribute goods, procedures that most of us consider 
legitimate even if we do not agree to the solution reached, and not an answer 
to how one should distribute goods (this is what the disagreement concerns). 
Of course, one could claim that the outcome of such a democratic 
procedure is just, d ue to the process, whatever the outcome may be. However, 
besides being at odds with moral intuitions (for instance: "So a distribution is 
just even if the majority robs a m inority of all its means of survival?") it seems 
to be at odds with the plausible idea that one cannot infer moral conclusions 
from strictly empirical premises, that is, infer an ought from an is.39 This is 
another general problem for Walzer's theory: even if there were no 
disagreements on or vagueness of the social meanings of goods, so that it were 
evident what distribution their meaning implied, it still seems problematic to 
infer from the fact that a good actually has a so cial meaning that it ought to be 
distributed according to it. 
I will not elaborate the problem of the ought/is-distinction.'10 Perhaps this 
problem can be solved. However, this problem points towards another 
problem that is, I think, even graver: Walzer's theory seems to have morally 
implausible implications. For instance, if it were a part of the social meaning 
of health care insurance and health care that it should be distributed according 
to free exchange, then you should not get it if you cannot pay for it. However, 
Walzer's theory implies that it must be just to apply this view in these 
circumstances. However, this would clearly be unjust, so Walzer's theory must 
be wrong. 
Of course, someone might disagree with my claim that this is morally 
appalling. Perhaps you are a libertarian. But even if you are, you should be 
reluctant to claim that the social meaning of a good determines the just 
distribution of it, even if you agree that the distribution is right. Otherwise 
you would deprive yourself of the possibility of rationally questioning the 
distribution of a certain good when it is in accordance with the social meaning 
39 This is the famous Hume's law, most famously formulated in Hume, 1740, Book III, Part I, 
Section I, p 469-470. 
40 See instead Salwén, 2003, for a discussion of Hume's law. 
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of the good, but not according to the distribution you favour, since the 
question of just distribution is settled by the social meaning of the good in 
question. And a theory that closes the possibility of rational criticism in such a 
way is problematic, to say the least. So even if Walzer's theory reaches the 
correct solution, it seems to do so in the wrong way. 
6. Other third parties 
Up till n ow, this chapter has dwelled on the question of insurance companies' 
right to genetic information. I have argued that this right should be limited 
somehow, but that the morally defensible way to provide insurance for disease 
and premature death is through public insurance. However, as we have seen, 
insurance companies is just one of many parties interested in genetic 
information. In this section, I will address the question of two other parties 
alleged right to genetic information: employers and researchers. While doing 
this, the findings from the previous discussion will prove useful, especially 
regarding employers, although limited, especially regarding researchers. This is 
so, since the case of employers is more relevantly similar to the case of 
insurance companies than is the case of researchers, not least since employers 
and insurance companies share the economic interest in genetic information. 
This indicates that the previous discussion of insurance companies can be 
useful to illuminate all relevantly similar questions, that is questions regarding 
economically interested third parties' legal right to genetic information. I will 
thus start off with employers. 
6.1 Employers 
Employers may also have an interest in receiving genetic information from the 
presymptomatic genetic testing of an individual. The interest of employers in 
receiving this information is primarily economic, just like the case with 
insurance companies. Employers can avoid or reduce various costs by 
receiving information that someone has an increased risk of (genetic) disease 
by using this information to avoid having such an individual on the staff. This 
may reduce costs for the disruption of work and compensation due to sick 
leave (in countries where such compensation is to some extent financed by 
employers). The reduction of cost will of course be greater when employers 
can avoid job applicants rather than firing an already employed person. This is so, 
since firing an employee on the basis of genetic testing, even if legally 
permissible in the country in question, may be connected with severance 
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payment and hiring and training a replacement employee.41 Another way to 
reduce cost in the light of genetic information about increased risk of disease 
is to adapt the work environment so as to remove or reduce the risk in 
question. However, this is also likely to be a cost. So the most obvious 
economic advantage for employers of receiving genetic information is to 
receive it from job applicants, i.e. p rospective employees, who they then can 
abstain from employing if the risk of increased costs they might impose is 
considered to be too high. 
In light of these interests of employers in receiving genetic information 
from presymptomatic genetic testing, should they be allowed to demand this 
information from the individual? That is, s hould employers have a legal right 
to obtain this information or should this be regulated in any way? My primary 
aim in this subsection will not be to argue in favour of any specific answer to 
this question (even though I will indicate in which direction the arguments 
point), but only try to demonstrate how the previous argument concerning 
insurance companies can serve to illuminate also this question. 
First, it should be noted that the separation between total, partial, and 
absence of regulation, could be used regarding employers as well: they may be 
prohibited from using any kind of genetic information at all (total regulation), 
they may be allowed to use only information that the (prospective) employee 
already has (partial r egulation), and they may also be allowed to demand genetic 
testing as a prerequisite of employment (absence of regulation). 
Realising that the same types of regulations are applicable in the case of 
employers as in the case of insurance, it also becomes easier to see that much 
of the same arguments are applicable, albeit with some important exceptions. 
First, with regard to consequentialistic arguments, just like partial regulation 
may lead to deterrence from testing in the case of insurance companies, it may 
have the same consequences in the case of employers. And just like anything 
less than total regulation may leave some people without insurance due to 
their genetic risk, it may leave the same people without employment. However, 
there is no parallel to the argument of adverse selection in the case of 
employment, since increased risk of genetic disease does not provide an 
increased incentive to look for employment, whereas such increased risk 
41 In fact, the economic gain of receiving genetic information about someone who is alre ady an 
employee can be questioned altogether, pardy due to the factors already mentioned, but also due 
to the fact that sick leave may increase as a result of the person receiving information about her 
increased risk for disease (Laurie, 2002, p 155). 
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provides an increased incentive to seek for life- and health insurance. Thus, 
genetic high-risk persons getting work will not threaten the work supply. 
Thereby, the strongest argument in favour of giving insurance companies 
some access to genetic information is absent in the case of employers. 
Second, arguments of autonomy apply. Just as the autonomy of the 
individual, in the sense of her (possibilities of) self-realization, may be reduced 
by partial regulation as compared to total regulation, and even more so by 
absence of regulation, in the case of insurance companies, the same goes for 
the case of employers: if employers are allowed to turn down an employee on 
the basis of her genetic risk, this can severely limit the autonomy of the 
individual. For instance, absence of regulation may make it difficult for an 
individual to remain ignorant about her genetic constitution even if she so 
desires, since it allows for employers to demand new tests of the individual. 
And turning down a job opportunity in order to remain in ignorance might be 
too burdensome for the individual to be a live option. 
Third, arguments of privacy apply. Privacy is threatened if anything less 
than total regulation is implemented, since giving the employer a right to 
obtain genetic information will mean that the individual can suffer adverse 
consequences (be out of employment) if she refuses to give up control of this 
information. 
Fourth, arguments of justice apply. This is so, since employment can be 
considered to be a good, and it is a good that (the structure of) society 
determines the distribution of. Of course, work d oes not have to be a good. At 
least some types of work, sometimes, are more plausibly seen as a burden. 
However, employment, and thus work, is tied to the distribution of several 
other goods: most obviously money, but also social status and, thus, self-
respect. And questions of the proper distribution of societal goods are 
questions of justice. 
However, there is one important difference between the distribution of 
care and compensation of ill-health on the one hand and work on the other: in 
the former case, a publicly financed system may secure a just distribution just 
as well as r egulation, if not better. However, in the latter case, this solution 
does not seem to be feasible, at least not to the same extent. To be sure, society 
does offer employment and could offer employment to those shut out of the 
work market due to their genes. But in the case o f absence of regulation, there 
is reason to believe that the number of people without work due to their 
genes can become too great in order for society to be able to bear the long-
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term costs. Still, the general point remains that all ethical considerations that are 
relevant regarding insurance companies are relevant regarding employers. 
As already mentioned, I will not try to figure out what specific answer to 
the question of employers' right to genetic information these arguments 
would lead to. I think, however, that already these brief remarks points towards 
a stricter regiment of regulation than regarding insurance companies. As 
already noted, the most important argument in favour of partial, rather than 
total, regulation of insurance companies, namely the argument of adverse 
selection, is irrelevant regarding employers. And to this may be added that 
publicly financed alternatives in order to secure justice do not seem as feasible 
in this case as in the case of insurance. 
However, this may be to take matters too far. Even if one concurs that the 
economic interest of avoiding costs relating to sick leave should not matter for 
decisions of employment,42 there are other parties than the employers whose 
interest is at stake. For instance, one can refer to the fact that it can be in the 
interest of the (prospective) employee to have the information too. The 
following might be an example: one may be especially vulnerable to certain 
environments due to one's genetic constitution. For instance, one may have an 
increased genetic susceptibility for developing a certain disease if exposed to 
certain chemicals and substances compared to others. In such cases, it can 
certainly be in the interest of employees to test themselves in order to be able 
to avoid such work environments. However, despite initial appearance, this 
argument does not speak in favour of allowing employers to demand genetic 
testing or genetic information that the person has as a term of employment. It 
merely supports the right of the employee to obtain testing if she is 
concerned that she might get sick due to her work environment. 
However, in rare cases, the interest of others, like the general public, might 
be at stake. Thus, it has been suggested that "the legislation be drafted so as to 
forbid employers testing for genetic conditions other than those which might 
put the public at direct and substantial risk."43 An example might be genetic 
tests for Huntington's disease performed on airline pilots. However, it is 
questionable if testing should be performed by the employer and before 
42 The opinion that this should be irrelevant for the question of whether or not one employs 
someone seems to be widespread (Laurie, 2002, p 154-155). Rather, "decisions on employment 
should be based on current ability to do the job" (Ibid.). 
43 The suggestion is m ade by the Science and Technology Committee in UK (Laurie, 2002, p 154). 
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symptoms. There are alternative and established ways of ensuring the safety o f 
the public in this case, like regular testing of ability to work the plane and the 
presence of co-pilots in the cockpit. 
This relates to another problem with genetic testing for employment 
purposes: allowing employers to use genetic information can discourag; them 
to take s teps to ensure a sa fe work environment. It may sometimes be easier 
and cheaper to do a genetic test than to try to implement measures that 
reduces risks. This also relates to the case of insurance companies, :ince it 
relates to the question of the point of regulation. The point of regulating 
insurance companies use of genetic information is to protect the interest of 
the prospective insurance holder. It is problematic if some people tecome 
uninsured due to their genes and thus looses out on important social goods 
necessary to lead a good life, like health care and compensation in :ase of 
disease or premature death. Similarly, the point of regulating employers use of 
genetic information is to protect the interest of the prospective employee. It is 
problematic if some people become unemployed due to their genes and thus 
loose out on important social goods necessary to lead a good life, like 
employment. However, unlike the case of insurance companies, regulation 
does not seem to be counterproductive in the case of employers. Rather, it 
seems to be an efficient mean to realize the society that, I guess, mos' of us 
want: a society where no one is excluded from the possibility of living a good 
life due to her genes.44 A reasonable and just measure to achieve this in the 
case of insurance is through collectively financed insurance distributed 
according to need, or so I have argued. And a r easonable way of achievng this 
in the case of employment is to improve work environment so that potential 
genetic disease does not have to become a problem. And letting employers use 
genetic information can, then, be a disincentive to strive for this. So the 
argument that speaks against (total) regulation in the case of imurance 
companies (it is counterproductive to its aim) seems to speak in favour of 
regulation in the case of employers (it co ntributes to its aim). 
The question of employers' use of genetic information, thus, just Ike the 
question of insurance companies', ultimately boils down to the quesion of 
what constitutes a good society. And, somewhat rhetorically, the queston can 
be asked, what society is most desirable: a society where parts of the 
44 This relates to the notion of "the morality of inclusion", discussed by Buchanan et a, 2000, p 
258-303. 
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population are excluded due to their genes, or a society where people make an 
effort to create an environment that enable for as many as possible to be 
included? 
6.2 "Researchers 
Finally, I will say s omething brief about another third party that can have an 
interest in the genetic informadon of a person: researchers. The interest of this 
party is somewhat different to the cases of insurance companies and 
employers, since they do not have to be economically motivated.45 They also 
perform research that can be beneficent to people, for instance, that might 
lead to cures for diseases. This gives rise to questions about the individuals' 
obligations to further good causes in a more obvious way than is the case with 
insurance companies and employers. Presenting this problem will thus serve 
the purpose of pointing out that different third party interest gives rise to 
different kinds of moral questions. 
Do researchers have a right to genetic information? They may, in a sen se, if 
someone has an obligation to participate in a genetic study. Then the 
researchers have a right towards that person regarding her participation. 
However, I have never heard of anyone claiming that such a right should be 
legally en forced or otherwise institutionalised in any way. That is, the question 
is not whether anyone ought in any way be coerced into participating in 
genetic research. I take it for granted that arguing this point is superfluous. 
Furthermore, there are very good reasons for the confidentiality of scientific 
research on genes to be rigorous, since otherwise the possibility of getting 
people to participate voluntarily would be bleak. So I also take it for granted 
that genetic information from genetic research ought never to be released to 
other third party interests.46 
Still, then, researchers may have a right in the sense that someone else has a 
moral reason to participate, and perhaps a moral reason so strong that it 
supports a duty to do so: one ought to participate. Recall the case of Tom 
(V.3.2): "Tom has to decide whether to participate in a population study which 
would provide scientists with a more accurate picture of Huntington's 
45 This is n ot to deny that biomedical researchers often have substantial economic interest in 
their research, e.g. regarding the possibilities of patenting prospective pharmaceuticals. 
46 The question becomes different if the research-subject finds out this information herself. Then 
it might be the case that she has obligations to others, e.g. relatives (see chapter VI). However, also 
in that case, to legislate the o bligation seems a bad idea. 
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disease." (Takala & Häyry, 2000, p 109). Does Tom, or any one else in his 
situation, has a duty to participate in the scientific study? "Because the 
information can be a significant good to them [some unspecified others that 
can benefit from the research] and because we are morally required to render 
service to our brethren, Tom has a d uty to participate in the study." (Rhodes, 
1998, p 23) Is there such a duty? Let us suppose, like Rhodes seems to do, that 
the only ground for participation is the possibility of doing good and avoiding 
harm for some others. Is there a duty for Tom (or anyone in a relevantly 
similar situation) to participate? 
This depends on the importance of the investigation and on the 
importance of Tom's participation. Let us for now assume that the failure of 
the investigation would indeed harm someone to an extent that is morally 
relevant. We still have to know how important Tom's contribution is in order 
to establish his duty to participate. I would thus concur to the following claim: 
if, and only if, Tom's participation is necessary in order for the study to be 
successful, he has a duty (based on beneficence and/or non-harm) to 
participate. That is, Tom has no duty if his participation is not necessary for 
the success of the study. That can happen in two ways. 1) Too few are 
participating in the study in order for it to be successful. 2) There are enough 
people participating in the study, so the participation of Tom is not necessary 
for the study to be successful. In other words, Tom only has a duty to 
participate if he tips the scale.47 
To this, the following might be retorted. The claim just made implies that 
if enough people participate, no single individual of those who participate has 
a duty to participate. But the participation of these individuals taken together is 
necessary for the success of the study. Thus, no individual who could 
participate but does not do so does anything wrong, even if the result of this is 
that there are not enough people participating to make the study successful 
(with the exception of the case where it is true of every individual that her 
participation would tip the scale). 
This is only as it should be, however. In the case when more people than 
necessary for the success of study are participating, it is just because of this 
that no one in particular among these people is obliged to participate. It is a 
good thing that they do, but since no one of them is necessary for the success 
47 Or if he is part of a group of people who tips the scale, if the number of persons tipping the 
scale is vague. This proviso will be implicitly assumed in the following. 
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of the enterprise, it is hard to see that thej have a duty to do so. Not only is the 
affirmation of such duties counterintuitive. If we had such duties, we would 
drown in them. This is so, since we would then have a duty to participate in 
every study that has beneficiary consequences, even when our contribution is 
of no consequence. In the case of participating in a study with too few 
participants, it seems odd to claim that we have a duty to participate in every 
enterprise that would have beneficiary consequences if enough people 
participated, when they in fact do not. 
What lurks in the background is, of course, the question of how to generate 
individual duties from (what seems to be) collective ones. It is tempting to 
think that an individual should participate on the ground that at least someone 
would be harmed if a collective that can comprise of the individual in 
question fails t o participate. One way to reach such a c onclusion is to refer to 
rule-oriented versions of consequentialism. The general idea of rule 
utilitarianism4® is t hat the tightness of an action is determined by whether it is 
in accordance with a rule such that, if people were generally adhering to it, the 
world, on the whole, would better than if they were adhering to another rule 
(Tännsjö, 1998b, p 49). 
Rule utilitarianism could be used to underpin the duty of an individual to 
participate, even if that individual is not necessary for the success of an 
enterprise. However, this idea has general problems, of which a few were 
previously suggested. Firstly, it has normative implications that are hard to 
accept. The most salient is perhaps the following. Rule utilitarianism implies 
that I should do some things that would have optimal consequences if 
everyone did it, even when everyone is not doing it and my doing it would 
have disastrous consequences. This is not only troubling in itself, but also 
seems to be at odds with the spirit of consequentialistic thinking. 
Take the following example. An old house is burning. Inside the house 
there is a beautiful and rare antique bookcase, a t rue piece of art. I n order to 
save it before burning down and without getting hurt, we would have to be at 
least five persons. If there were four others gathering around to do this, I 
would indeed have a duty to participate in the rescuing operation. The danger 
to myself is then minimal and an old treasure that brings a lot of joy to others 
would be saved. But no one is gathering to save it. Do I have a duty to go in 
48 On the use of consequentialism and utilitarianism, see II.4.2. 
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myself and try to save it, even if this means that I will become unconscious by 
the gases and burned to death in the futile process of trying? It seems hard to 
accept. Yet, this seems to be the implication of rule utilitarianism. 
To this it might be retorted that this is a scurrilous portrait of rule 
utilitarianism. No one thinks that this is the rule to follow in the situation. But 
then another, more devastating, problem rises to the surface. What exactly is 
the rule? How general or specific is it to be? This is, of course, the problem of 
relevant act descriptions. Kant can avoid the problem by referring to the actual 
motive of the agent. The act-oriented version of utilitarianism can avoid it by 
referring to the actual consequences of the action. But rule utilitarianism is 
essentially referring to something de dicto, namely a rule. Any answer in order to 
avoid examples like the above mentioned only runs the risk of making rule 
utilitarianism collapse into act-oriented version of utilitarianism.49 
Another way to get to an individual duty on consequentialist grounds is to 
say that the moral responsibility for bad consequences due to failure of a 
collective to act in a certain way somehow distributes to the individuals of the 
collective (Glover, 1975). However, this move is not available i n this case, since 
it is reasonable to hold that the distribution of responsibility to any particular 
individual, for instance Tom, is proportional to the contribution Tom would 
do to the collective action in question, for instance the (collective) action of 
performing a useful population study. This implies that Tom has a reason to 
participate, in virtue of the collective having a reason to participate, only to the 
extent that Tom contributes to this action. Since Tom only contributes to this 
if he actually tips the scale, he has no reason to participate unless he actually 
can tip the scale. 
However, all of this is of course compatible with claiming that, generally, 
one should participate in scientific studies that may bring good to others. One 
reason is, of course, that there is often insecurity on whether enough people 
will participate — I might just be the one that tips the scale over. More 
generally, act-oriented versions of utilitarianism are quite compatible with 
encouraging strategies and character traits that are conducive to general welfare, 
such as the strategy to participate in beneficiary s tudies every now and then. 
The conclusion of this is that Tom probably has no duty to participate in 
the study based on non-harm. This is so, since it is unlikely that the success of 
49 Lyons, 1965, has convincingly argued this, so I will not go through the tedious process of 
repeating the argument. See also Nell, 1975, chap. 2 and Kagan, 1998, p 226-227. 
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the study is dependent on his participation. So, in general, researchers have no 
corresponding rights towards individuals.50 However, maybe he should 
participate in some studies sometimes. This might be justifiable from a 
consequentialistic framework. And the same that goes for Tom goes for all 
individuals who can participate in beneficial research-programs. 
7. Conclusions 
This chapter has addressed some questions regarding third parties rights to 
genetic information. The question that has received most attention is whether 
insurance companies should be legally allowed to gain access to and use 
genetic information or if this should be regulated somehow. I have used four 
types of ethical arguments when addressing this question: arguments of 
consequences of well-being, autonomy, privacy and justice respectively. 
More specifically, I have argued that there are reasons to believe that all 
types of regulation will lead to severe adverse consequences for high-risk 
persons. The form of regulation that seems to avoid the problem of an 
uninsured high-risk population more than any alternative regulation is partial 
regulation. However, partial regulation may lead to deterrence to perform 
genetic testing, which can be a great loss. A public social security system that is 
generous enough to make access to private insurance superfluous to basic 
welfare will, h owever, lessen these negative consequences of partial regulation. 
Regarding autonomy, different ideals of autonomy support different 
conclusions. I a rgued that the ideal of self-realization seems most promising as 
a basis for a defence of regulation, since insurance companies demands to gain 
access to genetic information can limit people's possibilities to live the lives 
they choose. However, once again, this can be at least partly remedied by a 
public social security system, which would be preferable to total regulation if 
the problem of adverse selection becomes so grave as to make such regulation 
counterproductive. Regarding privacy, I argued that the general rationale of 
such arguments is consequentialist in spirit, which once again gives rise to the 
question of what type of regulation is a good instrument for achieving 
consequentialist goals. Regarding justice, I argued that libertarian and Walzerian 
theories are flawed, while more plausible theories of equality speak in favour 
of relieving the burdens of those worse off, including those who have 
50 An interesting theoretical possibility, that I will not enter, is that they have these rights towards 
collectives. 
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increased risk of suffering from genetic disease. However, this does not imply 
that private insurance are the party obliged to contribute. Rather, all those 
better off should contribute. This, taken together, suggests that it has been a 
mistake to dismantle collective social insurance and let private insurance take 
over. Rather, social insurance, a key component of the welfare state, should be 
resurrected. This, together with some form of partial regulation, is what the 
arguments seem to support in the end. 
I then briefly tackled the same question regarding employers: should they 
be legally allowed to gain access to and use genetic information? I argued that 
the same ethical considerations that are relevant in the case of insurance 
companies are relevant in the case of employers. However, some of these 
considerations point in another direction in the latter case: while total 
regulation is likely to be counterproductive to protect the interest of insurance 
holders, total regulation is likely to contribute to the protection of 
(prospective) employees, since the problem of adverse selection is absent in 
this case and such regulation will pr ovide an incentive to improve the working 
environment. Lastly, I briefly discussed the question of a duty to participate in 
genetic research programs on consequentialist grounds. I argued that one only 
has such a duty in very rare circumstances, and that alternative ways of arguing 
in favour of such a duty on this ground are unsuccessful. 
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Chapter VIII 
Summary 
This book has addressed two main questions: 
(i) What is the value of genetic information from presymptomatic genetic 
testing for first, second, and third parties? 
(ii) D o any of these parties have some kind of right to genetic information 
from presymptomatic genetic testing? 
And, as a consequence, the following question has received some attention: 
(iii) How should conflicts of interests/rights between various parties be 
handled? 
More specifically, I have discussed presymptomatic genetic testing performed 
on normal adults, which may reveal information about risk of disease. 
Regarding the question of the value for the individual that goes through with 
testing, I have argued that the value of presymptomatic genetic testing lies in 
the possible uses of the information such tests can result in. For instance, such 
information can be used to implement preventive measures, reduce anxiety, 
and make plans for the future. I argued that these particular values ultimately 
rest on two basic values: subjective well-being and autonomy. Although these 
values may be both promoted by genetic testing, I have also argued that they 
may be reduced, or even damaged, by receiving the result from 
presymptomatic genetic testing. I have also argued that, generally, these values 
show the basis for some types of testing weaker than for others. For instance, 
this goes for testing for diseases for which there are no preventive measures, 
since these cannot lead to the realization of health-related values, and testing 
that are uncertain (testing with low reliability or predictability), since they are 
less likely to reduce anxiety and promote autonomy. I also argued that the 
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situation of the test, for instance, the way in which the test result is disclosed, 
is crucial for the realization of the values of well-being and autonomy. Perhaps 
most notably, ensuring proper understanding of the test result, as well as of 
the possible psychological and societal consequences, and providing support, 
is of importance for promoting the values in question. This renders some 
support for genetic counselling, a practice which aims at understanding and 
emotional support. Accepting that the two values of both presymptomatic 
genetic testing and genetic counselling basically are well-being and autonomy 
provides us with a coherent account of more specific values in these practices, 
as well as a s tandard of evaluation for the practices based on these basic values. 
For instance, the norm of non-directiveness and the requirement of pre-test 
counselling are thus evaluated. However, the idea of autonomy as a value to 
promote often presupposed in this context is somewhat of a novelty in 
biomedical ethics, in which autonomy is usually considered to be a right that 
should be respected. This called for a closer analysis of autonomy. This 
analysis consisted of developing a conception of autonomy, useful for 
formulating ideas of autonomy conceived of as a va lue, as well as a right, and a 
discussion of the theoretical problems that arise in relation to the conceptions 
and moral ideals of autonomy. 
Regarding the question of the values for the blood relatives, whose genetic 
constitution can be inferred from testing the individual, I argued that their 
possible value of receiving that information is the same as for the individual. 
The values for third parties of receiving genetic information depend on the 
interest they have in the information. For instance, the interest for insurance 
companies is to receive information in order to adjust premiums accordingly, 
since this is necessary for their economic viability. 
Regarding the question of the individual's right to genetic information from 
presymptomatic genetic testing, I have argued that the proper basis for any 
right to genetic information, both positive and negative, is the values that can 
be promoted as a result of societal recognition of these rights. The values I 
have in mind are the values I argued provide the possible justification for 
presymptomatic genetic testing in the first place, namely well-being and 
autonomy. If this is correct, which I have argued that it is, the moral landscape 
of presymptomatic genetic testing will become much easier to survey, since 
the rights in this area ultimately will bo il down to considerations of the values 
in it. As mentioned, I have also argued that given this basis, the recognition of 
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some rights of the individual seems reasonable, both positive and negative 
ones. However, these rights will be special (holding under the circumstances 
in which the values that are the basis for the rights really are promoted), 
derived (from these values), and prima facie (since they may be overridden by 
the values they are based on). Furthermore, I have argued that, even if there in 
very rare cases may be a moral duty to know, negative, and even positive, rights 
to ignorance should be recognized. At least, the legal right not to be forced to 
genetic testing or to be informed about one's genetic constitution without 
one's consent should be recognized. Although such a right has its limitations, 
e.g. d ue to the fact that it seems unreasonable to enforce sanctions on relatives 
who choose to reveal such facts and that, at times, consent cannot be obtained 
without revealing some information one is asking for consent to reveal, the 
legal right to ignorance should be rather extensive. This is not undermined by 
alleged general moral duties to know based on arguments of Kantian ethics or 
considerations of autonomy, arguments that are irrelevant in this context or 
sometimes just plain false. O r so I have argued. 
Regarding the question of blood relatives' rights to genetic information, I 
argued that there are moral reasons to inform relatives that vary in strength 
with the value for the relatives of being informed, but that practical 
considerations make it plausible to leave the decision of whether or not to 
inform relatives to the tested person, except perhaps in very rare cases. I also 
argued that the consent of relatives should not be a requirement for testing. 
Regarding the question of third parties' right to genetic information, I 
almost exclusively focused on the question of insurance companies' rights. I 
argued that regulation is insufficient to protect the interest of those in need of 
being insured against the financial burdens of genetic risk for disease, but that, 
at least very stern, regulation may be counterproductive to this effect. Instead I 
argued that considerations of well-being and justice speak in favour of the 
protection or resurrection of social insurance, a key component in the welfare 
state. I then used the findings in this discussion to very briefly address the 
question of employers' right to genetic information, where a more restrictive 
stance seems plausible. I finally added some remarks on researchers right to 
genetic information, which brought the plausibility of different versions of 
consequentialism to the stand. 
Thus, the question of this book has been discussed and, in some instances, I 
have argued in favour of specific answers to them. However, some questions 
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have received more attention than others. Perhaps most notably, the question 
of first parties' value of and right to genetic information has been most 
thoroughly discussed. This is partly due to the fact that much of the basis of 
the discussion of other parties was laid when discussing first parties. However, 
it is also partly due to the fact that the discussion of other parties is almost 
never ending, since there are so many parties at stake. I have merely made a 
selection based on previous debates and own interest. Furthermore, some 
answers have been more specific than others. This is partly due to my own 
interests as well, but also partly because of my shortcomings due to being a 
moral philosopher: I can argue in favour of some features being morally 
relevant while others are not, but I often lack the knowledge and experience 
necessary in order to take a more definite stand on what to do in practice in 
order to meet (what I argue to be) reasonable moral standards. So, for instance, 
I have taken a more definite stand on the moral irrelevance of genetic 
relatedness than on what practice to implement in order to look after the 
interest of relatives (although I have indicated some answer to this as well). A s I 
said in the outset of the book, this is not the first or the last word on the 
subject. It is a contribution to an ongoing debate, in which the voice of 
empirical researchers and practitioners is crucial in order to reach more 
specific and determinate answers on what to do. Moral philosophy in general, 
and applied ethics in particular, cannot be performed in isolation from the 
subject matter it addresses. 
But also many philosophical questions that have arisen in the course of this 
book have been left for future investigation. For instance, although I have 
argued that the most straightforward and coherent account of what has been 
said about the justifiability of presymptomatic genetic testing presupposes that 
autonomy is a value that should be promoted, I have not taken a stand on 
whether this is a reasonable ideal in general and for health care in particular. 
So, should promotion of autonomy really be a goal of health care practices? 
To what extent should this goal be prioritised in relation to other goals? This 
last question obviously actualises the underlying philosophical question: is 
autonomy a value in itself? This is obviously a crucial question for anyone 
interested in the justification of presymptomatic genetic question. Similarly, 
many broader questions relating to the good and just society has been posed, 
but not answered: How should the values that presymptomatic genetic testing 
can realize be distributed? 
436 
These questions call for further investigation, both of what we can do and 
what we should do. So, like many long investigations' journey into summary, 
this one ends with even more questions. 
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